Sunday, March 19, 2017

Russian Iskander-M Missile System: Credible Deterrent

SOURCE:
http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/09/19/russian-iskander-m-missile-system-credible-deterrent.html


Russian Iskander-M Missile System: Credible Deterrent



                            [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUEoAKFNDYQ ]









Published on May 1, 2016

A video about a missile system that is feared by US Military. The Iskander-M has no shortage of admirers. They include the Islamic State and other Islamist entities in Syria, Poland, Turkey, NATO as a whole, and of course the United States. Seemingly no other Russian weapon system is as likely to steal a headline as soon as it makes an appearance somewhere on the global chess board. 

To what does it owe its worldwide fan base?

In part the answer lies in its actual combat abilities. It is a medium-range missile system which uses a combination of maneuvering, and therefore difficult to intercept, ballistic missiles capable of carrying a variety of conventional and nuclear warheads. It is extremely accurate, with a circular error probable of under 10 meters, which makes it useful against heavily protected, small targets that would require a direct hit in order to be destroyed.

 Its officially acknowledged range of 500km makes it a weapon of far more than tactical importance, as it can destroy sites far behind enemy front lines and hold in check enemy value targets such as key infrastructure, high-level command posts, and logistical nodes. The entire system is based on highly mobile wheeled platforms which are suitable for aerial transport by heavy airlifters. Iskander-M deployment to Syria demonstrated Russia’s ability to send these powerful warfighting and conventional deterrent weapons to almost any friendly part of the globe on a moment’s notice. 

As of April 2016, the Russian military had six complete Iskander-M brigades in service, with each brigade possessing 12 launch vehicles. Since each vehicle carries two ready-to-launch missiles, with reloads carried by the brigade’s resupply vehicles, each brigade is capable of a simultaneous 24-missile volley that would be sufficient to saturate any tactical anti-ballistic missile system currently in service or development. In effect, a single Iskander-M brigade is equivalent to 3 Buyan-M missile corvettes, in terms of firepower, though the land-based launchers can be rapidly reloaded whereas the corvettes would have to return to base for replenishment.

The other reason for Iskander-M’s popularity is its political dimension. By the late 1980s, the Soviet military was using two sub-strategic ballistic missile systems, the 120km-range Tochka, and the 450km-range Oka. Even though Oka’s range was below the 500km threshold of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty, the Gorbachev government in effect made the US a present by pledging to eliminate the Okas along with longer-range missiles. Even though it left the Soviet military without a modern operational-range missile system, evidently Gorbachev and others hoped that such weapons would be unnecessary in the era of the “New World Order.” 

They turned out to be wrong.
The Iskander-M was developed and deployed in order to fill that gap once it became clear that NATO’s intentions toward the post-Cold War Russia were far from benign. 


NATO, and especially the US, has undertaken several initiatives to render the INF Treaty obsolete. They include the deployment of intermediate-range air-launched cruise missiles such as the JASSM carried by tactical aircraft, whose existence clearly violates the spirit of the INF Treaty. The US Army has since deployed large numbers of ATACMS ballistic missiles whose officially acknowledged range is 300km, though the missile’s actual potential is unknown, and the LPRF program is supposed to yield an even-longer ranged missile for the US military. Cruise missile carrying US naval ships, including the rather well-known USS Donald Cook, regularly approach Russian coasts. But the most direct US violation of the INF Treaty is the placement of land-based anti-ballistic systems in Eastern Europe. These systems use the naval Mk41 launchers which are perfectly capable of using the entire range of Tomahawk cruise missiles. Therefore the deployment of these ABM systems also means a US breakout from the INF Treaty.

The Iskander-M therefore should be viewed as a Russian response to the US INF violations. In addition to the 9М723 ballistic missile with a range of 500km, each launch vehicle can also fire the 9M728 cruise missiles whose actual capabilities have never been revealed, though the missile has been tested out to at least 200km. Considering that the size of these missiles is comparable to the Kalibr sea-launched weapons whose range exceeds 2,000km, there is a definite possibility that the Iskander-M could be equipped with weapons of similar range unless the US begins to display more of an interest in re-establishing a mutually acceptable security framework for Europe.







The most modern weapons in the world produced by Russia were on display at the international military exposition «Army 2016», which took place on September 6-11, 2016 outside Moscow.

 80 delegations across the world attended the event. More than 1,000 Russian manufacturers, researchers and members of the military universities were among the participants. «Real battle» simulations were presented to the foreign delegations by various branches of the Russian military. The Iskander-M tactical missile system - the most effective and deadly nonstrategic ballistic missile in existence, attracted particular attention.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rtyzdp-bfX0 ]







The Iskander-M is a mobile short-range ballistic missile system designed to be used in theater level conflicts with an official range of up to 500 km (minimum-50 km) to comply with the limits of the INF Treaty. Highly mobile and stealth, it can hardly be detected even with the help of space reconnaissance assets. The accuracy, range and ability to penetrate defenses allow it to function as an alternative to precision bombing for air forces that cannot expect to launch bombing or cruise missile fire missions reliably in the face of superior enemy fighters and air defenses.
Deadly to stationary infrastructure along a broad front of conflict, it is intended to engage small and area targets (both moving and stationary), such as hostile critical infrastructure facilities, fire weapons (missile systems, multiple launch rocket systems, long-range artillery pieces), air and antimissile defense weapons, command posts and communications nodes, troops in concentration areas and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft at airfields. Jets operating from forward bases will immediately come under threat of attack, or at least immobilization.
The Iskander-M weighs 4615 kg. It is system is equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage guided missiles, which use stealth technology. Each missile in the launch carrier vehicle can be independently targeted in a matter of seconds.
The missile cruises at hypersonic speed of 2100–2600 m/s (Mach 6–7). The high velocity of the missile allows it to penetrate antimissile defenses. Flight altitude is up to 6–50 km. Interval between launches: less than a minute. The missile can maneuver at different altitudes and trajectories and can turn at up to 20 to 30 G to evade anti-ballistic missiles. It is controlled in all phases of the flight with gas-dynamic and aerodynamic control surfaces. Targets can be located not only by satellite and aircraft but also by a conventional intelligence center, by an artillery observer or from aerial photos scanned into a computer.
The missiles can be re-targeted during flight in the case of engaging mobile targets, making it possible to engage mobile targets (including ships). The optically guided warhead can also be controlled by encrypted radio transmission, including such as those from AWACS or UAV. The electro-optical guidance system provides a self-homing capability. The missile's on-board computer receives images of the target, then locks onto it with its sight and descends towards it at supersonic speed. The circular error probable (CEP) is 5–7 meters.
The Iskander was designed to evade missile defenses. .In flight, the missile follows an alterable trajectory with rapid acceleration, performing evasive maneuvers in the terminal phase of flight and releasing decoys to spoof interceptor missiles to overcome the enemy's missile defense systems.
Following a relatively flat trajectory, the missile never leaves the atmosphere as it. False targets and small jammers separate from the rocket upon approaching the target. Iskander-M carries a complex of electronic warfare jamming devices, both passive and active, for the suppression of the enemy's radar. As such, the missile is extremely difficult to intercept with current missile defense technologies.
The Iskander has several conventional warhead options weighing between 480 and 700 kg, depending on type. These include a high explosives (HE) variant, sub-munition dispenser variant, fuel-air explosive variant, a HE penetrator variant or a nuclear payload (50 thousand tons of TNT to make it a truly versatile weapon.
The system can be transported by any means of transport, including cargo aircraft. It can operate in temperatures ranging from -50 to +50 degrees Celsius (-58 to +122 F) - practically everywhere in the world.
New missiles are being developed for the system.
Aleksander Dragovalovsky, deputy commander of Russia's missile forces, said «This system, the Iskander-M, has a great potential for modernization, which is happening in terms of armaments and missiles in particular. That is, the standard array of missiles is growing and new missiles are being developed».
According to the assessment of the National Interest, the Iskander missile system is one of 5 Russian most formidable weapons NATO should fear.
NATO members, such as Romania and Poland, which deploy Aegis Ashore missile defense systems on their soil, become targets for the Iskander-M. The Russia’s response to the bloc’s increased military presence and intensified activities near Russian borders may include deploying Iskander missiles in the border areas to counter the potential threat, for instance in the Kaliningrad region. Practically undetectable on the ground, extremely accurate, flying at hypersonic speeds and possessing missile defense capabilities, the Iskander-M performs the role of efficient deterrence to make any potential aggressor think twice before crossing the red line.






















































Friday, March 17, 2017

INDUS WATER TREATY :How Politics Dictated Indus Waters Treaty From First to Last

SOURCE:
https://thewire.in/111893/how-politics-dictated-indus-waters-treaty-from-first-to-last/



How Politics Dictated Indus Waters Treaty                   From First to  Last 

                                 BY 

                 






Water sharing between India and Pakistan was less about economics or ecology but far more about politics, argues the author of Indus Divided: India, Pakistan and the River Basin Dispute.




A tributary of the Indus flows through Sarbal, Kashmir. Credit: Sandeep Pachetan/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0


India And Defence Expenditure: A Challenge For Defence Economists

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/17032017-india-and-defence-expenditure-a-challenge-for-defence-economists-analysis/utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29




India And Defence Expenditure: A Challenge For Defence Economists – Analysis

                                      By 

                          Amit Cowshish



India's NS Kalvari at the Mazagon Dock Limited on the day of her undocking. Source: Indian Navy, Wikipedia Commons.



The only sub-theme that vies for pride of place alongside the debate on the alleged shenanigans of an inept civilian bureaucracy is the gross inadequacy of defence outlays. Governments have come and gone since 1947, but the sluggish trajectory of annual defence budgets continues, interrupted only by pay commissions and wars.

It does not require any great power of prophesy to rule out a steep hike in the defence budget in the coming years. The history of the defence budget over the past seven decades should be enough to drive home this truth.

More specifically, the growth in annual defence allocations since 2014 only indicates that it is naive to expect that the gap between the demand projected by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the actual allocations made for defence in the union budget will soon be a thing of the past.

Defence analysts never tire of mentioning the year 2004 when the then outgoing government made a provision for a defence modernisation fund in the interim budget, seen till date as a bold step to address the problems besetting the modernisation of the armed forces. But it is the same political dispensation which, despite being in power now for almost three years, not only has not revived the defence modernisation fund but has also failed to cut the mustard when it comes to raising the defence expenditure.
There is a continuous lament over inadequate funding and this is invariably attributed to politicians and bureaucrats, widely believed to be impervious to the imperatives of defence and security of the country. Apart from being an unfair characterisation, this has served no purpose all these years and is unlikely to be much help in future.
If anything, this narrative has crowded out the academic discussion on how much should be allocated for defence and, more importantly, how could the government of the day meet the expectations of the defence establishment without an adverse impact on other competing sectors, such as health, education and infrastructure.
The dominant view among the strategic studies community in the country is that the defence budget should be pegged at a minimum of three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Going by this benchmark and without questioning its basis, the defence allocation for 2017-18 should be approximately Rs 2,31,310 crore more than the amount actually allocated in the union budget, excluding defence pensions for which a sum of Rs 85,737 crore has been allocated separately.
This is a huge gap to cover, especially if the fiscal and revenue deficit targets are to be met. The gap cannot also apparently be bridged just by reducing expenditure on other sectors. On the face of it, the government will have to raise its income substantially to be able to almost double the allocation for defence to reach the three per cent of GDP mark. Governments have evidently not been up to this task either because of the serious political cost of raising income through taxation or for other inexplicable reasons. This is where defence economists, and even think tanks, need to step in and suggest a pragmatic way out.
The question that arises every year when the union budget is analysed in seminars and in the media, but remains unanswered, is whether the Finance Minister could actually allocate more funds for defence without, at the same time, causing an adverse impact on other sectors, assuming no positive change in the estimated income. The alternate question would be whether the minister had more options for raising governmental revenues to the extent that allocation for defence could be raised substantially, if not to the extent of three per cent of GDP, without facing any difficulty in giving a rational explanation for rejecting the demand from other sectors for higher allocations.
To answer both the above questions, defence economists will have to deal with a more fundamental set of questions. What should be the pragmatically ideal level of funding? Whether the defence allocation should be fixed at a certain percentage of GDP? If so why? Or, would it be enough to meet the requirement projected by the MoD, irrespective of how much it works out to in terms of percentage of GDP and regardless of the method of costing adopted for working out the requirement.
The basic challenge for defence economists is to demonstrate that there are other feasible ways of skinning the cat during budget formulation. But the challenge is also inextricably linked with the need for rationalisation of defence expenditure, especially if manpower costs cannot be contained in any substantial measure.
There are indeed other steps, such as the creation of joint logistics and theatre commands that could potentially bring down costs and increase operational efficiency. But the thrust for these measures is unlikely to come from within the services or from the political class, unless independent and objective analyses by defence economists points to the imperative of adopting these measures and throws up a roadmap for bringing about these seminal changes.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/defence-expenditure-a-challenge-for-defence-economists_acowshish_140317

Why PM needs a Parrikar 2.0 as Raksha Mantri

SOURCE:
https://www.defencenews.org/2017/03/pm-needs-parrikar-2-0-raksha-mantri.html



Why PM needs a Parrikar 2.0 as Raksha Mantri


In 28 months, Manohar Parrikar as defense minister developed easy relationships with the top brass of the three Services as was rarely ever witnessed before. He threw caution to the winds and managed to pull the forces out of a downward spiral in operational capabilities.

Now that Manohar Parrikar’s return to Goa is done and dusted, the immediate priority for Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be to find an equally hard working, transparent and approachable Raksha Mantri for India.
Though Arun Jaitley, the perennial ‘go-to’ man, has been given additional charge of the defense ministry, surely he cannot be expected to handle two large and critical ministries simultaneously.

However, whosoever is the new occupant in South Block in the coming months will find it a hard act to follow since Parrikar, in his 28-month stint, had brought in a new sense of vigor and purpose in the largely moribund MoD.

Before Parrikar took over as defense minister, he had been variously described to me as a reluctant politician, an even more reluctant minister at the Center and an outsider in the power corridors of Delhi.

To my mind, after getting acquainted with him over the past two-and-a-half years, Parrikar can be best described as a simple man who is not a simpleton; a man of frugal habits who shunned all visible trappings of power and was quick to understand complex issues.

Parrikar Will Be missed at Defense Ministry

Those attributes not only allowed him to grasp the intricacies and complexities of the important ministry, but also enabled him to put his own stamp on the day-to-day functioning of the MoD.

There have been slip-ups and some embarrassments too because well-entrenched vested interests tried to undermine his authority.
I remember meeting him for the first time in February 2015 (before that, I had only heard of Parrikar as an unusual politician).

One of the questions he had was: “What, in your view, is the biggest challenge here?”

At first, because of unfamiliarity with him, I had thought of playing safe and gave a standard reply that, “It is a large, sensitive and important ministry and therefore not easy to understand quickly.”

But his easy manner encouraged me to be bolder and remark: “Your greatest challenge will be the status quo mindset that pervades through the civil and military bureaucracy. Everyone will tell you that such and such thing cannot be done because there has been no precedent to it. If you can overcome that trend, maybe you would have made a big start.”
I cannot judge if Parrikar took that input (not advice) seriously, but whoever I came across since then — whether in the Services or in the defense industry — swore by Parrikar’s efforts to re-engerise the MoD and bring in more accountability.

This in itself is a big change because at the best of times, the MoD is a lumbering giant, slow to stir and act.

It is not only entrusted with the defense of the country but is also the administrative ministry for India’s nearly 15 lakh military personnel (Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard).

It also has one of the largest budgets in the government. For 2017-18, for instance, it has been allocated Rs 359,854 crore ($53.5 billion).

Critics have quibbled over the comparatively low increase in the defense budget this year. But that is the least of the challenges.

Instead, reducing timelines for acquisitions, better and optimum utilization of available resources, bringing in more accountability and transparency in the MoD’s functioning and making sure most critical voids in India’s defense preparedness are made up in quick time, have been the focus areas in South Block.

But above all, the MoD under Parrikar saw to it that the prime minister’s Make in India initiative gets the necessary impetus in defense production.

Promulgation of Defense of Procurement Policy-2016 was the first step towards making fundamental changes in the way weapons platforms are acquired in India.

The Buy IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) category, introduced in DPP-2016, now gets the topmost priority among six categories that constitute the new DPP, which is the guiding document for all defense purchases in India.

Make Indian, Buy Indian: Defense Minister’s Mantra
In effect, this means all those Indian companies who have the capability of designing and developing their products indigenously will from now on get the first preference in most purchases that the three armed forces undertake.
Under the new category for IDDM equipment, it will be mandatory for 40 per cent of the content to be sourced locally.
The new DPP has many fresh ideas designed to accelerate defense acquisitions while encouraging indigenous companies under the flagship program of Make in India.
For instance, in order to cut down delays, the DPP henceforth mandates that all Acceptances of Necessity of a particular platform will be valid only for only six months as against the 12 months deadline that it currently provides.
Moreover, no AON will be notified until it is accompanied by a finalized RFP (Request for Proposal or detailed tender). In essence, this eliminates one intermediate stage since notifying an RFP after an AON used to be inordinately delayed.
Prioritization of Projects Was The First Step
Defense acquisitions are expensive and since very little was purchased in the past five years, the backlog just added to the problem.
A review of proposed projects made over the previous five years found that the bureaucracy in the ministry — both civil and military — was sitting on some 400-odd big and small projects that were critical to the three armed forces. A thorough review revealed that nearly one-third of the 400-odd projects were now irrelevant. So they were discarded.
About 50 projects were accelerated since they were of critical importance.
Next, important schemes across the three services that needed immediate funding and implementation were identified.
The figures speak for themselves: The MoD cleared a total of 124 new contracts worth Rs 209,751 crores since the Modi government came to power.
These include artillery guns, attack and medium lift helicopters for the Army (Chinook and Apache helicopters from the US); frigates and mine counter-measure vessels for the Navy and Akash missiles for the Air Force.
Post-September 2016, when India conducted ‘surgical strikes’ against Pakistan, it seemed for a while that Pakistan may mobilize for a larger conflict,
India’s Cabinet Committee on Security authorized the three forces to make fast track acquisitions worth nearly Rs 20,000 crores making it one of the most productive years for the MoD.
This had to be done on priority because the previous government had neglected even the basic requirements.
The previous Comptroller and Auditor General report tabled in Parliament made for grim reading.
‘Stocking of ammunition even at “minimum acceptable risk level” was not ensured, as availability of ammunition as on March 2013 was below this level in respect of 125 out of a total of 170 types of ammunition.’
Also, in 50 per cent of the total types of ammunition, the holding was ‘critical’ — insufficient for even 10 days of fighting, the report added.
This has now been corrected by making sure that ammunition for 10 days of intense fighting is always in stock.
Once that objective is achieved, the ministry will look at further replenishing the stocks.
The delegated financial powers for the vice-chiefs of the three Services and army commanders have been enhanced to allow speedier purchases.
This is a big change in the notoriously slow and opaque functioning that has historically besieged the MoD.
In another major decision, the government opened up the defence sector for FDI, allowing 49 percent FDI through the automatic route and up to 100 percent FDI on a case to case basis.
Also, the restrictions on what was ‘state-of-the-art technology’ has been reduced to ‘modern technology’. This would increase the number of defence companies investing in India.
Procurement and modernization of three services apart, the biggest decision by the Modi government was to grant the One Rank One pension — a 40-year-old demand of the veterans.
Although there have been some voices of disgruntlement on the issue, the fact is, this government showed the necessary political will and resolve to give due dignity to military veterans.
Significantly, the MoD has now allowed authorized, registered agents to represent companies and eliminate delays or cancellation of contracts because of anonymous complaints. Anonymous letters are now a no-go.
The ministry wants to use the power to ban a firm only in the rarest case. The previous government had indiscriminately blacklisted over a dozen firms, severely restricting the options of the forces to source equipment.
Despite Parrikar’s efficiency and good intentions, a toxic legacy left behind by a decade and more of lethargy and timidity under A K Antony will take sustained efforts by Parrikar’s successor to ensure that the MoD effectively discharges its duties towards securing the nation.
Half-done initiatives like choosing the strategic partners for making defense platforms in India, reforming higher defence management (appointing a CDS — even if 4-star), creating joint commands for space, cyber and special operations will have to be followed upon by Parrikar’s successor.
It is for Prime Minister Modi to choose the right man — or woman — to do that, and do it fast.