Vasundhra

Friday, April 28, 2017

NUKES : South Asia is not the Most Dangerous place on Earth

SOURCE:
http://thebulletin.org/south-asia-not-most-dangerous-place-earth10720






                South Asia is Not 

  the Most Dangerous place on Earth

                              By

          Ramamurti Rajaraman




Nuclear weapons are arguably among the most dangerous inventions of man. The scale and rapidity of the destruction they can cause is unparalleled, as evidenced by the two occasions that they were used on civilian populations and by the numerous tests conducted on testing ranges. It follows that any country choosing to possess nuclear weapons is creating an existential threat, not only for its adversaries but also for itself and for its general neighborhood. Such places are all very dangerous to be in.

Given the immensity and gravity of this danger, it might seem silly and ghoulish to quibble over which nuclear weapon country is a greater danger than the others. Nevertheless, in the 70-year history of nuclear weapons such comparisons have often been made by diplomats, national leaders, scholars, and the media. Motivations have varied. Mostly they come from genuine concern for the safety of that region and of the world in general. But sometimes it is part of the thrust and parry of diplomatic engagement, or a strategic step to name and shame a country. It can also be a strategy for individuals and nongovernmental organizations specializing in that region to enhance the importance of their scholarly niche and ensure the next tranche of grant money.

In this genre, the flavor of the decade has been the notion that “South Asia is the most dangerous place on Earth.” This view was launched after a remark by President Bill Clinton, about two years after the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May 1998. Shortly before he was to make his first state visit to India, Clinton said: “The most dangerous place in the world today, I think you could argue, is the Indian subcontinent and the line of control in Kashmir.” The statement quickly gained wide currency.
Since then it has become customary for analysts in think tanks and Western media to routinely and casually use this phrase or something equivalent.
This perception, however, is not widely shared in the Indian sub-continent. In fact, soon after Clinton made his statement and during a formal banquet in India honoring Clinton’s visit, Indian President K.R.Narayanan cautioned:
“It has been suggested that the Indian sub-continent is the most dangerous place in the world to-day and Kashmir is a nuclear flash-point. These alarmist descriptions will only encourage those who want to break the peace and indulge in terrorism and violence.” 
A similarly sober assessment continues to be provided by experts in India. These include not just politicians and civilian officials who could conceivably be expected to paint a reassuring picture, but also senior military officers who would seem to be inclined to be hawkish and belligerent.
.
For example, Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, has written:

 “Keeping rhetoric, verbal statements, and saber rattling aside, both India and Pakistan know that even a single use of a nuclear weapon—whether in [its] own or [on the] adversary’s side of the border, would invite massive retaliation and destruction, not only for both countries or substantial parts of both countries, but also have severe adverse impact for the region and many parts of the world. Consequently, it is illogical to conclude that the escalatory ladder will climb to the nuclear level as a matter of course.”

Such sober views are not limited only to Indian analysts who, one might say, are compelled by regional pride to be biased in favor of thinking highly of their ability to handle nuclear responsibility in a crisis. Some analysts in the Western media have taken a similar stance, such as the BBC’s Defence Correspondent Jonathan Marcus
: “In going nuclear, and in a sense in getting away with it, they [India and Pakistan] have provided a dangerous precedent. That is certainly the way western analysts would view it. Though local experts in the region would probably echo their own governments in insisting that if nuclear deterrence is okay for Britain, France, Russia, and the United states—not to mention China—then it should be fine for India and Pakistan as well.”
Meanwhile, other Westerners took a very different view. In 2007, four very distinguished elder statesmen of the US establishment—George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn—published a very influential article in the Wall Street Journal calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. Such a call for total disarmament by veterans of the Cold War was widely welcomed around the world. But one of the arguments they used to advocate this goal was less than universally welcome

: “New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?”

Although the distinguished authors used very diplomatic language in attributing the prevention of nuclear disasters to good fortune, the undertone was that the “new nuclear states” may not have the same technical capability or the nuclear maturity that the two Cold Warriors had to safely maintain their nuclear arsenals. That is a bit rich, given that the time when we came closest to a nuclear exchange was during the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, which lasted for 13 days as the world waited with bated breath to see who would blink first, the United States or the Soviet Union. No threat of remotely similar proportions has emerged from South Asia in the 19 years since Pakistan announced that it had conducted nuclear warhead tests and the region can be said to be nuclearized by both parties.
Our weapons are not on a ready-to-launch state of alert. In India, and as far as I know also in Pakistan, the warheads are kept de-mated from the missiles.

Despite this, outbreaks of alarmist comments about South Asia recur from time to time from think tanks and scholars in the West. One recent example was reportedly a talk at the prestigious Carnegie Conference held at Washington in March 2017, which in turn led to a flurry of articles in major US newspapers. The talk and a subsequent New York Times article about it drew their conclusions from some re-interpretations of our No First Use doctrine by some retired Indian officials to permit a first strike in some circumstances. True, these officials are highly respected people who had held apex positions in the government‘s strategic establishment. But there is no evidence that their post–retirement views represent in any way the policies of the government currently—or for that matter, even when they held office.
In fact, one can cite several examples of restrained behavior in the subcontinent in support of India's claim that nuclear weapons, while very dangerous anywhere, are no more so in the hands of the Indians and Pakistanis. Situations that could have escalated from the conventional level to a nuclear exchange did not do so. The first example, the Kargil “war” of 1999, happened just a year after the two countries had turned nuclear. It began with the Indian discovery that Pakistani soldiers had occupied some strategic mountain peaks on the Indian side and had to be evicted. 

Although it was limited to a narrow 100-mile long strip of uninhibited mountain ridges abutting the Line of Control, or de facto border, in Kashmir, it went on for three months, involving not only ground troops but also the Indian Air force. If there ever was a time to seriously worry about a nuclear war, it was then. The two countries, after conducting their respective nuclear tests in May 1998, were presumably in possession of a few warheads each. One could have legitimately worried that with little prior experience in possessing nuclear arsenals, one or the other side might have erred on the side of excessive military action or aggressive bluster, and take them both down the treacherous slope towards nuclear exchange.
But that did not happen.
The war was not allowed to escalate. The Indian government had given firm orders to its Air Force that beyond evicting the intruders, its airplanes should not cross the border in hot pursuit. The Pakistanis in turn, with reportedly some counseling by the Americans, withdrew from the remaining occupied areas. Cease fire followed.
The next few years witnessed what could be viewed as far more serious challenges to nuclear stability in the subcontinent. First came the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, by the Pakistan-supported terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Fortunately, it was repelled by the Indian security detail, but even if a single terrorist had managed to enter the building, there were a hundred unarmed members of the parliament inside, ready for picking. Despite the massive uproar this caused in India, with calls for immediate revenge, the Indian government kept its cool and took no military action. For purposes of comparison, imagine the dilemma President Trump would face if some armed outfit from Mexico snuck across the newly renovated border wall and attacked the Capitol building while the US Congress was in session.
What the Parliament attack in New Delhi did result in was a show of strength by India through a military mobilization (“Operation Parakram”) at the border the following summer, leading to a similar response by Pakistan. The troops were lined up on their respective sides of the border in a face-to-face confrontation which lasted for months. From time to time sporadic incidents on the border or a burst of overheated rhetoric from either side would generate rumors in the foreign media that war between the two nuclear armed neighbors was imminent.
I recall being on a brief visit to the United States in that summer of 2002. My American friends expressed concern over the situation back in India and were equally concerned over my nonchalance on the matter, given that my family was living in New Delhi. So, mostly to reassure my friends, I called my wife that evening and was informed that there was no feeling of imminent danger, let alone panic on the streets of Delhi. The poor were as usual worried about their next meal, while the middle classes was pre-occupied with upward mobility in a growing economy!
It must be acknowledged that during this face-to-face standoff, leaders of other nations, especially the United States, contacted their counterparts in India and Pakistan, expressing their concern and urging them not to let the situation go out of control. While their concern and advice did contribute to the resolution of that crisis, it does not follow that without their input the two protagonists would have not have, on their own, avoided stepping into the abyss.
Terrorist attacks continued to be launched even after that, not only within Kashmir but also on the Indian mainland. The worst of them was the attack in Mumbai in 2008 in which over 160 people were killed. This attack also received more attention than usual in the West, because several foreigners from the United States and Israel were among the casualties. The Indian public reaction to this attack was stronger than ever before and, as credible evidence of the involvement of Pakistan-based outfits grew, so did calls for reprisal. Yet once again the Indian government resisted pressures to retaliate. Instead, it was content to register its outrage through diplomatic channels, by providing evidence on how and by whom the attacks were planned.
It is not as though India has been the only one to exercise restraint. The other side has, in its own way, done that too. Once it became clear, after Mumbai, that the Indian government might be forced by public opinion to launch a punitive strike the next time there was a major act of terror on India, there have in fact been no more attacks of that magnitude for several years since. Whoever organizes and funds these attacks from Pakistani soil has been told to refrain from doing so. How much of this is because of pressure from the world community and how much due to the wisdom of Pakistani strategists, we do not know. But the fact is that nothing close to the Mumbai or Parliament attack in size or significance has happened since then.
Another instance which effectively became an act of Pakistani restraint was their response to the Indian “surgical strikes” on Pakistani infiltration camps last November. Although terrorism on the scale of Mumbai has not happened since then, there has been a resurgence of attacks on Indian military bases near the border, first at the Pathankot airbase on January 2016 and then at Uri on September 18, 2016. Seven Indian soldiers were killed at the former and 18 at the latter. The Indian government decided that this time a calibrated punitive measure was finally called for and launched a set of coordinated strikes across the border on the launch pads of the infiltrators. The scale of that counterattack was not much higher than standard cross-border attacks that have been taking place for years in Kashmir. The difference this time was that the Indians publicly announced these counter strikes. In Asia, where saving face is as important a criterion as any other in deciding foreign policy, the announcement of the Indian counterattack was also a public reprimand to Pakistan. Such an “insult” could easily have generated an uncontainable public demand in Pakistan for a tit-for tat response and the whole situation could easily have escalated to something bigger. But the Pakistani government chose not to retaliate, either with military action or even threatening rhetoric. Instead they chose to ridicule the Indian claims of a major “surgical strike” and declared that no such things had happened. Now, I do not know what exactly motivated the Pakistani army to take such a position of denial. But the net result, once again, was that matters were prevented from escalating.
No one is arguing that the nuclearization of South Asia has not been a very dangerous development. It certainly has. There is also no doubt that all the nuclear weapon nations of the world, including those in South Asia, should relentlessly strive to get rid of these weapons. Specifically, making South Asia a nuclear weapons-free region is primarily the responsibility of us Indians and the Pakistanis. In support of this ongoing effort by right-thinking people here, advice, counsel, and analysis coming from other nations are of course very welcome. But such inputs will be counter-productive if they are condescending and simplistic. That will only put the backs up of conservatives and ultra-nationalists in South Asia, and make the prospects of arms reduction even more distant.



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Labels: NUCLEAR WARFARE, NUKES INDO - PAK, NUKES INDIA

Thursday, April 27, 2017

Russia's Strategic Debate on a Doctrine of Pre-emption

SOURCE:
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-unsettling-view-from-moscow?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Release%20Unsettling%20View%20from%20Moscow&utm_content=Release%20Unsettling%20View%20from%20Moscow+CID_57beea5d43d2b67af7e5d828274c4dbf&utm_source=Campaign%20Monitor&utm_term=httpswwwcnasorgpublicationsreportsthe-unsettling-view-from-moscow


Russia's Strategic Debate on a Doctrine of Pre-emption



APRIL 27, 2017

The Unsettling View From Moscow

Russia's Strategic Debate on a Doctrine of Pre-emption
                                  By
              Alexander Velez-Green

    Download PDF
A rising number of Russia’s senior military strategists are advocating for the adoption of a doctrine of pre-emption for the defense of their nation. This doctrine would be intended to protect the territorial integrity and vital national interests of the Russian Federation. 

To achieve these fundamentally defensive aims, Russian military strategists argue that if an attack on Russian vital interests appears imminent, Moscow must be prepared to use strategic non-nuclear or limited nuclear force first in order to deter or defeat the United States or NATO. Pre-emption could occur in crisis or in the early stages of an escalating conflict. Russian advocates of pre-emption argue that the pre-emptive attacks on U.S. or NATO targets could serve one or more of three purposes. 
  • Deterrence by cost imposition. Pre-emptive attacks on countervalue targets could provide a “punch in the nose” that deters U.S. or NATO aggression by communicating to Western policymakers and publics alike that the costs of attacking or escalating a military confrontation with Russia will outweigh any plausible benefits. 
  • Deterrence by denial. Pre-emptive attacks on counterforce targets could degrade U.S. or NATO power projection capabilities, and change the “correlation of forces,” such that Washington and other NATO capitals no longer believe that they can prevail in a major war, at acceptable levels of escalation, against Russia. 
  • Pre-emption as a defeat mechanism. Some advocates argue that pre-emptive attacks on key Western aerospace – and other – capabilities may allow the Russian armed forces to degrade or eliminate U.S. and NATO forces’ comparative advantages, such as long-range strike, thereby improving Russia’s relative military-operational position. 
Russia’s potential adoption of a military doctrine based on pre-emption appears to remain in debate. The Kremlin does not yet appear to have shifted to a pre-emptive posture, based on open-source reporting. However, arguments for Russia’s shift to pre-emption seem to have gained traction in Moscow since the mid-2000s. And there is a significant likelihood that Moscow may ultimately endorse pre-emption for the defense of the Russian state in the coming decades. 
Consideration of a pre-emptive military doctrine is motivated first by Russian policymakers’ dismal geopolitical outlook. Moscow sees the United States as the world’s sole remaining superpower, intent on maintaining its position by constraining aspirant powers and imposing its own will on other nations – chief among them Russia. The Kremlin has indicated as well its belief that the United States would be willing to use force to impose its will on Russia in the future, if Russia is not prepared to defend itself. 
Simultaneously, a growing number of Russian military strategists forecast that defensive or retaliatory operations alone will soon be insufficient to protect Russia’s vital interests. They assess that a host of new military technologies are collapsing the battlespace and giving growing advantage to the side that escalates first. These systems will allow both Russia and the United States to act more rapidly across broader geographic expanses than before. Moreover, many of these emerging technologies – including cyber, counterspace, conventional prompt global strike (CPGS), and certain autonomous weapons – may hold Russia’s strategic nuclear forces at unprecedented risk in the coming decades. 
From a Russian perspective, seizing the initiative will be the key to deterrence or if necessary military defeat of Western aggression in this collapsing battlespace. Pre-emption advocates contend that if Moscow does not escalate first in a future crisis or conflict, then the United States and its allies will. If that happens, they fear that Russian defenses will be unable to repel or absorb the U.S. or NATO attacks on Russian vital interests. They expect further that the Russian Federation will be unable to seize back the initiative once it is lost. Indeed, if the initial period of this future war is as devastating as many expect, the Russian armed forces may have limited retaliatory options left.
Russia’s adoption of a defensive doctrine of pre-emption would severely complicate efforts by U.S. and NATO policymakers to deter Russia or manage a future crisis or conflict on NATO’s eastern flank – such as a Baltic contingency – without triggering runaway escalation. It would deny Russian, U.S., and NATO officials the time required to determine whether an attack is actually imminent and enact a proportionate response. The result would be to increase the risk of rapid early military strikes and rampant escalation. This will be especially dangerous in the coming years. In view of the growing perceived fragility of Russian and U.S. nuclear forces, once war begins, it may prove difficult to contain at non-nuclear levels. 
The United States should therefore take steps to dissuade Moscow from shifting to a doctrine of pre-emption. It is beyond the scope of this study to offer exhaustive recommendations to this effect. As a starting point, U.S. policymakers should seek to reduce both the expected value of and the perceived need for a doctrine of pre-emption, as seen by Moscow.
To reduce the expected value of pre-emption, as seen by Moscow, the United States should:
  • Seek recognition of “rules of the road” for cyber and counterspace operations. 
  • Prioritize the development of more resilient U.S. and NATO operational concepts. 
  • Demonstrate NATO’s emphasis on resilience in future military exercises. 
  • Boost investment in cyber resilience. 
  • Expand investment in space resilience. 
  • Bolster conventional deterrence in Europe. 
  • Sustain Third Offset technological, doctrinal, and organizational innovations. 
  • Reaffirm the United States’ intent to respond forcefully to Russian aggression. 
  • Engage the American public on the costs of inaction in the face of foreign aggression. 
To reduce Moscow’s perceived need for pre-emption, the United States should take a complementary but distinct set of steps:
  • Restore U.S.-Russian military-to-military contacts. 
  • Sustain engagement with Russia on NATO ballistic missile defenses. 
  • Consider limitations on U.S., Russian, and Chinese CPGS forces.
  • Promote the responsible use of military autonomy. 
  • Clarify the United States’ preference against pre-emption. 
  • Engage Russia on geopolitical concerns. 
This policy approach is not without risks. Yet, the evolving security environment demands a more active U.S. strategy. If the Russian Federation officially adopts a defensive doctrine of pre-emption, it will signify the opening of a deeply concerning chapter in U.S.-Russian relations. That chapter would be defined by more acute fear, hastening timelines, and perilous risk-taking in a security environment defined by uncertainty. It would constitute a return to Cold War–level tensions, only this time with more ways for the United States and Russia to stumble into potentially catastrophic escalation than before.

The Monument to Minin and Pozharsky stands before St. Basil’s Cathedral in the Red Square in Moscow. The monument commemorates Kuzma Minin and Count Dmitry Pozharsky, who assumed prominent roles in Russia’s struggle for independence from the Poles in the 17th century.
Wikimedia Commons

The Unsettling View from Moscow

Russian policymakers believe their nation is under siege. The eastward march of liberalism in post–Cold War Europe is seen by the Kremlin to pose an existential threat to the Russian state. Meanwhile, rapid shifts in the military-technological environment are simultaneously exposing Russia to U.S. or NATO military coercion. These trends inform arguments by Russia’s top military strategists in favor of what they perceive to be a defensive doctrine of pre-emption. 

A Dismal Geopolitical Outlook

Moscow has identified the United States and its NATO allies as the Russian Federation’s greatest threats today and for the foreseeable future.1 This pronouncement is rooted in Russian policymakers’ understanding of U.S. hegemonic intent. Russian officials believe that the United States is actively working to weaken the Russian state in order to fortify its own position as the world’s sole remaining superpower.2 
They cite a host of U.S. policies as evidence of this intent. For instance, Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, often characterize NATO expansion in the 1990s and 2000s as an effort to isolate and subordinate Russia.3 They argue similarly that U.S. activities in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria are motivated by a desire to cultivate U.S. proxies in Russia’s near abroad. Russian analysts say the United States ultimately hopes to use these proxies to stir dissent within Russia itself.4
These attempts to co-opt or reorient regional actors to disadvantage Russia are not isolated events, according to Russian analysts. Instead, they sit within a long history of U.S.-backed “color revolutions” in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.5 U.S. analysts often characterize Russian military-operational art as “hybrid warfare.” Yet, Russian political-military thinkers are clear in their assessments that it is the United States that is using a combination of political, economic, information, and other non-military instruments to destabilize foreign nations.6

Vladimir Putin speaks in July 2015. He has forcefully criticized what he characterizes as the United States’ ongoing efforts to impose its will on weaker nations.
The Kremlin
Lastly, Russian policymakers find little reason to expect that future U.S. interference in other nations’ domestic affairs will remain non-military. The Russian Federation has repeatedly highlighted and condemned what it has seen as the United States’ unlawful use of force to impose its will on weaker nations in the post–Cold War era. Frequent citations to this effect include U.S. actions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya.7 The regularity and severity with which Russian officials criticize the United States’ alleged overreliance on military force strongly imply their belief that the United States would be willing to use force to impose its will on Russia, if Russia is not prepared to defend itself. 
In this context, some Russian officials believe that President Donald J. Trump’s election may offer new opportunities for bilateral political engagement.8 Yet Moscow also knows that U.S. skepticism of Russia has strong and lasting bipartisan support. This means that any gains achieved through U.S.-Russian engagement over the next four or eight years may prove limited or subject to reversal after Trump leaves office. As a result, Russian policymakers assess that the United States and its allies will remain a serious and lasting threat to Russian national security for the foreseeable future. Senior Russian officials thus say quietly that “Cold War 2.0” has begun between the United States and Russia.9

A Collapsing Battlespace

Rising U.S.-Russian geopolitical tensions are paralleled by rapid shifts in the military-technological environment. Russian strategists forecast that a host of novel or improved military technologies will allow both parties to act more rapidly across broader geographic expanses than before. At the same time, new weapon systems integrating greater autonomy and harnessing new physical principles promise to inject even further uncertainty into the U.S.-Russian correlation of forces. These shifts threaten to erode Russia’s ability to deter or defeat future U.S. aggression by defensive or retaliatory operations alone. In this regard, they constitute a primary reason why a rising number of Russia’s senior military strategists endorse a doctrine of pre-emption. 
Russian analysts in Military Thought and other outlets consistently forecast that major wars in the future will be fought across all domains – not just in the land, sea, and air.10 They write that fighting will occur in outer space as adversaries attack one another’s space-based military architectures in order to cripple space-dependent air, sea, and land forces.11 And fighting will take place in the information domain – a domain unto itself – the “high ground” of modern warfare upon which all else rests.12 
Russian forecasts stress equally that fighting in these domains will occur at once-unfathomable speeds.13 As Major General I.N. Vorobyov (Ret.) writes, “Its Majesty Time has sped up its flight.”14 Novel informational capabilities will allow belligerents to coordinate action by widely dispersed strike units with unprecedented synchrony and precision.15 At the same time, high-precision weapons – particularly conventional prompt global strike assets – will allow belligerents to strike one another’s vital targets faster than ever.16 And, as many analysts predict, novel attack methods – leveraging dramatic advances in military autonomy, directed energy, electromagnetics, nanotechnology, genetic engineering, and even the ability to control geological and climatic phenomena – may put the defense at a significant disadvantage relative to an increasingly diverse and deadly array of offensive tools.17
Russian authors posit that enemy targets will no longer be engaged successively in major wars.18 Traditional notions of the front and the rear, strong points, flanks and junctions, and combat-contact lines will be largely outmoded.19 Where is a nation’s flank when the enemy can hold its entire territory at risk through a combination of an expansive array of advanced sensors; exquisite information networks capable of synthesizing large amounts of targeting data in real time; and a balance of long-range precision strike assets that outmatch enemy air defense capabilities? Where is the front line when the objective in future wars will be to ensure that no enemy soldiers ever make it close to a defending nation’s borders?20 

Russia’s top military strategists expect future wars to be all-encompassing affairs. Militaries will compete for control of the cyberspace, outer space, air, sea, and land domains.
Wikimedia Commons
The full report is available online.
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ENDNOTES

  1. The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, Presidential Edict 683 (December 2015), http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf; Vladimir Soldatkin, “Putin names United States among threats in new Russian security strategy,” Reuters, January 2, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-security-strategy-idUSKBN0UG09Q20160102; “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on December 25, 2014, http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029; and Carol J. Williams, “Russia revises military doctrine to name NATO as chief threat,” Los Angeles Times, December 26, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-military-doctrine-nato-20141226-story.html.  ↩
  2. “Russia’s Putin Suggests U.S. Bent On World Domination,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, February 8, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-us-wants-to-dominate-world/26835291.html; “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Italian magazine Limes, published on February 4, 2016” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 4, 2016), http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2055307; and Andrei Kokoshin, “Ensuring Strategy Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions” (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June 2011), 50, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ensuring%20Strategic%20Stability%20by%20A.%20Kokoshin.pdf.  ↩
  3. Nikolaus Blome, Kai Diekmann, and Daniel Biskup, “Putin – The Interview: ‘For Me, It Is Not Borders That Matter,’” Bild.de, November 1, 2016, http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimir-putin-the-interview-44092656.bild.html.  ↩
  4. I.N. Vorobyov and V.A. Kiselyov, “Strategies of Destruction and Attrition: A New Version,” Military Thought, 1 (2014). ↩
  5. Dmitry Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” Proliferation Papers 54 (Institut français des relations internationales, November 2015), 17–30, http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and the ‘Color Revolution’: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2014), https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-%E2%80%9Ccolor-revolution%E2%80%9D; and Dmitry Gorenburg, “Moscow Conference on International Security 2015 Part 1: The plenary speeches,” Russian Military Reform blog on RussiaMil.wordpress.com, April 21, 2015, https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2015/04/21/moscow-conference-on-international-security-2015-part-1-the-plenary-speeches/.  ↩
  6. Valery Gerasimov, “The Syrian Experience. Hybrid Warfare Requires High-Tech Weapons and Scientific Substantiation,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, March 2016; V.A. Kiselyov and I.N. Vorobyov, “Hybrid Operations: A New Type of Warfare,” Military Thought, 2 (2015); Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War,” Survival, 57 no. 6 (December 2015-January 2016), 51–58, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-december-2015-january-2016-522a/57-6-04-charap-cm-7a0a; and Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/.  ↩
  7. “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html; Louis Charbonneau, “Russia and U.S trade barbs over Iraq, Kosovo at U.N.,” Reuters, August 28, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-un-idUSN2832039520080828; “Putin does not see any logic or conscience in the U.S. use of force abroad,” RIA Novosti, March 21, 2011, https://ria.ru/arab_ly/20110321/356274298.html; “Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly speech,” The Washington Post, September 28, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/?utm_term=.248906d17c69; and Masha Lipman, “Putin’s Syrian Revenge,” The New Yorker (October 8, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/putins-syrian-revenge.  ↩
  8. Andrey Ostroukh, “Trump and Putin see eye to eye on many foreign policy aims: Foreign Minister,” Reuters, January 23, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-us-foreignpolicy-idUSKBN157151.  ↩
  9. Author’s conversation with senior Russian officials.  ↩
  10. 1V.N. Gorbunov and S.A. Bogdanov, “Armed Confrontation in the 21st Century,” Military Thought, 1 (2009); S.G. Chekinov and S.A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” Military Thought, 4 (2013); and V.I. Litvinenko and I.P. Rusanov, “Basic Trends in Firepower Employment in Modern-Day Operations (Combat Actions),” Military Thought, 4 (2014). ↩
  11. I.N. Vorobyov and V.A. Kiselyov, “On the Innovative Development Concept in the Armed Forces,” Military Thought, 3 (2009); V.I. Lumpov and V.V. Karpov, “Analysis of the U.S. Strategic Triad,” Military Thought, 1 (2012); and S.G. Chekinov and S.A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast for Future Wars: Meditations on What They Will Look Like,” Military Thought, 4 (2015). ↩
  12. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, February 26, 2013, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf. See also I.N. Vorobyov and V.A. Kiselyov, “Analysis of the Effectiveness of Defensive Operations,” Military Thought, 1 (2007); Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War”; V.A. Vinogradov, “Trends in the Conduct of Operations in a Major War,” Military Thought, 4 (2013); Gorbunov and Bogdanov, “Armed Confrontation in the 21st Century”; A.A. Rakhmanov, “Network Centric Control Systems: Natural Trends, Problems, and Solutions,” Military Thought, 1 (2011); and Chekinov and Bogdanov, “A Forecast for Future Wars.” ↩
  13. Rakhmanov, “Network Centric Control Systems”; Vinogradov, “Trends in the Conduct of Operations in a Major War”; Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War”; Gorbunov and Bogdanov, “Armed Confrontation in the 21st Century”; and Litvinenko and Rusanov, “Basic Trends in Firepower Employment in Modern-Day Operations.” ↩
  14. I.N. Vorobyov, “Analysis of Theoretical and Mathematical Development of Netcentric Warfare,” Military Thought, 2 (2012). ↩
  15. Rakhmanov, “Network Centric Control Systems”; Vorobyov, “Analysis of Theoretical and Mathematical Development of Netcentric Warfare”; Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War”; and Litvinenko and Rusanov, “Basic Trends in Firepower Employment in Modern-Day Operations.” ↩
  16. V.V. Matvichuk and A.L. Khryapin, “A Strategic Deterrence System Under New Conditions,” Military Thought, 1 (2010); Vorobyov and Kiselyov, “On the Innovative Development Concept in the Armed Forces”; Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War”; and Litvinenko and Rusanov, “Basic Trends in Firepower Employment in Modern-Day Operations.” ↩
  17. Gorbunov and Bogdanov, “Armed Confrontation in the 21st Century”; Rakhmanov, “Network Centric Control Systems”; Vorobyov and Kiselyov, “On the Innovative Development Concept in the Armed Forces”; Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War”; Litvinenko and Rusanov, “Basic Trends in Firepower Employment in Modern-Day Operations”; Chekinov and Bogdanov, “A Forecast for Future Wars”; Vorobyov and Kiselyov, “Analysis of the Effectiveness of Defensive Operations”; Matvichuk and Khryapin, “A Strategic Deterrence System Under New Conditions”; and Vorobyov, “Analysis of Theoretical and Mathematical Development of Netcentric Warfare.” ↩
  18. Vinogradov, “Trends in the Conduct of Operations in a Major War.” ↩
  19. Vorobyov, “Analysis of Theoretical and Mathematical Development of Netcentric Warfare”; Vorobyov and Kiselyov, “On the Innovative Development Concept in the Armed Forces”; Vinogradov, “Trends in the Conduct of Operations in a Major War”; and Litvinenko and Rusanov, “Basic Trends in Firepower Employment in Modern-Day Operations.” ↩
  20. Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War.” ↩
  • Alexander Velez-Green

    Research Associate, Defense Strategies and Assessments Program
    Alexander Velez-Green is a Research Associate with the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program and 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative. His research focuses on Russian milita...

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