NUKES : INDIA TRAPPED IN THE NUCLEAR WEB (r)

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/trapped-in-the-nuclear-web/490819.html








                               PART  one  OF  two  

NUKES : INDIA TRAPPED IN THE NUCLEAR WEB  

      Monster cloud: India got down to its N-programme
                  after a veiled threat from Pakistan.

                           The challenges India faces

                                   G Parthasarathy

 Nov 2, 2017

LED by the US and Soviet Union, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council tried to ensure, some five decades ago, that they alone had the divine right to possess nuclear weapons in perpetuity, with the signing of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Their nuclear arsenals steadily increased and pleas for nuclear disarmament arrogantly disregarded. The world nuclear scenario today is now different to what the five envisaged. Nuclear stockpiles have steadily grown. In the past few decades, Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea have joined the “nuclear club”. Others like Japan and Iran are capable of doing so when needed. There are an estimated 14,900 nuclear warheads in nine countries, with 93 per cent of these in the possession of the US and Russia.

While China tested and acquired nuclear weapons in the 1960s, the next country to acquire nuclear weapons was Pakistan, which commenced its quest for nuclear weapons after the 1971 Bangladesh conflict. India crossed the nuclear threshold only after it received a veiled nuclear threat from Pakistan during tensions over military exercises named “Operation Brasstacks” in January 1987. Instructions were issued in 1988 to nuclear scientist PK Iyengar and scientific adviser VS Arunachalam to assemble a nuclear arsenal. India’s distinguished strategic thinker, K Subrahmanyam, provided the strategic rationale for the nuclear weapons programme. India decisively demonstrated its nuclear weapons capabilities 10 years later, with the Pokhran tests. Pakistan predictably followed suit, barely a fortnight later. 

 India is today confronted with a situation where China has not only provided Pakistan with designs and equipment for manufacturing nuclear weapons, but has also given Pakistan the knowhow and materials for manufacturing missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons to every part of India, including the Andaman islands. While these facts are known to those involved inside and outside the government in monitoring nuclear developments, it is astonishing that public knowledge on this crucial issue is limited. Sadly, it has never been debated seriously in Parliament. Surely, the public and Parliament need to know more on these issues, to promote awareness of the challenges the nation faces from two hostile neighbours working together dangerously. American nuclear analyst Gary Milhollin has perceptively noted: “If you subtract China’s help from Pakistan’s nuclear programme, there is no Pakistani nuclear weapons programme.”

While Zulfikar Ali Bhutto moved to establish a nuclear weapons capability within weeks of the Bangladesh conflict, his prison memoirs suggest that he was guaranteed of Chinese assistance after his meeting with Chairman Mao in 1976. China, with antiquated uranium enrichment facilities, benefited from designs stolen by AQ Khan from European (URENCO) enrichment facilities. By the early 1980s, China was providing Pakistan designs for nuclear weapons. China currently has approximately 280 nuclear warheads for delivery by 150 land-based and 48 sea-based missiles and fighter aircraft. While India is estimated to possess 110-120 nuclear warheads. Pakistan has 130-140 nuclear warheads, designed for delivery by ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft. Experts estimate that Pakistan’s stockpile could potentially grow to 220-250 warheads by 2025, making it the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapons state. Pakistan’s missiles, with ranges up to 2,750 km, are all of Chinese design and produced at the National Defence Complex facilities in the Kala Chitta Dhar mountain range to the west of Islamabad. The development, production and test launching of missiles is done at locations south of Attock, using road mobile Chinese-designed missile launchers, produced in Fatehjang.

According to former US Air Force Secretary Thomas Reed, himself a designer of nuclear weapons at America’s Los Alamos Laboratories: “The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani (nuclear) scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build as a model for export. There is evidence that AQ Khan used Chinese designs for his nuclear designs. Notes from those lectures later turned up in Libya. And the Chinese did similar things for the Saudis, North Koreans and Algerians.” The great champions of nuclear non-proliferation in the US, who lectured India for decades on non-proliferation, covered up and did nothing to curb these Chinese activities. Pakistan is also known to have received liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles from North Korea in exchange for information on uranium enrichment, in a deal evidently undertaken with Chinese blessings.

Though Pakistan has not enunciated a formal nuclear doctrine, its then head of strategic planning division of its nuclear command authority, Lt-Gen Khalid Kidwai, had averred that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistani territory, or destroys a large part of its land and air forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of using nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically strangulate” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation. India has declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will use nuclear weapons only if its territory or armed forces face an attack anywhere, in which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are used. Since India has no desire to conquer large parts of Pakistani territories or destroy its armed forces, there is no possibility of India provoking a nuclear conflict. But, given Kidwai’s utterances about a “full spectrum” deterrent, involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons, issued after he retired, New Delhi has to carefully review nuclear strategy imaginatively, bearing in mind that our “no first use” doctrine has served us well internationally.

It is obvious, especially after Xi Jinping’s recent enunciation of Chinese global ambitions at the Party Congress, that missile and nuclear proliferation by China to Pakistan will continue in its efforts to “contain” India. Pakistan has already tested a sea-based missile and China is set to strengthen Pakistan’s navy with substantial supply of submarines and frigates. China appears determined to use Pakistan as its stalking horse for its maritime ambitions to promote its OBOR projects in the Indian Ocean. The most crucial challenge we now face is how to deal with a jingoistic China, for which “containing” India has been a continuing strategic effort for over four decades now. Balancing Chinese power necessarily involves developing partnerships with others across the Indo-Pacific region. China’s policies are multi-faceted and Beijing will likely avoid open hostility, even as it continues to keep up pressures along its borders with India and uses proxies across India’s immediate neighbourhood to keep India tied up in South Asia. These issues will, hopefully, be reviewed and discussed in Parliament.

                    

                            PART  two  OF  two            

[ https://world-defense.com/threads/fas-pakistan-has-130-140-nuclear-warheads.4225/ ]




Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons                              Infrastructure
  Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan 
                           By 
              Hans M. Kristensen


Nov.16, 2016

 
Pakistan’s tactical NASR nuclear-capable                  mobile rocket launcher 
      now appears to be deployed.
                            By 
                Hans M. Kristensen

In our latest Nuclear Notebook on Pakistani nuclear forces, Robert Norris and I estimate that Pakistan has produced an estimated stockpile of 130-140 nuclear warheads for delivery by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and fighter-bombers.

Pakistan now identifies with what is described as a full-spectrum nuclear deterrent posture, which is though to include strategic missiles and fighter-bombers for so-called retaliatory strikes in response to nuclear attacks, and short-range missiles for sub-strategic use in response to conventional attacks.

Although there have been many rumors over the years, the location of the nuclear-capable launchers has largely evaded the public eye for much of Pakistan’s 19-year old declared nuclear weapons history. Most public analysis has focused on the nuclear industry (see here for a useful recent study). But over the past several years, commercial satellite pictures have gradually brought into light several facilities that might form part of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear weapons launcher posture.

This includes 10 facilities, including 5 missile garrisons (soon possibly 6) as well 2 (possibly 4) air bases with fighter-bombers.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons related infrastructure includes at least 10 major industrial facilities and about 10 bases for nuclear-capable forces. Click map to view full size.
The nuclear warheads that would arm the launchers are thought to be stored at other secure facilities that have not yet been identified. In a crisis, these warheads would first have to be brought to the bases and mated with the launchers before they could be used.

Security at these and other Pakistani defense facilities is a growing concern and many have been upgraded with additional security perimeters during the past 10 years in response to terrorist attacks.

There are still many unknowns and uncertainties about the possible nuclear role of these facilities. All of the launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means they can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads. So even if a base has a nuclear role, most of the launchers might be assigned to the conventional mission. Further analysis in the future might disqualify some and identify others. But for now, this profile of potential road-mobile launcher garrisons and air bases are intended as a preliminary guide and accompany the recent FAS Nuclear Notebook on Pakistani nuclear forces. 

Nuclear-Capable Road-Mobile Missile Launcher Bases

The total number and location of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missile bases is not known. But analysis of commercial satellite photos has identified features that suggest that at least five bases might serve a role in Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture. This includes army garrisons at Akro (Petaro), Gujranwala, Khuzdar, Pano Aqil, and Sargodha. A sixth base at Bahawalpur (29.2829, 71.7955) may be under construction. There is also a seventh base near Dera Ghazi Khan (29.9117, 70.4922), but the infrastructure is very different and not yet convincing.

An obvious difficulty in identifying nuclear missile bases is that the infrastructure is not yet publicly known, that commercial satellite photos do not have sufficient resolution to positively identify nuclear-capable launchers with certainty (especially smaller shorter-range types), that all launchers are dual-capable (not all bases with a certain launcher may have a nuclear role; and not all nuclear-capable launchers at a particular base may be assigned nuclear warheads), and that Pakistan (like other nuclear-armed states) most likely is engaged in considerable efforts to conceal and confuse identification of nuclear launchers.

With these caveats, here is a description with images of what we consider to be the five primary nuclear-capable bases and the primary TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) production facility in Pakistan:





Akro Garrison: 

This base is located (25.5483, 68.3343) approximately 18 km (11 miles) north of Hyderabad between Akro and Petaro in the southern part of the Sindh Province approximately 145 kms (90 miles) from the Indian border. The garrison covers an area of 6.9 square kms (2.7 square miles) and has been expanded significantly since 2004 (the base was first pointed out to me by Martin Bulla, a German amateur satellite imagery enthusiast). The Akro Garrison includes a unique underground facility located under what appears to be a missile TEL garage complex. The underground facility consists of two star-shaped sections located along a central corridor that connects to two buildings with covered access ramps. The six TEL garages appear to be designed for 12 launchers.

The Akro Garrison has a TEL area with unique underground facility. Click image to view full size.
It is not possible to identify the suspected launchers in the TEL complex from the available photos. But analysis of a vehicle training area in the northeast corner of the garrison shows what appears to be five-axel  TELs for the Babur cruise missile weapon system.

In a hypothetical crisis the launchers presumably would load their complement of missiles at the base and disperse outside to predetermined launch locations in the region. The range of the Babur is uncertain; NASIC reports it as 350 km (217 miles) while the Pakistan government claims a range of more than 500 kms (373 miles), sometimes as much as 700 kms (435 miles). The Akro unit would be able to defend all of the southeastern part of Pakistan, including Karachi.


Gujranwala Garrison: 
This sprawling base complex covers an area of approximately 30 square kms (11.5 square miles) and is located (32.2410, 74.0730) in the northeastern part of the Punjab Province approximately 60 kms (37 miles) from the Indian border. Since 2010, the base has added what appears to be a TEL launcher area in the western part of the complex. There is also what appears to be a technical area for servicing the launchers. The TEL area became operational in 2014 or 2015. The TEL area appears to be made up of two identical sections (each consisting of launcher garages, a weapons loading hall, and a weapons storage igloo), each similar in design to the TEL area at Pano Aqil. The security perimeter appears to have room for a third TEL section. (This and other facilities have also been spotted by 
https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven.)






The Gujranwala Garrison appears to be a base for the NASR tactical nuclear-capable launcher. Click image to view full size.

Several trucks have been seen on the satellite pictures that strongly resemble the NASR short-range missile launcher. It is impossible to identify the launchers with certainty due to the relatively poor quality of the pictures (the launchers could potentially also be multiple rocket launchers), but the resemblance is strong with a drivers cabin, a power and hydraulics unit, and a twin box launcher seen on NASR test launch photos published by the Pakistan military. The range of the NASR is equal to the base’s distance from the Indian border.



Khuzdar Garrison: 

Of the missile garrisons located so far, the Khuzdar Garrison some 220 kms (136 miles) west of Sukkur in south-east Balochistan Province is the one located (27.7222, 66.6241) the farthest from the Indian border (295 kms or 183 miles). The base is split in two sections: a northern section and a southern section (where the TELs are based).

Possible launchers have not been seen and identified in Khuzdar photos, but the TEL garages are longer than at all the other bases except the Sargodha Garrison. This could potentially be a base for Shaheen-2 medium-range missile launchers.

The Khuzdar Garrison might deploy Shaheen-2 launchers. Click image to view full size.
The TEL area includes what appears to be an underground facility similar to the one identified at the Akro Garrison. It consists of two buildings on covered access ramps that probably provide TEL access to an underground weapons storage and handling facility.

Khuzdar appears to also have a second underground facility approximately 600 meters (1,800 feet) east of the TEL area. This facility has roughly the same overall dimensions as the suspected underground facility between the access ramps inside the TEL area, but the second facility has no TEL facilities on top of it and does not appear to have clear access points. One potential possibility is that this facility may be intended for a second TEL area in the future.



Pano Aqil Garrison:

 The Pano Aqil Garrison is split up in several sections that cover a combined area of nearly 20 square kms (7.7 square miles). This includes the main garrison area, a TEL area (27.8328, 69.1575), a munitions depot, an airfield, and a shooting range. The base is located approximately 80 kms (50 miles) from the Indian border in the northern part of the Sindh Province.


The TEL area is located 1.8 kms (1.2 miles) northeast of the main garrison and includes five TEL garages (a sixth is under construction) and a service building. At the north end of the facility are located a weapons storage igloo and a weapons handling hall. The layout of the TEL area is similar to the Gujranwala Garrison (which appears to have twice the capacity). The five TEL garages can potentially hold 25 TELs although some of the spaces are probably used by support vehicles.

The Pano Aqil Garrison has a remote TEL area. Click to view full size.
Identification of TEL type is difficult due to the relatively poor quality of the satellite pictures, but it could potentially be NASR, Shaheen-1 or Ghaznavi short-range missile launchers.




Sargodha Garrison:

 The large munitions storage depot at Sargodha has long been rumored to include TEL garages. The facilities date back to the mid-1990s when Pakistan was first reported to have acquired M-11 missiles from China (DF-11 or CSS-7), which was used to produce what is now known as Pakistan’s Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 short-range ballistic missiles. But the garages (31.9722, 72.6838) at Sargodha are nearly twice the size that would be needed by short-range Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 launchers and seem better sized for medium-range Ghauri or Shaheen-2 launchers. There appear to be 10 TEL garages plus two garages with different dimensions that might be used for maintenance.

Yet the Sargodha complex has less of the type of infrastructure seen at other potential TEL bases. Much of the infrastructure seen might be used by personnel that maintain the large weapons depot itself. Whatever the large garages are used for, they are currently being upgraded and additional infrastructure is being added.

The Sargodha Garrison has large garages and underground facilities. Click to view full size.
The Sargodha complex also includes several underground facilities, including a section with two large buildings that could potentially be missile handling halls. Additional tunnels are under construction.



National Development Complex:


 Several of the TEL types seen or suspected at the different missile garrisons are assembled at the National Development Complex (sometimes called National Defense Complex), or NDC. It consists of a string of facilities scattered across the Kala-Chitta Mountain Range west of Islamabad. But the heart of the complex is the TEL assembly section north of Fateh Jang (33.6292, 72.7106). NDC reportedly emerged in the mid-1990s to produce Gazhnavi and Shaheen-1 short-range ballistic missiles based on technology supplied by China.

Since then NDC has expanded considerably to include facilities west and east of the central TEL assembly area. The central area has expanded considerably since 2003, with the addition of a TEL truck assembly facility as well as three large high-bay TEL assembly halls for mounting missile compartments onto TEL trucks. For the past ten years, these facilities have been busy producing Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile launchers and Babur ground-launched cruise missile launchers.

The National Development Complex assembles Shaheen and Babur missile launchers. Click image to view full size.

Satellite pictures give an example of the flow of production of different TEL types at NDC and also provide valuable reference points for comparing dimensions of TELs seen at individual missile garrisons. Several pictures from 2016, for example, show both 6-axel Shaheen-2 TELs and 5-axel Babur TELs, and possibly also 4-axel Shaheen-1 TELs, in the process of assembly or maintenance. The 8-axel Shaheen-3 TEL has not yet been seen as this weapon system is still very early in production and not yet operationally deployed.





                                Air Bases

Pakistan has a large number of air bases but only a small number is thought to be involved in the nuclear mission. This includes bases with Mirage and F-16 fighter-bombers. United States officials have stated that F-16s were sold to Pakistan on the conditions that they could not be uses to deliver nuclear weapons, but other sources have indicated that some of the planes were converted nonetheless. French-produced Mirage aircraft are widely assumed to be equipped to deliver the Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile.

Masroor Air Base: This base is located (24.8855, 66.9280) west of the city of Karachi and has long been suspected of serving a role in Pakistan’s airborne nuclear deterrent. The base is home to the 32nd Fighter Wing with Mirage fighter-bombers and is located only 5 kms (3 miles) from a potential nuclear weapons storage site (24.9429, 66.9083).

Over the past decade, unique facilities have been construction at Masroor Air Base that might potentially form part of Pakistan’s nuclear posture. This includes a large underground facility that is located inside a high-security area. The purpose of the facility has not been confirmed and could potentially also involve command and control. Yet the facility is clearly unique compared with other Air Bases and might potentially serve as an underground nuclear weapons storage and handling facility. 

(Update: the underground facility is possibly a command center.)

Masroor Air Base includes unique underground facilities. Click image to view full size.

Another unique facility at Masroor Air Base is a hardened aircraft shelter connected by an underground tunnel to what appears to be a weapons storage facility. The purpose of this facility (first spotted by https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven) is unknown but could potentially be designed to enable concealed nuclear weapons loading of Mirage fighter-bombers.

It should be emphasized that despite the interesting features of some of the facilities at Masroor Air Base, there is no official publicly available information that explicitly identifies them as nuclear.




Mushaf Air Base:
 One of Pakistan’s oldest suspected nuclear-capable air bases is Mushaf Air Base located (32.0431, 72.6710) near Sargodha in the Punjab Province. The base is the home of the 38th Wing with F-16 squadrons that have long been suspected of forming part of Pakistan’s air-borne nuclear deterrent.

One pair of hardened aircraft shelters at the base are located inside an area with additional security perimeter but there is little visible evidence of nuclear facilities at the base. The munitions storage area shows no unique structures that suggest a nuclear weapons storage role.

Mushaf Air Base has long been rumored to have a nuclear role. Click image to view full size.

Instead, nuclear bombs for the F-16s at Mushaf Air Base might be stored at the nearby Sargodha weapons storage facility less than 10 kms (6 miles) to the south.



Others Air Bases: There are a couple of other Mirage and F-16 Air Bases that could potentially also serve a role as part of Pakistan’s airborne nuclear strike mission. This includes the Mirage-equipped base at Rafiqui (30.7580, 72.2822), which has been upgrade over the past three years. The F-16 base at Shahbaz (28.2825, 68.4506) has been upgraded considerably to accommodate the new F-16s (Block 52).

These and other bases could potentially serve a dispersal bases for Mirage and F-16 nuclear-capable bombers. But there is little visible physical evidence to suggest they serve a nuclear role. Likewise, Kamra (Minhas) Air Base (33.8697, 72.4004) has often been suspected to have a nuclear role but appears to serve as conversion facility for aircraft.



Conclusions and Implications

Commercial satellite pictures provide new information about Pakistan’s emerging nuclear weapons posture that includes missile garrisons for short-range nuclear-capable missiles, unique underground facilities potentially intended for nuclear weapons storage, and air bases with possible nuclear-related facilities.


The tactical nuclear-capable launchers do not present a strategic threat to India due to their short range, but their introduction into the Pakistani armed forces raises important questions about early dispersal of nuclear warheads and launch authority in a crisis as well as potential earlier use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with India.

We estimate that Pakistan currently has a stockpile of 130-140 nuclear warheads and is building more. But we also take note of statements by some Pakistan officials that the country might not intend to continue to increase it arsenal indefinitely but may soon reach the goal for the size of its full-spectrum deterrent. Whether and when that will happen remains to be seen. For now the Pakistani arsenal is in a dynamic phase.



Additional Information:

• FAS Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2016

• Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Industries

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.


http://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/11/pakistan-nuclear-infrastructure/

DEGRADATION OF ARMED FORCES IT IS TOO LATE THE TRADITION " to fight for my nation" IS DEAD

SOURCE:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4dNZas47Ls]

       DEGRADATION OF ARMED FORCES

           IT IS TOO LATE THE TRADITION 
                        to fight for my nation 
                               IS DEAD



                                       [ https://youtu.be/Q4CtBD21hh4 ]

                                                       VETERANS  GOT THIS 

                                         ON

                         14 AUGUST 2015

             THANKS  "MODI GOVERNANCE "
                               FOR 
        REDEEMING OUR (DIS)HONOR


      [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4dNZas47Ls]

                    

               IT IS TOO LATE THE TRADITION 
                             to fight for my nation 
                                    IS DEAD

1962 WAR : CHINA’S INDIA WAR How the Chinese Saw the Conflict

SOURCE:
https://chinaindiaborderdispute.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/neville-maxwell-chinas-india-war.pdf






              CHINA’S INDIA WAR
       How the Chinese Saw the Conflict 

                                By 
          Neville Maxwell (May 2011) 



The Chinese leadership was slow to recognise the seriousness of the problems presented to it by the Nehru government’s border policy. Soon after the establishment of the Peoples Republic in 1949 its government had recognised border settlement as a problem involving all its numerous neighbours, and had evolved a strategy to deal with it: forswearing irredentist attempts to regain “lost lands”, China would accept the border alignments with which history had left it, and negotiate where necessary to formalise and confirm them, in the spirit of “Mutual understanding and mutual accommodation”. In the case of India, this meant that India should retain the territory, up to what they called the McMahon Line, which the British imperialists had seized in their final expansionist foray. Zhou Enlai gave assurances to that effect in his several meetings and exchanges with Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s, and Beijing foresaw no territorial dispute with India. 



Their first inkling of troubles ahead came in 1958 when Beijing found itself accused of “aggression” (an extreme and loaded term in diplomatic parlance) when Indian border guards found a Tibetan/Chinese presence in small tracts claimed by India in what became known as the middle sector of the border. Then an Indian patrol was detected and detained in Chinese-claimed and -occupied territory in the western sector. And in August 1959 an armed clash at a point called Longju on the McMahon Line, in which an Indian border guard was killed, set off an outburst of public and official suspicion and anger against China, not only in India but in the West generally and, critically, in Moscow. So in October that year the Chinese leadership found itself being reprimanded over the Longju incident by the visiting Nikita Krushchev.1 “Why did you have to kill people on your border with India?” he demanded to know. Mao Zedung replied, defensively, “They attacked us first, crossed the border and continued firing for twelve hours”. Krushchev retorted, “Nobody was killed among the Chinese, only among the Indians”.


 Zhou Enlai came in: “What are we supposed to do if they attack us first? We cannot [just] fire in the air! The Indians even crossed the McMahon Line. Besides, very soon Vice President Radhakrishnan is coming to China – that shows that we are undertaking measures to resolve the issues peacefully by negotiations”.


 Mao summed up the Chinese position: “The border conflict with India is only a marginal issue, not a clash between the two governments. Nehru himself is not aware of what happened [at Longju]. As we found out, their patrols crossed the McMahon Line. We learned about it much later, after the incident took place. All this was known neither to Nehru nor even to our military district in Tibet. When Nehru learned that their patrols had crossed the McMahon Line he issued orders for them to withdraw. We also worked towards peaceful restoration of the issue.” 


Zhou continued with those reassurances: “You will see for yourself later that the McMahon Line with India will be maintained and the border conflict will end”. Mao underlined that prediction: “The border issue with India will be decided through negotiations”.


 So it can be seen that at that stage the Chinese had failed to grasp the truth behind the border friction and beneath the careful wording in the Indian government’s diplomatic communications. Nehru had decided, well before this and irrevocably as it turned out, that India would never agree to negotiate its borders. And the Longju clash was not accidental but reflected the Indian approach to borders that was later to be named, from the British imperial vocabulary, the “forward policy”, involving here the unilateral amendment of McMahon’s alignment in accordance with Indian convenience. India was treating the territory it claimed as ipso facto (by reason of that claim) Indian territory.



 The more serious clash in October 1959 at the Kongka Pass on the Kashmir/ Xiangkiang border, with killed on both sides, had a galvanic effect on Indian public opinion and jolted the Chinese leadership into alarmed attention. Convening again to discuss the border with India, with Army commanders in attendance, they learned that Chinese border guards were experiencing frequent challenges from Indian patrols, and were chafing at orders that denied them the right to “rebuff’ them. Mao, perhaps rankling still from Krushchev’s dressing down and certainly recognising that further clashes resulting in Indian casualties would add to the international opprobrium on China, decided that only disengagement of the two sides’ forces would prevent them. He ordered a 20 kilometre withdrawal of Chinese guards all along the border, with a request to be made to India for reciprocation. That request was refused but the proposed withdrawal was implemented by Chinese forces.2 


Still, and for at least a year thereafter, the Chinese leadership failed to appreciate the severity of the problem with which India’s assertive and unyielding approach to the border dispute confronted them, apparently expecting that their repeated diplomatic calls for negotiation, and for agreed short-term measures to tranquillise the borders, would ultimately be accepted.


 By mid-1961, however, the newly named forward policy of using force, non-violently, to extrude the Chinese from the tracts of territory claimed by India, was beginning to bite in the Western border sector. Indian patrols, conducted now by the Army rather than armed police, were challenging Chinese posts and probing for positions from which to dominate and sever their lines of communication. The unyielding granite in India’s diplomatic refusal to negotiate had been personally felt by Zhou in his abortive summit meeting with Nehru in April 1960. It now began to occur to the Chinese leadership that India might deliberately be making itself an enemy of China – and even be bent on provoking hostilities.



While noting Nehru’s long-standing declarations of friendship towards China and welcoming his support for their claims to UN representation, as Marxists the Chinese had always harboured a reserve of distrust of Nehru as a “national bourgeois” politician. As such he was unreliable, and might at any time, for domestic political reasons or to curry favour with China’s implacable counter-revolutionary foe, the USA, turn towards enmity. To the Chinese, that seemed to be the only possible explanation for India’s aggressive policy and Nehru’s bellicose utterances, since conflict with China could not be seen as being of benefit for India.


 Toward the end of 1961 a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC) was convened to consider the response to India’s forward probing. Mao, in the chair, compared those to chess moves. “What should we do?”, he asked. “We can also set out a few pawns…. If they then [stop advancing] that’s great. If they don’t, we’ll eat them up. Of course we can’t just blindly eat them. ‘Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans’ [as the saying goes]. We must pay attention to the situation.” Orders were issued for Chinese forces to reverse their previous unilateral withdrawal, and for road construction to forward areas all along the border to be accelerated. Mao took the “struggle with India” under his personal control, ordering that no shot be fired from the Chinese side without his prior approval. 


In March 1962 the CMC met again to reconsider the border situation. Indian troops were continuing to press forward in the Western sector, attempting to cut off Chinese posts and sometimes opening harassing fire upon them. On the diplomatic front India was meeting every Chinese appeal for a mutual military standstill and negotiations with demands for unilateral Chinese withdrawal from all territory claimed by India. It was decided there should be no retreat under Indian pressure. When Indian troops established positions threatening Chinese posts in the western sector, additional Chinese forces should simply use their great advantage in manoeuvrability and numbers to outflank and dominate them in turn. Thus the two sides would be confronting each other in interlocking, mutually threatening positions. Chinese forces would still be forbidden to fire without permission from the central political authority. Since India was rejecting China’s calls for peaceful coexistence, Mao quipped, it should be confronted with “armed coexistence”.


 The summer of 1962 saw only intensification of that situation. Beijing increased the minatory tone and heat of its diplomatic warnings and made its threats of counterforce more open. Delhi’s replies continued to be insouciant and intransigent, Nehru being confident in the assurances from his Intelligence chief and courtier generals that the Chinese were bluffing and would never dare hit back at India. For their part too the Chinese were uncertain about India’s motives and ultimate intention. 

Could it really be true that India, so obviously weaker militarily and at every logistical and tactical disadvantage along the border, would press on to the point of war? 


Zhou Enlai directed Chen Yi, now foreign minister, to meet privately with the Indian defence minister, Krishna Menon, when they were in Geneva at an international conference, and sound him out about India’s real intentions. Chen reported that Menon had simply re-stated his government’s position: Beijing’s complaints were groundless since Indian troops were doing nothing more than advancing into their own territory; the international borders were clearly marked on India’s maps and were fixed and final – therefore there was nothing to negotiate. 


Menon’s tone was arrogant, Chen added. Zhou concluded,
“It seems as though Nehru truly wants a war with us”. 


Meanwhile the forward policy had begun to be implemented in miniature in the northeast, with Indian forces advancing across the McMahon Line in such places as the Indians thought it necessary to correct McMahon’s cartographic deficiencies. Their reoccupation of Longju in May prompted Beijing to warn that it would not “stand idly by” under such provocation – only to see another Indian post established across the McMahon Line near the trijunction with Bhutan.
The Indians named it Dhola post.


But Mao was still not ready to admit that his policy of “armed coexistence” was failing to deter India. In July the CMC reasserted his orders: the Chinese Army must “absolutely not give ground, strive resolutely to avoid bloodshed, interlock [with Indian positions] in a zigzag pattern, and undertake a long period of armed coexistence”. That cautious patience was understandable. China’s international position was parlous: the Americans were warring in Vietnam, Chiang Kai-shek was threatening to invade the mainland from Taiwan, the Soviet Union was turning hostile. All rational considerations pointed to avoidance of hostilities with India if possible. 


On 8 September the Chinese extended their tactic of containment through “armed coexistence” to the recently established Dhola post north of the McMahon Line at its western extremity. An outnumbering force (about 60 troops) was ordered to invest the little Indian post, use threats to induce its withdrawal if possible, and anyway to block further advance. This move was likely to have been made by the sectoral command without consultation with Beijing since it did no more than implement the orders already in effect. 


Misreading that move as a deliberate incursion into Indian territory (although the Indian government was aware, of course, that the threatened Indian post was well to the north of the map-marked McMahon Line), Nehru gave orders that the Chinese must be repelled. The Indian Army was given orders to attack the Chinese troops threatening Dhola post and drive them off all the territory there claimed by India. Moreover Nehru publicly proclaimed his order as soon as he issued it.


 The Chinese would have recognised instantly that Nehru’s announced order meant a radical escalation in the Indian policy which they had been passively containing. Although the Chinese had begun to suffer casualties in clashes in the Western sector there had been no Indian attacks on Chinese positions there; but now Nehru had declared that a determined assault in force was to be launched on Chinese troops – positioned on their own side of the McMahon Line. There was no doubt that any such attack could be thrown back, even wiped out. Controlling the high ground on Thagla Ridge, dominating Dhola post, the Chinese troops could swiftly fortify their  position to make it impregnable. However many troops India put into their attack the Chinese could effortlessly outnumber them. But would such a local victory do China any good? 


International public sympathy was with India, whose charge that it was China which had embarked on a program of aggressive expansion and was refusing to negotiate its territorial claims was almost universally accepted -- “Standing truth on its head” as Beijing ruefully described it. A local Indian defeat, with many casualties suffered, would be taken as another demonstration of brutal Chinese aggressiveness; and the Indians, with plentiful American and British support, would only build up for a much stronger attack and a wider war. 


On 3 October Beijing sent its final diplomatic warning and plea for immediate, unconditional negotiations: India instantly rejected it. After listening to a situation report of intensifying skirmishing in the west and Indian troop concentrations around Dhola post Mao conceded: “It seems armed coexistence won’t work…. Nehru really wants to use force: he has always wanted to seize Aksai Chin [in the western sector] and Thagla Ridge. He thinks he can get anything he desires.” 


Like a war-horse hearing bugles, he reminisced:

"We fought a war with old Chiang Kai-shek. We fought a war with Japan, and with America. With none of those did we fear. And in each case we won. Now the Indians want to fight a war with us. Naturally we don’t have to fear. We cannot give ground, once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province…. Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would be unfriendly – courtesy emphasises reciprocity”.


Zhou Enlai followed up:
“We don’t want a war with India. We have always striven to avoid war. We wanted India to be like Nepal, Burma or Mongolia, and solve [border] problems with us in a friendly fashion. But Nehru has closed all roads. This leaves us only with war. As I see it, to fight a bit would have advantages. It would make some people understand us better”.


 “Right”, Mao concluded:
“If someone doesn’t attack me, I won’t attack him. If someone attacks me, I will certainly attack him!” Thus the Chinese leadership decided to take up India’s challenge to war. But how to fight and win that war? “What should be our method? What should the war look like?”, Mao asked at a subsequent meeting.


 What China needed was not a local victory but to inflict a defeat so crushing that India might be “knocked back to the negotiating table”, Mao said, or at least taught a lesson that might last thirty years. To that end, China must keep the initiative throughout, deciding when to terminate hostilities as well as when to open them. Crack troops of the Peoples Liberation Army should be deployed, with orders to achieve swift victory regardless of casualties, keeping always within the disputed areas. When all Indian forces in the disputed areas had been destroyed a unilateral ceasefire would be declared and then PLA forces would withdraw from all territory occupied in the campaign. On 18 October an expanded Politburo meeting approved the PLA’s operational plans and set 20 October as the day for action. In terms of international law Beijing could argue that in the circumstances, with Nehru having declared his belligerent intentions and the Indian army having, on 10 October, made its first offensive move in the Dhola area and being steadily reinforced there, China was fully justified in acting in “anticipatory self-defence”.



 The Chinese campaign went precisely as planned. Mao had over-estimated the prowess of the Indians when he warned the PLA to expect strong resistance from experienced Indian troops. In the event incompetent commanders on the Indian side, obeying politically motivated and tactically foolish directives from Delhi, quickly brought their own troops to defeat and rout. Having achieved total victory in a two phase campaign Beijing declared its pre-planned ceasefire on 21 November and all Chinese forces withdrew a few weeks later.


The political aims of the “counter-attack in self-defence”.were not fulfilled, however. There was no change in the Indian approach, and nearly 50 years later India still refuses to negotiate, while Mao’s expectation of a 30 year lull on the borders fell short by five years: in 1987 after a minor confrontation at Sumdurong Chu, not far from Dhola, India again moved troops across the McMahon Line in calculated challenge, and war was narrowly averted. Still today there is no agreed “line of actual control”, friction on the borders is constant, the danger of renewed conflict ever-present. India’s refusal to negotiate has left it isolated in this regard; every one of China’s other contiguous neighbours (except Bhutan) has amicably negotiated a boundary settlement. [2800 words] 




 1 The Minutes of that meeting are in Cold War International History Project Vol. 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp 264-267.


 2 The China’s government has been far more liberal than India’s in releasing documentation about the diplomatic and military events around 1962.. The account of the Chinese leadership’s thinking and comments here is drawn from John Garver “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, editors, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, 2006, pp 86-130. The writer has drawn on this material previously in his fuller paper, “Forty Years of Folly: What Caused the Sino-Indian Border War and Why the Dispute is Unresolved” in Critical Asian Studies 35:I (2003), pp 99-112.

DEGRADATION OF ARMED FORCES : RANK RANKLE IN FORCES -MoD, armed forces lock horns over panel report

SOURCE;


[ http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/mod-armed-forces-lock-horns-over-panel-report/484780.html ]

 [  http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/panel-report-may-lead-to-discontent-armed-forces/485368.html  ]


[  http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/status-parity-issues-remain-despite-announcements/485765.html ]




             ARE THE ARMED FORCES 

                   BEING PRESSURISED 

                                 TO

              SIGN ON THE DOTTED LINE 

                              ON 

                THE DEATH WARRANT ?

        RANK RANKLE IN FORCES 

                          PART-I

[ http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/mod-armed-forces-lock-horns-over-panel-report/484780.html ]

MoD, armed forces lock horns over panel report

The committee in its report has not spoken about the ranks of Captain and Lieutenant while suggesting rank parity norms

 October 20

In a move that threatens to question the seniority in military ranks, a report of a committee of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has resulted in a heated exchange of correspondence between various wings of the ministry and the forces.

The three-member committee headed by an Additional Secretary-rank officer had been tasked to study rank-equivalence norms between the armed forces and the civilians employed in the Armed Forces Headquarters, called the (AFHQ) cadre.

The armed forces are contesting the committee’s 21-page draft report that has not yet been presented to the MoD, top sources confirmed to The Tribune.

The Principal Personnel Officers Committee (PPOC), a body of the three armed forces, has reacted sharply and shot off a letter questioning the several claims made in the report and the documents relied upon to arrive at the conclusions, sources said. Sources point out that if the committee’s report is accepted, there would be serious ramifications on the morale of officers in the ranks of Lieutenant, Captain and Major of the Indian Army and their equivalents in the Navy and IAF.

The first 10 years of service of an officer are spent in these ranks and the committee in its report has not spoken about the ranks of Captain and Lieutenant when suggesting its rank parity norms.

A Major and Lieutenant Colonel have been made equal to the Deputy Director; a Colonel is equal to a Joint Director; a Brigadier is equal to Director and the Major General equal to Principal Director.

The forces are protesting these as the warrant of precedence (WoP) issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs says a Major General is equal to a Joint Secretary and a Brigadier is equal to a Deputy Director General.

The forces are questioning the various equations drawn out by the MoD.

The committee had been set up in October last year by the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

Parrikar had ordered a ‘cross-checking of facts’ on rank parity between officers of the three forces and civilians. The forces had protested saying that equivalence had been disturbed and the status of service officers had been downgraded following an MoD note in October last year.

One year later, the committee says the MoD note issued in October last year has basically reiterated the arrangements which have existed for years. In other words, the protest of the three forces has been brushed aside.

The committee has suggested that a standing committee be constituted to resolve the ongoing issues between the forces and the AFHQ cadre.

The AFHQ cadre was set up in the mid-1960s and was meant to provide only Secretarial support and has no executive authority or powers.

Tomorrow: The stinging protest by the forces










        RANK RANKLE IN FORCES 

                         PART-II

 [  http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/panel-report-may-lead-to-discontent-armed-forces/485368.html  ]

Panel report may lead to discontent: Armed forces

 October 21

 A storm is brewing in South Block, headquarters of the Ministry of Defence in the national capital. In view of the rank-parity committee’s draft, the armed forces have warned against violating “established equations”. They say it could cause “dissatisfaction” among forces and give rise to “avoidable litigation”.

The 21-page draft report of the committee headed by an additional secretary rank officer is on rank-equivalence norms between the armed forces and the civilians employed in the Armed Forces Headquarters, called the AFHQ cadre. The report has not yet been presented to the MoD. The armed forces are protesting vehemently. 

The Principal Personnel Officers Committee (PPOC), a body of the three armed forces, in a letter to the three-member committee on September 22, reiterated rank benchmarks and questioned the veracity of the documents submitted by the AFHQ cadre. The PPOC said the rank-parity claims of the AFHQ cadre are based on unsubstantiated documents largely based on a letter written by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 1968. 

“Its veracity is in serious doubt,” stated the stinging protest letter. It cites a 2007 MHA letter which clarified that no such document exists to establish equivalence between defence officers and civilians except for the warrant of precedence. The same was reiterated by the Group of Ministers’ report in 2008. The armed forces have cited that the charter of the PPOC cleared by the Union Cabinet mandates policy matters of the AFHQ cadre. 

The AFHQ officials in their presentation to the committee have disputed this Cabinet memo dated 1974 and subsequent MoD letter in 2002. The PPOC has argued that the AFHQ cadre headed by a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) has made various communications regarding status equivalence based on “nonexistent” precedence. “Gross misrepresentation seems to have been made regarding equivalence, cadre restructuring and creation of higher posts,” the letter from PPOC suggests while seeking that all such letters be examined for their appropriateness. 

Talking about ranks, it said Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs), who rise from the ranks, are mandated as gazetted ‘group B’ employees. Commissioned Officers are equal to ranks of all-India services and the IPS. 

In July, the Army had written to the MoD saying that JCOs are accorded gazetted status as per an Act of Parliament and have legally defined status. However, when posted at South Block, a JCO is issued an identity card equating him with group C, the lowest in the government employee cadre. 

Tomorrow: Helpless, despite announcements

            RANK RANKLE IN FORCES

                        PART-III

[  http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/status-parity-issues-remain-despite-announcements/485765.html ]

Status, parity issues remain despite announcements

October 22



Almost nine years ago, on December 27, 2008, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a detailed note asking for setting up a high-powered committee to resolve the issues of status and parity among the armed forces, the Central armed police and also the civilians.

This implied having a well-defined parity among the forces and other cadres like the IAS and IPS.  Certain ranks have been “added” at the higher level in the past three decades in the IAS and IPS.

In all these years, no committee has been set up that could, for once and all, decide on the matter. In the hierarchy-driven forces, encroachments on status are a strict no-no. Announcements are made and then noting happens, noted a senior functionary.

The December 2008 PMO note originated after forces protested against what they termed as “lowering” of status by the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC). Besides then Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, the decision makers included then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and then Defence Minister AK Antony.  

The non-functional upgradation (NFU) is yet another issue. The 7th CPC report tabled in 2016 said NFU should be given to forces. The government differed. The matter is now before the Supreme Court. A “non-functional scale (pay) upgradation” is allowed by the government to Group-A officers. Meaning they get the same scale as a Joint Secretary, but after 24 years of service. The NFU increases the salary of an individual by taking it to the upper scale. In the government, all facilities, perks, accommodation, travel allowance, vehicle, etc., are decided on basis of pay scales.

Strangely, the armed forces are neither classified as group “A” services nor are they termed as “Central services” like the IAS or the IPS, hence, they do not get an NFU. Now, with others getting NFU the gap gets widened. On the operational side, all civilian officers in Border Roads Organisation or the Military Engineering Services get this NFU, making them “senior” in hierarchy to the armed forces officers, who are otherwise senior in warrant of precedence  (WoP) defined by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In November last year, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) notified a three-member committee to study rank equivalence between the armed forces and the civilians employed in the Armed Forces Headquarters, called the AFHQ cadre.

The MoD appointed an Additional Secretary as head of the committee, while a Lt-Gen rank officer, who as per the WoP is ahead in status, was made a member of the committee. How the Armed forces accepted this, is not known.  The committee has made 21-page draft report that has not yet been presented to the MoD.

 The armed forces are protesting vehemently at the proposed “lowering” of their status.

In case of the forces, the ranks and their roles, functions and names have remained more or less the same since the British era. No more than 20 per cent of make it to the rank of Colonel as there are no automatic promotions. The percentage drops sharply for Brigadier, Maj General and Lt General.

(Concluded)