Saturday, October 5, 2019

Part 22 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA : PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN DOKLAM EFFICACY OF PLA IN WESTERN THEATRE COMBAT COMMAND

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR

[ REPRESENTATIVE VIDEO INDO PAK WAR--1971 REPRODUCING THE EXACT EVENT WHICH LED TO SURRENDER OF PAKISTAN ARMY IN ERSTWHILE EAST PAKISTAN ( NOW BANGLADESH ]

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html
Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html

Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html

Part 1 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

Part 21 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

Part 1 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

SOURCE:

GOOGLE EARTH

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poAVmF8BPjk

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2018/07/geographys-curse-indias-vulnerable.html

EFFICACY OF PLA CDS ,INTEGERATION &
MODERNIZATION
IN
THE WESTERN THEATRE TIBET COMBAT COMMAND

By
Vasundhra

REFERENCE: Must read
>Click URL to Read

Geography's Curse:

India's Vulnerable 'Chicken's Neck

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2018/07/geographys-curse-indias-vulnerable.html



Forget about India's Mountain Strike Corps. It has been put in the cold storage by SHEER PANIC ATTACK after a  "THREAT" from an obscure Chinese media agency "GLOBAL TIMES" .

On assumed figmentation of vested imagination, propagadated as hostile action performed by Indians, against the docile , peace loving civilised chinese. The Global Times launched a direct media offence directing the Indians to stop the raising & modernizing its armed forces or face the dire consequences.  Chinese media onslaught succeeded in suppressing, subduing and persuading  by coercion in  convincing the Indians who mattered in the Indian hierarchy  that the Chinese media threat  be taken in all seriousness as official Chinese  "DIKTAT". Chicken hearted Indian bureaucrats simply panicked and forced the modernization of armed forces on hold .    -- Vasundhra ]

Without entering into the detailed back ground of the  DOKLAM CRISIS let the issue be discussed purely from the MILITARY angle. Militarily consequences of freezing the raising of Indian mountain strike corps was the direct reason which encouraged the CHINESE for the DOKLAM to happen. Indians became the victim of chinese refined art of Sun tzu's principle of war:

"ENTER THE BATTLE, ONLY ONCE, WHEN THE WAR HAS BEEN WON "

PLA entered Doklam without firing a single bullet and the INDIANs kept on watching mutely and helplessly and in no time under the watch of Indian Army 67.5 sq Kms of Doklam platue was occupied by a DIVISON equivalent of HIGHLY INTEGERATED BATTLE GROUPS OF PLA. Chinese very subtly demonstrated the integration of psywarfare, media & armed forces under the umbrella of modernization of the armed forces. The process of this integration was put into action for perfection from early eighties and was detected  by CIA only around 2004. Indians most probably were the first casualty in DOKLAM of this media & armed forces integration under modernization as developed by the Chinese ( ref to : ( https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html  )

Before we proceed further on the deployment of PLA in DOKLAM , military importance of DOKLAM be examined.

After 1962 war with China & withdrawal of Indian trade mission from Yatung & Lhasa, Indian Army occupied mountain heights along the crest line of Chumbi valley. Indian army was in the advantageous position along Chumbi viz a viz PLA. This complete advantage now has been lost due to forceful occupation of DOKLAM by PLA.

Before militarily entering into Doklam PLA ensured the back up of sufficient military, psywarfare & diplomatic resources .

DOKLAM AND  THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY (COG) OF
THE BATTLE FIELD

   In a FLUID state of battle be it conventional or unconventional (   STATIC or Mobile or  be it be even Psychological ) there always is a ever shifting point called CENTRE OF GRAVITY ( COG ) at any given point of the battle. COG if identified timely be immediately be attacked & destroyed with requisite quantum of force. On destruction of the targeted objective (COG ), the complete battle field of the ADVERSARY will collapse and the adversaries defenses will be reduced to the state of uncoordinated resistance leading to ultimate surrender. To achieve this AIM of destruction & capture of COG the attackers has to preposition itself in a premeditated location called FULCRUM to avail the multiple options which may crop up during the course of BATTLE.

  By occupying DOKLAM, PLA has pre positioned itself on the FULCRUM  and has opened up the various options both TACTICAL & STRATEGIC to take forward the battle to its advantage.

A cursory mental INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION of the ground situation will reveal disturbing  & frightening end result fallout which will depend upon the AIM of what CHINESE & PLA are aiming at.

Militarily it cannot not be ignored that DOKLAM is located on the attackers SPRING BOARD  PLATFORM to pounce on the "SILIGURI CHICKENS NECK " of India. Any INFANTRY man will concur that all the viable targets to be achieved are with in ONE STANDARD INFANTRY MARCH to reach upto the target area & occupy ground of INTEREST .

Having said so let us examine the strategic capability of PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY in Tibet. After the setback of 1986-86 Sumdrung Chu confrontation PLA suffered far more casualties due to climatic conditions rather than ground action. This awakened the PLA to the actual state of ground realities. This gave an impetus to the Political leadership towards the PLA modernization. During DENG era not much progress could be made on modernization due to internal resistance to modernization within the PLA heirachy . A deliberate push to modernization has come with the advent of President Xi.

PLA demonstrated the following military strategic capabilities:

(a) 2008 EARTH QUAKE : PLA air dropped a complete PARA DIVISION in one go in the earth quake zone to collate the damage assessment under the personal supervision of President Xi. A sufficient data is available in the open media

(b) 2011-12 Mobilization Exercise of Forces from mainland China to Lhasa Region: To check & exercise the speedy mobilization of formations an exercise was conducted to shift the troops from Central, Eastern & Southern Army Group regions. PLA was able to shift almost a CORPs sized troops by airborne mode in stipulated time factor.

IT CAN BE SAFELY ASSUMED THAT PLA HAS PERFECTED ITS MOBILIZATION DRILLS OVER THE PERIOD

SUBJECT TO INTENTIONS OF PLA SUGGESTED STRATEGIC ' COGs ' OF THE BATTLE FIELD MAY BE CONSIDERED BY PLA ARE INDICATED IN THE DIAGRAM BELOW

ORDER OF BATTLE (ORBAT) PLA WESTERN THEATRE
COMBAT COMMAND

In addition to the ORBAT given below, during the process of modernization of PLA in 2016 a reduction of 3,00,000 troops was announced. All theses units were transferred to POLICE FORCE and re-positioned in the areas surrounding LHASA & SINKIANG to maintain peace and supress the internal unrest. No organisational, EQUIPMENT or manpower changes were made and all units have remained directly under jurisdiction & command of PLA, units as usual being commanded by PLA officers and administration. It can be safely assumed that these units will also be available.

Going by the previous experience of 1986-87 it can be assumed that 13th & 21st Army Group will be deployed against Arunachal and resources from 47th Group Army will be available for Chumbi Valley

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
DEPLOYMENT IN DOKLAM
AS ON 16 Jan 2018

DOKLAM: THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF BATTLE FIELD
AT A STRATEGIC & TACTICAL LEVEL

Below is the url of deployment of PLA on the Doklam plateau. On googling the the URL complete deployment of PLA in DOKLAM will open. At this stage no comments or explanation notes are given as the developments are in the state of flux . Standard symbols as available in Google earth are used. Any military mind will take no time to put the picture in its correct perspective on the nature of deployment .
------------------------------------------------
CLICK/ GOOGLE TO OPEN

https://www.dropbox.com/s/40431413vwglli1/PLA%20DEFENCES%20DOKLAM%20AS%20ON%2008%20MAY%202019.kmz?dl=0

----------------------------------------------

OUTLINE OF DEPLOYMENT

As per GOOGLE EARTH imagery fortifications for a divison level force are ready. There are NINE Mortor PLATOONS located. TEN Hellipads . Satellite antenna for illuminating and registering the targets along with transmission to satellite monitoring station for acquisition , targeting and destruction .guidance system to the destruction of the target .

All support arms are chassis based & mounted. Towed wpns have not been sighted. A net work of roads have been laid . New roads from Chumbi to Doklam plateau are in progress via SENCHE LA PASS. Every second day new fortifications can be observed coming up. There are chassis loaded platforms seen of Howtizers, may be a sqadron of light tanks ( 32 tons ), Precision guided Pinaka class rocket tubes, MBRLs. Deployment non mistakenly is of OFFENSSIVE DEFENCE posture. This is a initial posture of ATTACK OPERATIONs OF WAR. Intensive additional offensive fortifications are in progress.

By conservative estimate the force level in Doklam is approximately a Division ( PLUS or MINUS ) & total force in CHUMBI VALLEY seems to have increased by multiplication factor point five(.5) to point seven five( .75) The intensive fresh trench work and realignment of existing roads have been detected which clearly suggests a heavy augmentation of resources in the existing defenses along Nathu La & Jelep La defended areas

It can be safely assumed that PLA's likey deployment could be :

(a) DOKLAM: One Division
(b) CHUMBI : Three Divisions
(C) AXES SHIGATSE -GYANTSE -PAHARI : (a) Mechanised Inf Bdes - TWO
(b) Armour Bde ............. -ONE

FIG 1 : DOKLAM PLATEAU BEFORE PLA INTRUSSION WHICH TRADITIONALLY WAS ALWAYS A SUMMER GRAZING GROUND

FIG 2 : LAND MARKS IN THE TARGETED AREA OF PLA INTEREST ON DOKLAM PLATUE

FIG 3 : TOPOGRAPHY DEPICTING STREAMS & RIVER

FIG 4: INTERNATIONAL BOUNDRY INDIA - BHUTAN -& CHUMBI VALLEY(CHINESE OCCUPIED TIBET)

FIG 5 : DOKLAM PLATUE ROADS CONSTRUCTED BY THE CHINESE (PLA) AFTER INTRUSSION

FIG 6 : DOKLAM PLATUE HELLIPADS

FIGURE 7 : DEPLOYMENT PLA ON DOKLAM PLATUE AS ON 17 JAN 2018

FIGURE 8 : ENLARGED VIEW PLA DEPLOYMENT FIRST QUADRANT ( 0 deg TO 90 deg)

FIGURE 9 :ENLARGED VIEW PLA DEPLOYMENT SECOND) QUADRANT ( 90 deg TO 180 deg)

FIGURE 10 :ENLARGED VIEW PLA DEPLOYMENT THIRD QUADRANT ( 180 deg TO 270 deg)

FIGURE 11 :ENLARGED VIEW PLA DEPLOYMENT FOURTH QUADRANT

( 270 deg TO 360 deg)

Detail Intelligence Appreciation Report will follow in the subsequent Aricles

REFERENCE: Must read
>Click URL to Read

Geography's Curse:

India's Vulnerable 'Chicken's Neck

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2018/07/geographys-curse-indias-vulnerable.html

Please ensure that "GOOGLE EARTH " is

downloaded on your Mobile or LAPTOP or Desk Top

> FOR BEST VIEWING

WATCH ON DESKTOP/ LAPTOP

PLA DEPLOYMENT AT DOKLAM
ON
GOOGLE EARTH

------------------------------------------------
CLICK/ GOOGLE TO OPEN

https://www.dropbox.com/s/40431413vwglli1/PLA%20DEFENCES%20DOKLAM%20AS%20ON%2008%20MAY%202019.kmz?dl=0

----------------------------------------------

Wednesday, September 25, 2019

CDS PART 21 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA : The Western Theater Command (r)

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html
Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

Part 1 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

PLA THEATRE COMMANDs REFERENCES

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-western-theater-command/

ANALYSIS
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/59413

https://imrmedia.in/current-issue.php#772

Despite continuing high-level meetings between China and India’s military, Beijing has not settled its border disputes with India, and continues aggressive military activity along the disputed border regions (China Military Online, November 22, 2016). This is despite China’s resolution of most disputed land borders including those with Russia and Vietnam. China has also continued construction of infrastructure to support military operations in a conflict. The current round of ambitious PLA reforms, including creation of peacetime joint theater commands, will significantly increase joint operations capabilities in the newly formed Western Theater Command with responsibility for the Indian strategic direction. [1]

Each of the five new theater commands will focus on combat operations and enhancing joint training of subordinate forces based on wartime missions.The new commands include the Eastern Theater Command (TC) based on the former Nanjing Military Region (MR) responsible for Taiwan operations and territorial disputes with Japan; the Southern TC based on the Guangzhou MR responsible for operations against Vietnam and the South China Sea region, as well as providing forces for operations in a Taiwan conflict; Western TC based on the former Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs; Northern TC based on Shenyang MR plus Inner Mongolia and Shandong Provinces responsible for responding to potential instability on the Korean peninsula or possibly supporting operations against Japan; and a Central TC based on Beijing and Jinan MRs with responsibility for capital defense and serving as a strategic reserve to reinforce other theaters (Global Times, February 2, 2016; Xinhua, February 1, 2016).

The Western Theater Command

The Western Theater Command (WTC) is the most expansive of the new theaters with complex internal and external operational requirements. The theater commander is Army General Zhao Zongqi, former commander of Jinan MR (2012–2016). General Zhao participated in combat against Vietnam, served as commander of the 52nd Mountain Brigade in the early 1990’s, and commander of the 14th Group Army (2005–2008) before moving to assignments in Jinan MR. These experiences demonstrate extensive operational knowledge of mountain warfare, making Zhao a good choice as WTC commander (Xinhua, February 1, 2016; The Beijing News, February 2, 2016; China Military Online, March 3, 2016).

The Western Theater Command

The WTC is the largest theater and has complex terrain including desert and high mountains, long borders, and challenging social conditions. Theater missions include supporting the People’s Armed Police Force maintaining internal stability in the restive Tibet and Xinjiang regions. Disaster relief requiring liaison with civilian organizations is also an important theater mission. External responsibilities include responding to possible unrest in Central Asia under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO sponsored series of Peace Mission exercises since 2005 have trained SCO forces for combined operations responding to large scale unrest. However, the WTC’s primary strategic direction is India and the contested border regions (Xinhua, August 18, 2014; China Military Online, March 3, 2016).

CLICK/GOOGLE TO OPEN & TRANSLATE

http://www.81.cn/2016xbzq/2016-03/16/content_6962518.htm

The Chinese press has reported that the Tibet Military Command/Military District in the WTC has been elevated by one level compared to other provincial-level military districts and placed under the PLA Army (PLAA). Most provincial-level military districts are under the National Defense Mobilization Department of the CMC with responsibility for reserves, militia and conscription. An article in The Global Times reported that the Tibet Military Command will be responsible for operations against India, at least in the Arunachal Pradesh area, training forces for specialized high-altitude mountain warfare and long-range mobility for such a contingency (Global Times, May 13, 2016). However, Army command would appear to usurp the theater’s command responsibility. The Xinjiang Military District is also under PLAA command. The current reforms and reorganization make the services responsible for force development and training their respective forces, which would appear to include the Army commands in the Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts. Since the WTC has a difficult internal mission, the Army might additionally be responsible for internal missions in Tibet and Xinjiang, acting as an intermediate command level for the theater, which would have a daunting span of control if widespread unrest occurred in both areas, compounded by an external crisis.

The WTC headquarters includes a joint operations command center also located in Chengdu. The theater Army headquarters is in Lanzhou. The new Strategic Logistics Support Force has subordinate Joint Logistics Support Centers in each theater, with one in Xining for the WTC. The WTC can deploy subordinate PLAA and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) units, and request additional forces from the CMC if required. Each theater will require time to fully transition from the Army dominated MR headquarters to establish joint commands, gain familiarity between the services, as well as train personnel in their new joint positions. For example, the WTC brought together experts to address theater construction and develop plans to promote joint operations from February 28–29, 2016. The newly formed PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) as well as the other services have assigned high quality officers to the new joint commands. The PLARF reportedly assigned approximately 100 officers to the five new theater commands to support planning and training. It is not yet clear whether PLARF conventional missile launch brigades remain directly subordinate to the CMC or are theater assets. If they remain under centralized control, the CMC would assign launch brigades to support to the theaters as required (Global Times, February 4 , 2016; Xinhua, April 6, 2016; China Military Online, April 7, 2016; Global Times, April 12, 2016; China Military Online, May 10, 2016; PLA Daily, March 2, 2016; MOD, January 11, 2016).

The theater headquarters likely includes service departments and other specialized elements. A joint command post structure could include a command and control center, intelligence center, communications center, information operations center. firepower coordination center, air defense operations center, special operations center, military affairs mobilization department, political work department, logistics and equipment support department, and other elements as required. The theater would likely include a main, alternate, rear, and possibly a forward command post to command operations in a conflict (PLA Daily, May 28, 2016). [2]

WTC Training

The theater contains the combined arms tactical training bases (CATTB) located at Xichang and Qingtongxia. These CATTB’s are highly developed training facilities for both combined arms and joint training with the PLAAF. CATTB’s typically contain direction, evaluation and simulation facilities. Exercise umpires, multiple integrated laser engagement systems (MILES), data collection systems, and Opposing forces (OPFOR) are employed to promote training realism and evaluation. Qingtongxia CATTB, established around 2000, includes an urban warfare training village, electromagnetic environment simulation, monitoring and control systems, as well as a 1:500 scale (900 meters x 700 meters) mock-up of the contested Aksai Chin border region. The PLAAF experimental training base at Dingxin, Gansu Province, is used for live fire and complex electromagnetic environment training. PLAAF units rotate through this large training area, which also contains a mock-up of Taiwan’s Ching Chuan Kang Air Force Base (清泉崗). A PLAAF training base at Korla contains an airfield mockup resembling the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. The PLARF uses the airfield mock-ups as targets for live fire training. The PLA also employs military training coordination zones for joint exercises, and the WTC contains joint training coordination zones in the Tianshan Mountains, in Gansu Province, and in the Chongqing area (PLA Daily, January 2, 2009; The Register, July 19, 2006; WantChinaTimes, December 30, 2014; PLA Daily, March 2, 2006; PLA Daily, November 3, 2010; PLA Daily, October 6, 2006).

PLA training exercises in the WTC have featured offensive and defensive mountain and cold weather warfare training and long-distance movement of units. The Stride (跨越), Joint Action (联合行动), and Firepower (火力) series of exercises have trained units, including those from the WTC, to move long distances by multiple means to reinforce another region and engage in combat. Firepower-2016 in Qingtongxia featured units from the five theaters training against a 47th GA brigade acting as a simulated enemy (China Military Online, February 28, 2016; China Military Online, July 12, 2016; China Military Online, October 12, 2015).

Potential PLA Operations in the Indian Strategic Direction

The primary border areas under dispute are the Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin in the west, and Arunachal Pradesh in the east controlled by India. China and India have conducted combined “Hand-in-Hand” (携手) counter-terrorism exercises on a small scale and have established high-level dialogue on border issues to alleviate tensions. There has also been tension between the two countries over Chinese activity in the border regions as well as the Indian Ocean. The WTC would have to coordinate operations with the responsible command for naval operations against India. The WTC focuses on relevant campaign scenarios to train troops for potential combat operations. PLA publications detail several campaigns that the WTC could conduct including Anti-terrorism Stability Maintenance operations to combat internal unrest; Joint Border Counterattack Campaigns to defend against an attack and regain lost territory; Mountain Offensive Campaigns; and Joint Fire Strike Campaigns usually supporting another campaign, but also an independent campaign (Global Times, September 5, 2012). [3]

China is rapidly improving infrastructure in the Sino-Indian border region as part of development plans for Tibet as well as to prepare for possible defensive or offensive operations. China has constructed roads to and along disputed areas, along with additional airbases, landing strips and logistics sites to support military deployments and operations. India has also improved transportation infrastructure in its controlled areas, and plans additional infrastructure construction to support its military and paramilitary forces along the border. India has also deployed additional forces to the border regions since 2012 (China Brief, September 13, 2016; Times of India, February 20, 2014; Daily Excelsior, February 11, 2016; NDTV, July 21, 2016).

The Sino-Indian disputed borders represent isolated high-altitude regions with difficult terrain and weather conditions presenting problems for troops, weapons and equipment. Ground combat will occur mainly along roads that normally follow valleys or ridges, limiting support and cooperation between forces operating on different axes. The lack of cross-terrain mobility limits the ability of ground forces to conduct penetrating or outflanking operations against enemy forces. PLA publications stress air mobile landings in the enemy rear area to overcome the restricted terrain and enemy defensive positions. Special operations forces available to the WTC would represent highly qualified units to operate in the enemy rear area to disrupt operations and attack vulnerable lines of communications. The high-altitude reduces aviation performance and lift capabilities, and increases maintenance requirements on equipment in general, although the thin air increases the range of projectiles and shrapnel. Weather conditions would mostly limit air operations to June through September. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in October and November without air support. Cold high-plateau regions place increases requirements on engineering and support operations, and the thin air is difficult for the troops even after acclimation. This situation reduces unit combat capabilities and increases non-combat losses. Training new recruits could affect an operation depending on the timing. New recruits would likely achieve a minimal operational capability to conduct small unit combat by late spring, which should be adequate for the restricted terrain which will limit maneuver and dictate primarily small unit operations. Depending on the timing of the crisis, the PLA could decide to delay mobilization of soldiers in the WTC to retain full combat capability of units. [4]

The Aksai Chin border terrain mock-up at the Qingtongxia CATTB [ https://international.thenewslens.com/article/59413 ] depicts mostly Chinese occupied territory with only a small portion of Indian controlled terrain. This appears to indicate a focus on a Joint Border Counterattack Campaign in response to an Indian military incursion. However, the exact purpose of the large terrain model is unclear. The border counterattack campaign was originally considered an Army offensive campaign, although some PLA books now refer to it as a joint campaign. This campaign includes initial border defense actions with a transition to the offense to regain lost territory and restore the situation. The two mountain brigades and independent mechanized brigade are the closest ground forces to Arunachal Pradesh, although the 13th Group Army trains in mountain warfare and could deploy as needed. While no PLA forces are permanently garrisoned in the Aksai Chin area, it is likely that the mechanized infantry division in Hotan (see map) would deploy to this area. Air and missile strikes would support the ground operations to annihilate and expel invading enemy forces depending on the weather, or as in the Sino-Indian Border War operations could consist of mostly ground operations. [5]

The PLA would conduct a Mountain Offensive Campaign or possibly a Joint Fire Strike Campaign if Beijing issued orders for offensive operations. A Joint Fire Strike campaign would support the border counterattack or mountain offensive, but could also represent an independent campaign. The terrain, weather, and difficult engineering and comprehensive support conditions restraining the deployment and sustainment of forces could make a joint fire strike appear more advantageous to a mountain offensive. A mountain offensive would require a substantial advantage in the correlation of forces for the attacker operating under terrain and weather restrictions. As an independent campaign, a joint fire strike could represent punitive strikes against key Indian targets. A joint fire strike campaign is a long-range precision strike by long-range rocket, missile and air forces with the objective to destroy important enemy targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems (integrated force grouping), weaken the will to resist and destroy war potential, or create conditions for other operations. The Chinese leadership could conclude that conducting precision strikes against key Indian targets was preferable to conducting difficult offensive ground operations where the defender has an advantage. [6]

Future Prospects

The creation in peacetime of theater joint commands accelerates the PLA’s plan to develop an integrated joint operations capability, promotes theater joint training and greater familiarity between the services, and provides for a rapid transition from peacetime to wartime operations. The theater commands will train units for wartime operational missions which will decrease the need for pre-war preparations and pre-battle training. Ultimately this development will increase the combat effectiveness of forces not only in the WTC, but also in the other theaters.

It will take time for the theater commands to achieve an optimal joint operational capability as the joint commands and personnel need to establish coordination procedures and working relationships. The PLA also recognizes the requirement to improve joint professional military education for its officers, which will take time to fully implement throughout the military educational institutes, graduating a quantity of officers adept at integrated joint operations. However, PLA joint operations are constantly improving and joint exercises for more than a decade provide increased joint experience and improving capabilities.

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Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, Russia, China and Taiwan during 31 years in the U.S. Government. He has written numerous intelligence products for decision makers, combatant commands, combat and force developers, as well as contributing to the annual Report to Congress on China’s military power. Mr. McCauley’s new book is titled,

“Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin.”

Notes

This article is based on an article appearing in the Indian Military Review, Vol. 7, Issue 9, September 2016
Theater Joint Operations Command (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016), pp. 76–82; Military Terms (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011), p. 173; Science of Joint Tactics (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2014) pp. 130–136.
Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006); Military Terms (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011.
Science of Army Campaigns Under High-Tech Conditions, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2003), pp. 303–323.
Science of Army Campaigns Under High-Tech Conditions, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2003), pp. 303–323; Military Terms (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011), pp. 70–71.

Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), pp. 404–425.

http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/CHINA%20pub784.pdf

China's Western Theater Command

CB_17_1_1.pdf