Thursday, October 31, 2019

Part 26 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA( N ) : Strategic Strong Points and Chinese Naval Strategy

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html

Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part 9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part 8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html

Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html

Part 1 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

SOURCE:

https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Read-the-03-22-2019-CB-Issue-in-PDF-1.pdf?x87069

China's Geography Problem

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiBF6v5UAAE ]

Why China is building islands in

the

South China Sea

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luTPMHC7zHY ]

Feb 17, 2017

Why China is building islands in the South China Sea

China's TrillionDollar Plan Global Trade

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=EvXROXiIpvQ ]

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvXROXiIpvQ ]

STRATEGIC STRONG POINTS
AND
CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY
BY
Conor Kennedy

PLA Navy Vice Admiral Tian Zhong reviews Chinese

and Djiboutian troops at the PLA Navy support base

in Djibouti, August 1, 2017. (Source: China Daily)

Introduction

On August 1, 2017, China opened its first overseas

military base, in the East African nation of Djibouti.

This was a landmark event that raised a whole host

of questions for Indo-Pacific states: Is Djibouti the

first of other bases to come? If so, how many?

Where will China build them? How will they be

used? Where do they fit into Chinese military

strategy? Chinese policymakers and analysts are

pondering these same questions. However, they are

employing concepts unique to Chinese strategic

discourse, and it is essential to grasp these concepts

in order to understand how Beijing intends to

project military power abroad.

For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the term

“overseas military base” (haiwai junshi jidi, 海外军事

基地) carries significant historical baggage:

foreign imperialists built them on the soil of other countries

in order to colonize and exploit them. On the other

hand, Chinese policymakers have come to recognize

the value of maintaining locations overseas where

the Chinese military—above all, the People’s

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—can concentrate

resources needed to support operations abroad.

To distinguish Chinese actions from the predatory

deeds of Western and Japanese imperialists,

Chinese military thinkers have adopted a

specialized term: the “strategic strong point”

(zhanlüe zhidian, 战略支点). [1] A careful analysis of

the Chinese use of this concept offers valuable

insights into Beijing’s strategic intentions outside of

East Asia.

Understanding the

“Strategic Strong Point” Concept

The term “strategic strong point” has different

meanings, depending on the context in which it is

used. In some cases it refers to a quasi alliance

relationship; in other cases, it is used in the context

of overseas ports ( Journal of Strategy and Decision

Making , No. 2, 2017). The 2013 Science of Military

Strategy describes them as locations that “provide

support for overseas military operations or act as a

forward base for deploying military forces

overseas” ( Military Science Publishing , December

2013). The PLAN’s new facility in Djibouti

has been called China’s first “overseas strategic

strong point” ( World Affairs , July 26, 2017).

The term is not just applied to Chinese bases: U.S.

bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are also

sometimes described as strategic strong points, and

Chinese observers have spent considerable time

examining these bases in order to inform their own

thinking on developing overseas strategic strong

points. Between 2016 and 2017, the PLAN’s official

magazine Navy Today ran a series of articles, each

one discussing the features and strategic roles of

individual U.S. bases. One refers to Pearl Harbor

as a “strategic strong point in America’s forward

defense,” without which its defensive lines would be

limited to the homeland ( Navy Today , June 24

2016). Two others describe the roles of Diego Garcia

and Guam as strategic strong points critical to

Washington’s global strategy. [2]

However, Chinese experts are quick to point out

that China’s strategic strong points are

fundamentally different from those of other states.

They state that China’s strategic strong points offer

benefits to host states and provide them with public

security goods. Moreover, these sites will not be

used to conduct offensive operations, as is the

case with the overseas bases of other states. [3]

The Need for Strategic Strong Points

Strategic strong points will improve the Chinese

military’s ability to operate overseas. Currently, the

PLAN conducts the vast majority of the PRC’s

military missions abroad. The PLAN serves two

primary functions: protecting China’s sea lines of

communication (SLOCs), and safeguarding China’s

overseas interests. Both require forward presence

in strategically important areas of the IndoPacific.

According to the Science of Military Strategy, an

expansion of the geographic scope of naval

operations requires the establishment of

replenishment points and “various forms of limited

force presence” ( Science of Military

Strategy, December 2013).

Strategic strong points fulfill these demands. An

engineer at the Academy of Military Science’s

Institute of Logistics explains that overseas strategic

strong points will support the military’s longrange

projection capabilities by effectively shortening

resupply intervals and expanding the range of

support for Chinese forces operating abroad

( National Defense , December 2017). However,

replenishment ships alone cannot meet the Navy’s

needs. As the deputy chief of the PLAN Operations

Department wrote in 2010, personnel relief,

equipment servicing, and the uncertainties of

foreign berthing facilities were limiting factors in

the long term regularization of overseas operations.

Chinese facilities in overseas ports are the next step

in building an “overseas support system.” [4]

PLAN Commander Adm. Wu Shengli talked about

the importance of strategic strong points in

December 2016, during an event commemorating

the eighth anniversary of China’s anti piracy

operation off the Horn of Africa. Wu Shengli

pointed out that “overseas strategic strong point

construction has provided a new support for escort

operations… We must give full play to the

supporting role of the overseas support system to

carry out larger scale missions in broader areas and

to shape the situation.” [5]

Establishing several strategic strong points near

crisis regions is integral to ensuring the sustained

and effective use of forces in these roles. [6] When

incidents and crises erupted in the past, efforts to

protect China’s overseas interests were highly

reactive. Strategic strong points allow China to

gradually shift its posture to stabilize and control

situations before they become crises. They might

even play a role in stabilizing local governments

and economies, and in ensuring civil order

( International Herald Tribune , October 13 2015).

Accurate and timely intelligence is vital to effective

operations, and PLA thinkers believe that strategic

strong points will serve intelligence support

functions. [7] Two authors from the PLA Equipment

Academy write about the PLAN’s development of a

“sea & space battlefield versatile situation picture”

that integrates various intelligence sources to

provide real time visualized information support for

the PLAN’s overseas actions. This system, they state,

will support the PLAN’s defensive strategy in its

strategic strong points, maritime passages,

and core interest areas ( Journal of Equipment

Academy , April 2017).

One is Not Enough

The 2013 Science of Military Strategy declared that

China “must build overseas strategic strong points

that depend on the homeland, radiate into the

surrounding areas, and move toward the two

oceans.” The “two oceans” refer to the Pacific Ocean

and the Indian Ocean. Chinese sources clearly place

an emphasis on the Indian Ocean, across which

extends China’s most important SLOC: often called

China’s “lifeline” ( shengming xian, 生命线), this

SLOC runs from the mainland across the South

China Sea, and through the Malacca Strait into the

Indian Ocean. There are two primary straits at the

end of this lifeline: the Babel Mandeb Strait and the

Strait of Hormuz ( Grand Strategies for

Strengthening the Nation: Research on the

Forefront Issues of National Strategy , June 2016).

Securing the end of this lifeline is China’s first

overseas strategic strong point,

the PLA(N) support base in Djibouti ( World Affairs ,

July 26, 2017).

The Maritime Silk Road follows China’s lifeline

through the Indian Ocean, connecting the ports of

many of the countries along this route. The

secretary general of the China Port Association

explains that Chinese port companies are expanding

their investment layout overseas through mergers

and acquisitions, joint ventures, and other methods.

These ports are referred to as important nodes for

constructing the Maritime Silk Road ( China Ports ,

July 2018). According to an expert from the Dalian

Naval Academy, each of these nodes can potentially

be transformed into a strategic strong point ( Ocean

Development and Management , January 2016).

Chinese strategists also view the PLAN’s island bases

in the South China Sea (SCS) as strategic strong

points, and believe that a network of mutually

supporting strategic strong points will help China

secure the SCS leg of its maritime lifeline. The PRC

established and expanded Sansha City in the

Paracels in 2012, and began constructing artificial

islands in the Spratlys in 2013 ( China Ocean Press ,

December 5, 2016; China News Weekly , May 12,

2016). Authors from the PLA and government

sponsored institutes describe these efforts as

the construction of strategic strong points

meant to strengthen China’s position in the SCS

Three authors from the Dalian Naval Academy

discuss the strategic logic of building this network

in the SCS, and the support that these island points

might offer for the PLAN’s operations along the

Maritime Silk Road ( Proceedings from the 8 th

Maritime Power Strategy Forum , October 21,

2016).

Figure 1 (below) shows their depiction of the

interlocking nature of strategic strong points in the

South China Sea.

Figure 1: —Hypothetical Map of Strategic Strong

Point Construction in the South China Sea

“ ( Proceedings from the 8th Maritime Power

Strategy Forum, October 21, 2016).

Linked to the PRC mainland, this network of strategic

strongpoints is intended to secure a military presence

on theeastern entrance to the Malacca Strait. With the

Djiboutinaval base in place, China has secured a

military presence on the far end of its lifeline. However

, the PLAN has notbeen sufficiently engaged on the

western entrance to theMalacca Strait, and many

Chinese analysts believe that thisis the logical next step

(The New Orient, September 23,2014). [8]

Discussion of the strategic strong point concept is not

confined to the Indian Ocean and the SCS. Other

authoritative sources have recently used the term in a

grander context, citing the expansion of China’s

interestsglobally (World Affairs, June 2018). Indeed, the

deputydirector of the Center for National Strategic

Research at theChinese Academy of Governance

advocates the building ofnumerous strategic strong

points across multiple regions(Administrative Reform,

June 2016). For example, some propose building a

similar network of strategic strong points in the South

Pacific (Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making, No. 2

, 2017), stating that the control of strategic strong points

in these areas can help relieve strategicpressure from

maritime challenges closer to home in the SCS (Ministry

of Commerce, May 23, 2017).

However, there currently exists a wide gap in strategic

strong point coverage of China’s lifeline across the

northern Indian Ocean between Djibouti and the SCS,

making this area the current priority. In the northern

Indian Ocean, the ports of Gwadar (Pakistan) and

Hambantota (Sri Lanka) are frequently cited as

candidates to become future strategic strong points

(Reformation & Strategy, March 2017). Gwadar is well-

positioned to cover the Strait of Hormuz, a key passage

for Chinese energy imports; whereas Hambantota

provides an excellent Indian Ocean mid-transit point for

replenishment, repair, and berthing (China

WaterTransport, December 2015).

Creating an Overseas Support System

Chinese strategists are already discussing the need to

integrate individual strategic strong points into an

overseas support system. The need to connect

individual “points”(dian, 点) into “lines” (xian, 线) is a

common theme in discussions about strategic strong

points (Administrative Reform, June 2016). Officers from

the PLAN Command College describe a future basing

layout that “combines points and lines” and “controls

chokepoints.” [9] Chinese experts also point out that

these lines should eventually combine to form “fronts”

(mian, 面) (Proceedings from the 8th Maritime Power

Strategy Forum, October 21, 2016).

Faculty at the Dalian Naval Academy have explained the

functions of strategic strong points in what they refer to

as the “Points, Lines, and Fronts Strategy for ‘Maritime

SilkRoad’ Strategic Strong Point Construction”

(Proceedingsfrom the 8th Maritime Power Strategy

Forum, October 21,2016). This concept is illustrated in

Figure 2 (below)

(Original graphic modified to provide author‘s

translation of the original Chinese)

The subject of “fronts” is currently unclear and some

what sensitive. Some discussions of a mutually

supporting network of strategic strong points intent

ionally avoid drawing connections between each

point, fearing that doing so could raise fears about

China’s grander ambitions. As one author from the

Institute of Strategic and Security Studies at the

PLA’s National Defense University explains, the

relationship between“points” and “fronts” in

strategic strong point construction must be properly

managed to reduce the risk of sparking alarm

among foreign observers and host states, who might

interpret such expansion negatively. China must

realistically plan numerous “points,” but only let so

me of them “bloom.” Some can make developmental

breakthroughs, but multiple “lines” should not

coincide with each other. The most strategically

valuable strategic strong points must be developed

first. [10]

If such an approach is ultimately adopted, it is likely that

we are witnessing an initial period of rapid strategic

strong point construction. What follows may be a

gradual maturation of civilian port infrastructure into a

more robust logistics support network–one located

along the mid-section of the lifeline route, which will link

up with locations in the South China Sea.

Conclusions

This article has attempted to answer some critical

questions about China’s approach to developing its

overseas military support capabilities. Tracking Chinese

discussion on strategic strong points can shed light on

the PRC’s intent to establish an overseas military

presence. Significantly, the term demonstrates a

relationship between the seeming unrelated military

facilities that the PRC has constructed in the Horn of

Africa and the South China Sea. Academic discussions

on strategic strong points are widespread, and there are

numerous Chinese experts exploring this subject on

two levels. Many examine in-depth the role of strategic

strong points in supporting Chinese sea power (Journal

of International Security Studies, February 2015).

However, there is also a branch of discourse that utilizes

the term as an alternative concept to an alliance:

scholarly discussions of strategic strong points in this

context often advocate that China relax, but not

abandon, its non-alliance policy (Journal of

Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, No. 1, 2014).

Beijing has sought to minimize the security dimensions

of its Belt and Road strategy in order to mitigate

negative press coverage regarding the PRC’s future

geopolitical intentions (China Defense News, May 5

, 2017). However, the widespread use of the term

“strategic strong points” appears to have successfully

allowed an open discussion since 2013 of China’s

construction of overseas military presence and basing,

while still allowing the PRC to posture itself as a more

virtuous international actor than the rapacious imperial

powers of the past. Understanding the terms and

concepts of this discussion will prove fundamental to

assessing future Chinese naval strategy.

========================

Conor Kennedy is an Instructor at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA from the Johns Hopkins UniversityNanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies.

------------------------------

Notes

[1] The term “strategic strong point” is also often written as 战略支撑点 (zhanlüe zhichengdian) , used interchangeably. See: 王多月 [Wang Duoyue], “战略支撑点与 ‘21世纪海上丝绸之路’ 的建设” [Strategic Pivot Countries and the Construction of the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ in 21 st Century], May 20, 2017, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, p. 27.

[2] 李大光 [Li Daguang], "关岛基地: 美军西太军事要塞" [Guam Base: The US Military's Fortress in the Western Pacific], 当代海军 [Navy Today], No. 2, 2016, pp. 6062; 杨燕南 [Yang Yan'nan], "迪戈加西亚: 美军印度洋上不沉的 '航母'" [Diego Garcia: US Military's Unsinkable 'Aircraft Carrier' in the Indian Ocean], 当代海军 [Navy Today], No. 7, 2016, pp. 5255.

[3] 许可 [Xu Ke], “构建 ‘海上丝路’ 上的战略支点” [On the Establishment of Strategic Fulcrums for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: A Reference of Diego Garcia Base for China], 亚太安全与海洋研究 [AsiaPacific Security and Maritime Affairs], No. 5 2016, p. 13.

[4] 王滨 [Wang Bin], “护航行动海外保障点建设思考” [Thoughts on the Construction of Overseas Support Points for Escort Operations], 海军杂志 [Navy Magazine], No. 12, 2010, p. 2.

[5] Commander Wu Shengli’s original quote: "海外战略支点建设为护航行动提供了新支撑。我们必须充分发挥海外保障体系的支撑作用，以便在更大范围、更广领域遂行任务、塑造态势." See: 梁庆松 [Liang Qingsong], 王元元 [Wang Yuanyuan], "海军召开亚丁湾护航8周年研讨会" [The Navy Holds a Seminar on the 8th Anniversary of the Gulf of Aden Escorts], 人民海军 [People's Navy], December 30, 2016, p. 1.

[6] Xu Ke, p. 12.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Xu Ke, p. 10.

[9] The original Chinese for the phrase describing China’s basing layout is “点线结合、控制咽喉、依托城市、重在长远.” See: 谌力, 汪丽, 韦政 [Chen Li, Wang Li, Wei Zheng], “新安全观视域下海外基地转型重塑的影响及启示” [The Impact and Lessons of the Transformation and Reconstruction of Overseas Military Bases Under the New Security Concept], 国防 [National Defense], No. 9, 2017, pp. 4145.

[10] Original Chinese is “ 可以多点运筹, 但不宜全面开花; 适宜重点突破, 不能多线并进.” See: 胡欣 [Hu Xin], “中国的海外战略支点建设需要处理好五对关系” [China’s Construction of Overseas Strategic Strong Points Must Deal with Five Relationships], 世界知识 [World Affairs], No. 3, 2018, p. 74.

Wednesday, October 30, 2019

ISIS TERRORISM : Terrorism Landscape Set to Shift in the Wake of Al Baghdadi’s Death

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pufDrPUrNBE

PREVIEW

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadi ]

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s leadership and will to expand territory and govern people are key elements that set ISIL apart from its contemporaries. Removing that leadership in the early days of the movement might have completely derailed its progress and dispersed its followers. But the momentum of the organization, as it currently is, has grown beyond just the influence of one man, and removing al-Baghdadi might even promote him to martyr status and galvanize his followers behind his replacement. The replacement might not be as effective a leader, but there is no guarantee that removing this strength would prevent ISIL from attaining its objectives. Therefore, it does not follow at this point that al-Baghdadi is the center of gravity.

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ed9_2d3KFsE ]

REFER TO :

Click/Google to Open

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-one-centre-of-gravity-of-battle.html

SOURCE:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/10/30/terrorism_landscape_set_to_shift_in_the_wake_of_al-baghdadis_death_114821.html

Terrorism Landscape Set to Shift in the Wake of Al Baghdadi’s Death

By

Isaac Kfir

On 27 October, President Donald Trump announced that on the previous night U.S. special forces had raided a compound in Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria. In the house was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who detonated a suicide vest to avoid capture, killing himself and three of his children.

It seems that Idlib has become a centre for many Salafi-jihadists. The province has seen a massive population growth as people look for some semblance of security and stability, which depends in part on a ceasefire overseen by the Russians.

The president thanked the Russian, Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish governments as well as the Syrian Kurdish forces for their assistance in the demise of al-Baghdadi.

On Sunday, Islamic State suffered further losses when U.S. Hellfire missiles successfully targeted Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir, the group’s spokesman since 2016. Muhajir was killed in the village of Ayn al-Bayda, near Jarablus, Aleppo Province.

It’s useful to take stock of what al-Baghdadi’s death means to IS but also to the global Salafi-jihadi campaign. It seems that IS had been preparing for this day since the fall of the caliphate, if not before (on 7 August, for example, Amaq, an IS-affiliated news agency, reported that al-Baghdadi had appointed Abdullah Qardash as his successor, though it’s been suggested that the report was based on false information). In his video message of 29 April, al-Baghdadi is seen with what appears to be a suicide vest next to his weapon, which indicates that he wasn’t intending to be taken alive.

Beyond the symbolism of losing its leader, IS is unlikely to be affected. It’s unclear how much command and control al-Baghdadi had over the group after the collapse of the caliphate, as he’s been on the run.

Over the past two years, IS shifted its organisational structure by becoming a franchisor, which meant that the franchisees carried out operations, often independently of the IS leadership. U.S. officials shared that opinion, noting that in the post-caliphate period the top leadership was issuing broad guidance, as opposed to day-to-day directions. Hassan Abu Hanieh, a Jordanian expert on extremist groups, supports this view.

In the next few days, if IS confirms the death of al-Baghdadi, the IS Shura will likely name a new leader.

The more interesting implications of al-Baghdadi’s death begin with what was he doing in Idlib. The area is associated with IS’s opponents—the larger al-Qaeda-linked organisation Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly the Nusra Front.

[ https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts ]

One important group that has emerged in the area since 2018 is Hurras al-Din (the ‘Guardians of Religion’), an al-Qaeda-affiliated organisation formed by Abu al-Qassam (aka Khalid al-Aruri), a close friend of Ahmed Abdullah (aka Abu Muhammad Al-Masri) and Saif al-Adel. In 2015, the three were released from prison by the Iranians, after which they travelled to Syria, forming all sorts of jihadi groups.

Abdullah and al-Adel are close to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda; both were allegedly involved in the 1998 East Africa bombings. Al-Aruri was close to IS’s spiritual founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Reports indicate that al-Baghdadi was staying with Abu Mohammed al-Halabi, one of the leaders of Hurras al-Din. The fact that al-Aruri and al-Halabi are involved raises some interesting issues.

Zawahiri has shown himself to be a careful strategist who is in for the long game, and he may be looking first to a possible consolidation with IS. This doesn’t mean amalgamation, as there’s too much bad blood between the two groups. However, there is a possibility of a sort of a hudna (‘calmness’, though it is often understood to mean a ceasefire), as the two networks spend too much time, treasure and resources fighting each other, and in doing so inflict a lot of damage on local populations.

In August, al-Adel released a statement noting that the enemies of the jihadis were trying ‘to exterminate any organization working to return Islam to its fundamentals and Turkey and others will not accept anything other than that’, adding that the mujahidin ‘must once again change the military theory to one that fits the situation and will succeed against the conspiracies of the enemies and against the Turkish program that the factions have agreed with’.

Zawahiri is 68 years old and is rumoured to have a serious ‘heart complaint’. It’s therefore likely that he’s thinking about the next generation and how to continue the Salafi-jihadi franchise, which requires money and new disciples. Those are things that IS has been very effective in developing, and the group reportedly still has access to U.S.$50–300 million and many foreign fighters. Zawahiri undoubtedly noticed IS’s latest propaganda campaign, ‘And the Best Outcome Is for the Pious’, which saw Salafi-jihadis from around the world renew their oaths of loyalty to al-Baghdadi.

Edmund Fitton-Brown, a top UN counterterrorism official, recently said that Zawahiri might be looking to northeast Syria as a potential centre from which to launch international terrorism. This is also why the presence of Hurras al-Din might be significant, as the group supposedly relies on between 1,500 and 2,000 fighters from many places. The key to Zawahiri’s strategy has been to unite local and international issues, while ensuring that the domestic takes precedence, which may become easier now that IS will be led by someone new.

Al-Baghdadi’s death may be a blow to IS, but it will also be an opportunity for the group to explore a new strategy, which could include moving away from the need to establish a caliphate. That would obviate the need to designate Baghdadi’s successor as caliph—a cumbersome process that also narrows the pool of candidates. Undoubtedly the U.S.-led decapitation program is causing havoc, but it also means that we could soon be seeing a new campaign by IS.

October 30, 2019