Delivering his work report to the National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang noted that “the Chinese mainland will resolutely oppose and contain ‘Taiwan independence separatist activities’” (“台独”分裂活动) (Xinhua, March 5). [1]President Xi Jinping, however, was even more explicit in early November 2016, when he said “1.3 billion Chinese people will oppose Taiwan independence. We have the ability, the determination and are prepared to deal with Taiwan independence. If we do not, we will be overthrown (推翻) by 1.3 billion people” (Apple Daily, November 2, 2016). China’s ability to “deal” with Taiwan involves political and economic pressure. These tools have already seen some success as the number of countries that recognize Taiwan shrinks, and Taiwan’s participation in international organizations is severely restricted. However, as China’s military becomes more effective, military coercion is increasingly a viable option. An overview of China’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC) provides some insight into the Chinese military’s current capabilities against Taiwan.
China’s Eastern Strategic Direction
Although eastern China is one of the most densely populated and important areas of the country, China’s east coast has not always been its primary strategic direction. Chinese military writings note that China’s historical focus on ground forces arose out of a lack of maritime threats to China from the east. In ancient times, and again during the 20th century, the threat of land invasions from the west and north outweighed threats to the east and south. [2]With the renewal of ties with Russia in the mid-1980s the strategic focus shifted again to the east, raising the importance of aerospace and maritime forces.
In the mid-1990s, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis put the region back in headlines. Missile launches in 1995 and 1996 prompted the United States to send two carrier strike groups to the area around Taiwan. The incident also revealed a number of deficits in PLA capabilities. While Taiwan remained a key issue for the PLA, its lack of sufficient maritime lift capacity, air superiority and even intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities meant that an invasion across the strait would not succeed. The U.S. navy’s ability to operate without real challenge was another major problem, and Chinese defense planners recognized the need to have layered offensive and defensive systems to project power into the East China Sea.
The Japanese governments’ 2012 purchase of the Senkaku Islands from a private owner sparked tensions and prompted widespread protests throughout China. Projecting power not just toward Taiwan but throughout the East China Sea gained additional importance. The Chinese government followed up on this by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone in late November 2013 (China Brief, December 5, 2013). The area has since seen a steady increase in Chinese military aviation and maritime patrols (China Brief, October 26, 2016). Accompanying these events, ........ China’s military has reformed and reorganized to better deal with security issues along its eastern strategic direction.
The military organizations responsible for most of eastern China have undergone a number of changes since the 1980s. Until 1988, China had 11 military regions (MR) including ones centered on Fuzhou in northern Fujian province and Nanjing. The Fuzhou MR was incorporated into the Nanjing MR, which, after the latest round of reforms, has been folded intact into the Eastern Theater Command. An important result of the 2015 military reforms is that the Theater Command acts as joint headquarters for Army, Navy and Air Force (China Brief, June 21, 2016). The Rocket Force also has units present in the ETC, although they are directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military body.
The Geography of Eastern China
Province/
Municipality
Population Millions (2015)
Anhui
69.5
Fujian
38.3
Jiangsu
79.8
Jiangxi
52
Shanghai
24.2
Zhejiang
55.4
Total
319.2
The current ETC is composed of military units within the borders ofAnhui, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, as well as Shanghai Municipality. Together, their populations include over 319 million citizens and three of China’s top ten ports—Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen. Bisected by the Yangtze River (长江), the region’s geography is dominated by plains in the north portion and mountains in the west and south. A cluster of multi-million person megacities connected by high-speed rail dot the landscape between the ETC’s headquarters in Nanjing in southwestern Jiangsu province to Shanghai on the coast. A number of large lakes, including Lake Tai (太湖), break up this geography. The three provinces and municipality on China’s coast together make up the Yangtze river delta (长江三角洲). So important is it to China’s economy, industry and population, The Science of Military Strategy, a PLA textbook, describes this area, along with the Pearl River Delta in China’s South, as one of its “centers of gravity”(重心所在). [3]
The Yangtze River connects eastern China with its central core, and the river plays a vital role commercially and logistically. The 1st Group Army, based in Huzhou, Zhejiang province contains a mix of units meant to defend the central coast of China. This includes an amphibious unit capable of operating in this environment of lakes and rivers that would also be used in a Taiwan scenario. The same group army contains well-equipped mechanized brigades and an armored brigade. Further to the north, the 12th Group Army is headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, and has mechanized brigades protecting Nanjing and northern Jiangsu. This central core of the ETC is also protected by the Air Forces’ 3rd Fighter Division, with a variety of air interception units.
China has its largest concentration of naval forces at the mouth of the Qiantang river (钱塘江). The East Sea Fleet is headquartered in Ningbo, and home to naval aviation units and several destroyer and submarine squadrons (zhidui; 支队), typically of 4–5 ships. PLA Naval Aviation units play an important role as they are responsible for patrolling the line between Taiwan and the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. Long-range naval H-6G bombers from Benniu air base regularly participate in long-distance patrols through the Miyako Strait and into the western Pacific.
The southern half of the ETC is dominated by rough terrain, and was the birthplace of the PLA’s predecessor, the Red Army, in Nanchang, Jiangxi province. Jiangxi’s mountains served a home base for a weakened Red Army in the early stages of China’s civil war. Now, Rocket Forces launch brigades present within the ETC are primarily located in the complicated terrain of Jiangxi and Anhui.
The coastal cities of Xiamen and Fuzhou, situated directly across the strait from Taiwan are also home to a large concentration of forces. The PLA Ground Forces’ headquarters is located in Fuzhou, and the area is well protected by Air Force and Ground Force air defense units, including long-range surface to air missiles that cover the entirety of the Taiwan Strait. Amphibious and Special Forces units vital to an invasion of Taiwan are also present under the 31st Group Army.
Joint Operations
The ETC’s Commander is Liu Yuejun (刘粤军) and its Political Officer is Zheng Weiping (郑卫平). Liu and Zheng are both ground force commanders with experience in China’s former Guangzhou military region in the south. Liu even participated in China’s last military conflict, its short border war with Vietnam in 1979 (The Taiwan Link, April 3, 2016). In any conflict, these men would need to coordinate closely with their subordinate commanders of the Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force, as well as the Rocket Force commander. In March 2016, in the midst of the shift to theater commands, Liu and Zheng co authored an editorial in the Communist Party’s journal Seeking Truth in which they described the creation of the theater commands as a key enabler of joint operations (Seeking Truth, March 31, 2016).
The PLA has made progress in learning how to conduct joint operations, but the complications of conflict on its eastern seaboard also necessitates coordination between Theater Commands, particularly the Southern and Eastern Commands (China Brief, July 22, 2016). China’s two marine brigades, for example, are located near Zhanjiang in Guangdong province. Although Shanghai is home to a landing ship squadron, such forces would need to work together. Other units would need to be redeployed from other theater commands. This would allow, for example, strategically important areas to rapidly increase their air defenses by redeployment from the Central TC to the area around Fuzhou, as recently practiced by an HQ-9 Surface-to-Air Missile (ChinaMil, October 12, 2016).
The PLA regularly practices the types of operations it would need in a Taiwan scenario. Amphibious units practice long-distance movement overland as well as maritime operations (China Brief, August 4, 2015). The Liaoning, China’s test-bed aircraft carrier, has recently begun live-fire air superiority and anti-ship operations (China Brief, December 21, 2016). As China completes and brings online its own indigenously built carriers, both operations could be used off the northeastern coast of Taiwan. Air Force and Naval Aviation have conducted joint long-distance patrols near Taiwan and through the Miyako Strait (China Brief, October 26, 2016).
The Rocket Forces also play an important role in the ETC’s offensive power projection. There are at least four Rocket Force Launch Brigades in the ETC, under Base 52 in Huangshan, Anhui, as well as an additional brigade in Shaoguan, Guangdong. According to the latest Annual to Congress on the Chinese military, some 1,200 short- and medium-ranged ballistic and cruise missiles are aimed Taiwan and beyond. (See chart for specific numbers).
These forces would be expected to strike quickly at air bases and ports in Japan as well to neutralize threats. The Rocket Force even dubs its advanced DF-16 SRBM the “Okinawa Express” (People’s Daily Online, February 15).
Though beyond the scope of this discussion, network warfare units under the Strategic Support Force in Shanghai, Quanzhou and elsewhere would play an important role in any Eastern Theater Command campaign. A large number of signals intelligence units are also present opposite Taiwan (TheTaiwanLink, August 8, 2016). Rocket Force units, along with operations by the Strategic Support Force against key ISR infrastructure would take the lead in attacking Taiwan or Okinawa in a conflict.
Conclusion
Chinese rhetoric regarding Taiwan and Japan have gone through several cycles. Ahead of the Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress later this year, it is possible that such rhetoric has a political rather than strategic meaning. However, the PLA continues to modernize, and Taiwan’s military deterrent continues to suffer due to budgetary and political issues (China Brief, August 22, 2016; October 4, 2016). The United States itself is reexamining its own policies toward East Asia, introducing an additional element of uncertainty. However, despite the many changes that China’s military strategy has undergone, it unlikely that the Eastern strategic direction will lose importance any time soon. If conflict breaks out between China and another country, the Eastern Theater Command will play a leading role.
Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW
Notes
While such language has long been part of official statements on Taiwan, it is a recent edition to the NPC report. A review of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 NPC Work reports did not find similar language, although the 2015 report included the phrase “opposing independence”.
The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 32
The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 101
General References
Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation For the 21st Century, 2nd Edition, New York: Routledge, 2012.
At the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Defense Minister Wei Fenghe dismissed a question on whether the PRC is seeking a future military presence in Cambodia (VOA Cambodia, June 3). This question arose following an assessment by the U.S. intelligence community that autocratic developments in Cambodia—particularly the single-party dominance of Cambodia’s legislature, which has extended Prime Minister Hu Sen’s tenure and made possible a constitutional amendment permitting a foreign military presence in the country—had increased the possibility of a Chinese military presence on Cambodian soil (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29). Cambodian officials exacerbated these concerns in June when they withdrew a 2017 request to the United States for funds to upgrade facilities at the Ream naval base near Sihanoukville (Radio Free Asia, July 2;Observer Network, July 2).
Recent media reports have indicated that Cambodia signed a “secret agreement” giving the PRC use of Ream, where it may station military servicemen and warships, for 30 years (WSJ, July 22). Although Cambodian and Chinese officials vehemently deny the existence of this agreement, gaining access to Ream is broadly consistent with Chinese foreign policy. The PRC appears to be employing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) funding to further strategic cooperation with Cambodia through the construction of potential dual-use infrastructure. Ream naval base is the latest in a network of regional security projects—including Cambodia’s Dara Sakor investment zone and Thailand’s Kra Canal—which, taken together, significantly improve Chinese power projection into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
News of the Ream agreement raises the specter of increasing Chinese maritime militarization at a time of intense unease in Southeast Asia. Conspicuously silent in this latest controversy is India, which has significant economic and military interests in Southeast Asia. This article will discuss the security infrastructure China is building in Cambodia and its implications for Indian interests in the region.
Chinese Investments in Southeast Asian Security Infrastructure
China’s 2019 National Defense White Paper (NDWP) emphasized developing far seas capabilities and overseas logistical facilities so that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can ensure Chinese maritime interests and secure strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) globally (Ministry of National Defense (China), July 24). The most critical SLOC passes through the Malacca Strait, on which the PRC is heavily dependent for energy imports (China Brief, April 12, 2006). More naval basing options near the Strait—and opportunities to circumvent it altogether—would improve China’s naval power in the region, and may position the PLAN to project presence further into the IOR.
The PRC is pursuing several infrastructure investments that would significantly increase its naval capabilities in and beyond the Gulf of Thailand. The oldest is Dara Sakor, a 139 square mile territory comprising 20 percent of Cambodia’s coastline, where Chinese companies have secured a 99-year lease. A significant BRI investment, Dara Sakor is the target of $3.8 billion in Chinese investments to build an international airport, a deep-water port, and an industrial park alongside resort facilities (Bangkok Post, July 20; C4ADS, April 17, 2018; People’s Daily, December 26, 2016). U.S. analysts have long suspected that the investment holds dual civilian and military purposes: the airport has an unusually long runway able to support any plane in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and the deep-water port, when constructed, would be large enough to host PLAN warships (SCMP, March 5).
The Dara Sakor airport and projected seaport sit at the edge of the Botum Sakor peninsula, across the Bay of Kompong Som from the Ream naval base. Between the two sites is Sihanoukville, which houses Cambodia’s only current deep-water port and where Chinese entities invested over $1.1 billion in 2018 (SCMP, August 7, 2018). Reinforcing the PRC’s interest in Sihanoukville, three PLAN warships made an official visit to Sihanoukville in early 2019 and docked for four days (Phnom Penh Post, January 7). Although the Sihanoukville port is unlikely to be used for Chinese naval operations, the positive relationship the PRC has cultivated with the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port authority will support coordination around the Bay of Kompong Som should PLAN warships begin operating out of Dara Sakor or Ream.
While these ports and potential naval bases would significantly bolster PLAN naval projection on their own, the PRC is also leveraging BRI funds to advocate the construction of the Kra Canal across the Gulf of Thailand (The Independent, October 2, 2016). The canal would create SLOCs which effectively bypass the Strait of Malacca and improve access to the IOR: passage through the canal would reduce the distance Chinese ships currently must sail to reach Indian ports by nearly 750 miles (Firstpost, November 5, 2018).
The Threat to India’s Presence in the Andaman Sea
Current PLAN presence in the IOR has already raised concerns for India. At the 2019 Raisina Dialogue, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba commented that at any time, there are six to eight PLAN submarines patrolling the IOR—ostensibly to protect Chinese trading vessels and conduct anti-piracy operations (Economic Times, January 10). Indian analysts have long suspected this presence was an excuse for the PRC to gather intelligence on “the underwater operating environment in the sub-continental littorals” (ORF, February 9).
The Indian response to increasing PLAN presence in the IOR is militarizing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI). An Indian Union territory, these islands are strategically located approximately 620 miles from the Malacca Strait and 400 miles from the projected Kra Canal. India has also been making regular arms purchases to equip its three bases on the ANI. In 2009, the United States sold India eight P-8I aircraft, a long-range maritime patrol plane with extensive monitoring, intelligence-gathering, and anti-submarine capabilities. New Delhi has since purchased further P-8Is in 2016 and June 2019 (Swarajya, June 26). The United States recently sold India twenty-four MH-60R Seahawk helicopters with anti-submarine capabilities, and has offered twenty-two MQ-9 Guardian drones for maritime surveillance (Economic Times, April 3; Hindustan Times, June 9). India has reportedly approved a 10-year, $700 million plan to fund additional facilities for troops, warships, aircraft, drones, and missile batteries for the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), the Indian Armed Forces tri-service theater command based on the islands (Times of India, January 26).
Although India is improving its capabilities to track and engage PLAN presence in the IOR, as of 2018 the Indian Navy only had 137 ships, while the PLAN has more than 300 (Economic Times, July 8, 2018; SCMP, May 26). PLAN operations out of Dara Sakor and Ream would further tilt the regional balance of power in China’s favor. First, local basing options will increase the already-growing number of PLAN warships and submarines entering the IOR through the Malacca Strait. Should the Kra Canal be constructed, Chinese vessels will have better access to the Andaman Sea, putting significant pressure on India’s capacity to monitor the increased traffic. Indian military planners are reportedly worried about China’s interest in the canal for precisely this reason (SCMP, July 19).
Further,Dara Sakor airport is approximately 740 miles from ANC military bases, putting Indian forces well within range of Chinese strategic bombers. If Chinese air and naval bases at Ream and Dara Sakor become a reality, India will likely face urgent tests of its already-underfunded military (The New York Times, March 3;The Straits Times, March 5).
Fear of China and Growing Indian Influence in Southeast Asia
India has sought multilateral solutions to address Chinese presence in the IOR. In December 2018, then-Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the opening of an Information Fusion Center for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) based outside New Delhi. Friendly nations were invited to post liaison officers to share information and organize responses to developing situations. The United States, Japan, and Singapore were among the first to express interest in posting officers. To expand its outreach and joint capabilities, India should make meaningful efforts to encourage Southeast Asian countries that are threatened by China’s aggressive actions—including Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand—to post liaison officers. Such a move would increase military-to-military connections between these countries (The Week, December 22, 2018).
A heightened PLAN presence in Cambodia could push Southeast Asia closer to India. Over the past several years, India’s investments and outreach to the region have bred goodwill. The Modi administration’s “Act East Policy” places the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the center of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. In the recent ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said, “We want to see a strong, unified and prosperous ASEAN playing a central role in the emerging dynamic of the Indo-Pacific as it contributes to India’s prosperity and security as well” (Times of India, August 2).
India has increasingly invested in infrastructure and military projects in the region commensurate with its economic interests, emphasizing port construction and infrastructure projects connecting Southeast Asia with India’s northeastern states (Economic Times, December 12, 2017; MEA.gov.in, August 2018). In May 2018, Indonesia agreed to give India economic and military access to the strategic Sabang Port, which neighbors Indian facilities on the ANI and is located approximately 310 miles from the Malacca Strait. Luhut Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s coordinating minister for maritime affairs, noted, “the port’s 40-meter depth is suitable for all kinds of vessels, including submarines” (Hindustan Times, May 17, 2018). An Indian naval warship, INS Sumitra, and coast guard ship, ICGS Vijit, have since visited the port in July 2018 and March 2019, respectively (Economic Times, March 20).
Other Southeast Asian states may be following Indonesia’s lead. Since 2014, Vietnam has conducted joint oil exploration with an Indian company in the SCS, despite protests from Beijing. New Delhi and Hanoi have a burgeoning defense relationship, recently holding a joint military drill in the Bay of Bengal and discussing arms sales in the past (The Hindu Business, November 21, 2018). Thailand and Myanmar have both similarly engaged in talks to purchase weapons from India (Economic Times, August 1; Financial Express, July 21). Vietnam has a special incentive to balance against China: Ream would strategically encircle Vietnam with the Ream naval base to the west, the Paracel Islands to the east, and the Spratly Island bases to the southeast. These bases will likely give Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries a sense of strategic insecurity, which may convince them to join India in balancing against China.
Conclusion
Ream is the latest in a series of concerted steps China is taking to dominate the regional security architecture. So why the silence from New Delhi? Despite the Modi government’s advocacy for a “rules-based order” in a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” and its recent defense purchases, India simply lacks the economic and military capability to challenge the PRC. Immediately condemning China’s secret agreement would upset Sino-Indian relations in the lead up to the Modi-Xi informal summit scheduled for October in Varanasi, India.The meeting is a follow up to the Wuhan summit that is credited with stabilizing relations after the Doklam crisis in the summer of 2017. The Varanasi summit’s outcome should provide insight into the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations.
Both leaders will attend the summit with significant domestic support. PM Modi’s party deepened its parliamentary majority in May and now faces a disorganized opposition. Xi is no longer subject to constitutional term limits and has no designated successor in place. The Indian government might see the leaders’ positions as an opportunity to settle the long-running border dispute with China, but New Delhi’s recent decision to change Kashmir’s constitutional status and Beijing’s insecurities over Tibet will complicate any negotiation on this issue (China Brief, July 16; The Hindu, August 6). Since the Wuhan summit, India and China have attempted to refocus the relationship from contentious issues between them to areas of cooperation and mutual benefit. The Varanasi summit will be a prime test of India’s cooperative policy.
Some analysts predict that India and China will downplay geopolitical differences in favor of economic cooperation: India may reduce its trade deficit with China, which in turn may rely on India as a trade partner in the face of pressures from the United States (Millenium Post, July 29). In this way India finds itself in the same position as the countries of Southeast Asia: concerned by Chinese actions, but unwilling to damage the economic relationship. However, a failure on Modi’s part to advocate for India’s Southeast Asian partners might damage India’s attempts to portray itself as an effective alternative to Chinese economic and military assistance.
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John Foulkes is a Program Associate for Jamestown’s Global Terrorism Analysis program. He graduated with distinction from the University of North Carolina with a focus on international security and South Asian affairs.
Howard Wang is the China Program Assistant at The Jamestown Foundation. He received his MPP from the Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy.
