The Philosophy of Mission Command and the NCO Corps

SOURCE:

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2018/February/Philosophy-of-Mission-Command/

The Philosophy of Mission Command                               and

                the NCO Corps

                           By 

  Command Sgt. Maj. Paul G. Hutchings

     2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)

Feb. 21, 2018

UPDATED 12 AUG 2020

Yes, another article on mission command. Before you click the "back button," let me explain why embracing the philosophy of mission command is critical to the development of the noncommissioned officer Corps.

"Mission command" has been the buzz phrase of choice since its adoption as official Army doctrine in 2012. It was born from the need to evolve out of command and control doctrine to meet the demands of a complex and demanding battlefield. However, mission command is not a new concept, and examples of its application can be found as far back as when humans first took up arms against one another.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6.0, Mission Command, defines this philosophy as: "The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."1

We know what mission command is, and knowing is half the battle, but do we practice mission command at the NCO level? Is mission command, especially the philosophy, even in the realm of the NCO? Lastly, how do we create agile and adaptive leaders?

Holistically, the answer to the first two questions is "No." Even with mission command crammed down our throats, we still have NCOs, even senior NCOs, paralyzed with fear when asked to take initiative within the commander's intent. The answer to the second question should be a resounding "Yes" if we want to develop an NCO Corps that is prepared to meet all challenges. Therefore, how do we teach mission command and develop agile and adaptive leaders who feel empowered to take disciplined initiative? What is the secret? There is no secret. It takes time, patience, and understanding. With all the requirements Soldiers are tasked to accomplish each day, we can be lacking in all three of these elements.

When teaching mission command, we use examples like Joshua Chamberlain's stand on Little Round Top on the second day of Gettysburg. Do we have to wait for opportunities like this to teach the essence of mission command? Of course not! We do it through everyday tasks like cleaning your work areas or sweeping a hangar's floor.

The six guiding principles of mission command are:

1. Build a cohesive team through mutual trust.
2. Create a shared understanding.
3. Provide a clear commander's intent.
4. Exercise disciplined initiative.
5. Use mission orders.
6. Accept prudent risk.2

By employing these principles, everyday tasks can be used to teach and develop the philosophy of mission command and build leaders willing and able to take disciplined initiative within their commander's intent.

Build a Cohesive Team through Mutual Trust

Commanders must have the confidence that all required tasks for a properly functioning organization are being carried out. The act of completing even routine tasks also builds mutual trust. ADRP 6.0 puts it best: "Trust is gained or lost through everyday actions more than grand or occasional gestures."3 This is also true in building a cohesive team. The best teams are formed by doing routine, mundane, daily tasks together.

Create a Shared Understanding

A shared understanding starts with everyone knowing the part they play in accomplishing a goal. What is the operational environment? The hangar where we perform aircraft maintenance. What is the purpose of the operation? A clean and safe working environment. All the specified and implied tasks to accomplish the goal need to be conveyed and understood by everyone. 

Provide a Clear Commander's Intent

By doctrine, the commander's intent should be concise and to the point. The "conciseness" depends upon your target audience. For example, "go sweep the hangar floor" is enough for a sergeant who has swept many a hangar floor. However, if you are telling the specialist who has never done it before, more details may be needed.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative

If we lay the proper foundation, this is where the magic happens. If you have built a team through mutual trust, created a shared understanding, and conveyed a clear intent, subordinates will have the confidence to exercise disciplined initiative.

Vice Adm. Horatio Nelson, a famous commander of the British Royal Navy known for his victories against the French during the Napoleonic Wars, once said, "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In other words, if the desired end state has been met, it is the right way! Is there a better way to sweep a hangar's floor? Tell a group of Soldiers if they complete this task they can go home, and watch the innovation flow!

Can there be mistakes? Sure, but the most valuable lessons often begin with a mistake. Leaders must possess the courage to allow their subordinates to make mistakes. No one put it better than retired Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, 38th chief of staff of the Army, when he said, "Encourage initiative and underwrite failure."4 Giving a subordinate the opportunity to "own" a task by allowing disciplined initiative, though checked by failure, is the philosophy of mission command.

Use Mission Orders

In the warfighting function, mission orders come in the form of Warning Orders, Operation Orders, and Fragmentary Orders. In our scenario, this can be as simple as "go sweep the hangar floor." Again, the level of detail required depends upon the experience level of the subordinate in charge.

Accept Prudent Risk

Are there risks in sweeping a hangar or the hundreds of other menial tasks you could use to develop agile and adaptive leaders? It is safe to say that as subordinates use creative ways to accomplish a task, they will also find innovative ways to hurt themselves or break something. The key to preventing injuries or damage is to analyze what could go wrong. It can be as simple as asking, "How have I screwed up doing this same task in the past?"

Conclusion

There you have it. There is no secret formula. It all starts with engaged leadership.

To put it another way, how do you get good at running two miles? By being good at running one mile. Two miles leads into three, four, and eventually a marathon. The same holds true with the NCO you are tasking with sweeping a hangar, supervising a motor pool, or running a small arms range. This same NCO, who now possesses the confidence to exercise disciplined initiative to seize, retain, exploit, or maintain a position of relative advantage, is the agile and adaptive leader you helped develop.

Again, this is a process that takes time, patience, and understanding. With everything we have to juggle as leaders, it is easier for leaders to give detailed instructions on how to accomplish a task, especially if they know the best way. Trusting subordinates to "figure it out" could mean a late night or two, but the pros far outweigh the cons. The result will be an NCO corps with the confidence won from opportunities given to find a better way. This is the philosophy of mission command we must embrace in the development of our future leaders.

Notes

1. U.S. Army, Mission Command, ADRP 6.0 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 17, 2012), para 1-5.
2. U.S. Army, ADRP 6-0, para 2-3.
3. U.S. Army, ADRP 6-0, para 2-5.
4. Jonathan Koester, "NCOs Have Important Roles in Mission Command," NCO Journal legacy website, September 17, 2013, accessed January 25, 2018, http://ncojournal.dodlive.mil/2013/09/17/1932/.

SOURCE:

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/target-g219-deploy-weapons-peace

Target G 219, Deploy Weapons of Peace

                  By

           Shiv Kumar Verma

• August 2, 2020,
 

  A view of the Chinese national highway, G219.

Whenever China decides to poke at India anywhere on the 4,056 kilometre boundary, we as a nation are subconsciously teleported to the events that led up to one of the greatest military debacles of all times—the war that wasn’t in October-November 1962. Mao Tse Tung and Peking, now better known as Mao Zedong and Beijing, have since been sitting on both our shoulders, seriously impacting our ability to think objectively. The military aim of the PLA in 1962 was to take Aksai Chin—and they took it, conveniently distorting history to fabricate their claim. The PRC’s strategic aim was to dominate India for the next 50 years—and they successfully did that as well! The price India as a country paid for that defeat, continues to haunt us.

The similarities between “then” and “now” are much too startling to ignore, for they continue to expose our underbelly to a ruthless and far-thinking enemy, who is constantly watching and looking to exploit fault lines. Unable to match China’s single-minded fixation towards its stated objectives of Asian and world domination, India finds itself constantly running extremely hard from pillar to post in a desperate attempt just to stay in the same place. In almost all modern day writing, China is depicted as the dragon draped across Tibet and Sinkiang, breathing fire in our direction. India, by the same token, is the elephant, good, solid and mostly benign. Trouble is, more often than not, it feels as if the elephant is being guided by the “blind men of Hindoostan”, who seem incapable of avoiding the same carefully laid out trap!

When the burden of history makes it difficult to breathe, like an exoskeleton it must be shed. For starters, we need to forget 1962 and nudge our historical clock to the events that led up to the 1965 war that was ostensibly fought with Pakistan. And with that we also need to forget Jawaharlal Nehru and perhaps turn our unfettered attention towards a diminutive little man called Lal Bahadur Shastri. For maybe, just maybe, the answers we seek might lie there.

Shortly after a brief skirmish had occurred in the Rann of Kutch and India and Pakistan disengaged in May 1965, a meeting took place in Peking, miles away from the swamp-like erstwhile delta of the Indus River. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, was listening in rapt attention to Chairman Mao, who carefully spelt out what the former needed to do. In great detail, Mao laid out the blueprint for what was later given the codename “Op Gibraltar”. China had brought India to its knees… Pakistan must now ruthlessly chop off the head and take Kashmir. It was big brother China’s gift to little brother Pakistan.

On Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan had reservations about Mao’s masterplan, so the maverick minister decided to go over his President’s head. Since Pakistan was bristling with new US military hardware, there were enough weapons available from the discarded stocks to arm an entire new army. Though the projected strength of 30,000 Mujahids is probably an inflated number, a sizeable force was quickly trained and equipped for guerrilla warfare and infiltrated into Jammu & Kashmir by end-July 1965. As all hell broke loose, especially in the Valley and in the Naushera-Rajauri-Poonch region, the Indian Army suddenly found itself with its back to the wall. Taken initially by surprise, individual units started fighting back, but as the scale of the ingress became apparent, it soon became obvious something different had to be done.

Under the circumstances, the plan to take the fight into POK by capturing the Haji Pir salient, was an extremely bold decision. Most importantly, Pakistan suddenly found itself in an unfamiliar situation where it was not calling all the shots. Almost immediately, it reacted and launched “Op Grand Slam”, which aimed at cutting off the Akhnur-Chhamb axis and once again, given the boldness of the strike, it initially looked like the Pakistanis would have India on its knees. Lal Bahadur Shastri, without a moment’s hesitation, then green flagged “Op Riddle” that allowed India to attack across the IB in the Rajasthan and the Lahore sectors while “Op Nepal” then further took the battle into the Sialkot sector as well.

For all its bluster about “buzdil” Indians and a flurry of initial punches against India especially in the air, the tables were turned on Pakistan dramatically despite some inept and timid handling of both the Army and the Air Force by their respective commanders. By 14 September, a week after the Indians crossed the IB, Pakistan was a spent force and it was only their massive superiority in artillery and General Chaudhuri’s miscommunicating on the ammunition state that saved it the complete blushes.

1965 set the stage for 1971, where once again the political and military leadership came together to fight a war almost entirely on our own terms. The United States, the Chinese, the Soviets all had a role to play, but clear, firm leadership left no room for any ambiguity for anyone to exploit. It’s a different matter the same ruthlessness was not brought to the table in Shimla after the war.

34 years after Shastri’s masterclass on taking the fight to the enemy, we fell flat on our faces in Kargil, by letting Pervez Musharraf dictate terms to us again. With every passing year, we hail it as a great military achievement, but in reality, even though it was a tactical victory, it was a huge strategic defeat! After the dust had settled, the last remnants of the Northern Light Infantry returned to Pakistan either dead or alive despite their endless denials of involvement, India increased the deployment in the Baltistan region substantially. The area that had hitherto been looked after by 121 Independent Brigade was now the “area of responsibility” of a mountain division, which also then necessitated the raising of a new corps headquarters. For Musharraf, despite the “defeat” it was a big consolation prize—India for years would, in a classic case of bolting the door after the horse had bolted, be committed to guarding and maintaining a large tract of inhospitable land at considerable cost. To cover up our own lapses, it never seemed to occur to anyone that all we should have done was restore the status quo ante, albeit with better detection systems in place at best. Instead, we opted for a “boots on the ground” approach which committed a large number of men who now stay there even through winter. Just for the record, Drass used to be known as the second coldest inhabited place on the planet.

CALL OFF MILITARY TO MILITARY TALKS

Today, the lessons of 1965 and Kargil are unfortunately forgotten, and we are making the same mistakes again, caught up as it were in creating little illusions of victory where actually in a deadly game of geopolitical chess, we are looking down the barrel of a gun. Before we get further mired and trapped in quicksand, India needs to do some deft footwork in order to point the gun in the opposite direction. It’s always a lot better to look down a gunsight. It certainly gives you a lot more options.

By having put its offensive plans in place, China has done two things which place it in a position of advantage at the tactical level. First, it decides the place, the terrain and the timing of each confrontation. Second, confident that India will go into a tizzy over “loss of territory”, it can localize each area of conflict and therefore contain the situation. Since it sees itself as being vulnerable in the Chumar region, it has picked the Pangong Tso as the key area and will probably up the ante in October/November in the Depsang Plains in a bid to make DBO look vulnerable.

India has reacted firmly and has demonstrated its resolve to fight should matters escalate further. The formidable airlift capability of the IAF in my opinion is the key factor. However, now having put our existing troops on high alert, we now need to hold our hand and adopt not only a wait and watch policy, but also do some plain speak with China.

If indeed the threat to G219 (Chinese national highway, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet) by the construction of a road by the Indians to DBO has been the catalyst for Chinese actions (as suggested by most analysts) then it underlines the massive insecurity that is at the base of China’s thinking. Just for a while let us pull back from Eastern Ladakh and look at the entire alignment of this “highway in the sky”. Running more or less parallel to the Great Himalayan Range, following the flow of the Tsang Po, it’s a nice, fat juicy 2,500 km-long target for India to look at. This Chinese lifeline which is the equivalent of the “6 Degree Channel” on land, has plenty of “choke points” a la the Strait of Malacca.

We need to spell it out. Even if the LAC is not defined, any tampering with the status quo will amount to a declaration of war and India reserves the right to then pick and choose targets to hit this “artery” wherever it chooses. Since His Excellency the Chinese Ambassador is being most vocal about various issues these days including the South China Sea, some counter-advice to him may not be out of place.

First, India needs to call off the ridiculous military to military talks and if you must, then engage the Chinaman through the existing diplomatic channels—after all, Sun Weidong is there for a purpose other than writing op-edit pieces in leading Indian newspapers, a sign that he perhaps has little else to do. Generals are not meant for talking and by exposing a corps commander to the enemy, we are doing ourselves a huge disservice. Everyone knows with the Chinese it is two steps forward, three steps back.

Second, contrary to popular belief we don’t have to start saturating the border with troops. Every time the PM or some hot shot drives from Palam into town, the ridiculous spectacle of a cop every 20 metres “sanitizing” the route underlines the “police” mindset of our leadership. In the case of the Chinese border, the ITBP has had the sole charge of it and if there have been lapses, the issues need to be addressed but they must continue to police their designated areas and man their BOPs. Border management is not the job of the Army, but now that the Chinese have activated the border, the Army must be in the loop, if not in overall command. If 35,000 additional troops are being further inducted as reported by various newspapers, then we are once again, as in the post-Kargil scenario, thinking “police” and not “Army”.

NOT HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO GUARD A 4,000 KM BORDER

We are just two months away from winter in the Himalayas. The powers that be must also remember that mountains swallow men, and it isn’t humanly possible to guard a 4,000 km border (which incidentally is roughly the distance between New Delhi and Taipei—just to underline the distance). Today, there are plenty of existing protocols available to communicate with China. The message must be clear—any transgression will be treated as a declaration of war. Having demonstrated our capability to mobilize, we need to maintain the barest force levels and be prepared to induct the required manpower if and when required.

In Eastern Ladakh especially, building the infrastructure to house additional troops must continue, but troops must be thinned out and rotated as is done in Siachen so that they are mentally and physically acclimatized to operate in the region if the necessity arises. The welfare and health of our men must remain our biggest priority. Anyone who has operated in these regions in the harsh winter will know just how important it is to do this.

The IAF has always been the key. In 1962 we shot ourselves in the foot by taking that option off the table. India over the last few decades has also had a robust missile development programme and year after year we have watched with pride long cylindrical tubes being paraded on Rajpath with exotic names like Prithvi, Nag and BrahMos among others. If the entire G219 has not been bracketed, do it now. Like those policemen guarding VIP routes, these would be a lot more assuring to have if Xi Jinping further decides to rock the boat.

Until then, keep looking at ways to make China hurt if they so much as sneeze again in Ladakh, or refuse to pull back to Chip Chap in Pangong Tso. We must remember, when it comes to playing the game, big boys play with hard balls.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of “1962: The War That Wasn’t” and “The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why”.

Two-Front War: What Does it Imply? (R)

SOURCE:

https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/national-security-vol-1-issue-1-colloquium.pdf

Google url TO OPEN pdf

https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/national-security-vol-1-issue-1-colloquium.pdf

           Two-Front War: What Does it Imply?

                             N C Vij 

                            R K Dhowan

                            K K Nohwar

                           Krishan Varma

 There has been much public concern about a potential two-front war provoked by Pakistan or China from the west and north as the strategic alliance between China and Pakistan deepened through the past decade. Persistent terror attacks and armed support by the Pakistani military to jihadi groups and separatists in the Kashmir Valley and the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that runs through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), whose legal sovereignty belongs to India, are deeply disturbing and pose serious strategic threats. The concerns have not dissipated despite the recent improvement in India-China relations and the Confidence Building Measures in place, since Beijing’s strategic stakes in Pakistan are rising and it has shown little willingness to restrain Islamabad from pursuing its dangerous course or lower the risks of conflict escalation that may drag it in.

 To understand the risks involved in conflict escalation flowing from nuclear armed Pakistan and China’s military strategies and alliance operations, in this segment we carry the perspectives of three highest level senior retired officers and strategic thinkers of the armed forces and that of an equally senior civilian analyst. The views are those of the individual experts and do not represent current official thinking. The aim is to better understand the issues, the possibility of such a scenario emerging, and what needs to be done to prevent such an outcome. 

                         ***************************

              Defending the Land Frontiers 

                               N C Vij*

   [ *N C Vij, Former Chief of Army Staff & former Director                         Vivekananda International Foundation. ]

  “Let him who desires peace, prepare for war” 

                            Vegetius, De ReMilitari, iii, 378

 

O ne of the earliest pronouncements, free India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Nehru is reported to have made on assuming office was, “India does not need an army, it needs a police force. We have no enemies…” This view, however, proved to be misplaced and ironically India has been subject to aggressions, once by China in 1962 and four times by Pakistan in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Unfortunately, India does not appear to have learnt its lessons from these five blatant aggressions, unlike other countries of the world.

 Security Threats and Challenges

 At the global and the regional level the stature of India is on the rise. It has been termed as a pillar of regional security in the Indo-Pacific region by both US Presidents Obama and Trump. The significant role of India in the regional security architecture is also recognised in the latest US Security Strategy. India’s intent to take on this role is evident from its continuing efforts towards its economic and military capability development, though the latter leaves a lot of scope for improvement both in terms of quantum and pace. India’s quest for ‘Make in India’ and self-reliance are steps in this direction, but have not yet made notable progress. 

The major external threats emanate from Pakistan and China, India’s two nuclear armed neighbours. 

Pakistan

 With Pakistan, India shares a delineated and demarcated international boundary (IB) of 2545 Km and 778 Km along the Line of Control (LoC) in  Jammu and Kashmir (J&K and 110 Km of Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in the mountainous and high altitude area of Siachen. India has never had peace with Pakistan, and Kashmir is only a symptom of that problem; the actual problem in Pakistan’s case is existential. It cannot bring itself to believe that India has accepted the Partition as a legacy of history and, hence, reconcile to that reality. On Pakistan’s part, waging a State sponsored proxy war by using terrorists in J&K is an important part of its strategy to bleed and keep a stronger India tied down. Pakistan has also allowed China to construct a road through Pakistan Occupied Indian Territory in Kashmir and up to the Arabian Sea, as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Besides, this they have virtually handed over the Gawadar Port to China, which solves its Malaca dilemma up to a point.

 China

 India shares a 4057 KMs   un-demarcated border with China. Frequent transgressions by both sides are the norm due to differing perceptions regarding the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China, at times talks of sharing a border of only 2000 km with India, implying indirectly its nonrecognition of J&K as a part of India. India is the only neighbour of China, besides Bhutan, with whom it has an unsettled land border. Although India has been pressurising China to mutually resolve the disputed border, Beijing is keen on leaving this for the future generation. This, therefore, remains a seed of possible conflict at all times.

 Forays by PLA Navy (PLAN) ships and submarines into the Indian Ocean are on the increase and China’s influence on our neighbours is also on the rise. In the Indo-Pacific region the Chinese have acquired virtually dual purpose sea ports in Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Pakistan and Djibouti, thereby encircling India by what has been called a ‘string of pearls’.

 Doklam Flare-up: The 2017 China-India border standoff took place over Chinese construction of a road in Doklam near the Tri-Junction border area in Bhutan, from 16 June - 28 August 2017. Although, both sides have now disengaged and the Chinese road construction has stopped, there will always remain a possibility of a flare-up. This could be used by China to try to coerce India and keep Bhutan under intense pressure.

China-Pak Nexus 

It is widely assessed that collusion between China and Pakistan adds another serious dimension to their capability enhancement. It is also assessed that if there is a war-like situation between India and Pakistan, China is unlikely to intervene directly. However, it may carry out some deployments to tie down the Indian troops in the Northern and Eastern Sectors as it has done earlier. If there was to be a war between China and India, Pakistan would almost definitely activate the Western borders with a view to try and seize Kashmir, as Indian troops would be reduced to less than half the normal deployment opposite Pakistan. There will be very little possibility of switching troops and resources from one front to another in case of a war on two fronts.

 Nuclear exchange

 In case of a war with both China and Pakistan in collusion, there will be a very remote or negligible possibility of a nuclear dimension coming into play. But should ever an India-Pak flare up take place, Pakistan will always threaten with a nuclear response {to start with tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)} to neutralise India’s conventional superiority and try to halt India in its tracks. Unfortunately, India has bought this ruse.

 Additional ‘Half-Front’ – Kashmir

 Pakistan has been able to create a tense security environment, with radicalisation in the valley, a limited civil unrest and a situation of hybrid conflict there. India has, therefore, to continue to stabilise the situation in J&K through a combination of military domination and good governance. This necessitates heavy commitment of troops and, hence, can be termed as ‘Half Front’.

 Cyber and Space Domains 

In case of collusion between Pakistan and China, rising cyber threats, especially from China, and its growing Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), aerospace, artificial intelligence and unmanned weapon systems will add another critical dimension to their capabilities. India has to develop its own capabilities in this field over and above its full preparation for conventional war. 

Implications of a Two or Two and a Half-Fronts War               

•   (a) It will not be possible for India to deal with both the fronts piecemeal; they will have to be handled simultaneously. The only constant factor will be the Kashmir insurgency, but major burden of that will have to be passed on to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). This, however, imposes a limitation.
•  (b) Vast geographical separation also precludes rapid movement of large quantum of troops from one sector to another, not only for the Army but also for the Air Force. This will result in separation of forces: a major disadvantage for India
• (c) Navy of course will have to be divided into the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal
• (d) A war on two fronts will also result in much higher degree of ammunition consumption and thus much higher stocks of ammunition and spares need to be available from ‘ab initio’.
• (e) Strategically, India may consider adopting a posture of deterrence against Pakistan and dissuasion against China. This will result in optimisation and application of Forces as best-suited for such an operational scenario with available resources. Higher level of inter-theatre mobility will enhance operational options.                                                        

 Are We Prepared for a Two-Front War? 

Presently there are some major limitations, which are listed below: 

(a) Strategic Direction for the Armed Forces. The only political direction to the Armed Forces in existence is Raksha Mantri’s operational Directive of 2009. It is now outdated and hence needs to be revised. It lays down that, ‘We should be prepared to fight on both fronts simultaneously a war at 30 days (intense) and 60 days (normal) rates. 

(b) Are We Prepared? No Armed Forces in the world, and least of all the proud Indian Armed Forces, will ever raise their hands in case of operations because of their lack of wherewithal. They will fight to the very best of their capabilities. They have made suitable plans to optimise their potential in every scenario. However, it is better for the country to be aware of the actual situation, and for that they need to be guided by the recent Army Vice Chief’s presentation to the ‘Parliamentary Committee for Defence’. Briefly, Army’s thrust was that: 

• (i) 65 per cent of the arsenal is obsolete,
•  (ii) the ammunition  holdings are far below the operationally desirable stocks, and 
• (iii) forces lack artillery, missiles and helicopters which could enable them to fight on both fronts simultaneously. 

Way Forward 

Space does not permit a detailed discussion of this aspect. However, very briefly, India need to divide our preparation based on twin approaches of 

• (a) what needs to be done in immediate future (not more than 2-3 years at the most) and 
• (b) what all must be achieved in next 5-7 years (mid-term).This needs to address all areas warranting attention, (i) organisational issues, 
• (ii) structural issues, 
• (iii) financial aspects and finally,
•  (iv) the aspects of joint-ness among services.

 Immediate Future (2-3 years)

 (a) Strategic Direction for the Armed Forces:

 India must develop a ‘National Security Doctrine Strategy’ and from that the military will draw out its ‘National Military Strategy’. Raksha Mantri’s updated and revised operational Directive must be issued which should clearly lay down that the preparedness has got to be related to a ‘two-front war’ simultaneously and indicate the likely duration. From this our budgetary requirements must be closely established. The anomalous situation, as existing at present, must be removed. 

(b) Improving Operational Stocks of Ammunition, Munitions and Spares to Improve Serviceability Rate of Equipment and Preparedness: 

• (i) At least 50 per cent of the ammunition required (15 days intense) and 30 (Normal) must be stocked over the next one-two years, and for the balance, arrangement must be arrived at with friendly countries for their assured supply at a notice of 15 days. 
• (ii) Minimum serviceability rate for all types of equipment and armament must be maintained at a readiness level of minimum 70 per cent at all times. For this the assistance of our indigenised companies in the Defence Industrial Base should be taken as a permanent measure.

 (c) Refining the Higher Defence Organisation and Inculcating Joint-ness amongst Armed Forces. 

The report of Group of Ministers on National Security (2001) had recommended the creation of a post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for 

• (i) Single point military advice,
•  (ii) administering strategic forces, 
• (iii) enhancing effectiveness of planning process, and
•  (iv) promoting joint-ness. Subsequent committees have also forcefully recommended implementation of this report. Joint-ness serves as a force multiplier operationally and will also help in substantial financial savings. 

 (d) Budgetary Allocations to be Rationalised. An appropriate and thus much enhanced allocation of budget is a pre-requisite to attain preparedness and thus security. This will have to be done for a long period. An allocation of around $200 billion over a period of 10 years will help India attain the desired level of preparedness which will enable it to measure up to the challenges and be seen as a credible security provider in Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. As a starter, the Defence Budget must be raised to 3 per cent of the GDP. The newly-created Defence Planning Committee (DPC) is likely to be a great help in expediting all matters.

Long-Term Measures 

• (a) Budgetary allocations need to be increased to 3 per cent of the GDP.
• (b) The Higher Defence Organisation has to be refined. 
• (c) Civil-military relations to be improved by posting military representatives in the MoD at key decision making posts. 
• (d) Force structure to be refined.
•  (e) Expedite the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps to enhance and upgrade dissuasive posture against China to one of deterrence.
•  (f) Defence Industrial Base to be strengthened, and procurement procedures refined. 
• (g) ‘Make in India’ – to be given a push.

 Conclusion 

As far as the three Services are concerned they must try and ensure that the allotted resources are optimally utilised and joint-ness is implemented in letter and spirit. India has to be prepared to fight future wars with due emphasis on Cyber and Space dimensions without sacrificing our capabilities for conventional warfare. A two-front war can be a live possibility.

                       *****************************

                    A Maritime Perspective

                            R K Dhowan* 

[ *R K Dhowan, Chairman, National Maritime Foundation and                    the Former Chief of the Naval Staff. ]

I ndia’s quintessential maritime character and vital geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean are twin factors that define her vast maritime interests. The responsibility of protecting these assets fall squarely on the shoulders of men in white uniform, and it is the responsibility of the Navy to ensure that these maritime interests, which have a vital relationship with the nation’s economic growth, are allowed to develop unhindered, both in peace and war. 

A ‘two-front war’ is a sub-set of a multi-front ‘State-on-State’ armed conflict. As the former term indicates, this is an armed conflict on two separate fronts. These ‘fronts’ could involve armed conflict waged in separate domains (air war and land war, war-at-sea and war-on-land, etc.), or, the conflict could be waged in geographically distinct theatres (for instance, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal). Conversely, the term could indicate a simultaneous conflict of one State against two others. History is replete with examples of each type. For instance, the aim of the 600-ship US Navy of the 1980s was to gain Command of the Seas and also fight the Soviets on two maritime fronts, namely the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans.1 In the Indian context, the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, too, was a two-front campaign, fought in all the three domains – sea, land, and air. 

The possibility of simultaneous armed conflict between India on the one hand and, China and Pakistan acting either in cooperation or collusion with each other, on the other, is the subject of this analysis. 

In an armed conflict against India, China and Pakistan could choose either a collaborative or a collusive approach. The former involves one country openly aiding its partner/ ally, whereas the latter involves more covert cooperation between the two. These approaches could lead to the following scenarios, among others: (a) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan, and China intervenes with actual combat deployments in support of Pakistani forces. The cost of conflict (to China) in such a scenario would be inordinately high, without commensurate gains either in terms of actual combat winnings or gaining and sustaining a favourable global opinion. Consequently, the likelihood of such a scenario is relatively low. (b) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China offers moral and logistic support to Pakistan. The likelihood of such a scenario is high, as it involves minimal costs and few adverse implications for China. (c) India and China are engaged in armed conflict and Pakistan supports China by activating India’s western front. Given the general leanings of Pakistan, Islamabad is unlikely to have any of the inhibitions as applied to China, and would probably not hesitate in joining hands with China, whether overtly or covertly, as desired by China. The likelihood of such support being extended by Pakistan to China, both overt and covert, is, therefore, high. It may, therefore, be assumed that an armed conflict primarily with China is quite likely to lead to India facing a two-front war scenario, involving China and Pakistan. What is to be done? There is no gainsaying that two Armies do not, by themselves, go to war. Nor do two Navies, or two Air Forces. Two nations go to war. In recognition of this truism, a two-front war ought not to be planned-for (and certainly not executed) at the level of individual armed forces. On the contrary, all three Services must meaningfully and synergistically contribute towards the political and military aims of such an armed conflict. India’s joint approach should exploit the principle of manoeuvre — not at the Corps level, but at the ‘Theatre’ one. Basically, rather than confronting the adversary solely at his chosen point -of-attack, Insia should be in a position to stem or contain such an attack. Simultaneously, it should draw the adversary into an engagement in a geographical area or a domain of our choosing, where India is strong, and the adversary is weak or vulnerable.

SOURCE:

https://indianexpress.com/article/india/chinese-order-of-battle-in-aksai-chin-what-are-we-up-against-6500207/

Chinese order of battle in Aksai Chin: What are we up against?

            Written by Mandeep Singh Bajwa 

                By: The Indian Express

July 13, 2020;

The Chinese have a formidable number of troops in Aksai Chin with armour artillery, air defence, drones, helicopters, air support and mechanised infantry.

Chinese mechanised infantry with their infantry combat vehicles on exercise.

The Chinese have been quick to reinforce their troops in Aksai Chin facing India’s XIV Corps. Some of these additional forces had come in earlier as part of the pre-planned push to secure Indian territory. Reserves have been inducted to counter Indian deployment aimed at undertaking offensive operations. What did the Chinese have in the area for border management before launching Operation Land-Grab and what have they added? According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, before the start of the confrontation, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had three border-defence companies based close to the areas in question in Aksai Chin. Two were drawn from the 362nd Border Defence Regiment one being located at the 19th century Khurnak Fort on the north bank of the Pangong Tso and the other at the Spanggur Tso to the south. The third is located at the Kongka La Pass near the Indian post at Gogra/Hot Springs, and belongs to the 363rd Border Defence Regiment. All these sub-units patrolled the LAC running into Indian patrols and were used to make the initial intrusions. Border Defence Regiments are on a par with regular troops in equipment, (except in armoured fighting vehicles) communications and leadership. Their counterpart is the Indo-Tibetan Border Police which hold posts along the LAC and are backed up by infantry battalions of the Army patrolling the boundary in rotation from nearby camps.

There is also a Chinese patrol boat squadron on Pangong Lake itself. All these sub-units taken together would amount to around 500–600 personnel. Reacting to the changed situation, it is likely that additional troops drawn from one or both of their parent Border Defence Regiments’ operational reserves have also been deployed to the area, raising the total PLA border forces in the area to  1,000–1,500personnel.

The border troops have been reinforced by mobilising more combat forces, most likely from the 6th Mechanised Infantry Division, a northern or high-altitude manoeuvre formation. This formation is normally based at a distance from the Aksai

Chin on the southern boundary of the Taklamakan Desert. It constitutes the Southern Xinjiang Military District’s primary operational reserve and is earmarked to be first responders to any operational crisis in the region. This deployment replicates that of the 2017 Doklam crisis where border management troops manned the frontline  with manoeuvre regiments from regular formation held further back as a striking reserve.

By May-end, units of main battle tanks and batteries of towed artillery had been deployed at existing Chinese positions north and east of Gogra. This combination of heavy armour and towed artillery is now quite rare in the PLA following the latest military reforms. Normally armoured fighting vehicles would be supported by self-propelled artillery. What is known about the 6th Mechanised Infantry Division is that it has still to receive self-propelled artillery. This is also true of the three other mechanised divisions in the Xinjiang Military District.

                      A map of the region

In the Pangong Tso and the Fingers Area, the Chinese have now stationed themselves in a strong way in Finger 8. On May 18 and 19, the PLA had brought in around 2,500 troops to the sub-sector. These were regular rather than Border Defence Regiment personnel. This was done very visibly the obvious intention being to overawe the relatively smaller Indian contingent facing them on the lake’s bank. They have established a logistics hub along with deployment of armoured fighting vehicles. Bigger boats for dominating the water bodies and transporting assault troops across them have been brought in. The road built by the Chinese from Finger 8 to Finger 5 alongside the lake also helps them in the quick transfer of troops from there to the Finger 4 base. There is considerable Chinese build-up. This has resulted in shorter reaction time and time taken for movement of troops.

In the Galwan River valley, a Chinese infantry platoon deployed at Patrolling Point 14 (PP14) had been withdrawn by the fourth week of May. The main PLA camp was then established three kilometres further back in territory already occupied by them. We do not know at the moment whether this unit is supported by armour or artillery. Such manoeuvre or fire support seems unlikely in the absence of viable road communications. This has been planned for some time but remains unfinished. A further reinforcement of the sector seems unfeasible at the moment.

What is known is that China now has built up force levels along the LAC to include another mechanised infantry division trained and equipped for high-altitude warfare. Which one could this be? My view is that either 8th or 11th Motorised Infantry Divisions, part of the Xinjiang Military District’s three mechanised formations held in reserve some distance from the Aksai Chin have been deployed.

Indian Humint, Comint and Techint are closely watching the activities, readiness status and operational preparations of another 10,000-12,000 Chinese troops deployed in Xinjiang with high mobility vehicles (Chinese copies of Humvees) and weaponry in the rear positions with the capability to reach the LAC or depth positions ready to launch offensives or in a counter-penetration role within a period of two days. This could be 4th Motorised Infantry Division stationed at Aksu. Its induction into the theatre could tilt the scales in favour of the PLA.

The Chinese normally have two divisions trained and equipped for mountain warfare deployed in the Tibet region. Generally reliable sources claim that reacting to the current crisis and Indian build-up they have brought in close to two extra divisions from locations as far as 2,000 kilometres from mainland China as a counter-measure. This is outside the Aksai Chin region.

The Chinese have a formidable number of troops in Aksai Chin with armour artillery, air defence, drones, helicopters, air support and mechanised infantry. The regional command of the Western Theatre which commands all troops posed against and oversees operations against India has a number of reserves awaiting deployment.

Deploying Air Power Against the Chinese

A number of mistakes were made in the conduct of the 1962 war. By far the biggest one was not using our medium-sized but formidable air force for offensive air operations. Our Canberras, Hunters, Mysteres, Gnats, Ouragans (Toofanis) and Vampires flown by well trained and motivated pilots would have interdicted Chinese lines of communication, strafed, bombed and rocketed their artillery batteries, troop concentrations, headquarters, supply columns and even forward elements. Though combat air patrols and reconnaissance flights were flown by the IAF they were forbidden from firing even a single round. Air Marshal MM Singh, then a Squadron Leader commanding 24 Squadron (Hawks) saw a strong enemy column moving towards one of our forward defended localities in the Walong sector while flying a recce mission in his Vampire fighter. He dived down and had the satisfaction of seeing them scatter in panic even though he wasn’t able to fire even a single shot. It was galling for a professional fighter pilot to be thus hamstrung while troops on the ground were fighting for their lives.

IAF helicopters played a major role in reconnaissance, casualty evacuation, supply of otherwise cut-off posts and communications. Squadron Leader Vinod Sehgal volunteered to fly in his Bell helicopter to the Namka Chu and find out what was the ground situation after communications with the formation under attack there were lost by the divisional headquarters on the first day of the war. Unaware that the Chinese were already targeting the helipad, he tried to land and was shot down, and killed while exiting the machine and making for cover. Here a couple of helicopters fitted with machine-guns and lobbing bombs on advancing enemy troops would’ve caused attrition and boosted the morale of the stricken Indian defenders. But the aggressive spirit so essential for such improvisations was sadly missing. The government irrationally worried over Chinese retaliation against civilian targets had curbed the fighting spirit of the IAF.

Indian army trucks depart towards Ladakh amid stand off between Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh, at Manali-Leh highway in Kullu district. (PTI Photo)

Transport aircraft played a major role in 1962. From moving troops to far-flung destinations to supplying posts dependent solely on air-drops to strategic airlift the IAF was everywhere. AN-12s operating from Chandigarh transported AMX-13 tanks to Chushul making a significant impact on the operations in and around the airbase. It was a masterly exercise in improvisation and airmanship. A salute to the transport fleet!

While no air intrusions have been reported by the PLAAF (the Chinese Air Force) the IAF is on full alert. Combat air patrols are in full swing including night sorties. Frontline air-superiority fighters like the Su-30 MKIs. Mig-29s. Mirage 2000s and Jaguars have been moved to operational bases in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Haryana. Bases at Avantipura, Pathankot, Adampur, Chandigarh, Halwara, Ambala etc are on high alert.

Apache helicopters armed with Hellfire missiles are ready to take on Chinese armour and mechanised infantry. Not for nothing is the aircraft known as a super tank-killer. Chinook heavy-lift helicopters have been deployed for tactical troop movements, casevac and supply functions. Significantly, the Chinook can carry the M-777 ultralightweight 155mm medium howitzer unslung. This will add greatly to the punch and mobility of strike formations.

Strategic airlift is the IAF’s forte. Using C-17 Globemasters and C-130J Super Hercules transport planes tens of thousands of battle-ready troops have been flown into Ladakh along with the weapons and equipment. Shorter flights with lesser loads have been undertaken by Illyushin IL-76s. A large share of the burden of logistically maintaining the additional troops indicted into the theatre with food, ammunition, medicines, tentage, housing and other supplies through the winter will fall on the transport squadrons.

Quick-reaction surface to air missiles (SAMs) fielded by both the IAF and the Army have been positioned at strategic spots to undertake the air defence of installations, supply and ammunitions dumps, command and control centres and troop and armour concentrations. Defend Indian air space in short. Medium-range, mobile Akash missiles are included in these. These have been modified for deployment and use in high-altitudes.

Eastern Ladakh Sitrep: 9th July 2020

The Prime Minister’s visit raised the morale of the armed forces and the citizens of Ladakh. The visit and the public posturing therein indicated the temporary failure of the military-level talks aimed at de-escalation and disengagement of forces. The rhetoric and the hard intentions displayed had their effect. The Special Representative-level talks seem to have resolved matters to some extent. There are reports albeit carefully worded and guarded in nature of Chinese troop withdrawals and corresponding Indian disengagements.

All for the good. Things could be improving. What do we have to look out for in the future? We could be showing undue urgency for de-escalation. The Chinese have laid claim to the entire Galwan Valley and dominating heights. Their behaviour and moves even after a rearward move would have to be very carefully watched. Very definite and accurate reconnaissance and surveillance systems have to be put into place besides the use of human resources. Eyeballs Mark I in an Indian skull alone will not suffice! Anything out of the ordinary will be suspect. In this sector the Chinese have access to only a dirt track to move troops, vehicles and supplies. Macadamising i.e. black-topping of this road will indicate without a doubt that the Chinese are repudiating any agreements made with us. This is the reality of today.

The People’s Republic of China as a matter of national policy uses force and negotiation at the same time. We must be prepared to not just play the same game with them but beat them at it. A new professionalism, a new ruthlessness must take root. Wishing to forever occupy the moral high ground is passé. We must learn the right lessons and modify our strategic imperatives. While the Chinese give preference to the big picture our thinking is the exact opposite – tactical in nature.

Lastly, the reserve formations moved to Eastern Ladakh will in the main have to be kept there in the interim at least through the winter. Such is the fickle nature of agreements with the Chinese! This will add immensely to our logistics load and administrative burden. We must be prepared for that. It has to be remembered that in foreign policy as in war there are no prizes for runners-up.

• TAGS:
• China
• Galwan Faceoff
• India China Border Dispute
• Ladakh