Friday, December 4, 2020

MODERNIZATION INDIAN ARMED FORCES : The High Seas Command (r)

 SOURCE:   https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/special-report/story/20201207-the-high-se-as-command-1744377-2020-11-27 




Indian Navy Proposal For Maritime Theatre Command; Will it take wings?


                                             VIDEO : Click / Google url to open

                                            [  https://youtu.be/7bbIX7BbFS4  ]


Indian Navy proposes a Maritime Theatre Command in Karwar, Karnataka. This Maritime Theatre will not only patrol the country’s 7,516-km-long coastline but also from North Arabian sea to South China sea responsible for protecting India's interests in the Indo-Pacific region.The creation of the post of maritime theatre commander and a new integrated command, subsuming all operational aspects of the four existing naval commands, are key recommendations of a recent Indian Navy study. The proposed MTC will also include Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jets, helicopters and transport aircraft on the Indian peninsula, two Indian Army brigades, comprising around 10,000 soldiers, and, interestingly, all Coast Guard patrol vessels, helicopters and aircraft.
#IndiaFirst #IndianNavy #MaritimeTheatreCommand


    The High Seas Command 

A joint study draws up the ambitious Maritime Theatre Command by restructuring existing military commandsto straddle India's entire maritime sphere. Will it take wings or meet the fate of its predecessor?

Sandeep Unnithan

Executive Editor, India Today  


From his headquarters near the picturesque Binaga Bay in Karwar, Karnataka, the commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of India’s first Maritime Theatre Command (MTC) will have an overview of his enormous responsibilities. His ships will not only patrol the country’s 7,516-km-long coastline but also its distant maritime interests astride the world’s most important ocean, stretching as far as the Cape of Good Hope off South Africa and to the southern shores of the Indonesian archipelago.

The creation of the post of maritime theatre commander and a new integrated command, subsuming all operational aspects of the four existing naval commands, are key recommendations of a recent Indian Navy study. The proposed MTC will also include Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jets, helicopters and transport aircraft on the Indian peninsula, two Indian Army brigades, comprising around 10,000 soldiers, and, interestingly, all Coast Guard patrol vessels, helicopters and aircraft.

The study, part of a government mandate to reduce India’s 17 single-service commands into five joint commands, and prepared by vice chief of naval staff Vice Admiral G. Ashok Kumar, will soon be handed over to chief of defence staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat.

Government officials told india today that the study proposes a model that can be implemented in a short timeframe, nine months to a year, and does not require the creation of additional posts or flag ranks or even office space. It will use existing manpower and resources. It is the most complex of the two tri-services theatre commands to be created in the next two years, the other one being the Integrated Air Defence Command headed by the IAF.

Significantly, the MTC will be the first one that loosens a service chief’s command over operations and assets. A parallel study for setting up the Air Defence Command is underway, but it’s not as radical because the IAF chief will hold on to his fighter, transport and combat fleets.

The MTC commander-in-chief will report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee headed by the CDS. The navy chief will shed their operational roles and be primarily responsible for ‘Raise, Train and Sustain’ functions, administration, acquisitions and training. The three C-in-Cs will be reported to the CNS for ‘raise train and sustain’ functions and to the Maritime Theatre Commander for operations. The navy study, thus, paints a picture of the desired end state of independent India’s most significant military reform that kicked off this year with the appointment of the first CDS and the bifurcation of the military into theatres and service headquarters.

The MTC, earlier called the Peninsular Command, is likely to be the more significant of the first two theatres because it has a larger share of assets from the air force and the army. It could serve as a template for other more complex theatre commands to follow. The northern, eastern and western theatre commands, which directly address China and Pakistan, portend greater inter-services rivalry and will have to be undertaken on live borders. This could push their implementation to the second phase of the theaterisation.

The  Commands'  Challenge

General Rawat completes the first year of his CDS tenure on January 1, 2021. He has just two more years to complete his biggest task, of creating integrated theatre commands. A command is a military formation headed by a three-star C-in-C and is responsible for all military tasks in a given operational space. All of India’s 18 commands presently are single-service commands, which means they are exclusively run by the army, navy or the air force. The army and the air force have seven commands each; the navy has the remaining four. The Strategic Forces Command, which has operational control of India’s nuclear weapons, is the sole joint-services command.

The 18 commands are not co-located, and train, plan and exercise separately. If the IAF commander, for instance, needs to ask for a naval platform to assist his operations, he will have to initiate a complicated bureaucratic procedure through two service verticals.

Theaterisation pools in all resources, army, navy and air force, under a single theatre commander. “The setting up of such a maritime command, especially if it is to operate under the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is a right step that will address the issue of dual-hatted chiefs, which is an anomaly and a managerial nightmare,” says Anit Mukherjee, associate professor in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. “It is encouraging, though, as it seemingly addresses a fundamental tenet for jointness/ unity of command and control.”

The MTC integrates all Indian navy, army, air force and coast guard assets to achieve what the 2017 ‘Joint Forces Doctrine’ terms the addressing of the ‘integrated theatre battle’. This operationally adaptable force will ensure decisive victory in a network-centric environment across the entire spectrum of conflict in varied geographic domains. The Joint Maritime Theatre will not only have to address the growing power of China’s PLA Navy, which with 350 warships is the world’s largest, but also integrated Chinese military power. China’s president Xi Jinping recently set the goal of turning the PLA into a ‘fully modern military’ matching the US by 2027.

“Indian sea power today will not have the luxury of fighting the PLA Navy alone,” says Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande, who once headed naval intelligence. “It will also be fighting all the combined elements of the PLA’s military power, from air power to long-range ballistic missiles, range of expeditionary capabilities, cyber warfare and space-based assets. Our responses against the PLA Navy likewise, ought to be joint.”

Before that, MTC will have to deal with inter-services rivalries arising from the sharing of assets. The navy might not have trouble persuading the army to shed two amphibious brigades, based in Thiruvananthapuram and Port Blair, a force of nearly 12,000 infantry soldiers who can be transported on naval utility vessels to enemy shores. But it could face resistance while getting the IAF to move its maritime strike assets to the MTC, the Jaguars based in Jamnagar and Su-30MKIs and Tejas aircraft in Thanjavur.

Senior IAF commanders loathe tying their air assets to geographical theatres. Top navy officials say they have addressed this by proposing service verticals within the MTC. While the command will be headed by a three-star navy officer, the army and IAF verticals will be better interfaces with their respective services. The MTC will have a similar vertical for the Coast Guard, which presently reports to the defence minister through the defence secretary.

While this reporting chain will continue, Coast Guard assets will be placed under the MTC. The maritime theatre commander, for instance, could deploy Coast Guard patrol vessels for the navy’s ‘mission-based deployments’, warships deployed at seven vital points in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Navy officials cite the government designating the navy as the principal authority for overall maritime security post-26/11 as the logic behind this move.

The MTC is being created with the navy’s inhouse resources. The MTC C-in-C will be based out of the navy’s existing base, INS Kadamba in Karwar, and function with less than 300 staff, lesser than the crew strength of a Delhi-class destroyer.

Moreover, 2021 could well be the time to implement drastic restructuring in the service. The navy will see a rare and unprecedented reshuffle of its top brass when chief of naval staff Admiral Karambir Singh, vice chief of naval staff Vice Admiral Ashok Kumar, C-in-C West Vice Admiral Ajit Kumar, C-in-C East Vice Admiral A.K. Jain and C-in-C South Vice Admiral A.K. Chawla all retire within months of each other.

The Cost  Benefit

The navy is yet to calculate savings on account of this command. Top navy officials point to potential savings by halting acquisitions and new infrastructure for the Coast Guard. “The nation can ill-afford two maritime forces,” says a senior naval official.

Former Coast Guard director general Prabhakaran Paleri terms as “ridiculous” the move to place the Coast Guard under the navy in peacetime. (It is done so only in war.) “Navies cannot enforce maritime law; they are meant for war, which is why the navy itself had proposed the raising of the Coast Guard in 1978,” he says. The MTC structure will call for modifying the Navy Act and the Coast Guard Act, he adds.

The MTC is a gigantic version of the much smaller Andaman and Nicobar tri-services command that India had unsuccessfully attempted to create in 2001. The command was held in rotation by three-star officers from each service. This experiment was envisaged as a template for other geographically and functionally delineated joint commands. Lack of political will and inter-services rivalry thwarted this model from being replicated. Finally, in 2016, the navy took this command back.

Under MTC, the Andaman and Nicobar Command will go back to what it was in the mid-1990s, Fortress Andaman or FORTAN, just another outpost in the maritime theatre commander’s new domain.


Wednesday, December 2, 2020

1971 : The Two-Front War That India Fought - Indian Defence Research Wing

 SOURCE:  https://trendypedia.in/the-two-front-war-that-india-fought-indian-defence-research-wing/

                                                      WARNING

To day 49 years ago Pakistan had the audacity to hit me ( Us ) with thousand pounders at the sun set and read what we did to them what now is a HISTORY, I won't be surprised if Pakistan does not mend its ways than I ( We ) should not be blamed if PAKISTAN gets  VAPOURISED   from the world map. 


The Two-Front War That India Fought - Indian Defence Research Wing




SOURCE: SUNDAY GUARDIAN LIVE

The Pakistan Air Force attacked 11 Indian air bases from Jammu and Kashmir to Rajasthan in a preemptive air strike at the sunset of 3 December 1971. It violated Indian airspace with about 50 Sabre jet fighters. This opened up the second front for India in the Indian Western Theatre, ostensibly, to make the Indian armed forces recoil, which were then preparing to march into East Pakistan, as a response to the genocide being committed by the Pakistan Army on the Bengali Muslims there

. Certain preliminary border actions by the Indian Army had already commenced in November 1971. The western Pakistani Forces, primarily composed of Punjabi Muslims were creating mayhem on their Islamic brethren of East Pakistan, located some 1,600 km away, divided by the brilliance of the British. The country, on partition was unequally divided, with 55% population holding onto one-sixth of land area of the nation in the east as compared to the more influential Western Pakistanis holding large jagirs in the West where only 45% of the population resided.

The reason of the violence was clear—that an inferior Bengali Muslim from the East cannot rule Punjabi dominated West, even though a Bengali (Sheikh Mujibur Rehman) had won an election. This triggered a revolution in East Pakistan, a clear demonstration that religion is not enough to hold a nation together. Pakistan did not want India to come in aid of the Bangla resistance movement and expected that India would suffer the burden of millions of refugees silently. Indian patience was running thin under the increasing threats from Pakistan. On 23 November 1971, Indian Army had penetrated East Pakistan’s borders, with certain elements joining their Bangla allies. Emboldened with certain limited successes of the 1965 war and with American support, Pakistan had a false notion that they would be able to pull off an attack on India on the west and release pressure on their forces in East Pakistan where they were running a “scorched earth” policy of killing, looting and raping the Bengali population in millions.

In April 1971, post the hijack of the Indian Airlines Fokker friendship aircraft by Pakistan, which they also set on fire, India responded by closing Indian airspace to Pakistan, debarring them from flying directly to East Pakistan. Pakistani military garrisons in Dhaka, Comilla, Sylhet, Jessore, Rangpur, Bogra, Khulna, Rajshahi and Chittagong had to be sustained from the sea route. Pakistan had to supply jet fuel for its Sabre jets (F86), gasoline for its Chaffee tanks, ammunition for its guns and wheat for West Pakistan’s army. The supplies had to come via a long route, on Pakistani ships and planes, some needing refuelling in Sri Lanka. In mid 1971, the military requirements of transporting 180,000 tons and 120,000 personnel had doubled after Yahya Khan dispatched two additional infantry divisions from West Pakistan, only to be surrounded by the Indian Army later.

In July 1971, General Yahya Khan, warned India that “total war” was very near. Later, in August, he threatened that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would be given a death sentence, who after winning elections was denied the leadership of Pakistan and was accused of “political betrayal”. He had been put into solitary confinement in Lyallpur. Millions of Bengali Muslim refugees already pouring in from East Pakistan to Indian territory from the beginning of the year, turned into a torrent with Yahya’s announcement. By the end of the year almost 10 million refugees were already in India. India was sympathetic to East Pakistan and could not bear the increasing burden of feeding refugees. Those days vehicles in Pakistan were seen with stickers reading “Crush India”, while in India the stickers on transport read “Liberate Bangladesh”.

The Pakistan Army, facing a backlash, had recruited Bihari Muslims of East Pakistan to kill the Bengali Muslims—a tactic of running a proxy war they had mastered in earlier years. The Indian Army, on invitation and with the tacit approval of the provincial government of Bangladesh (name given during Liberation Struggle), posted some Bengali speaking military officers with small teams in a manner that they could covertly train and equip the Mukti Bahini under the code name of Operation Jackpot. In the wake of India supporting the liberation of Bangladesh, which had already extended assistance to the Bangla refugees, Pakistan threatened India with dire consequences. The then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, had the great challenge of shaping world opinion against Pakistan and support the cause for the creation of Bangladesh. Henry Kissinger made a hurried visit to India to deter, in fact warn India of consequences if India attacked Pakistan. Kissinger then visited Pakistan and from there visited China in Pakistan’s military aircraft on a secret mission asking for Chinese support to Pakistan.

India was certainly in a war-like situation, handling the mass exodus of refugees, a clear case of ethnic cleansing by Pakistan. The world watched this human tragedy quietly. India was frustrated and had no option but to take recourse to military action. General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw, then COAS, a great professional soldier, had his own mind on picking right time to attack Pakistan, even though he was asked by Indira Gandhi to wage a war in the earlier part of the year. Wary of China, he was looking for winters when China could not open the northern front and soil condition would be fit for Indian tanks to operate. Of course, he had many other reasons to delay. This gave time to India to prepare diplomatically as well as militarily. USSR was the only country that offered to support India. The blocs had shaped up where Pakistan, China and US (leader of NATO) were firmly tied to one side, with India standing alone with ten million Bangla refugees, and was leaning on understanding and support of the USSR.

On 3 December, the attack by Pakistani forces in the western sector gave a legitimate cause for India to attack Pakistan. Emboldened by Chinese and US support, Pakistan was surprised at the speed of Indian counter offensive in the west. Indian Air Force went in for air attacks on the entire front, literally paralysing the Pakistani Air Force. Indian Navy, in a swift attack caused heavy destruction of the Karachi port on 4 December with a repeat on 12 December with many ships, infrastructure and fuel dumps going up in flames each time. Indian Army’s ground operations, though more defensive initially in the west, were soon beating them in every battle. Contrary to the previous war of 1965, which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time in the Eastern Sector, strategy adopted by the Indian Army was to undertake a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan.
US dispatched its Seventh Fleet with Task Force 74, showing its presence near the Bay of Bengal on 11 December. In its support, the United Kingdom also deployed a Carrier Battle Group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay, on her final deployment. On 6 and 13 December, the Soviets dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers from Vladivostok, who trailed US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by the USS Enterprise task force in the Indian Ocean.
By the second week of December, Pakistani forces were quickly capitulating and falling apart in the East Pakistan. The morale of the Pakistani Army was abysmally low, even with supplies that could have lasted them for months. Their combat units were more than willing to surrender than fight.

The main Indian objective on the eastern front was to capture Dhaka, and on the western front to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan and dismembering it into different states. My unit 22 Maratha LI was involved right from the preliminary operations in East Pakistan prior to the outbreak of open hostilities. Some members of my unit were working closely with Mukti Bahini for months. For conventional operations, the unit was part of 202 Mountain Brigade, initially in reserve, with Brigade task to clear Hilli, a strong point that had to be cleared before advancing towards Rangpur. Pakistan had built a string of well-fortified strong points to defend the border. The BOPs (Border Out Posts) located ahead were cleared during preliminary operations. The attacks launched by other units of the brigade were suffering heavy casualties, who with sheer grit cleared the initial defences with heavy resistance.

My unit was tasked to launch a “silent attack” through the gaps of Pakistan’s 4 Frontier Force Rifles, taking the enemy by surprise which it cleared after some resistance. Once the surprise was lost, the further attack became intense and bloody, with the wiry Marathas slogging it out against the sturdy Pathans from bunker to bunker. The position was captured with heavy casualties on both sides. Post the capture of Hilli, the advance of the brigade towards Rangpur was resumed with the battalion in the lead. A wide outflanking move was undertaken to contact the Rangpur Defences. The enemy being encircled was petrified and began to surrender. The Indian Army was making such advances from all directions.

The paradrop of 2 Para (now Special Forces) at Tangail helped speed up operations towards final capture of Dhaka. By 12 December, Pakistani units still intact, began to willingly lay down arms in front of an increasing strength of Indian troops. On 16 December, Pakistan surrendered all troops located in East Pakistan. Many Pakistani Air Force officers, to save their lives, abandoned their missions and flew their planes into Burma. Similarly, many Pakistani fighter pilots in the western front also escaped and landed their planes in neighbouring Iran. Certain fighter planes supplied by the Middle East and Arab countries to Pakistan without pilots were left on Pakistani runways without being used. The Pakistan military led by Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, surrendered at the feet of the Indian forces. Over 90,000 Pakistan personnel (mostly from Pakistan Army) were taken prisoners of war (PoW) by the Indian Army. This was the greatest numbers of prisoners taken in the history of war between two countries ever. No wonder the Pakistan Army uses proxy warriors to fight its battles.

On the western front, certain critical areas had been captured by the Indian Army around Turtuk, Kargil and Kashmir, redefining the Cease Fire Line (CFL) into Line of Control (LoC). The Indian forces captured around 15,000 sq km of land in the west. The Shimla Agreement was signed as a gesture of goodwill where India decided to return the territory captured across the International Border. Territory captured in Jammu and Kashmir was retained by both sides and a new Line of Control was defined up to map reference NJ 9842 in the North. All PoWs were returned to Pakistan within five months, and those charged with war crimes were granted amnesty. Pakistan did not reciprocate the goodwill and has not returned 54 Indian PoWs still languishing in Pakistani jails.

Pakistan sought to have a diversified foreign policy, as Pakistani geo-strategists had been shocked that both China and the United States provided limited support to Pakistan during the course of the war, with the US displaying inability to supply weapons that Pakistan needed the most. The US at best encouraged other countries to help Pakistan with hardware.
Today, 49 years later, while the global dynamics around the subcontinent have changed, India continues to have adversaries in Pakistan and China, and have fought five wars with them. The US has realised the worthlessness of having untrustworthy friends; Pakistan has exported terrorism to the world while selling lies on fighting the War on Terrorism (GWOT) in support of the US. The Chinese have hurt US interests by stealing technology and pirating their intellectual property. China has challenged the US in every field, lately even military. Pakistan has become a vassal state of China and does its bidding. US and Russia relations continue to remain strained but are less serious from the years of cold war. In their case deterrence has worked towards keeping them away from a direct military confrontation, albeit taking opposite sides in global conflicts.

The current India-China-Pakistan conflict remains on the edge given their disputed borders and existence of historical fault lines. How these fronts and collusion pan out in the future need deliberate analysis. The current standoff on the LAC is still in the realm of conventional engagement, while “hybrid wars” are at play and are replacing the conventional. Regional peace can be ensured in remaining prepared for war and “securing peace through strength”. The next “two-front war” under a nuclear overhang and based on high technology will be more complex. Such wars would involve and impact every citizen of the countries involved. Devastation would be colossal and unavoidable. Only the maturity of global leaders can save the day for humanity.

                                     _________________________________

Lt Gen P.J.S. Pannu (Retd) is an officer of 22 Maratha LI, who has commanded his unit and Brigade at Uri (J&K), Division on the LAC (Arunachal Pradesh) and 14 Corps in Ladakh. He is also the former DG Infantry and Deputy Chief IDS, responsible for raising the Space and Cyber Agencies and Special Operations Division. He is a distinguished fellow of the USI.


Winter at LAC – Indian Defence Research Wing (r)

 SOURCE:  https://indianexpress.com/article/india/lac-winter-china-ladakh-border-indian-army-7072185/



                          

Defence 

                       Winter at LAC

    : Indian Defence Research Wing


The deployment of more than 100,000 soldiers belonging to two big armies, strung out over 872 km, in some of the harshest climes in the world, is simply without parallel in military history. The Indian Express on how the Army is staying fighting fit on the Line of Actual Control









 “General Winter”. 

That is the name historians gave to the adversary who routed both Napoleon and Hitler in Russia, more than a century apart from each other.

As the Indian and Chinese armies deployed at the Line of Actual Control eyeball each other, sometimes separated by just hundreds of metres, they are up against the same formidable foe, in a way that ambitious military campaigners of previous centuries might not have imagined. Eastern Ladakh is no Russia. Here the peaks go up to 18,000 ft and more. The winter deployment of more than 100,000 soldiers belonging to two armies, strung out over 872 km, is simply without parallel in military history.

“The first problem faced by a soldier in Ladakh is survival, fighting the enemy comes next… The peculiar geography has a major impact on the fighting and its outcome” — these are the opening sentences of the Fighting in Ladakh chapter of India’s official History of The Conflict with China, 1962, that was published more than three decades later.

At this time of the year, the maximum temperature in the forward areas of the LAC is as low as 3 degrees Celsius; minimum can plunge to minus 10 to minus 15 degrees Celsius. December and January will see minus 30 to minus 40 degrees, and snow. Added to this is the wind chill, as the official 1962 history highlighted. “Wind generally starts around mid-day and continues throughout thereafter”, and the combined effect “can cause cold injuries similar to burn injuries”. “Touching metal with bare hands is hazardous.”


With no breakthrough yet on a disengagement proposal from China at the eighth round of Corps Commanders’ talks, and no word on the next round, around 50,000 or so Indian troops are set for the long haul, guarding peaks over 15,000 ft through the winter, mirroring the deployment of the People’s Liberation Army.

Acute Mountain Sickness, high altitude pulmonary oedema, deep vein thrombosis, cerebral venous thrombosis, psychological illnesses — these are just some of the risks they are up against. With falling temperatures will come frostbite, snow-blindness, chilblains, and peeling of skin due to the extremely dry conditions.

Even now, with the most difficult months still ahead, Army sources say, there is daily attrition due to “cold-related” conditions — with many sent back to duty as soon as they get better. While information on altitude-related ailments is confidential, an official source says the non-fatal casualties are “not alarming” and “within the expected ratio”. There have been reported evacuations from the Chinese side too, from the heights of Finger 4.

Major General A P Singh (retd), who headed the logistics for XIV Corps deployed on the LAC between 2011 and 2013, says that till about a decade ago, the attrition rate was around 20%, mostly due to medical-based non-fatal casualties. “Attrition is because of snow, health or failure of oxygen,” he says, adding that soldiers are much better equipped now.

Singh expects soldiers, most of whom were sent to Ladakh between May and September, to be adequately acclimatised. At these heights, that matters as much as who has the superior fire power. Effectively, the Army is in winter deployment at the LAC, though that term has not been officially used. This is the first time.

The 1962 war document states that “nearly equal number of casualties suffered by the Indians were weather casualties”, lauding that it is “a tribute to the Indian soldier that even under such circumstances he fought and fought well”.

While this is the first ever time that so many troops are present in Ladakh at this time of the year, Indian military veterans say things have changed exponentially — for the better. Indian troops, with four wars against Pakistan (including Kargil), one against China, plus a three-decade-long experience of guarding Siachen, the highest battlefield in the world, are used now to dealing with both the heights and the winter, perhaps more so than their Chinese counterparts. Several establishments such as the Kargil and Siachen Battle Schools and the High Altitude Warfare School in Gulmarg train soldiers specifically to fight at heights.

“Our soldiers are deployed at 21,000 ft in Siachen, at 14,000-15,000 ft in Kargil and 14,000-17,000 ft in Eastern Ladakh,” says Lt Gen P J S Pannu (retd), who commanded the XIV Corps from 2016 to 2017. “In both Siachen and Kargil, we have posts that have no access to the outside world once snowfall begins. In the Kargil region, snow accumulates to 15-20 ft… it is highly avalanche-prone. For five to six months, troops are in lockdown positions… This kind of training and resilience is already there in our troops.”

Still, nobody thinks it will be easy.

***

Counting the elements the soldiers are up against, Major General Singh says, “One is the weather, which includes extreme cold and very high-speed winds. The second is the rarefied atmosphere, which is lack of oxygen and a function of the altitude. The third is of course the enemy. All three are treacherous.”

For a soldier arriving especially from a garrison in the plains, the first challenge is the sheer drop of oxygen level. The reduction can range between 25 and 65% — from Leh at 12,000 ft, to Mukhpari heights near Spanggur Gap at over 17,000 ft. On arrival troops undergo a three-stage acclimatisation exercise over 14 days. The first stage involves six days at 9,000 to 12,000 ft, with two days of rest and four days of walks and minor climbs. Stage 2 is four days at 12,000 to 15,000 ft heights, walking and climbing, and carrying loads over short distances. The next stage is four days at 15,000 ft and above, with the same walk-climb routine with and without loads.

In an emergency, this process is cut from 14 to 10 days. But that situation does not exist yet, says an officer. At Siachen in comparison, troops are inducted after a 21-day acclimatisation.

This gap gives the body time to adjust to the low oxygen and not go into hypoxia, which can lead to disorientation, nausea, headache, and if not detected early, more serious complications.

A medical memorandum issued by the Directorate General of Armed Force Medical Services in 1997 said that apart from hypoxia and cold, other factors that can affect performance at high altitudes and cause illnesses are “low humidity, solar and ultraviolet radiation”.

Lt Gen Pannu points out that the low oxygen levels mean efficiency reduces by almost 30-50%. “The soldier’s weight-carrying capability also goes down when, on the contrary, the requirement to carry weight goes up due to the lack of infrastructure.”

The layers of clothing one wears also cut efficacy, Major General Singh says. Talking of the sheer physical exertion needed, including to construct defences and bunkers, he adds that what can be done in the plains in a single day, “takes five to seven days”.

At high-altitude posts, soldiers carry anything between 20 and 45 kg of equipment, says a serving officer who does not want to be identified, depending upon the role the soldier is playing, whether offensive, defensive or on patrol. First and foremost are the weapon and ammunition. The weapon can be a pistol or a carbine, a rifle. If the weapon is heavy like a machine gun, weighing over 20 kg, multiple soldiers help carry it. A company of 60 to 120 soldiers carries at least one Medium Machine Gun, a section (6 to 20 soldiers) a rocket launcher. The ammunition load is divided.

Apart from this, a soldier’s gear includes boots, clothing for extreme weather, a set of inners, a multi-layered jacket, face protection from the cold, goggles to prevent snow-blindness and a helmet. Then there is a ‘sustenance kit’, which includes a sleeping bag, mattress, two pairs of change, toiletries, extra socks, a water bottle, and at least 24 hours worth of emergency, high-calorie cooked rations.

At forward posts, soldiers usually carry tinned food. “You cannot carry logistics to the frontline. Certainly not fresh food and vegetables, and due to low atmospheric pressure, you cannot cook in a pressure cooker for example. But it is not possible to eat large quantities of this (tinned) food. The moment you eat, your stomach pushes the diaphragm up against the lungs and heart, making breathing difficult. Very high calorific value of fruits, dried fruits, chocolates etc are given to soldiers. He enjoys none, and eats only to survive…,” says Pannu.

At the same time, any small movement can mean up to six-10 hours. “If pinned down by enemy fire, a soldier should be able to sustain (on his own),” the officer quoted above says.

Soldiers on the front also need to carry communication sets, the size depending on whether needed for company-to-company calls, battalion communication, or for communication between battalion headquarters and brigade or division headquarters. The sets get bigger with the formation.

***

In the 1962 conflict, the Indian forces across all sectors faced a severe paucity of winter clothing. In his book India’s China War, British journalist Neville Maxwell calls this “inadequate and in short supply”, apart from referring to other problems faced by the men such as the rarefied air, and lack of animals to carry loads. “All supplies, often including water, had to be airdropped.”

Elaborating what this means, Pannu says, “Imagine the air-dropped supplies falling a kilometre or even a few hundred meters from the designated dropping zone. It becomes a nightmare for the soldier who might spend the rest of the day fetching a few kilogrammes of essential supplies.”

Nearly 60 years after the India-China war, India still does not manufacture the insulated clothing required for the heights at which soldiers are now deployed in Ladakh. The clothing is imported at steep rates. Last month, at a public event, Vice Army Chief Lt General S K Saini talked of “a lack of viable indigenous solutions”.

Clothing has to not just ensure that the soldier keeps warm but also not be too heavy. Pannu warns against “heat load”, where the wearer feels hot when he is physically active but not warm enough when he is static.

Referring to the difference between Ladakh, Siachen and Kargil, all of which come under XIV Corps, Singh says that the LAC does not see that much snow, but “is cold, rocky”. “Soldiers here will not carry much snow clothing, but will carry warm clothing.” In comparison, in Siachen soldiers need alpine clothing and mountaineering equipment.

The winds also mean mere tents cannot be much of a protection, Singh says.

Recently, the Army unveiled some newly constructed heated accommodation for troops deployed behind the LAC; sources say facilities to accommodate all the men are in place. These are “smart camps” with barrack-like structures, and including electricity, water, heating, and other facilities. At the frontline though, where soldiers sit on peaks facing the PLA, they live in “heated tents as per tactical considerations”, an officer says.

Pannu notes that in reality a soldier might not spend much time inside the shelters. “He has to patrol, as well as build bunkers and defence work against the enemy’s fire and shelling from ground and air… He has to ultimately dig into the earth and bear the consequences of extreme cold directly.”

***

As deployment of this kind has never been required before at the LAC, many of the forward posts in Eastern Ladakh are being newly established, with no military infrastructure in place. This means, says the officer requesting anonymity, carrying material to create “defensive structures”, “if occupying a new feature”, as the heights on the north bank of Pangong Tso and in the Chushul sub-sector on the southern bank. Digging tools and corrugated galvanised iron sheets are needed to build bunkers and observation posts.

With the road infrastructure patchy, tracks right up to the top exist in only a few places, and soldiers must carry most of the equipment. “We use some amount of animal transport but patrolling is usually carried out on foot, unlike PLA troops who try and reach locations as far as possible by vehicles,” says Pannu.

The Chinese have the advantage of a topography that is like a rooftop — flat, with fewer mountains that are far apart, making the valleys on their side much wider, the veteran officer adds. “They have built highways, much easier to build on that side as they don’t go through so many mountain passes or tunnels. We, however, need to drill tunnels and build roads over passes. We cannot build very wide roads as that would need cutting mountains. The precipitation level on our side is also much more, therefore snow levels are much higher. In the Tibet area, the snowfall is only a few inches because it is very dry there. So they don’t have the challenges of snow blocking passes or tunnels for long period of time,” Pannu says.

While the IAF and Army helicopters have been pressed into service as part of the supply chain, the areas are higher than these are designed for, reducing their carrying capacity and hence meaning more sorties.

***

The other effect on soldiers is harder to detect. Singh talks of “the psychological part of being isolated”, with soldiers cut off from any contact for weeks, even months, from each other. “There is the fear that if something happens, even a helicopter cannot come to evacuate you.”

In order to reduce the exposure of soldiers at these forward posts, troops are being rotated as quickly as every two weeks. Singh says this is possible given the numbers the Army has there now, with a substantial strength in reserve. “If you come back from the post in two-three weeks, you are recouping yourself.”

At Siachen, which has infrastructure in place now at the forward posts as well as the base, a soldier generally spends around 90 days on the front. However, often this rolls over, an officer says, and beyond an acceptable limit, the damage could be permanent. The officer adds that they expect harsher climates in Ladakh, and hence the short rotation times.

“It is not just about maintaining a presence, but also keeping the soldier combat-ready. If you have to fight, you have to keep the health at a certain level. So, an early turnover may be necessitated. He can do a second round after a break,” the officer says, stressing this balance between raising defence and sustenance.

It’s not just the men either. Tanks, artillery systems and other hardware also need to be protected from the cold. “The equipment needs to be hardened and winterised. Repair and recovery are extremely difficult at sub-zero temperatures. In-situ workshops are equipped with warm canopies with bazooka heaters. The oil and radiators are prepared for the winter. All equipment with water pipes faces the problem of freezing, but certain innovations were made (during my time) to ensure water does not remain static in pipes,” says Pannu.

“There are inbuilt SOPs depending on the nature of the equipment, depending on whether they have oil, gas or electronic systems,” says another officer.

Whatever the difficulties, as of now, the troops at the border have dug in for the long haul, quite prepared for the eventuality that there may be no breakthrough towards disengagement. At the moment here is no clarity even on when, or if, the next round of senior commanders meeting will take place. There is precedence that a resolution could take years. In Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh, a standoff that began in 1986 took seven years before status quo ante was restored.

While no one can predict if the winter deployment at the LAC is going to become an annual feature, there are murmurs that these are the first straws in the icy winds blowing over Ladakh of the “LoC-isation” of the LAC, meaning the border with China may turn into a front that has to defended in the same way as the one with Pakistan.

And even as nobody wants that, this year could just be the start of a long, cold winter.

About the clothing
This is special clothing for 14,000 feet and above. Most of the troops on the frontline in Pangong Tso and Chushul would be having a similar kit
The soldiers carry enough ammunition (to attack/defend, depending on tasks), water bottle and medicine. As part of the unit, they might also have to carry ammunition for larger weapons, medicines, equipment to build defensive structures
The weight a soldier carries can vary from 20 to 45 kg, depending on the role he is playing and location



Line of Defence
Numbers: 50,000-plus;
average deployment is 15,000 to 17,000 usually

Heights: average 15,000 ft,
going upwards of 18,000 ft

LAC length: Over 870 km
in Eastern Ladakh

Weather conditions:
Temperatures 3 degrees to -15 degrees Celsius currently, will fall to up to
-40 degrees; oxygen low by 25% to 65%



Accommodation: Corrugated galvanised iron sheets for bunkers; heated tents on the frontlines; and new ‘smart camps’ with integrated electricity, water, heating behind the LAC

Risks: Acute mountain sickness, high-altitude pulmonary oedema, deep vein thrombosis, cerebral venous thrombosis, psychological illnesses, frostbite, snow-blindness, chilblains

Rotation at forward posts: At some places, as short as every two weeks, to minimise exposure

LAC vs Siachen, Kargil: Desert, not so snowy, with chilly winds, more rugged peaks


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