Friday, January 15, 2021

The Battle For The Soul Of Islam (r)

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Analysis


                The Battle For The Soul Of Islam 

Jordanian ruler Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein gloated in 1924 when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the visionary who carved modern Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire, abolished the Caliphate.


“The Turks have committed suicide. They had in the Caliphate one of the greatest political forces, and have thrown it away… I feel like sending a telegram thanking Mustapha Kemal. The Caliphate is an Arab institution. The Prophet was an Arab, the Koran is in Arabic, the Holy Places are in Arabia and the Khalif should be an Arab of the tribe of Khoreish,” Abdullah told The Manchester Guardian at the time, referring to the tribe of the Prophet Mohammed.1 “Now the Khaliphate has come back to Arabia,” he added.

It did not. Arab leaders showed no interest in the return of the Caliphate even if many Muslim intellectuals and clerics across the Middle East and the Muslim World criticized Ataturk’s abolition of it. Early Islamist political movements, for their part, largely declared the revival of caliphate as an aspiration rather than an immediate goal.

A century later it is not the caliphate that the world’s Muslim powerhouses are fighting about. Instead, they are engaged in a deepening religious soft power struggle for geopolitical influence and dominance.

This battle for the soul of Islam pits rival Middle Eastern and Asian powers against one another:  Turkey, seat of the Islamic world’s last true caliphate; Saudi Arabia, home to the faith’s holy cities; the United Arab Emirates, propagator of a militantly statist interpretation of Islam; Qatar with its less strict version of Wahhabism and penchant for political Islam; Indonesia, promoting a humanitarian, pluralistic notion of Islam that reaches out to other faiths as well as non-Muslim centre-right forces across the globe; Morocco which uses religion as a way to position itself as the face of moderate Islam; and Shia Iran with its derailed revolution.

In the ultimate analysis, no clear winner may emerge. Yet, the course of the battle could determine the degree to which Islam will be defined by either one or more competing stripes of ultra-conservativism—statist forms of the faith that preach absolute obedience to political rulers and/or reduce religious establishments to pawns of the state. Implicit in the rivalry is a broader debate across the Muslim World that goes to the heart of the relationship between the state and religion. That debate centers on what role the state, if at all, should play in the enforcement of religious morals and the place of religion in education, judicial systems and politics. As the battle for religious soft power between rival states has intensified, the lines dividing the state and religion have become ever more blurred, particularly in more autocratic countries. This struggle has and will affect the prospects for the emergence of a truly more tolerant and pluralistic interpretation of one of the three Abrahamic religions.

An Ever More Competitive Struggle

A survey of the modern history of the quest for Muslim religious soft power reveals an ever more competitive struggle with the staggered entry of multiple new players. Initially, in the 1960s, the Saudis, with Pakistani and a degree of West African input, had the playing field more or less to themselves as they created the building blocks of what would emerge as the world’s most focused, state-run and well-funded Islamic public diplomacy campaign. At the time, Western powers saw the Saudi effort in fostering conservative Islam as part of the global effort to contain communism. Ultimately, it far exceeded anything that the Soviets or the Americans undertook.

The Saudi endeavor, in contrast to the United States that could rely on its private sector and cultural attributes, was by necessity a top-down and largely government-financed initiative that overtime garnered widespread public support. The bulk of Saudi money went to non-violent, ultra-conservative religious, cultural and media institutions in countries stretching from China across Eurasia and Africa into the Americas. Some recipients of Saudi largesse were political, others were not. More often than not, funding was provided and donations were made with the tacit approval and full knowledge of governments, if not their active cooperation.

Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the kingdom’s religious outreach no longer focused on containing communism alone, and Saudi practice increasingly mirrored Iran’s coupling of religious soft power with hard power through the selective use of proxies in various Middle Eastern countries. Rarely publicly available receipts of donations by Saudis to violence-prone groups and interviews with past bagmen suggest that the kingdom directly funded violent militants in select countries in response to specific circumstances. This included Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, Pakistan to support anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian militants, Bosnia Herzegovina in aid of foreign fighters confronting Serbia in the 1990s, Palestine, Syria where Islamists were fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Iraq wracked by an anti-Shiite insurgency and Iran in a bid to fuel ethnic unrest.

Money was often hand carried to recipients or channelled through businessmen, money exchangers and chosen banks. Receipts of donations to Sipah-e-Sahaba, a banned virulently anti-Shia group that attacked Shias in Pakistan, and its successors and offshoots, bear the names of a Saudi donor who is hard to trace. They suggest that the dividing lines between private and officially-sanctioned funding are blurred.


To be sure, the level of Saudi funding and the thrust of the kingdom’s religious soft power diplomacy has changed with the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The drive today is to project the kingdom and its Islam as tolerant, forward-looking, and outward- rather than inward-looking. Saudi religious outreach also aims to open doors for the kingdom through demonstrative acts like the visit to the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz in Poland by a delegation of 25 prominent Muslim clergymen led by Mohammed al-Issa, the head of the Muslim World League. The League, which was once a prime vehicle for the kingdom’s global promotion of religious ultra-conservatism, has also been forging closer ties with Jewish and Christian evangelist communities.


Indeed, Prince Mohammed has turned the League into a propagator of his vaguely defined notion of a moderate Islam. Meantime, Saudi Arabia’s retreat from religiously packaged foreign funding2 has created opportunity for the kingdom’s competitors.

Facts on the ground in the kingdom and beyond, nonetheless, tell at times a different story. Schoolbooks are being cleansed of supremacist and racist references in a slow and grinding process initiated after the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom said in its 2020 report that “despite progress in recent years, Saudi textbooks have seen some backsliding regarding language inciting hatred and violence toward non-Muslims. While the 2019–2020 textbooks showed marginal improvements in the discussion of Christians, textbooks still teach that Christians and Jews ‘are the enemy of Islam and its people,’ and that members of the LGBTQI community will ‘be struck [killed] in the same manner as those in Sodom.’”3

  • Prince Mohammed’s nominal embrace of religious tolerance and inter-faith dialogue has produced far more public interactions with Jewish and Christian leaders but not led to a lifting on the ban on public non-Muslim worship and the building of non-Muslim houses of worship in the kingdom itself. Access to holy sites like Mecca and Medina remains banned for non-Muslims, as it has been for most of Islam’s history, and often entry into mosques is also barred.

While Saudi Arabia has implemented strict regulations on donations for charitable purposes abroad, the source and the channelling of funding to militants that serve the kingdom’s geopolitical purpose remains unclear at best. Militant Pakistani bagmen described in interviews in 2017 and 2018 the flow of large amounts of money to ultra-conservative madrassas that dot Pakistan’s borders with Iran and Afghanistan. They said the monies were channelled through Saudi nationals of Baloch origin and often arrived in suitcases in an operation that they believed had tacit Saudi government approval. The monies, according to bagmen interviewed by this writer, were being transferred at a time when U.S. policymakers like former national security adviser John Bolton were proposing to destabilize the Iranian regime by supporting ethnic insurgencies.4 Saudi Arabia was also publicly hinting that it may adopt a similar strategy.5

No Longer in A Class of Its Own

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran marked the moment when Saudi religious soft power was no longer in a class of its own. It also launched a new phase in Saudi-Iranian rivalry that progressively has engulfed the Middle East and North Africa and beyond. Competition for religious soft power and influence is a fixture of the rivalry. So is the marked difference in Saudi and Iranian concepts of religious soft power.

Although both had sectarian traits, Saudi Arabia’s primary focus was religious and theological while revolutionary Iran’s was explicitly political and paramilitary in nature and geared toward acquiring hard power. Iranian outreach in various Arab countries focused on cultivating Shiite militias, not on greater religious piety.

The Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s in which Sunni Gulf states funded Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s war machine shifted Iran’s focus from export of its revolution to a greater emphasis on Iranian nationalism. Iran also moved to nurturing Shiite militias that would constitute the country’s first line of defense.

Gone were the days of Tehran’s emphasis on groups like the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain that gathered regularly in a large sitting room in the home of Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, a one-time designated successor of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the exploits of his son, Mohammed Montazeri, who was nicknamed Ayatollah Ringo and founded an armed group in Lebanon and Syria that aimed to liberate Muslim lands.

The watershed shift has shaped Iran and its religious strategy, including its support for and recruitment of Shiite and other groups and communities in the Middle East, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It constituted Iran’s soft and hard power response to the Saudi effort to infuse Muslim communities worldwide with an ultra-conservative, anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian interpretation of the faith. Elsewhere, like in Southeast Asia and West Africa, the thrust of Iranian religious diplomacy was, like much of the Saudi effort, focused primarily on religious and social issues.

The shift was evident early on in emotive debates in Iran’s parliament in 1980 about the utility of the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran at a time that Iran was at war with Iraq. Men like Hojatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the parliament who later became President, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, the number two in the Iranian political hierarchy at the time, and chief jurist Ayatollah Sadegh Khalqali, who was known as the hanging judge for his penchant for the death penalty, argued unsuccessfully in favour of a quick resolution of the embassy crisis so that Iran could focus on the defense of its territory and revolution.

The debates signalled a shift from what was initially an ideological rivalry to a geopolitical fight that continues to this day and that is driven by the perception in Tehran that the United States and the Gulf states are seeking to topple the Islamic regime.

An Ever More Complex Battle

If the first phase of the battle for the soul of Islam was defined by the largely uncontested Saudi religious soft power campaign, and the second phase began with the emergence of revolutionary Iran, the third and most recent phase is the most complex one, not only because of the arrival on the scene of new players but also because it entails rivalries within rivalries.

The new players are first and foremost the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar, and Indonesia. Their entry into the fray has further blurred the dividing lines between purely religious and cultural soft power, nationalism, and the struggle within Muslim societies over values, including various freedoms, rights, and preferred political systems.

The third phase is complicated by the fact that all of the players with the exception of Indonesia have embraced Iran’s model of coupling religious soft power with hard power and the use of proxies to advance their respective agendas. This is apparent in the Saudi-UAE-led war to counter Iran in Yemen; Emirati, Egyptian and Turkish support for opposing sides in Libya’s civil war; and Turkish and Gulf state involvement in Syria.

The intensifying violence lays bare the opportunism adopted by most players. Saudi Arabia, for example, has been willing to forge or maintain alliances with groups aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood even though it has designated the organization as a terrorist entity,6 while the UAE, which claims the mantle of moderation but still supports the forces of Libyan rebel leader Khalifa Haftar whose ranks include a significant number of Salafist fighters.7

The resurgence of political Islam as a result of the 2011 popular Arab revolts that toppled leaders in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, fuelled the worst fears of men like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed, Egyptian General-turned President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed.

The upheaval also created an opportunity for the UAE, a country that prides itself on being a cutting-edge, cosmopolitan home to people from some 190 countries. It launched a multi-faceted effort to project itself as an open and tolerant society that is at the forefront of Islamic moderation and tolerance, and to respect religious diversity and inter-faith dialogue.

Bin Zayed’s acquiescence of the Salafis, who have sought to impose strict Islamic law on Haftar’s eastern Libyan stronghold of Benghazi, is based on their association with an ultra-conservative strand of the faith that preaches absolute obedience to the earthly ruler in power. That acquiescence contradicts Bin Zayed’s otherwise dim view of ultra-conservative interpretations of Islam like Wahhabism.


Speaking in 2005 to then U.S. ambassador James Jeffrey, Bin Zayed compared Saudi Arabia’s religious leaders to “somebody like the one we are chasing in the mountains,” a reference to Osama bin Laden who at the time was believed to be hiding in a mountainous region of Afghanistan.8 In an email to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman twelve years later, Yusuf al-Otaiba, a confidante of Bin Zayed and the UAE’s ambassador in Washington, asserted that “Abu Dhabi fought 200 years of wars with Saudi over Wahhabism.9

Al Otaiba’s comment came a year after the UAE, in a bid to undermine Saudi religious diplomacy, sponsored a gathering of prominent Sunni Muslim leaders in the Chechen capital of Grozny that effectively ex-communicated Wahhabism.10 Western officials refrained from publicly commenting, but they privately commended Emirati efforts to confront a worldview that they feared provided a breeding ground for social tensions and extremism.11

Bin Zayed has played a key role in shaping Bin Salman’s policies to shave off Wahhabism’s rougher edges and to bring the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s religious soft power endeavors closer together. This alignment has resulted in what author Shadi Hamid calls non-political politicized Islam, or a “third trend in political Islam.”12 That trend, in the words of scholar Gregory Gause, “is tightly tied to state authority and subservient to it.”13

Bin Zayed’s efforts have paid off. Despite ruling at home with an iron fist, Bin Zayed has been able to promote a state-controlled Islam that styles itself as tolerant and apolitical and preaches obedience to established rulers without addressing outdated or intolerant concepts embedded in the faith such as the notion of kafirs or infidels, slavery, and Muslim supremacy that remain reference points even if large numbers of Muslims do not heed them in their daily life.

His success, backed by armies of paid Western lobbyists, is evidenced by the fact that the UAE is widely perceived as a religiously tolerant, pluralistic, and enlightened society. This is in stark contrast to Bin Salman and Saudi Arabia’s reputational problems as a result of the 2018 killing in Istanbul of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the arrests and alleged torture of dissidents and others deemed a potential threat.

The UAE has also successfully projected itself as a secular state despite the fact that its constitution requires legislation to be compatible with Islamic law. In doing so, Emirati leaders walk a fine line. Islamic scholars with close ties to the UAE felt a need to rush to defend Al Otaiba, the UAE ambassador,14 against accusations of blasphemy for telling Charlie Rose in a television interview that “what we would like to see is more secular, stable, prosperous, empowered, strong government.”15

To avert criticism, the UAE government rolled out Mauritanian philosopher Adballah Seyid Ould Abah who insisted that it was “obvious that (Al Otaiba) did not mean secularism according to the concept of ‘laícite’ or according to the social context of the term. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other countries in the region are keen on sponsoring a religion, maintaining its role in the public field, and protecting it from ideological exploitation which is a hidden manifestation of secularization.”16

The UAE scored one of its most significant successes with the first ever papal visit to the Emirates by Pope Francis during which he signed a Document on Human Fraternity with Al Azhar’s Grand Imam, Ahmad El-Tayeb. The pope acknowledged the UAE’s growing influence, when in a public address he thanked Egyptian judge and his late advisor Mohamed Abdel Salam, who was close to both the Emiratis and Egypt’s Al-Sisi, for drafting the declaration. Abdel Salam ensured that the UAE and the Egyptian president rather than Al Azhar put their stamp on the document.

Creating the UAE’s Religious Ecosystem

To bolster the Emirati version of “counter-revolutionary” Islam and counter influential Qatari-backed groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and other strands of political Islam, Bin Zayed launched a multi-pronged offensive involving geopolitical as well as religious building blocks.

Bin Zayed drew a line in the sand when in 2013 he helped orchestrate a military coup that toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother who won Egypt’s first and only free and fair election.17 His engineering of the 2017 debilitating UAE-Saudi-Bahraini-Egyptian diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar, which is accused of being a pillar of political Islam, further strengthened Bin Zayed’s drawing of the religious soft power battle lines.

The battles that have ensued between the UAE and Qatar have been as much in the realm of ideology and ideas as they have been in war theatres like Libya, where the UAE has funded and armed Libyans fighting the elected, internationally recognized Islamist Government of National Accord based in Tripoli.

Bin Zayed signaled his ideational intentions with the creation of religious organizations of his own, the launch of Emirati-run training programs for non-UAE imams, and a visit a year after the 2013 coup in Egypt to Al Azhar’s sprawling 1000-year-old mosque and university complex in Cairo. The visit was designed to underline the Emirati ruler’s determination to steer Al Azhar’s adoption of moderate language and counter extremism and fanaticism.18

Meantime, the new Emirati imam-training programs put the UAE in direct competition with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Morocco, major purveyors of Muslim clerical training. The UAE scored initial successes with the training of thousands of Afghan clerics19 and an offer to provide similar services to Indian imams.20

The UAE’s growing world influence was evident in those who participated in the 2016 Grozny conference that effectively excommunicated Wahhabism. Participants included the imam of the Al-Azhar Grand Mosque, Ahmed El- Tayeb, Egyptian Grand Mufti Shawki Allam, former Egyptian Grand Mufti and Sufi authority Ali Gomaa, a strident supporter of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, Al Sisi’s religious affairs advisor, Usama al-Azhari, the mufti of Damascus Abdul Fattah al-Bizm, a close confidante of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, influential Yemeni cleric Habib Ali Jifri, head of the Abu Dhabi-based Islamic Tabah Foundation who has close ties to Bin Zayed, Indian grand mufti Sheikh Abubakr Ahmad, and his Jordanian counterpart, Sheikh Abdul Karim Khasawneh.

The participation of El-Tayeb, a political appointee and salaried Egyptian government official, and other Egyptian religious luminaries who had supported Al-Sisi’s military coup, said much about the UAE’s inroads into Al Azhar, an institution that was for decades a preserve of Saudi ultra-conservatives. El-Tayeb signaled the shift when in 2013 he accepted the Sheikh Zayed Book Award for Cultural Personality of the Year in recognition of his “leadership in moderation and tolerance.”

El-Tayeb was lauded “for encouraging a culture of tolerance, dialogue and protection of civil society” at a moment that Morsi, the embattled Egyptian president, was fighting for his political life, and Bin Zayed was cracking down on Emirati Muslim Brothers.21

The Grozny conference was co-organized by the Tabah Foundation, the sponsor of the Council of Elders, a UAE-based group founded in 2014 that aims to dominate Islamic discourse that many non-Salafis assert has been hijacked by Saudi largesse. The Council, like the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, another UAE-funded organization, was created to counter the Doha-based International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) headed by Yusuf Qaradawi, one of the world’s most prominent and controversial Muslim theologians who is widely viewed as a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Tabah Foundation is headed by Saudi-based Mauritanian politician and Islamic scholar Abdullah Bin Bayyah as well as El-Tayeb. Before he established the Emirati-supported group, Bin Bayyah was vice president of Qaradawi’s European Council for Fatwa and Research, created to provide guidance to European Muslims through the dissemination of religious opinions. He also heads the Emirates Fatwa Council that oversees the issuing of religious opinions and trains and licenses clerics.

Bin Bayyah as well as other prominent traditionalists with past ties to the Brotherhood and/or political Islam, including Hamza Yusuf, an American convert to Islam, and Aref Ali Nayed, a former Libyan ambassador to the UAE, found common ideological ground in the assertion that the Brotherhood and jihadist ideology are offshoots of ultra-conservative strands of Islam. They saw the UAE’s position as rooted in decades of animosity between Al Azhar and the Brotherhood that Egyptian presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak exploited to counter the Brothers and Wahhabism.

Born Mark Hanson, Yusuf, a disciple of Bin Bayyah, is widely viewed as one of the most influential and charismatic Western Islamic preachers.

Nayed, an Islamic scholar, entrepreneur, and onetime supporter of the 2011 popular “Arab Spring” revolts, moved Kalam Research & Media, a Muslim think tank that he founded in 2009, to Dubai and aligned it with the UAE’s strategy.

“I believe that the entire region is undergoing an identity crisis in reality. Who are we? And what is the Islam we accept as our religion?… It is an existential question and there is a major struggle. I believe that there is fascism in the region as a whole that dresses up as Islam, and it has no relation to true Islam… Let me be explicit: there are countries that support the Muslim Brothers, and there are countries that are waging war against the Muslim Brothers… This is a regional war—we do not deny it,” Nayed told BBC Arabic.22

Embracing Machiavelli’s notion of religion as a powerful tool in the hands of a prince, members of the Abu Dhabi ruling family, including Bin Zayed and his foreign minister, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, began courting Bin Bayyah in early 2013. They invited the cleric to the Emirates the same month that Morsi was toppled.23

In a letter three months later to Qaradawi’s IUMS that bitterly opposed the overthrow of Morsi and condemned the Egyptian military government’s subsequent brutal repression of the Brotherhood, Bin Bayyah wrote that he was resigning from the group because, “the humble role I am attempting to undertake towards reform and reconciliation [among Muslims] requires a discourse that does not sit well with my position at the International Union of Muslim Scholars.”24

Bin Bayyah published the letter to demonstrate to Emirati leaders that he had ended his association with Qatari-supported Islamist groups. He has since acknowledged that he speaks on behalf of the UAE government.25 The courting of Bin Bayyah emanated from Bin Zayed’s realization that he needed religious soft power to justify the UAE’s wielding of hard power in countries like Yemen and Libya. The timing of Bin Zayed’s positioning of Bin Bayyah as what Usaama Al-Azami, an Islamic scholar,26 dubs “counter‐revolutionary Islam’s most important scholar,” was hardly coincidental. It coincided with the gradual withdrawal from public life of the far more prolific and media savvy Qaradawi, who had become a nonagenarian.

Al-Azami argues that the UAE’s financial and political clout rather than intellectual argument will decide to what degree the Emirates succeed in their religious soft power campaign.

“The counter‐revolutionary Islamic political thought that is being developed and promoted by Bin Bayyah and the UAE suffers from certain fundamental structural problems that means its very existence is precariously predicated on the persistence of autocratic patronage. Its lack of independence means that it is not the organic product of a relatively unencumbered engagement with political modernity that might be possible in freer societies than counter‐revolutionary Gulf autocracies,” Al-Azami wrote.27

Yahya Birt, a British Muslim scholar of UAE-supported clerics, argues that their need to project their sponsors at times is at odds with reality on the ground. “The extracted price of government patronage is high for ulema in the Middle East. Generally speaking, they have to openly support or maintain silence about autocracy at home, while speaking of democracy, pluralism, and minority rights to Western audiences,” Birt said.

“What does this mean for the soft power dimension of the UAE with projects such as the Forum for Promoting Peace? On the face of it the Forum seems benign enough: promoting ideas of peace, minority rights and citizenship in the Arab and Muslim world, but at what price? Any criticism of the UAE’s human rights violations…seems impossible,” Birt went on to say.28

Longing For Past Imperial Glory

Slick public relations packaging is what gives the UAE an edge in its rivalry with both Saudi Wahhabism as well as with Qatar and Turkey. Saudi Arabia is hobbled by the image of an austere, ultra-conservative and secretive kingdom that it is trying to shed and a badly tarnished human rights record magnified by hubris and a perceived sense of entitlement. For its part, Turkey’s religious soft power drive has a raw nationalist edge to it that raises the spectre of a longing for past imperial glory.

Inaugurated in 2019, Istanbul’s Camlica Mosque, Turkey’s largest with its six minarets, symbolizes President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions. So does the controversial return a year later of the Hagia Sophia, the 1,500 old-church-turned-mosque-turned museum, to the status of a Muslim house of worship. In contrast to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the general who turned Hagia Sophia into a museum to emphasize the alignment with the West of the state he had carved out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire, Erdogan embarked on a campaign of support for mosques and Muslim communities in former imperial holdings and beyond.

In doing so, Erdogan was following in the footsteps of Ottoman sultans who sought legacy in grandiose mosque construction. He was signaling his intention to restore Turkish glory by positioning his country as the leader of the Islamic world, willing and able to defend Muslims across the globe. His was a worldview outlined by Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s onetime prime and foreign minister, who argued that Turkey’s geography, history, and religious and cultural agency empowered it to be a regional hegemon.29

Erdogan underlined the importance of religious soft power in his geopolitical strategy by granting his Religious Affairs Department or Diyanet a key role in foreign and aid policy. Established by Ataturk in 1924 to propagate a statist, moderate form of Islam that endorsed secularism, Erdogan infused the directorate with his version of political Islam.

Erdogan harnessed the Diyanet to legitimize his military escapades in Syria, Libya, and Iraq30 in much the same way that Iran and now the UAE blends hard power with religious soft power. Diyanet regularly instructs imams at home and abroad to recite a Quranic verse, Sura Al-Fath or the Verse of the Conquest, to legitimize the Turkish president’s adventures. The sura conveys a message of victory and conquest as well as the favor God conferred upon the Prophet Mohammed and his followers. It promises increased numbers of faithful as well as forgiveness of worldly mistakes by those who do jihad on the path of God.

The construction of mosques and the dispatch of Diyanet personnel who serve as imams, religious counselors, and political commissars have been an important component of a multi-pronged Turkish strategy to build influence. The strategy also included development and humanitarian aid, the funding and building of infrastructure, private sector investment, and the opening of universities.

The meshing of religious soft power and aid has served Turkey well. Perhaps nowhere more so than in Somalia where US$1 billion in aid channelled through Diyanet and other NGOs funded the building of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan Hospital in the capital Mogadishu31 and the establishment of Turkey’s foremost foreign military base.32 Somalia is at the eastern end of a major Turkish diplomatic, economic and cultural push across the African continent that is part of policy designed to position Turkey as a major Middle Eastern, Eurasian and African player.

The price tag attached to Turkish largesse often was that beneficiaries handed over schools operated by the exiled preacher Fethullah Gulen, a onetime Erdogan ally who Turkish officials accuse of building a state within a state and engineering the 2016 failed military attempt to unseat Erdogan with the backing of the UAE. Beneficiaries were often required to extradite suspected Gulen followers and look the other way when Turkish intelligence agents kidnapped alleged followers of the preacher and return them to Turkey.33

Turkey’s quest for religious soft power kicked into high gear in the wake of the failed 2016 coup with Erdogan repeatedly defining Turkish identity as essentially Ottoman. It is an identity that obliged Turkey in Erdogan’s view to come to the defense of Muslims around the world, starting with the 45 modern-day states that once were Ottoman territory. Erdogan, for instance, embraces Palestinian nationalist aspirations as well as Hamas, the Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip, and the struggle for independence of Kosovo because they are Muslim. Erdogan is not the first Turkish leader to root Turkey’s Islamic identity in its Ottoman past.

So did Turgut Ozal, who in the 1980s and early 1990s put Turkey on the path towards an export-driven free market economy. Ozal, as president, also pioneered the opening to post-Soviet Central Asia and encouraged Turkish investment in the Middle East and North Africa. But he shied away from de-emphasizing Turkey’s ties to the West. Erdogan’s contribution has been that by breaking with Turkey’s Kemalist past, he was able to put Islam as a religion and a foundational civilization at the core of changing Turkish educational and social life and positioning the country on the international stage.

If Ozal, a former World Banker, was the more cosmopolitan expression of Turkish Islamism, Erdogan veered towards its more exclusivist, anti-Western bent. Ozal embraced Westernization as empowering Turkey. Erdogan rejected it because it deprived the state of its religious legitimacy, ruptured historic continuity, and produced a shallow identity. It is a strategy that has paid dividends. Erdogan emerged as the most trusted regional leader in a 2017 poll that surveyed public opinion in 12 Middle Eastern countries. Forty percent of the respondents also recognized Erdogan as a religious authority even though he is not an Islamic scholar.34

The irony of Erdogan’s fallout with Gulen as well as the souring of Turkish-Saudi relations, initially as a result of Turkish suspicions of Gulf support for the failed coup and the 2018 killing in Istanbul of Khashoggi, is that both the Turkish preacher and the Saudi journalist were nurtured in Saudi-backed organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Gulen played a key role in the 1960s in the founding of the Erzurum branch of the Associations for the Struggle against Communism, an Islamist-leaning Cold War Turkish group that had ties to Saudi Arabia.35 Erdogan, former Turkish president Abdullah Gul and former parliament speaker Ibrahim Karatas, among many others, were formed in nationalist and Islamic politics as members of the Turkish National Students Union, which represented the Muslim World League in Turkey.36

Turkey has a leg up on its competitors in the Balkans, Central Asia, and Europe. Centuries of Ottoman rule as well as voluntary and forced migration have spawned close ethnic and family ties. Millions of Turks pride themselves on their Balkan roots. The names of Istanbul neighbourhoods, parks and forests reflect the Balkans’ Ottoman history. Central Asians identify themselves as Turkic, speak Turkic languages and share cultural attributes with Turks.

In Europe, Turkish operatives often enjoy the goodwill of large well-integrated Diaspora communities even if the fault lines run deep between Turks and Kurds opposed to the Turkish government’s repression of Kurdish political aspirations.

Turkey’s Achilles Heel may be that the Ottoman-style Islam it projects is a misreading of the empire’s history. In another twist of irony, Erdogan embraced a Kemalist vision of the Ottomans as a religiously driven empire rather than one that perceived itself as both Muslim and European and that was pragmatic and not averse to aspects of secularism. It is that misreading that in the words of Turkey scholar Soner Cagaptay has produced “an ahistorical, political Islam-oriented, and often patronising foreign policy concoction” and has informed Turkey’s soft power strategy.37

Turkey has sought to bolster its bid for religious soft power by positioning itself alongside Malaysia as the champion of the rights of embattled Muslim communities like Myanmar’s Rohingya. Turkey’s claim to be the defender of the Muslim underdog is however called into question by its refusal, with few caveats, to criticize the brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in China’s northwestern “autonomous region” of Xinjiang.

Turkey’s perfect opportunity to project itself arose with Gulf acquiescence to the U.S.’s official recognition of Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, as well the launch of a peace plan that buried hopes for a two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To the chagrin of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Turkey convened a summit in Istanbul of the Riyadh-based, Saudi-dominated Organization of Islamic Cooperation that groups 54 Muslim countries to denounce the U.S.’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Erdogan vowed two years later to prevent Israel from annexing parts of the West Bank and declared that Jerusalem was “a red line for all Muslims in the world.”38 Erdogan has also condemned the UAE and Bahrain’s recent diplomatic recognition of Israel even though he has never reversed Turkey’s own ties with the Jewish state.



The New Kid on the Block

Indonesia, the new kid on the block in the competition for Muslim religious soft power and leadership, has proven to be a different kettle of fish. Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim movement, rather than the government of President Joko Widodo, has emerged as a formidable contender, one that is capable of operating on the same level as the states with which it competes.

As a result, the Indonesian state takes a back seat in the global competition among Muslims. It benefits from its close ties to Nahdlatul Ulama as well as the movement’s ability to gain access to the corridors of power in world capitals, including Washington, London, Berlin, Budapest, the Vatican, and Delhi. Nahdlatul Ulama was instrumental in organizing a visit to Indonesia in 2020 by Pope Francis that had to be postponed because of the coronavirus pandemic.39

The movement also forged close working ties to Muslim grassroots communities in various parts of the world as well as prominent Jewish and Christian groups. Nahdlatul Ulama’s growing international influence and access was enabled by its embrace in 2015 of a concept of “Nusantara (archipelago) Islam” or “humanitarian Islam” that recognized the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.40 The movement has also gone beyond paying lip service to notions of tolerance and pluralism with the issuance of fatwas intended to re-contextualize the faith by eliminating categories like infidels.41

Nahdlatul Ulama’s evolution towards a process of re-contextualization of Islam dates back to a 1992 gathering of religious scholars chaired by Abdurrahman Wahid, the group’s leader at the time and later president of Indonesia. The gathering noted that “the changing context of reality necessitates the creation of new interpretations of Islamic law and orthodox Islamic teaching.”42

Speaking to a German newspaper 25 years later, Nahdlatul Ulama General Secretary Yahya Cholil Staquf laid out the fundamental dividing line between his group’s notion of a moderate Islam and that of Indonesia’s rivals without identifying them by name. Asked what Islamic concepts were problematic, Staquf said: “The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, the relationship of Muslims with the state, and Muslims’ relationship to the prevailing legal system wherever they live … Within the classical tradition, the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims is assumed to be one of segregation and enmity… In today’s world such a doctrine is unreasonable. To the extent that Muslims adhere to this view of Islam, it renders them incapable of living harmoniously and peacefully within the multi-cultural, multi-religious societies of the 21st century.”43

Widodo initially hoped that Nahdlatul Ulama’s manifesto on humanitarian Islam would empower his government to position Indonesia as the beacon of a moderate interpretation of the faith. Speaking at the laying of the ground stone of the International Islamic University (UIII) in West Java, Widodo laid down a gauntlet for his competitors in the Middle East by declaring that it was “natural and fitting that Indonesia should become the (authoritative) reference for the progress of Islamic civilization.”44

Widodo saw the university as providing an alternative to the Islamic University of Medina, that has played a key role in Saudi Arabia’s religious soft power campaign, and the centuries-old Al Azhar in Cairo, that is influenced by financially-backed Saudi scholars and scholarship as well as Emirati funding. The university is “a promising step to introduce Indonesia as the global epicenter for ‘moderate’ Islam’,” said Islamic philosophy scholar Amin Abdullah.45

Saudi and Emirati concerns that Indonesia could emerge as a serious religious soft power competitor were initially assuaged when Widodo’s aspirations were thwarted by critics within his administration. A six-page proposal to enhance Indonesian religious soft power globally put forward in 2016 by Nahdlatul Ulama at the request of Pratikno, Widodo’s minister responsible for providing administrative support for his initiatives, was buried after the foreign ministry warned that its adoption would damage relations with the Gulf states.46

That could have been the end of the story. But neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE anticipated Nahdlatul Ulama’s determination to push its concept of humanitarian Islam globally, including at the highest levels of government in western capitals as well as in countries like India. Nor did they anticipate Mr. Widodo’s willingness to play both ends against the middle by supporting Nahdlatul Ulama’s campaign while engaging on religious issues with both the Saudis and the Emiratis.

The degree to which Nahdlatul Ulama is perceived as a threat by the UAE and Saudi Arabia is evident in battles in high level inter-faith meetings convened by the Vatican, U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback, and others over principles like endorsement of the UN human rights declaration.

Nahdlatul Ulama’s rise to prominence was also what persuaded Muhammad bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa, the head of the Muslim World League, to visit the Indonesian group’s headquarters in Jakarta in early 2020.47 It was the first visit to one of the world’s foremost Islamic organizations in the League’s almost 60-year history. The visit allowed him to portray himself as in dialogue with Nahdlatul Ulama in his inter-faith contacts as well as in conversation with Western officials and other influential interlocutors.

Al-Issa had turned down an opportunity to meet two years earlier when a leading Nahdlatul Ulama cleric and he were both in Mecca at the same time. He told a Western interlocutor who was attempting to arrange a meeting that he had “never heard” of the Indonesian scholar and could not make time “due to an extremely previous busy schedule of meetings with international Islamic personalities” that included “moderate influential figures from Palestine, Iraq, Tunisia, Russia and Kazakhstan.”48

Saudi Arabia was forced several months later in the run-up to the 2019 Indonesian presidential election to replace its ambassador in Jakarta, Osama bin Mohammed Abdullah Al Shuaib. The ambassador had denounced in a tweet—that has since been deleted—Ansor, the Nahdlatul Ulama young adults organization, as heretical and he had supported an anti-government demonstration.49

Nahdlatul Ulama’s ability to compete is further evidenced by its increasingly influential role in Centrist Democrat International or CDI, the world’s largest alliance of political parties, that grew out of European and Latin American Christian Democratic movements. Membership in CDI of the National Awakening or PKB, the political party of Nahdlatul Ulama, arguably gives it a leg up in the soft power competition with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which both ban political parties. Meantime, the PKB is far more pluralistic than Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has shown increasingly authoritarian tendencies.

CDI’s executive committee met in the Javan city of Yogyakarta in January 2020. Participants included prominent Latin American leaders and former heads of state, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa and Elmar Brock, a close associate of German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Nahdlatul Ulama’s sway was apparent in CDI’s adoption of a resolution that called for adherence to universal ethics and humanitarian values based on Western humanism, Christian democracy, and Humanitarian Islam. The resolution urged resistance to “the emergence of authoritarian, civilizationalist states that do not accept the rules-based post-WWII order, whether in terms of human rights, rule of law, democracy or respect for international borders and the sovereignty of other nations.”50

Nahdlatul Ulama benefits from what journalist Muhammad Abu Fadil described as rejection of an “Arab face of Islam” that in his words was “hopelessly contorted by extremism” in Western perceptions. Abu Fadil suggested that “certain elements in the West have become interested in ‘Asian Islam,’ which appears to be more moderate than Arab Islam; less inclined to export radical ideology; less dominated by extremist interpretations of religion; and possessed of a genuine and sincere tendency to act with tolerance.”51

Conclusion

A major battle for Muslim religious soft power that pits Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey, and Indonesia against one another is largely about enhancing countries’ global and regional influence. This battle has little to do with implementing notions of a moderate Islam in theory or practice despite claims by the various rivals, most of which are authoritarian states with little regard for human and minority rights or fundamental freedoms.

Muslim-majority Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, is the odd-man out. A traditionalist and in many ways conservative organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim movement, has garnered international respect and recognition with its embrace of a Humanitarian Islam that recognizes the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles enshrined in it and has taken tangible steps to address Islamic concepts that it considers outdated. 

In doing so, Nahdlatul Ulama has emerged as a formidable challenger to powerful state actors in the battle for the soul of Islam. But it still faces the challenge of overcoming the Arab view, expressed by Abdullah I of Jordan after the end of caliphate, that Muslim leadership must somehow return to the Arabs. 

                   ________________________________________                                                                        

Source: This article was published by the Hudson Institute


Notes

1 The Manchester Guardian, Hussein The New Khalif:  Special Interview In His CAMP in TrandJordania. Arab Claims to Moslem Leadership. Dangers to Hedjaz From Arabia: Reproach For the Allies. Emir Abdullah Confident, 13 March 1924, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer  

2 Jonathan Benthall, The Rise and Decline of Saudi Overseas Humanitarian Charities, Georgetown University Qatar, 2018, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1051628/CIRSOccasionalPaper20JonathanBenthall2018.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 

3 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2020, 28 April 2020, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Saudi%20Arabia.pdf 

4 John R. Bolton, How to Get Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal, The National Interest, 28 August 2017, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/iran-nuclear-deal-exit-strategy-john-bolton-memo-trump/ 

5 James M. Dorsey, Pakistan caught in the middle as China’s OBOR becomes Saudi-Iranian-Indian battleground, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 5 May 2017, https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2017/05/pakistan-caught-in-middle-as-chinas.html 

6 James M. Dorsey, Indonesia: A major prize in the battle for the soul of Islam, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 30 July 2020, https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2020/07/indonesia-major-prize-in-battle-for.html 

7 David Kirkpatrick, A Police State With an Islamist Twist: Inside Hifter’s Libya, The New York Times, 20 February 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/world/middleeast/libya-hifter-benghazi.html 

8 United States Embassy in the United Arab Emirates, MBZ Meeting with Senior Advisor on Iraq Jeffrey, Wikileaks, 15 October 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUDHABI4308_a.html 

9 Leaked emails of Yusuf al Otaibah shared in 2017 with this author by GlobalLeaks  

10 James M. Dorsey, Fighting for the Soul of Islam: A Battle of the Paymasters, RSIS Commentary No. 241, 20 September 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CO16241.pdf 

11 Interviews with the author in September and October 2016  

12 Shadi Hamid, The false promise of ‘pro-American’ autocrats, Brookings, 19 March 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/19/the-false-promise-of-pro-american-autocrats/ 

13 F. Gregory Gause III, What the Qatar crisis shows about the Middle East, The Washington Post, 28 June 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/27/what-the-qatar-crisis-shows-about-the-middle-east/ 

14 Seyid Ould Abah, What does the UAE envoy to Washington mean by ‘secularism?’ Al Arabiya, 12 August 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/08/12/What-does-the-UAE-envoy-to-Washington-mean-by-secularism-.html 

15 Charlie Rose, Qatar and the Middle East, 26 July 2017, https://charlierose.com/videos/30799 

16 Adballah Seyid Ould Abah, What does the UAE envoy to Washington mean by ‘secularism?’ Al Arabiya, 12 August 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/08/12/What-does-the-UAE-envoy-to-Washington-mean-by-secularism-.html 

17 David D. Kirkpatrick, Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi, The New York Times, 1 March 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html 

18 WAM, Mohamed bin Zayed visits Al Azhar, meets Grand Imam – UPDATE, 18 September 2014, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395269811015 

19 Haneen Dajani, Afghan imams learn from UAE counterparts, The National, 16 April 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/afghan-imams-learn-from-uae-counterparts-1.70308 

20 Charu Sudan Kasturi, UAE keen on Indian imams, The Telegraph, 11 February 2016, https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/uae-keen-on-indian-imams/cid/1487085 

21 Mohammed Eissa, Azhar Grand Imam el-Tayyeb Wins Cultural Personality Award, Ahram Online, 30 April 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/18/0/70444/Books/Azhar-Grand-Imam-ElTayyeb-wins-Cultural-Personalit.aspx 

22 BBC News, Without Restrictions   (بلا قيود),  YouTube, 23 September 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yx9WRaYvOfw 

23 BinBayyah.net, Net, 2013, http://binbayyah.net/arabic/archives/category/news/page/15 

24 Usaama al‐Azami, ‘Abdullāh bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions: Counter‐revolutionary Neo‐traditionalism’s Ideological Struggle against Islamism,’ The Muslim World Today, Vol. 101:4, p. 427-440  

25 The UAE Council for Fatwa, 4 February 2019, http://binbayyah.net/english/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Popes-Visit-to-Abu-Dhabi-English.pdf 

26 Ibid. Al-Azami  

27 Ibid. Al-Azami  

28 Ibid. Birt  

29 Ahmet Davutoglu, The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order’, Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2:4, December 1997–February 1998), p.1.  

30 Hurriyet Daily News, ‘Conquest’ prayers performed across Turkey’s mosques for Afrin operation, 21 June 2018, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/conquest-prayers-performed-across-turkeys-mosques-for-afrin-operation-126072 

31 Pınar Akpınar, From Benign Donor to Self-Assured Security Provider: Turkey’s Policy in Somalia, Istanbul Policy Center, IPC Policy Brief, 3 December 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323219525_From_Benign_Donor_to_Self-Assured_Security_Provider_Turkey’s_Policy_in_Somalia 

32 Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon, Re-Examining the ‘Base’: The Political and Security Dimensions of Turkey’s Military Presence in Somalia, Insight Turkey 21:1, Winter 2019  

33 Die Morina, Kosovo Minister and Spy Chief Sacked Over Turkish Arrests, Politico, 30 March 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/03/30/kosovo-intelligence-director-and-internal-minister-dismissed-over-turkish-arrested-men-03-30-2018/ 

34 Yusuf Sarfati, Religious Authority in Turkey:  Hegemony and Resistance,” Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, March 2019, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/c873dd82/cme-pub-luce-sarfati-031119.pdf 

35 Ertuğrul Meşe, Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri, İstanbul: İletişim, 2016, p. 134-135  

36 Uğur Mumcu, Rabıta, Ankara: UMAG, 2014, p. 199  

37 Soner Cagaptay, Erdogan’s Empire, London: I. B. Tauris, 2020, p. 54  

38 Haaretz, Erdogan Vows to Defend Palestinians Against Israel’s ‘Annexation Project’ in Holiday Message to U.S. Muslims, 26 May 2020, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-erdogan-warns-against-israel-s-annexation-project-in-message-to-u-s-muslims-1.8872356?utm_source=smartfocus&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=daily-brief&utm_content=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-erdogan-warns-against-israel-s-annexation-project-in-message-to-u-s-muslims-1.8872356 

39 Multiple interviews with Nahdlatul Ulama officials  

40 Bayt Ar-Rahmah, The Nusantara Manifesto, 25 October 2018, https://www.baytarrahmah.org/media/2018/Nusantara-Manifesto.pdf 

41 Bayt Ar-Rahmah, Political Communique 2018_10_25 Nusantara Manifesto, 25 October 2018, https://baytarrahmah.org/2018_10_25_nusantara-manifesto/ 

42 Bayt Ar-Rahmah,  Gerakan Pemuda Ansor Central Board Bayt-Ar-Rahmah Board of Directors Joint Resolution and Decree, 25 October 2018, https://www.baytarrahmah.org/media/2018/Ansor_BaR_Joint-Resolution-and-Decree_2018.pdf 

43 Marco Stahlhut, Terrorismus und Islam hängen zusammen, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 18 August 2017, https://www.reddit.com/r/de/comments/6uorfx/faz_islam_und_terrorismus_h%C3%A4ngen_zusammen_volltext/ 

44 Fabian Januarius Kuwado, Harapan Jokowi pada Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia.., Kompas, 5 June 2018, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/06/05/12232491/harapan-jokowi-pada-universitas-islam-internasional-indonesia 

45 Luthfi T. Dzulfikar, How Indonesia’s new international Islamic university will host global research for ‘moderate Islam,’ The Conversation, 16 December 2019, https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-new-international-islamic-university-will-host-global-research-for-moderate-islam-128785 

46 Interview with the author of the paper, 13 July 2020  

47 Antaranews, World Muslim League supports NU’s harmonization mission, 28 February 2020, https://en.antaranews.com/news/142430/world-muslim-league-supports-nus-harmonization-mission 

48 James M. Dorsey, Indonesia: A major prize in the battle for the soul of Islam, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 30 July 2020, https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2020/07/indonesia-major-prize-in-battle-for.html 

49 Bayt Ar-Rahma, NU and netizens demand Saudi ambassador to Indonesia leave the country over pro-212 tweet, 4 December 2018, https://www.baytarrahmah.org/media/2018/coconuts-jakarta_nu-netizens-demand-saudi-ambassador-indonesia-leave-country-pro-212-tweet_12-04-18.pdf 

50 IDC-CDI, Draft resolution on promoting a rules-based international order founded upon universal ethics and humanitarian values, 23 January 2020, https://www.idc-cdi.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Resolution-on-promoting-a-rules-based-international-order-founded-uponuniversal-ethics-and-humanitarian-values.pdf 

  1. 51 Muhammad Abu Fadil, Political Horizons for Indonesian Islam  (آفاق سياسية أمام “الإسلام الإندونيسي”), 15 June 2015, Al Arab, https://alarab.co.uk/آفاق-سياسية-أمام-الإسلام-الإندونيسي


                     =====================================                                                                                            James M. Dorsey

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.


Thursday, January 14, 2021

PLA - Chinese Intelligence : From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors

 SOURCE:   https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/chinese-intelligence-from-a-party-outfit-to-cyber-warriors.pdf

See Also :-   Unrestricted Warfare - 

https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf







Chinese Intelligence 

: From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors

                                   By

                       Ajit  Doval, KC 

Whatever yardstick we choose to apply – size of the economy and its rate of growth, military hardware and pace of modernisation, stability of the polity and the government; size, population and geo-political setting – China qualifies for a major power status. If we decide to be more candid than correct in making a hard headed assessment, its rise is not an assured peaceful rise. Its military build up, maritime ambitions, territorial claims, assertions in the cyber world and space etc have definite security ramifications both for the region and the world at large. The direction, intensity and form of these assertions among other things will be determined by China’s self view of its interests, capacities and limitations on one hand and assessment of global response to its actions on the other. In making these policy choices, the intelligence capability of the Chinese state will play a seminal role.

 No one has internalised, more than the Chinese, the fact that strategic strength of a nation is directly proportionate to its knowledge dominance. Three millennium back, they believed in Sun Tzu’s dictum, ‘Know thy self, know thy enemy - a thousand battles, a thousand victories’, and they continue to believe it till date. While advances made by China in its economy, military modernisation, defence production and technology acquisition have been intensely studied and analysed, not much is known or written about its intelligence apparatus, its capabilities and vulnerabilities, role in policy making, systems and structures etc. Though China, compared to the past, has opened up in certain fields, its intelligence apparatus, not much understood by intelligence experts and scholars, remains a dark area. It assumes special import in the wake of its acquiring major power status on one hand, and expanding scope of clausewitzian doctrine of “War through other means” like cyber war on the other. It becomes all the more relevant in the Chinese context, as espionage has been integral to its strategic tradition and state craft.

Evolution: 

The history of Chinese intelligence is as old as that of the early warring kingdoms of ancient China. In terms of its antiquity, it can be compared only with the history of Indian intelligence that dates back to about 700 BC, perfected by Chanakya during the Mauryan Empire (322 to 185 BC); the only difference being that while the Indians proclaimed ‘resorting to secret craft by the state’ as unethical and immoral after the Gupta period (320 AD to 600 AD), it remained an uninterrupted part of Chinese state craft. Intelligence played a seminal role in the efforts of successive Chinese dynasties to deal with their external enemies – primarily the warring nomadic tribes- as also tackling internal threats. 

In recent history, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek extensively used their spy networks to gather information about the Manchus that led to fall of the Qing dynasty. Intelligence also played an important role during the Sino-Japanese war and later the Civil War that led to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the Kuomintang. Mao, during this extended civil war, heavily relied on CCP’s secret apparatus and covert actions to subdue his political opponents. It is significant that one of the first resolutions adopted by the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), after the creation of People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, pertained to the crucial role played by the intelligence. 

Establishment of Communist Rule to Cultural Revolution:


On assuming power, three factors defined CCP’s approach towards national security and concurrently the intelligence build up. First was a strong belief that all those who were opposed to the Communist ideology were counter revolutionaries and thus enemies of the Chinese state and the people. Second was an inherent distrust of all foreigners and foreign powers, particularly the Western democracies, who were perceived to be conspiring to undo the socialist revolution. Taiwan and Hong Kong were considered to be bases of their covert activity. Third was a fierce undercurrent of Chinese nationalism that emphasised on avenging ‘wrongs of history’ and transforming China into a State with high Comprehensive National Power (CNP). 

In terms of action points, at the intelligence front, this approach, inter alia, manifested into 

(i) Creation of a strong security state- policing its citizens, identifying ideological enemies and their neutralisation; 

(ii) denying access to suspected foreign agents;

 (iii) penetration into claimed areas of Chinese territory not fully under its control like Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong etc. (often referred as homeland territory by the Chinese); 

(iv) accessing scientific and technical information, mainly from Western sources, to build indigenous military and civilian capacities and 

(v) leveraging Chinese diasporas abroad for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, including coverage of activities of anti-communist elements abroad. 

As the CCP was envisaged to play the central role in this secret activity, intelligence apparatus continued to be controlled by it, albeit with some structural changes. The erstwhile intelligence outfit, Public Security Department (PSD), was re-organised. Its internal security tasks were partly entrusted to the Central Ministry of Public Security (MPS) headed by Gen Luo Ruiqing, foreign intelligence was brought under Liaison Department headed by Li Kenong and some sections were transferred to People Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Central General Office and the General Staff Department. Li Kenong was also designated by Mao as Secretary of the Central Committee’s Intelligence Commission, Director of the Central Military Commission, Intelligence Department, as also as the country’s Deputy Foreign Minister. Central Investigation Department, a field intelligence outfit, worked under Li Kenong.

 At this stage, Chinese intelligence had limited exposure to the outside world, confronted problems of access and language and faced a generally hostile anticommunist environment internationally. These factors, abetted by ideological proximity to the USSR made the intelligence apparatus considerably dependent on the Soviets, particularly for external intelligence. KGB, in those days, worked closely with Gen Luo Ruiqing and helped him develop intelligence systems, doctrines, trade craft, training etc., whose footprints can be observed even today. Russians also helped the Chinese develop liaison arrangements with fraternal communist parties through ‘International Liaison of the Chinese Communist Party’. The intelligence bonhomie with Soviets, however, started cooling off in the mid fifties and by 1960 the operational cooperation almost ceased to exist.

 During the 1950s, almost every Chinese embassy had an Investigation and Research Office – a cover name for intelligence staff belonging to the Central Investigation Department. These were the field units for intelligence collection which were low in trade craft, highly secretive in their functioning and comprised of ideologically committed members. One of their major pre-occupation was to keep close watch on other members of the mission. They often remained present during the meetings with their diplomatic counterparts. In the headquarters, the analytical task was carried out by Central Investigation Department’s Eighth Bureau, publicly known since 1978 as the "Institute of Contemporary International Relations." 

In 1962, just before the Cultural Revolution, Li Kenong died and was succeeded by Luo Qingchang. The legendary Kang Sheng, a confidant of Mao who for long years had headed the Central Department of Social Affairs and in 60s was a member of the Politburo, was entrusted with the overarching responsibility of ‘guiding’ the country’s intelligence apparatus. The infamous Kang Sheng played a vital role during Cultural Revolution in suppressing and neutralising Mao’s political enemies. The political confusion that prevailed during Cultural Revolution created serious fissures with the intelligence community also. Reportedly, on the initiative of Lin Biao, the Central Investigation Department was abolished, most of its senior officers shunted to the countryside for re-education and its operators and human assets, both within and outside the country, deputed to the PLA General Staff Second Department. It is suspected that there was an internal conspiracy, in which some intelligence operators of the dissolved Central Investigation Department were used, that led to mysterious death of Lin Biao in 1971 in a plane crash in Mongolia. Following his death, the department was re-established and its representatives sent to missions abroad.


Cultural Revolution

The role of intelligence in the internal polity of China during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), that witnessed millions of killings, deserves a special mention. The revolution created conditions of anarchy and uncertainty, and saw sharp degradation of civil society and violation of human rights. There was extensive abuse of secret police and intelligence services that were responsible for large number of killings of political opponents. The secret apparatus became not only the perpetrator of atrocities but also a victim of it. In April 1967, Secretary General of the Central Investigation Department, Zou Dapeng, committed suicide along with his wife, who herself was a senior intelligence officer. A large number of intelligence operatives were dubbed as renegades or traitors and punished - often for their suspected pre 1949 roles or proclivities. Ironically, these persecutions were spearheaded by none other than the intelligence Tzar, Kang Sheng, who himself was head of the CCP’s Intelligence and secret apparatus from 1939-1946. In those turbulent years, Kang, the hatchet man of Mao Zedong, headed the Central Case Examination Group (CCEG) that dealt exclusively in secret coercive practices and dirty tricks to bring about ‘cultural’ cleansing. At one point of time, at his behest, 88 members/alternate members of the party Central Committee were under investigation for suspected ‘treachery’, ‘spying’ or ‘collusion with the enemy’. Kang Sheng used his infamous apparatus to crush Mao’s ideological opponents dubbing them as enemies of the revolution. The powerful role of Kang and his security services in China’s internal power play can be gauged by the fact that Kang Sheng was directed by Mao to supervise drafting of the new Party Constitution, which was adopted at the Ninth Congress in April 1969. He was also ‘elected’ as one of the five members of the Politburo Standing Committee, along with Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Chen Boda. 


Ministry of Social Security (MSS): 

The political developments in China consequent to the death of Mao Zedong (1976), fall of the Gang of Four (1976) and rise of Den Xiaoping heralded a new era in Chinese politics. Following the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee Congress, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the most powerful leader and gave a new fillip to the pace of modernisation and structural reforms. Himself a victim of political misuse of intelligence during Cultural Revolution, he wanted to re-structure the intelligence apparatus making it less susceptible to political vagaries. He resurrected the Chinese traditional concepts of Shishi Qiushi (seeking truth from facts), ‘Xianzhi’ (foreknowledge) and ‘Hide Your Strength, Bide Your Time’ as some of the guiding doctrines to reform the country’s intelligence set-up. He wanted Chinese intelligence to be transformed into a modern professional outfit – in tandem with China’s four modernisation programmes - having high technical capabilities and insulated from day to day party control. Deng Xiaoping was also not in favour of intelligence officers using legal cover as diplomats and wanted them to operate under illegal covers like media persons, representatives of business firms, scientists and researchers in universities etc.


 Many piecemeal reforms were brought about during 1976 to 1982 that eventually culminated in the formation of the Ministry of Social Security (MSS) in 1983. It was envisaged to be the country’s apex intelligence outfit, a position that it continues to hold till today. A formal proposal was initiated by Liu Fuzhi, who at that time headed the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and was approved by the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. The new outfit that defined its charter as “the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies and counterrevolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China’s socialist system”1 was made answerable to the Premier and the State Council. The above charter defined by Liu Fuzhi, however, hid more than it revealed. Unstated, the primary functions of the MSS included collection of foreign intelligence and undertaking covert intelligence operations both within and outside the country. It had a major internal intelligence charter as well. Ling Yun was appointed its first Chief, who on assuming office proclaimed that intelligence would no longer be used to settle ideological differences or allow party barons to use the service to settle factional fights. It was, however, nothing more than a pious wish and propaganda ploy.

Major segments of the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and remnants of the Chinese Communist Party’s Investigation Division under Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA) were merged into the new outfit. For the first time, foreign intelligence was collected, collated and analysed in a systematic manner on modern lines. As MSS did not have a body of experienced analysts to interpret the data, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), which had existed since 1980 and had a professional research staff, was brought under its control. The organisation, though has an open profile, is a feeder outfit that provides MSS with intelligence assessments based on inputs received from all sources including open sources and interaction with foreign think-tanks. It is a conglomerate of eleven institutes and two research divisions specialising in diverse areas of international interest to China. According to some press reports, “the CICIR has provided intelligence collection support to the MSS and the Foreign Affairs Leading Group (FALG), the Communist Party of China’s top foreign-policy body. 2 

The MSS over the years has emerged as China’s largest and most effective intelligence organisation, working under the state council with its headquarters in Beijing. Under Article 4 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law, it enjoys police powers to arrest and initiate prosecution in cases involving national security. It has different wings covering foreign intelligence, internal intelligence, counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. There is a certain degree of overlap with the Second Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in respect of foreign intelligence and Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in the field of domestic intelligence. 


Ministry of Public Security (MPS): 

Though essentially a national security agency, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has a wide intelligence network. Enjoying overriding powers over the police and law enforcing agencies, huge resources and proximity to the CCP makes it a powerful security cum intelligence outfit 

In its intelligence gathering and operational role, it keeps a close watch on internal political developments and concurrently reports to the State Council (executive component of the state) and Central Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (party apparatus). Besides collection of intelligence through police organisation at provincial and local levels, MPS performs its intelligence functions using ‘working units’ of the ‘Chinese citizens’. MPS is empowered to draft any citizen to spy over fellow citizens or foreigners living in their area. Surveillance over visiting foreigners is an important function of the MPS which it performs through local law enforcement units besides its dedicated intelligence units. However, deficient in skills, experience and equipment, its trade craft is primitive and crude and easily detectable.


While the intricate network of MPS informers allows the system to keep a close watch on its citizenry, it often leads to erroneous or disproportionate police actions on account of perfunctory reporting, informers settling personal scores through false reporting and intervention by party bosses. Some of the problems encountered by MPS include managing the unwieldy data generated by diverse working groups spread throughout the country, validation and analysis of data, delayed real time flow of information among the provinces and from provinces to the MPS headquarters in Beijing and lack of coordinated decision making process due to two parallel masters - the state executive and the party apparatus. Intervention by the Central Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, that is supposed to deal with coordination problems, often proves to be delayed and non-workable. 

As custodian of ideological security, the MPS also performs an important political role of monitoring political opinions of the people, logging people’s grievances and collecting information about rivalries among the party cadres/leaders. To assist its political role, it maintains a massive national database covering personal information from national to local levels. The inputs are derived from police reports, inputs of working groups, local level party sources, interception of e-mails and telephonic communications, employment records, data available with banks and industrial concerns, prosecution and immigration records etc. This data is integrated and  aggregated to identify ‘persons of interest’ which in turn are sent to police stations for stipulated action.

Internally, China has created intelligence capacities for a panoptic state where it can identify, monitor, control, intervene and, when required, coerce citizens to submission for furthering perceived national interests. This trend got further strengthened after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, that badly shook China and whose after effects continue to haunt it. Growing unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang and the spate of suicides in Tibet have further unnerved China. The declining face of economic growth, unemployment and exponential rise in agitations and protests have further compounded the internal security landscape.

In 2011, Zhou Yongkang, China’s senior party leader in charge of security and stability, emphasised the need of integrating MPS intelligence system for “social management” that would include monitoring political views, moulding public opinion and propaganda to shape people’s decision. In furtherance of this policy in December 2011, MPS directed units under it to visit villages and houses to win over their hearts and minds on the one hand and monitor their opinions on the other. This is illustrative of the Chinese management of state affairs intricately intertwining security, development, political and civil society controls. Though it has not drawn the attention of strategic analysts abroad, in last one decade, both the size and influence of MPS has increased substantially. However, to what degree the MPS influences political decision making process and policy formulation needs further investigation. 

Military Intelligence - 2 nd General Staff Department (2nd GSD):

The powerful Chinese military apparatus has dedicated intelligence apparatus of its own under the General Staff Department (GSD) of the PLA. Second Intelligence Department (2nd GSD) is one of the most important departments of the military intelligence setup. It is headed by a Director who is assisted by two Deputy Directors and a Political Commissioner. The Director and Political Commissar are equivalent to a Group Army Commander. 3 As it works directly under the General Staff, political control over it is lesser than in the case of MPS and MSS. STRATFOR, a leading intelligence research organization, avers that border intelligence is one of the primary responsibilities of the MID in which it is assisted by the PLA’s reconnaissance units. 4 Specializing in tactical intelligence, it keeps tab of the order of battle (ORBAT) of foreign armies, their doctrines, strategies, location, identity of field formations and profiles of their commanders etc. Its responsibilities include terrain assessment of target areas of military interest, identification of military command and control centres, plotting vulnerable Areas/Points (VA/VPs), equipment profile, counterintelligence tasks, etc. It also monitors the activities of foreign armies operating in the Asian continent.5

Some of the important wings of the 2nd GSD include (i) ‘Department 2’ collecting information through human assets (HUMINT) with seven bureaus working under it, (ii) ‘Department 3’ collecting intelligence through communication interceptions (SIGINT) located in seven of its military regions and (iii) Department 4 specializing in battle field Electronic Intelligence. Electronic intelligence is sourced through Electronic Warfare (EW) Regiment/Reconnaissance Units functioning at the Group Army (GA) level. Other departments deal with administration, logistics, training etc. 

The 2nd GSD’s field formations have Military Reconnaissance Units (MRs) in border areas, Intelligence Analysis Centre at the Divisional level and Intelligence Peace Units at Company levels. During war time, the Intelligence Analysis Centers function at the Battalion Headquarter level also with a limited remit. It also monitors the activities of foreign armies operating in the Asian continent. Earlier the 2nd GSD primarily focused on human intelligence and traditional military intelligence activities but has recently expanded the range of its activities to cover scientific and technological information. 6

The 2nd Department is further sub-divided in functional bureaus such as Military Intelligence Bureau, Tactical Reconnaissance Bureau, Political Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Comprehensive Bureau and Confidential File Bureau. 8 Military Intelligence Bureau focuses mainly on Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong; collects technical  intelligence to improve and develop military hardware for the PLA and establishes contact with potential clients for weapons exports concealing PLA’s direct involvement in arms trade. The Tactical Reconnaissance Bureau streamlines the information flow from specialized units at the MR level. The 3rd Bureau (Military Attaché Bureau) screens and debriefs military attaches who are deputed to foreign missions abroad. The 4th Bureau’s responsibility is Intelligence analysis for Russia, former Soviet republics, and other East European countries. The 5th Bureau is also known as the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Its responsibilities include organizing foreign visits of PLA officers, military exchanges and receiving foreign military visitors. It, at times, works under the cover name of “the Ministry of National Defence Foreign Affairs Office”. It has its work divided on territorial lines like America & Canada Bureau, Europe & Asia Bureau, etc. It is learnt that the Press Bureau, known as "Ministry of National Defence Press Affairs Office", also works in conjunction with 2 nd GSD. Several PLA Universities and Command colleges are directly subordinate to the Foreign Affairs Bureau.9 The 6th Bureau focuses on analysis of Intelligence pertaining to the neighbouring Asian countries. The 7th Bureau (Technology and Equipment Bureau) plans and carries out cyber espionage operations through six governmental research institutions and two computer centers. It also enlists the services of individual civilian hackers and uses companies that produce electronic equipment for carrying out its activities. In addition, the 2nd GSD oversees working of the Arms Control Bureau, Space Reconnaissance Bureau, Computer Institute, PLA College of International Relations.

3 rd General Staff Department: 

The 3rd GSD or the Technical Department primarily focuses on signal intelligence (SIGINT) operations of the PLA. In the American jargon, the quintessential SIGINT task is to carry out cyber surveillance or Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). Computer network operations (CNO) in China are often referred to as ― “Network Attack and Defense”, based on the premise that –“without understanding how to attack, one will not know how to defend”. The 3rd Department’s SIGINT targets are diplomatic missions, military activities, economic entities, public education  institutions, and individuals of interest. There may also be bureaus operating at the Military Districts for conducting network defense and attack, technical reconnaissance, and psychological operations. Bureau Directors and Political Commissars are equivalent in rank to an Army Major-General.10


4 th General Staff Department:

The Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) and Radar Department, also known as the 4th GSD Department, is responsible for developing equipments, doctrines, and tactics for electronic warfare and information. Established in 1990, it maintains a data base of electronic and radar signatures of foreign armies. The department is headed by a Director and two Deputy Directors and has at least, four bureaus, one brigade, and two regiments. It is widely believed that an ECM Brigade is headquartered at Langfang in Hebei Province with subordinate battalion-level entities located in Anhui, Jiangxi and Shandong. Two units, including one with operational or experimental satellite jamming responsibilities, are located at Hainan Islands with the purpose of jamming US satellites. All PLA, PLAAF and PLAN Military Regions have one ECM Regiment. The 3rd and 4th General Staff Departments also operate a joint centre dedicated for network attack/ defense training system. 

General Political Department (GPD): 

The GPD functions directly under the Central Military Commission (CMC). It oversees the discipline, political education and indoctrination of PLA personnel. It has an organisation called the China Association for International Friendly Contacts which infiltrates foreign armies in order to subvert loyalty of their personnel and propagate Chinese ideology among them to further their aim. The Political or the Liaison Department also conducts counter-espionage activities in foreign countries to keep a watch on its own intelligence operatives. The GPD maintains Liaison Departments at the Military Region (MR) level. The Department also oversees the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution, Liberation Army Daily, the PLA Literature and Art Press (Kunlun Press), PLA Pictorial, and PLA Press.


Human Intelligence:

 The modus operandi of the Chinese intelligence is uniquely Chinese in its application characterised by Chinese cultural traits. As only few cases of Chinese intelligence operations are available for detailed study and analysis, it is generally presumed that Chinese intelligence trade craft is primitive and low in its reach. The famous case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin is indicative that even before People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into existence, the CCP’s intelligence setup had started recruiting deep penetration sources in target areas. Chin passed on classified information to China while working for the US intelligence community for over 35 years. He supplied a stream of high grade intelligence till his retirement in 1981. He was detected only in 1985 when his cover was blown by a defector leading to his suicide before being brought to trial. The trade craft used for intelligence collection, contacts between the source and handling officers, communications, briefing and debriefing etc. show a high degree of sophistication. The fact that Chin was able to operate undetected for 35 years also indicates high level of secrecy standards in protecting source identity. 


The technique and methodology adopted by the Chinese operatives in respect of raising and handling human assets (intelligence sources) is slightly different from those employed by other modern intelligence agencies. Even after the initial ‘ice breaking exercises’, the handler remains vague and circumspect in specifying his needs and considerations in return. Emphasis is more on personal and friendly relations. Quite often, even when a human asset starts passing on information, he is not consciously aware of working as an intelligence agent. The trade craft used is elementary and the relationship between the handler and the source is nebulous and ill-defined. It is only after considerable period of time that the handler discloses his real intentions, requirements and identity; asking the agent to follow more rigorous trade craft for collection of classified information, fixing of RVs, communications etc. Despite the fact that during its formative years the Chinese intelligence operatives were trained by the KGB, who make a fetish of traditional trade craft, their cultural trait of being circumspect and employing symbols to communicate is discernible in their intelligence practices. Nigel Inkstar, in his ‘Chinese Intelligence in the Cyber Age’, however, feels that “when the need arises, or when they are sure of their ground, Chinese intelligence officers can be very direct and explicit and capable of deploying sophisticated tradecraft”.

Chinese are also known to effectively provide cover identities to its human assets using forged documents. The case of Liu Kang-Sheng, a MSS operative, who was caught using forged Thai and Singaporean passports is illustrative. Though passports of these countries have high security features, it was found that the forged documents were almost perfect in incorporating these features. It is obvious that Chinese intelligence has well developed facilities for forging documents. 

Among the Chinese intelligence officers, there is a marked preference for people of Chinese ethnicity and those seen as friends of China for cultivation as human assets. However, this phenomenon is gradually undergoing a change. Valentin Danilov, a Russian physicist who headed the Thermo-Physics Centre at Krasnoyarsk State Technical University (KTSU) and had researched on effects of solar activity on space satellites is a case in point. In 2004, he was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment for passing on classified information to the Chinese. Similarly, Swedes uncovered diplomats in the Chinese embassy in Stockholm who recruited a Uyghur émigré to monitor the activities of Uyghurs in Europe. The case of US nationals Noshir Gowadia and Glenn Duffy Shriver are also illustrative of Chinese intelligence recruiting foreign nationals for espionage. Shriver was arrested for spying in June 2010 while flying to China. He pleaded guilty of unlawful communication of national defence information after a polygraph test and was imprisoned for four years. He had met his Chinese handlers about 20 times and received $70,000 for the services rendered. Gertz Bill reported in Washington Times on March 25, 2013 that “Shriver is not the first spy for the Chinese to target the CIA. U.S. intelligence sources have said at least three CIA officers who reported to Director George J. Tenet in 1999 as having spied for China, but were never caught. One of the agents was paid $60,000 by Beijing”.

Chinese intelligence pursues its defined operational missions, once defined and approved, most doggedly unmindful of its cost-benefit ratio. Chinese efforts to go for outright purchase of a Stealth aircraft parts manufacturing company for obtaining the in-flight refuelling capability for its Air Force is a case in point. The attempt was foiled at the last moment. It resorts to all means, including most unethical practices to achieve its operational missions. The case of Da Chuang Zheng, a Chinese intelligence agent, who was caught while attempting to steal advanced radar and electronic surveillance technology to China is one among many such cases of heist. 

The Chinese have mastered the technique of amalgamating disparate micro intelligence accessed from incongruous sources with no comparable gradations in respect of their authenticity and reliability. This technique of ‘Thousand Grains’ entails collecting small bits of information and then piecing them together to make intelligence sense. This has particularly been used for acquiring mid level technologies using inputs both from human and technical sources. Widely spread Chinese diasporas working in research and academic establishments, high technology using manufacturing concerns, business houses etc. are often utilised for the purpose. Potential targets are, at times, recruited during their visits to China. Another variation is collecting micro intelligence bits during participation in scientific cooperation programmes, seminars and conferences in foreign countries and visits of scientists under scholar overseas exchange programmes. FBI investigations in 1988 had revealed that the technology for neutron bomb detonated by China was not indigenously developed but acquired from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in California. Various Chinese delegations comprising ostensibly of scientists, but actually MSS intelligence operatives, visited the facility and were able to collect the required information in bits and pieces over a prolonged period of time. 


Chinese intelligence closely monitors activities of political dissidents and groups both within and outside China, suspected foreign agents, visitors and scholars visiting China and members of diplomatic missions. Human assets are often placed in vantage positions to cover their activities. In June 1989, Shou Huaqiang, a delegate to the Chinese Alliance for Democracy Convention in California, an anti-China dissident group, publically declared that he was an MSS agent sent to spy on the activities of the Alliance. He alleged that he was forced for the job by MSS officers who made him sign an agreement with instructions to disrupt its work.

 Cyber Intelligence:

When the rest of the world was busy celebrating the great strides in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the late eighties, the Chinese Strategic Community was busy evaluating its security implications. They realised that they could not allow the revolution in ICT bypass it, lest their modernisation programme come to a naught. At the same time, if allowed free access, it could not escape its concomitant adverse fallouts. The American military successes during the Gulf War during 1990s shook them and made them realise formidable capabilities of war machine supported by the informatics. Internally, in the wake of people’s uprising culminating in Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, there were apprehensions about internal security if people were allowed unchecked access to the outside world through internet. By 1996, the number of internet users in China had touched the figure of 2 million, which was fraught with danger. The ‘bourgeoisie’ influence through the internet posed a threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing Patriotic Education Campaign launched in early nineties. These developments led China to embark on an ambitious programme of acquiring cyber dominance, both in offensive and defensive modes. It became evident by 2008 that Chinese intelligence had made remarkable strides in this direction on both fronts. 

While there is no direct evidence to prove culpability of Chinese intelligence undertaking covert cyber intelligence operations abroad, there is ample circumstantial evidence to infer that. Besides reliable intelligence inputs, tracing large number of cyber attacks to servers in China, technological sophistication of cyber attacks, resources required to carry out the operations at global scale, selection of targets, type of information accessed and long history of Chinese intelligence for science and technology thefts strongly point towards state involvement.11 Many instances of cyber attacks on countries like the US, Canada, Japan and India have been tracked to China. 

There are strong pointers to infer that China is indulging in large scale cyber espionage using an army of hackers, drawn from military, intelligence, cyber professionals etc. As an intelligence activity, it has enabled China to penetrate classified domains of target countries to extract technological and systems information and collect military and security related information about programmes and activities of the countries on its intelligence radar. On the internal security front, it is being used to contain and counter liberal and democratic ideas of political dissidents. However, there is little information to assess China’s ability to validate and analyse the colossal data collected by it both internally and externally.

The Gulf War, in addition to highlighting the potential of information and communication technology (ICT), also made the Chinese aware of the heavy dependence of Western military systems on these state of the art technologies and attendant vulnerabilities. They saw in it an opportunity of developing asymmetric capabilities which could defeat advanced technical capabilities through counterelectronic systems. 

Col Ling Qiu and Col Wang Xiangusi in 1998 in their book ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ conceptualised how huge US combat superiority emanating from its IT edge could be transformed into their vulnerability. It was a doctrinal shift for preparing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to fight under informationised conditions. According to Nigel Inkster, “the PLA is pursuing a highly ambitious cyber-warfare agenda that aims to link all service branches via a common ICT platform capable of being accessed at multiple levels of command and has created three new departments of Informatisation, Strategic Planning and Training to bring this agenda into being.” 12

Though late to enter the internet domain, China took giant strides, both in development of hardware and software on one hand and training people on the other, that made up for the lost time. The first indications of Chinese capabilities started trickling in the early years of the last decade when hackers broke into US official networks to steal sensitive information which US investigators code-named as ‘Titan Rain’. Nathan Thornburgh writing in the Time Magazine said that the targets included US military establishments, NASA, the World Bank, etc Similar attempts were reported from United Kingdom, Germany and New Zealand during 2006-07 detailing cyber attacks that had emanated from China. Mandiant, an American firm dealing with information security, reported that PLA Unit 61398, one amongst many such units, was responsible for the cyber attacks on more than 140 companies the world over since 2006. In 2009, University of Toronto’s Information Warfare Monitor Citizen came out with its so-called ‘Ghost Net” report detailing intrusion by Chinese hackers into the network system of Indian security establishment and offices of Dalai Lama’s secretariat.13 Though rejected by the Chinese, it was a well researched and accessed professional report which concluded that the cyber operations were being conducted by the “2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department”.14

The Chinese have been systematically recruiting and training a pool of cyber professionals to undertake these tasks. In 2005, hacker competitions were held at the regional and provincial levels in China for hiring computer network operators. In 2007-08, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), internal intelligence cum security outfit advertised job vacancies for hackers under the cover name of computer operators. According to a report in Asia Times of Feb 9, 2010, Chinese embassies were contacting Chinese IT graduates in different foreign universities purportedly for jobs in public security departments but essentially for computer network operations.15

China’s cyber capabilities are not only confined to military combat needs, espionage and internal security. Economic and Technical intelligence, that have figured high in its national priorities, are also being served through cyber warfare. In target countries, computer networks containing classified data pertaining to trade secrets or denied technologies are being accessed. According to a report of the Office of National Counter Intelligence Executive submitted to US Congress in 2011, US networks were facing Chinese onslaught for trade information, communication technology, data pertaining to scarce natural resources and civilian technologies in energy and health sectors.16 Accessing critical defence technologies is more alarming. A recent report published in the Washington Post points out that Chinese hackers have broken into  several defence production firms involved in the manufacturing of critical military hardware including the Patriot missile system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, as also vital combat aircraft and ships like the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship. The report submitted to the Pentagon by the Defense Science Board underlines the enormity of the Chinese cyber-espionage activities and investment of effort to overcome the US military advantage.17 One illustrative case is of US company AMSC, specializing in wind turbine manufacturing, having lost its centre software code to the Chinese hackers. This theft led to the company losing 80 % of its revenues. Similar was the experience of Nortel, Canadian Telecommunication giant that went into bankruptcy. Brian, its former security adviser in an interview to CBC on October 11, 2012 said that, “Huawei spent years hacking into Nortel’s system and stealing information so it could compete with Nortel on world markets and added that, “These kind of things are not done just by average hackers. I believe these are nation state activities”.18 A disclosure was made by Daily Mail in March 2012 that Chinese hackers were able to find “full access” to NASA computers containing information about 13 spacecrafts. It is believed by experts that it helped the Chinese in their quest for outer space utilization programme. Similar evidence of Chinese efforts to beef up its cyber warfare capabilities came to light in 2011 when McAfee, an American cyber security company brought out its White Paper, code named ‘Operation Shady Rat’. McAfee reported about the attacks, some of them raging for as long as five years targeting 70 government and private agencies in different parts of the world. Forty nine of these were US based networks while others were located in Taiwan, India, UK, South Korea, etc. Through these digital storms, the Chinese have also been undertaking ‘Spear-Phishing’ operations that involves sending innocuous e mails to targeted individuals, websites etc and to extract stored data from the computers. Through a detailed and carefully researched trade craft, high potential targets are selected, artificial identities created, and malware messages routed through multiple destinations that are often difficult to trace. A report brought out by the Northrop Grumman in 2009 geographically detailed the modus operandi used first to breach and then to ‘exploit’ 19

Information about what is the cyber intelligence infrastructure, who controls it, how the key intelligence needs are identified, what is the co-ordination mechanism, how the data is validated and integrated to convert information into usable intelligence are still grey, if not black, areas. Going by the scale of activity and swathe of their operational targets, it presents a highly confusing picture. It is believed that 3/PLA has the highest technological capabilities at least to gain covert entry into targeted domains and access the data. However, except for information of military value, its capability to process other inputs are seriously doubted. The co-ordination mechanism available with the MSS also appears to be inadequate and while the relationship between MSS and MPS, uncomfortable though, is known to some extent, the working mechanism of 3/PLA with other intelligence outfits is a matter of speculation. 

Intelligence in Internal Security:

To make a holistic assessment of what the Chinese call Comprehensive National Power (CNP), it is essential to evaluate its internal stability and political dynamics and the role intelligence services play in this arena. It assumes special import as with the opening of China and its modernisation programme, the Chinese are finding it increasingly difficult to keep a lid over internal dissidence. Murray Scot Tanner in his ‘Cracks in the Wall: China’s Eroding Coercive State’ as back as 2001, observed that, “Beijing’s control over the coercive system, as well as that system’s capacity to maintain social control appears to be slipping”. Since then, the internal security landscape has further deteriorated. There have been well over one hundred thousand incidents of mass protests and agitations in 2012. Large scale visits of Chinese, particularly the students abroad, access to internet and mobile phones, activities of pro-democracy groups and economic affluence have raised the threshold of political awareness. The situation in Tibet has become precarious, particularly after the Olympic Games in 2008. Besides, a large number of protests and agitations, there have been over a hundred cases of self immolation by Tibetans since the Olympics. The rise of Islamic radicalism and violence in Xinjiang is another cause of serious concern. The Tiananmen Square massacre still looms large on the psyche of the people and have accentuated Chinese fears of internal destabilisation which they  attribute to conspiratorial counter-revolutionary forces propped up by external enemies. The anxiety was discernible when in the year 2011, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in a public address, stated that “We have not yet fundamentally solved a number of issues that the masses feel strongly about”. The Jasmine Revolution in 2011 further shook the Chinese administration and they hiked their budget for internal security, reportedly, to $95 billion in 2011 and $111 billion in 2012. It is significant that notwithstanding China’s massive military modernisation programme, the internal security budget ranks above the defence budget.

China’s internal intelligence apparatus is much more complex and multilayered; with both the party and state having overlapping roles. Department one of MSS, the premier national intelligence agency, handles ‘homeland security’ while its department six and nine deal with ‘counter espionage’ and ‘counter defection and counter surveillance’ respectively


The Indian Experience: 

The Indian experience of Chinese intelligence dates back to early fifties when its intelligence apparatus started operating in Tibet. It assisted both the CCP and the PLA in degrading Dalai Lama’s regime and consolidating its position in Tibet, politically and militarily. Dalai Lama was eventually coerced to sign the 1951 agreement. Extensive reconnaissance of the areas bordering India was done and construction of national highway 219 was undertaken through Aksai Chin connecting Lhasa in Tibet to Xinjiang. The Indian intelligence, though reporting about Chinese activities in Tibet for quite many years to a government that was not listening, had physical confrontation with the Chinese, when on November 21, 1959, Karam Singh, a Deputy Central Intelligence Officer (DCIO) of the Intelligence Bureau was killed at Kongka La (Hot Springs) in Ladakh.20 The years that followed saw intensified Chinese intelligence activities mainly undertaken by the PLA and party apparatus in Tibet. 

Following the exodus of over 80,000 Tibetans, led by the Dalai Lama, in 1959 to India and a deep sense of fear that, his influence over the Tibetans created in Chinese minds, coverage of Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in India became a high priority  item for Chinese intelligence. Ethnic Tibetans are regularly recruited and infiltrated into India, mostly through Nepal, to cover the activities of the Dalai Lama. Arrest of Pema Tsering, a former PLA combatant, on May 23, 2013 from Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh for spying is one of the recently reported cases. He infiltrated into India a few years back, acquired an Indian voter ID card in 2011 and was masquerading as a Tibetan refugee.21

Intelligence coverage through diplomatic staff has remained in vogue all through and got intensified particularly after 1959. Even during Den Xiaoping’s regime when this practice was discouraged, use of legal cover for intelligence operations in India remained unabated. In some instances, Chinese nationals from mainland China with illegal cover are sent to India for coverage of political intelligence, establishing contact with the insurgent and extremist groups and collecting defence related intelligence. One of the illustrative case is of Wang Qing, a young Chinese lady who operated in India using different covers before she was arrested in Dimapur (Nagaland) on January 18, 2011. She flew to Kolkata from Kunming on a tourist visa as an executive of a Chinese timber company, and visited Nagaland where she held a four hour long secret meeting with Naga insurgent leader T Muivah. She was deported and a protest note was sent by the Indian government to the Chinese embassy. 

Chinese intelligence has also been active in supporting North-eastern insurgent groups and providing them with weapons, training and financial support. Coinciding with the Cultural Revolution at home, the first group of Naga insurgents, comprising 300 strong Naga rebels, led by Muivah and Isak Swu were imparted military and ideological training in Yunan in 1966 and sent to India with a consignment of arms. This trend continues till today with Chinese assisting the Assamese, Manipuri and other rebels besides Left-Wing extremists.22 One of the recent cases of Chinese support to Indian insurgents was revealed during questioning of Anthony Shimray, who after his return from China in 2010 was arrested in Nepal. He was assured supply of 1,800 pieces of arms that included AK series rifles, M 16 rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and rocket launchers. The shipment was to be loaded from a port in  Beihei in China and sent to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh via a shipping agent based in Bangkok.23

One of the marked features of China’s intelligence activity in India is its close relationship with Pakistan’s ISI. Besides, their close strategic relationship, the advantages enjoyed by Pakistanis in respect of language, appearance, well entrenched local networks account for the special relationship. This cooperation started way back in mid sixties with Dhaka as the operational hub where Chinese and Pakistani intelligence officers first established contacts with the North Eastern insurgents together. With the deepening of this relationship, it got extended to other areas of common interest. Daily Mail (UK) in its report dated September 30, 2012 observed that, “Chinese agencies are financing and providing assistance to Pakistan’s ISI to keep insurgent groups active in the North East.24 However, with Chinese intelligence coming of age, there are indications that it is now launching independent operations. {Google:-  https://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2210988/China-inter-services-intelligence-touch-RAW-nerve-Northeast.html }

Conclusion: 

In last six decades, starting from a primitive party apparatus, Chinese intelligence has attained new heights and capabilities. Its intelligence apparatus is highly complex and intricately intertwined between party and the government, internal and external, civilian and military et al with parallel roots of command, control and reporting etc. All this has led to large degrees of duplication and redundancy. Though over the years, governmental machinery has taken control of large segments of intelligence activity, the party apparatus continues to reign supreme. Deeply concerned about internal security, all its intelligence agencies have a marked internal intelligence or counter-intelligence role. The PLA, over the years, has upgraded its intelligence capabilities at tactical, technological and strategic levels, particularly in Asia Pacific Region, South Asia and Central Asia. It has built an extensive technical and signal intelligence infrastructure, and its electronic intelligence capabilities have been considerably augmented by cyberspace and space based platforms. The MSS has evolved itself as the premier foreign intelligence agency and besides diplomatic intelligence, it has been aggressively hunting for technological data and systems information to augment national economic and military capabilities. It continues to bank heavily on Chinese global diaspora that provides it a vast catchment area for human assets for intelligence gathering and espionage. To widen its catchment area, it is expanding its illegal cover for intelligence gathering by using commercial companies and business houses, media agencies, Chinese banks etc. Establishment of nearly 380 Confucius Institutes in 180 countries, Chinese language institutes etc. also are part of its foreign intelligence activities. China envisions for itself a big power role and, silently but steadily, is building up its intelligence capabilities commensurate to that vision. Image Sources:

1   http://www.trdefence.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/chinese-spy.jpg 

2   http://www.techinasia.com/techinasia/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/china-hackers-new-york-times.jpg 

End Notes

 1 Ministry of State Security, Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists, accessed online at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/mss/history.htm

 2 Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: Terrorists’ Antics, The Washington Times, May 16, 2012, accesed at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/16/inside-the-ring-terrorists-antics/?page=all 3 Ibid 

(3) above

 4 sinodefence.com, accessed at http://www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gsd.asp

 5 sinodefence.com, accessed at http://www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gsd.asp

 6 Ibid (5) above 

7 Nicholas Eftimiade, Chinese Intelligence Operations, 1994. 

8 ibid (8) above

 9 Ibid (8) above 

10 Mark A. Stokes, Jenny Lin and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure, Project 2049 Institute, November 11, 2011

 11 Many instances of cyber attacks on countries like the US, Canada, Japan and India have been tracked to China. On the internal security front it is being used to contain and counter liberal and democratic ideas of political dissidents.

 12 Nigel Inkster (2010): China in Cyberspace, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52:4, 55-56, IISS

 13 Tracking Ghost net: Investigating a cyber espionage network, Information Warfare Monitor, March 29, 2009. accessed at http://www.infowar.monitor.net/ghostnet 

14 Mandiant report, accessed at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/ 

15 Willy Lamb, “Beijing beefs up Cyber Warfare capacity”, Asia Times, Feb 9, 2010 

16 Foreign spies stealing US economic secrets in cyberspace – Report submitted to Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, accessed at http:// www.ncix.gov/publication/reports/fecie_all/ 

17 Ellen Nakashima, ‘Confidential report lists US weapons system designs compromised by Chinese cyberspies. The Washington Post, May 28, 2013, accessed at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-27/world/39554997_1_u-s-missile-defenses-weapons-combataircraft 

18 CBC News, Oct 11, 2012, ‘Former Nortel executive warms against working with Huawei’, accessed at http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2012/10/11/pol-huawei-nortel-experience.html

 19 Ibid (13) above.

 20 Ram Pradhan, Debacle to revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65.

 21 The Indian Express, May 24, 2013, accessed at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/suspected-chinese-spyarrested-from-dharamsala/1119797/ 

22 N Manoharan, China’s Involvement in India’s Internal Security Threats: An Analytical Appraisal, Vivekanda International Foundation, 2012, accessed at 

23 Is China backing Indian Insurgents, The Diplomat, January 22, 2011, accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/22/is-china-backing-indian-insurgents/ 

24 Abhishek Bhalla, Daily Mail (UK), September 30, 2012, accessed at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2210988/China-inter-services-intelligence-touchRAW-nerve-Northeast.htm




https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news


National Security Adviser Ajit Doval with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.(PTI)
National Security Adviser Ajit Doval with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.(PTI)

China’s spies, India and the 2013 paper by NSA Ajit Doval that saw it coming

In July this year, India’s lead intelligence agency had outlined efforts by Chinese intelligence to infiltrate into the government and the key pillars of democracy.
By Shishir Gupta | Hindustan Times, New Delhi
UPDATED ON DEC 16, 2020 01:04 PM IST

Before he became National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Ajit Doval as Director of VIF think-tank wrote a seminal paper published on July 3, 2013 titled “Chinese Intelligence: From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors.”

The paper highlights the Chinese intelligence agency Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) penetration into the Dalai Lama establishment in Dharamshala and supporting the anti-India North-East insurgent groups with the help of Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) when required, and keeping a close watch on Indian Army activities on the border with Tibet.

The paper concludes: “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the years, has upgraded its intelligence capabilities at tactical, technological and strategic levels, particularly in Asia Pacific Region, South Asia and Central Asia. The MSS has evolved itself as the premier foreign intelligence agency and besides diplomatic intelligence, it has been aggressively hunting for technological data and systems information to augment national economic and military capabilities. It continues to bank heavily on Chinese global diaspora that provides it a vast catchment area for human assets for intelligence gathering and espionage. To widen its catchment area, it is expanding its illegal cover for intelligence gathering for using commercial companies and business houses, media agencies, Chinese banks etc. Establishment of nearly 380 Confucius Institutes in 180 countries, Chinese language institutes etc. also are part of its foreign intelligence activities. China envisions for itself a big power role and, silently but steadily, is building up its intelligence capabilities commensurate to that vision.”

While it is quite evident from the monograph that both western world, Indo-Pacific and India knew about the penetration of Chinese intelligence, it was woken up from deep slumber after the PLA troopers in a planned action aggressively transgressed into the north banks of Pangong Tso followed by Galwan and Gogra-Hot Springs area of East Ladakh.

This week, an investigative report by The Australian spotlighted how loyal members of Communist Party of China infiltrated western consulates and mega corporations masquerading as professionals. The 2016 leak of the Communist Party member data-base also reveals, as per The Australian, that newspaper editors and intellectuals act as influencers of the largest Communist Party in the world on social media and seminars.

Even though The Australian investigative report does not talk about India, India’s lead intelligence agency did caution the Cabinet Secretary and senior secretaries to the threat posed by Chinese intelligence in the government, particularly in departments of telecommunication, power and higher education on July 15. The Indian agency’s presentation gave a broad overview about Chinese intelligence infiltration attempts into the government and the key pillars of democracy. The use of Chinese mobile applications for extracting data and the role of Confucius Institutes as an influencer along with embedding malware into power equipment was also highlighted. It was then decided that the government review the Confucius Institutes in the country and memorandums of understandings with countries sharing land borders with India should first get approvals from the ministry of external affairs and the ministry concerned. The action, five months later, is still work in progress.

Ajit Doval, in his 2013 paper, wrote that in 2009, the University of Toronto’s Information Warfare Monitor Citizen published a “Ghost Net” report detailing intrusion by Chinese hackers into the network system of Indian Security Establishment and offices of Dalai Lama’s secretariat. The report was expectedly rejected by Beijing.

Although the Indian counterintelligence closely tracks Chinese activities, the reduction of Pakistan to a client state of the Middle Kingdom would have serious security repercussions for the sub-continent as Islamabad could become an important source of intelligence collection against India and the sub-continent with linguistic and cultural similarities. The appointment of officials belonging Chinese United Front Work Department, which reports directly to the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, as ambassadors to the Indian sub-continent presents a bigger security challenge. These ambassadors are ideologically committed workers of the Chinese Communist Party as opposed to Indian diplomats whose views on India and the world are not dictated by the political party in power.

Given the humongous financial resources with these embassies, Indian security agencies are already fighting a downhill battle against Beijing’s influence.

It is quite evident that the two iron brothers will exploit all Indian fault-lines, right from Kashmir, north-east insurgencies, Maoists to the economic disparity and religious fundamentalism, to destabilise India.

It is to the credit of Chinese pelf and power, that even though 1.6 million people have succumbed to coronavirus, which originated in Wuhan in November 2019, the international community finds it very hard to blame Beijing or demand reparations for the year lost.

With India standing up the PLA aggression in East Ladakh and demanding that the status quo ante of April 2020 be restored, the Narendra Modi government needs to be battle-prepared for a dominant China.

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