Monday, January 18, 2021

PLA : Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations (r)

 SOURCE: https://jamestown.org/program/integrating-the-pla-rocket-force-into-conventional-theater-operations/



Image: A soldier attached to an unidentified brigade under the PLA Rocket Force operates an optical sighting device in conjunction with the erection of a reported DF-21A medium-range ballistic missile system during a night training exercise in February 2020. 
(Image source: China Military Online, February 27, 2020)



Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations 

                      ( Publication: China Brief Volume: 20 Issue: 14 )


Introduction

Currently, only limited analytical discussion exists regarding the command authorities over China’s land-based ballistic and cruise missile inventory. Much of the discourse surrounding the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)—the military service that operates most of China’s land-based precision strike systems—focuses on nuclear command and control. Further discussions regarding the PLARF’s conventional land-based ballistic and cruise missile systems are limited, and make only vague references as to how the PLA is working to integrate PLARF units into the theater command structure—without going into detail about the major obstacles that preclude full integration of the PLARF.

This article makes the case that PLA theater commands almost certainly have clearly defined operational control authorities over some of the PLARF’s conventional missile force. This conclusion is based on the evidence of command authorities granted to certain PLARF bases; the integration of missile operations into theater joint operations command structure; and indications from PLA press outlets that PLARF units are subordinate to the theater command operational structure.

Understanding the Difference Between Administrative and Operational Control

This section briefly discusses how the PLA conceptually exerts administrative and operational control over its forces. Figure 1 broadly displays how the PLA oversees issues relating to manning, training, and equipment. It is also more closely aligned with what most observers traditionally associate with the PLA’s organizational structure.

Figure 1: The PLA’s Administrative Organization Chart


However, the PLA’s organizational hierarchy looks a little different when it comes to operations. Figure 2 displays the operational chain of command, as well as the primary command node at each level.


Figure 2: Operational Command in the PLA



Although there are many similarities between the PLA’s administrative and operational chains of command, they are not identical. Notably, the PLA uses elements of standing division and regiment-level organizations to create temporary operational and tactical groupings, termed jituanqun (集团群), biandui (编队), and qun (群). This means that in practice, units that report to the same higher administrative headquarters may report to two different operational commands.

Empowering PLARF Bases

As seen in Figure 2, the PLARF does not have a theater service headquarters at each of the theater commands, as the PLA’s other services do. This apparent lack of theater service headquarters leads to some confusion as to how PLARF units are integrated into theater operations. This confusion is resolved by understanding that PLARF bases appear to fill a role similar to that of theater service headquarters. PLARF bases are corps or corps deputy-grade organizations that are responsible for geographic or functional areas. [1] In addition to providing administrative oversight for PLARF units under its command, a PLARF base with missile launch units also acts as the PLARF’s primary campaign-level organization (基本战役单位, jiben zhanyi danwei) in wartime. This means that PLARF bases are expected to conduct conventional missile strike campaigns independently or as part of a larger joint campaign. [2]

In order to enable PLARF bases to leverage joint forces when executing a conventional missile strike campaign, the PLA designates at least some PLARF base joint operation duty offices as “theater conventional missile sub-command centers,” according to authoritative PLA press from late 2017. [3] This nomenclature makes a clear connection between the theater commands and PLARF bases. Not only do these bases exert operational control over conventional missiles on behalf of the theater command, but these bases also have the authority to coordinate operations with army, navy, and air force units.

Theater Rocket Forces

In addition to designating some PLARF bases as “theater conventional missile sub-centers,” the PLA also envisions PLARF bases as being roughly analogous to theater services headquarters. They also maintain their own subordinate forces. Limited press and social media reports suggest that the PLA identifies certain PLARF units as “theater command PLARF units” (战区火箭军某部, zhanqu huojianjun moubu). This designation suggests that the PLA gives certain PLARF units a status analogous to that of army, navy, or air force theater-level command nodes within the theater command structure.

At the corps level, the Eastern Theater Command (and possibly other theater commands) identify PLARF bases as theater service component equivalents. The following image from a CCTV-7 series on the PLARF depicts how the Eastern Theater Command generates combat power:

Image: A still image from a CCTV-7 (state television) series, which lists service branch components of the Eastern Theater Command. “Rocket Force Bases” (火箭军基地, Huojianjun Jidi) are listed alongside the “Theater Army,” “Theater Navy,” and “Theater Air Force.” (Image source: 军事报道 20180521)


This image indicates that Rocket Force bases are equivalent to theater services and contribute directly to theater command combat power. Corroborating this graphic is the fact that an Eastern Theater Command social media account also regularly reports on Number 61 Base, suggesting that this base falls under the theater command structure (Eastern Front View (Weixin), November 13, 2018).

At the tactical level, various PLA press sources identify multiple PLARF units as being “theater PLARF units.” To date, PLA social media has identified at least five different PLARF units across three separate PLARF bases as “theater PLARF units,” as shown below:

Figure 3: Identified Theater-Level PLARF Units in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands


UnitEquipmentTheater
612th Launch BrigadeDF-21A (probable)Eastern Theater Command
617th Launch BrigadeDF-15/16Eastern Theater Command
61 Base Training RegimentN/AEastern Theater Command
623rd Launch BrigadeCJ-10Southern Theater Command
635th Launch BrigadeCJ-10Southern Theater Command

Source: Compiled by the author.

Unauthoritative PRC press sources have also identified PLARF units subordinate to the Northern, Central, and Western Theater Commands. This small list of PLARF units under theater commands suggests that launch brigades equipped with short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) fall under the theater command. Assuming that the trend of PLARF SRBM and GLCM units being subordinate to the theater command holds true for the entire force,

Figure 4: Locations of Other Known SRBM and GLCM Launch Brigades in the Eastern and Southern Theater Command Areas of Responsibility

Image: China Aerospace Studies Institute PLARF Map

Notably, with the exception of a single DF-21A unit, all of the units identified by PLA social media as being a theater PLARF unit are conventional in nature, with a range limited to roughly the First Island Chain. The single Eastern Theater Command-based DF-21A unit may also be an exception due to mission and warhead limitations. Extrapolating from this small data set could suggest that the PLA withholds theater command access to conventional systems that are intended for strategic targets—such as the DF-21D or DF-26—in addition to nuclear-only systems such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Why Is There No “Theater Rocket Force”?

The rationale behind the PLA not designating PLARF bases as “theater rocket forces” is likely a result of the PLARF’s relatively small force size. Theater armies, navies, and air forces control two or more corps-level entities. Those corps-level entities in turn oversee more than half a dozen division or brigade level organizations. In total, a theater service headquarters could oversee 20 or more division or brigade level organizations either directly or indirectly.

PLARF launch bases, on the other hand, oversee approximately six launch brigades and six support regiments. Half of the launch bases oversee the administration of primarily nuclear-equipped ICBM units, which most likely are under the direct operational control of the Central Military Commission. This means that PLARF launch bases only have a fraction of the responsibility of larger theater service headquarters. As such, it makes little sense for the PLA to form fully-fledged rocket force headquarters at the theater command level.

Integrating Conventional Missile Operations at the Theater Commands

Given that most conventional missile strike campaigns are to be executed as part of a larger joint campaign, the theater commands must also have an organic capability to plan and execute conventional missile operations. Theater commands have accomplished this by providing theater command staff with officers who have a PLARF background, as well as command information systems that have the functionality to pass commands to conventional missile units.

In order to help integrate and execute missile operations as part of a larger joint campaign, some if not all theater commands have dedicated PLARF staff officers. For example, Southern Theater Command (STC) deputy chief of staff Tan Jianming (谈建明) is a career PLARF officer (Southern Daily, December 5, 2018; Peng Pai News, July 29, 2017). He previously served in various capacities at Base 63 (formerly Base 55), which is a unit well positioned to support STC operations. It is not unreasonable to assume that other theaters also have a PLARF officer serving in similar capacities. Theater-level joint operations command centers (JOCCs) also have dedicated “conventional missile seats” from which staff officers can direct missile operations (Xinhua, January 7, 2018).

In order to execute the plans developed by PLARF staff officers in theater commands, and to oversee conventional missile operations conducted in support of theater joint campaigns, at least some theater commands may have technical systems in place to pass commands to PLARF units.


Image: A still image from a CCTV-7 (state television) series, which shows a probable command information system used in the Eastern Theater Command JOCC. The screen includes an icon labeled “missile orders” (导弹命令, daodan mingling). (Image source: 军事报道 20180521)

Conclusion

Although units capable of both nuclear and conventional missions may pose some challenges for command and control, these difficulties are almost certainly overstated. The PLA’s administrative organization does not perfectly reflect how the PLA is organized for operations. Conceptually, PLARF units can task organize into operational and tactical groups during crises or wartime, just like any other service. Although a nuclear-capable PLARF missile brigade may be administratively subordinate to a base acting as a theater command conventional missile sub-center during peacetime, under warfighting conditions that missile brigade will simply be assigned to a CMC-controlled operational group.

It appears that the PLA has taken appropriate steps to empower the theater commands by providing clearly defined operational authorities over some, if not most, PLARF conventional missile units. Although PLARF base boundaries do not perfectly match theater geographic boundaries, the PLA has clearly defined command relationships between the two. Furthermore, the PLA has empowered the theater commands with resident expertise in the form of dedicated PLARF staff officers. This provides theater commanders with what is almost certainly a major component of their regional land attack capability.

The apparent command relationship between theater commands and certain PLARF units has several implications for the United States and its regional partners. First, U.S. and partner nation planners should treat theater command PLARF units as valid targets that do not pose significant additional risks for nuclear escalation. One of the points of contention in Western discourse is that the PLARF’s integration of conventional and nuclear forces complicates targeting: this is because any destruction of a PLARF unit may be perceived by the PLA as a step towards nuclear escalation. However, because the PLA has publicly identified certain units as not falling under the direct authority of the CMC, the United States and its partners should not treat these PLARF units any differently than a PLA fighter brigade or combined arms brigade.

Second, this knowledge should be used as a starting point of discussion with the PLA on issues related to escalation. A clear understanding of conventional versus nuclear command and control in the PLA at the operational and tactical level allows interlocutors to move beyond PLA attempts to stonewall conversations through claims that the opposing side simply does not understand the PLA. This in turn provides a greater chance of clarifying which PLARF units the PLA will allocate to nuclear and strategic missions.

                         _____________________

Roderick Lee is the Director of Research at the Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), where he oversees research on Chinese military aerospace forces and the Chinese civilian aerospace sector as it relates to the military. Prior to joining CASI, he served as an analyst with the United States Navy covering Chinese naval forces. He earned his Master of Arts degree from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. The views expressed here are his own, and are not intended to represent those of the Air University or any other U.S. government institution.

Notes

[1] See: ‘PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces’ 2nd ed., China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Primer_2nd_Edition_Web_2019-07-30.pdf.

[2] See: ‘Science of Campaigns [战役学],’ ed. Zhan Yuliang (张玉良), 2nd ed., Beijing: National Defense University Press (国防大学出版社), 2006.

[3] See: “PLA Rocket Force Follows Reform Process and Further Advances Realistic Combat Training,” [火箭军部队紧跟改革进程深入推进实战化训练], Han Xinbang (韩兴邦), Liu Ya (刘亚), Rocket Force News [火箭军报], November 15, 2017.

[4] See: CCT-7 Military Report 30 January 2018[ 军事报道 20180130], CCTV-7, January 30, 2018.

 

Sunday, January 17, 2021

Strike Corps Reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs Larger Restructuring(R)

 SOURCE: 

 https://theprint.in/opinion/strike-corps-reorientation-comes-for-ladakh-but-army-needs-larger-restructuring/584936/

   https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0




Army Chief General M M Naravane addresses an annual press conference at the Manekshaw Centre in New Delhi on 12 January 2021 


Strike Corps Reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs Larger Restructuring

At last the Army has recognised that it is China, and not Pakistan, that is the principal threat to India’s national security.

 14 January, 2021

VIDEO :-     Google the URL to open U-TUBE

                                      [ https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0 ]

Strike Corps reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs larger restructuring: HS Panag

#Army #China #LAC

crisis is an opportunity riding a dangerous wind’ goes a Chinese proverb. The Chinese-perpetrated crisis in Eastern Ladakh seems to have inspired the Indian Army to seize the opportunity to initiate structural and organisational reforms. Without much ado, it has given directions for 1 Corps — one of the three mechanised forces, predominant Strike Corps focussed on Pakistan — to be restructured and reoriented as the second Mountain Strike Corps for Ladakh. 17 Mountain Strike Corps will now become the strategic reserve dedicated only to the Northeast, and it will be restructured into three-four Integrated Battle Groups, or IBGs.

This move signals that, at last, the Army has recognised that it is China, and not Pakistan, that is the principal threat to India’s national security. However, it also allows the flexibility of using the Mountain Strike Corps against Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir/Western Ladakh. One sincerely hopes that this does not remain a one-off change but becomes part of larger, holistic reforms for optimisation of the Army through restructuring and reorganisation. The Army is still based on World War-II organisations, living with incremental changes tailored to the wars of the 20th century. We need to come to terms with strategic compulsions that will influence the way we engage in future conflicts/wars.

VIDEO :-     Google the URL to open U-TUBE

                                 https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0


The Strategic Compulsions

    • Nuclear weapon armed States cannot engage in decisive conventional wars.
    • Conflict/wars will be fought below the nuclear threshold, will be driven by high-technology and limited in time and space. For this type of conflict/war,agile and multi-capability formations are required.
    • Indian economic compulsions do not permit any substantial increase in the  defence budget in the near future. Currently, the bulk of the defence budget goes in sustaining a manpower-intensive army.

And this is why the restructuring of our mechanised and infantry formations becomes important.

Restructuring of Mechanised and Infantry Formations

We are an infantry predominant army, organised in 17 Mountain Divisions (including three, otherwise designated as Infantry Divisions) and 18 Infantry Divisions (including 4-6 Reorganised Plains Infantry Divisions, or RAPID, which also have an armoured brigade in lieu of an infantry brigade). In addition, we have some Independent Infantry  Brigades. The mechanised formations are organised into three Armoured Divisions, 18-20 Independent Armoured/Mechanised Brigades, including those part of RAPIDs. All Infantry Divisions operating in plains and two Mountain Divisions also have an armoured regiment. The divisions operate under 14 Corps, seven each for mountains and plains.

A decision has already been taken to reorganise the divisions into tailor-made Integrated Battle Groups, or IBGs, with varying numbers of combat arms and combat support units dictated by the mission and terrain. All modern armies have or are in an  advanced stage of adaption to these organisations. The PLA has already implemented this concept in the form of Combined Arms Brigades. India’s progress has been painfully slow and needs to be expedited. Unfortunately, the basic fighting units of the IBGs — armoured regiments and infantry battalions —continue to be organised as they were 80 years ago. We seem to have discounted our own war-fighting experience and the impact of technology. The organisations have become part of regimentation, and the fighting arms remain smug and revel in status quo.

An infantry battalion has four rifle companies of 120 soldiers each. In addition, it has specialist platoons for mortars and anti-tank guided missiles apart from a logistics subunit. Based on the World War experience, particularly causality rates, and the advent of modern technology, all modern armies have switched to a three, instead of four-rifle  company system and provide armour protection with Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV) or Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC). Our own experience supports this change.

In Kargil War, we suffered 527 killed (462 were due to actual combat) and 1,363 wounded. Thirty infantry battalions took part in the operations. Since 90 per cent of casualties are suffered by the infantry, mathematically, on an average, each battalion suffered 16 killed and 41 wounded, that is just 6 per cent of the unit strength of 800 personnel. As a defending and defeated army, Pakistan suffered approximately 453 killed and 665 wounded, out of nearly six infantry battalions in the battle, that is about 20 per cent of the total strength. These figures justify adopting the three-company system. Modern weapon systems and reconnaissance/surveillance resources further reinforce the logic.

We have 390 infantry battalions (including 10 Scouts Battalions), nine Para Special Forces Battalions, five Para Battalions, 63 Rashtriya Rifles Battalions and 40 Assam Rifles Battalions. If all/most of these are reorganised on basis of three rifle companies, we can spare approximately 50,000 troops, giving us enough infantry battalions for at least 12-18 IBGs, with 4-6 Infantry Battalions each. Alternatively, this manpower could be utilised to meet other shortfalls or be simply reduced.

An armoured regiment in the Indian Army has 45 tanks since 1940, organised into three squadrons and four troops each, with 14 and 3 tanks respectively. Regimental Headquarters has three tanks and Squadron Headquarters two tanks each. Since those days, tank design has undergone revolutionary changes in terms of mobility, protection and firepower. Our war experience makes a very strong case for reducing the number of tanks to 31, that is 10 tanks per squadron with three troops of three tanks each, and one tank each for squadron commander and regimental commander. Infantry Combat  Vehicles (ICVs)/Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) can be used for command and control by the regimental/squadron second-in-command and adjutant.

The maximum number of tanks lost by a regiment in 1965 or 1971 wars has been only 15. In the battle of Chawinda in 1965, out of 225 tanks in the battle, as part of five armoured regiments, we lost only 29 (we were on the offensive). Pakistan, out of its 150 tanks, lost 44. In the battle of Asal Uttar, 1965, (we were on the defensive) out of the 135 tanks, we lost only 10-14. Pakistan, out of its 220 tanks, lost 99, that is 20 tanks per regiment, primarily due to flawed tactics and boggy terrain. The biggest of tank battles of the 1971 War was at Basantar, where we lost 10-14 tanks and Pakistan 46, once again a higher number for Pakistan due to the flawed tactics adopted.

We have approximately 70 armoured regiments, including those that are being raised. If these are reorganised on the basis of 31 tanks, 980 tanks will be available, which is equivalent to 32 armoured regiments organised on 31-tank basis, enough for 16 IBGs at scale of two regiments per IBG.

Similarly, there is scope for reducing one ICV per ICV platoon in mechanised infantry battalions, that is 9 ICVs per battalion. With 50 mechanised infantry battalions, 450 ICVs will become available, enough for nine additional mechanised infantry battalions.

On a transparent battlefield, unprotected infantry cannot carry out any movement without incurring heavy casualties. Hence, in a gradual manner, all infantry battalions operating in the plains and relevant terrain of Ladakh and the Northeast must be equipped with a simple, cost-effective wheeled APC.

The above restructuring/reorganisation will enable us to switch to the IBG concept, fulfilling 100 per cent requirement of fighting arms, including the formations in Ladakh and the Northeast. A similar exercise can be carried out for combat support arms and combat support services. However, in respect of these, it is their need-based allotment as per mission and terrain which is relevant and not placing them under command.

It is time for the Army to get out of inertia and restructure, reorganise and modernise for wars of 21st century, and it can be done from within. 

                       'Concentration' is a principle of war. 

In future battles/wars, what will matter is agile and usable combat potential at the point of decision and not a huge elephantine mass per se.

                                          ____________________

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.


Friday, January 15, 2021

CDS INDIA : Chief of Defence Staff – Game Changer or Damp Squib? (R)

 SOURCE ;  http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/chief-of-defence-staff-game-changer-or-damp-squib/

ALSO  SEE : https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/book-defence-reform-3.pdf






Chief of Defence Staff

 – Game Changer or Damp Squib?

                              By 

          Brig V Jai Kumar (Retd)


12 Jan , 2021


It has been a year since the much-awaited post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was created to provide single point military advice to the national leadership. Almost two decades after a Group of Ministers recommended the creation of the post, General Bipin Rawat took over as the first CDS on 01 Jan 2019. It is perhaps the right time to see whether the manner of its creation and tenancy is a harbinger of enhanced military might and an efficient and cost-effective military machine or just another damp squibs

To put things in perspective, the military is the single source of hard national power, to exert the national will against an adversarial nation, or to prevent aggression by one as seen in Kargil, Doklam and Galwan. While the other sources of national power including economic, political, diplomatic, social and cultural cannot substitute for military power, the hard component, they have a role in enhancing soft power. Eviction of the Pakistani intruders from the icy heights of Kargil or stopping Chinese intrusions in Doklam and Galwan etc would not have been possible without application of military power. The Chinese annexation of Tibet and vast portions of Mongolia as well as extension of its territorial limits well into the South China sea, are all due to exercise of her hard power. It is difficult to imagine these results being achieved through other means.

Military power thus provides the foundation of national power, over which other elements build up. It is not without reason that developed countries with strong economies and highly developed diplomatic and other systems devote a substantial portion of their GDP to sustaining their military might as an essential means of compellence or deterrence

Development and sustenance of military power involves, besides creating well trained military units and formations, for land, sea and air warfare, equipping and training them, providing them with higher direction to synergize their potential, where the whole is greater than the sum of all, and to ensure their development through a continuous cycle of threat assessment, capability gap analysis, capability building, training and testing. Military power must also be supported with timely and comprehensive intelligence inputs, R&D, capital acquisitions and logistics support. There is need of an overarching authority to direct, coordinate, control and take responsibility for all these aspects. In a democracy, this authority must function directly under the political-executive, to enable it to merge the military might of the nation with the other sources of national power. This is the rightful role of the Chief of Defence Staff.

A review of the pre-CDS system and how the nation and its military fared on the parameters of military preparedness, intelligence, R&D, capital acquisitions and logistics would be useful. The pre-CDS Ministry of Defence (MoD), consisted of the Department of Defence (DoD), Department of Defence Production (DoDP), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA), each headed by a Secretary level officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). ..A financial cell of the Finance Ministry was attached to the MoD. There appears to be no one, other than the Defence Minister, who exercises control to ensure that the departments work together or to synergize their energies. Till a few years back the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister also headed the DRDO – an arrangement which was flawed.

The three service headquarters were initially “attached offices” and, post-Kargil, became became “Integrated Offices” of the MoD. Files from the service headquarters were routed through a Joint Secretary in the DoD. Parametric analysis of the four wars that the nation fought under this dispensation would be useful to comment on its appropriateness.

The 1948 Kashmir war, which was fought before the present MoD was in place, saw well trained and equipped army units airlifted to Srinagar airfield to evict the tribal lashkar hordes let loose and actively supported by the Pakistani military in a bid to capture Jammu and Kashmir. Decisive military action executed with grit and valour soon had the marauders on the run. Disaster came in the form of Jawahar Lal Nehru’s decision, without the benefit of cabinet approval to declare a cease fire (on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah) and to refer the matter the UNO, even before the marauders were completely evicted. Refusal to postpone the cease-fire by a fortnight as advised by his Army Chief resulted in a large portion of J&K remaining in the hands of the marauders, which constitutes Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).

The debacle of 1962 was a direct consequence of Nehru’s naivety, inane concepts of statesmanship and obdurate dismissal of expert advice as well as of realities on the ground. The military was relegated to a ceremonial force, its powers severely curtailed in a dispensation created under Nehru’s orders by Defence Secretary HM Patel (Oct ’47 to Jul ’53). { Google :-   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirubhai_M._Patel }  As a consequence, an ill prepared, un-acclimatised and ill-equipped army under an incompetent military leader (Lt Gen BM Kaul, an incompetent and unqualified relative that Nehru imposed upon the Army), was run over by the Chinese PLA, despite raw display of courage, valour and dedication and awe-inspiring junior leadership in the field. Nehru’s refusal to permit use of India’s superior air power, which would yet have resulted in defeating the Chinese aggression, was perhaps his crowning folly that cemented the outcome.


Despite being surprised in ’65, the Indian military, equipped with WW II vintage bolt action rifles, Sherman tanks (the Vijayanta was yet in prototype stage), fighter aircraft fleet of Vampire, Mysteres, Gnats and Hunter aircraft fought the Pakistani aggressors, equipped with superior Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre Jets and F 104 Star Fighters aircraft, to a stand-still. Intelligence failure apart, the political leadership under Lal Bahadur Shastri gave the military its full support and complete freedom of action to grab the initiative by opening a front against Lahore rather than fighting as per Pakistan’s design. This forced Pakistan to divert military resources to protect its hinterland and effectively halted its aggression. Post-war analysts showed a lack of coordination between the Army and the Air Force at the highest levels, with the Army and Air Force not sharing plans.

India created history in 1971 with a brilliant campaign that liberated Bangladesh in under a fortnight (3 to 16 Dec 1971). Backing her Chief’s decision to launch the campaign in December rather than in March, the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi ably complemented General Manekshaw’s efforts through a whirlwind diplomatic initiative and domestic synergy that geared up the entire nation for the effort. One (but not the only) reason to postpone the campaign was deficiency in wherewithal to sustain the military campaign. Unstinting efforts by the defence production agencies and synergizing of all required national energies for the upcoming national effort saw a sharp ramp up of military preparedness. Tri-service synergy was in full display during the entire campaign. Under-whelming performance by the Vijayanta was a        set-back, for which it would be unfair to blame the Heavy Vehicle Factory or the design agency alone.



Surprised again by the surreptitious occupation of heights on our side of the LOC in Kargil by Pakistani forces in May 1999, the army, actively supported by the air force evicted the intruders from virtually invincible positions under harsh environmental conditions. Vajpayee’s directive prohibiting our forces from crossing the LOC, while giving India international brownie points, imposed severe constraints on its military. The Bofors howitzer imported in the 1980s, served the campaign well though India had to resort to emergency procurement of ammunition, normal procurement of which had been derailed due to the corruption scandal.

To summarize, the only instance of close linkage between the political-executive and the military leadership, which happened in 1971, purely due to the personal equations between Mrs Indira Gandhi and General Sam Manekshaw, led to brilliant results. 

The Ministry of Defence, specifically designed by HM Patel, under Nehru’s directives, to debilitate these links and the resultant structure has served the nation ill.

Lack of a single point of accountability for the military being starved of modern of modern weapon systems, munitions and wherewithal to manifest its capabilities also points to inappropriateness of the system by which India conducted her military affairs before institutionalization of the CDS.

So, can the CDS change all this? The answer, sadly, is NO. There has been no meaningful restructuring to address the well-known shortcomings in the conduct of the defence of India. There has been no meaningful restructuring of the MoD. Specifically, the aforementioned lack of an authority, acting under the orders of the Defence Minister, to coordinate, control and take responsibilities for all facets of the MoD is still unchanged.


The much- vaunted CDS is just another department head in the MoD. Further, the newly created “Department of Military Affairs” that he heads is not involved with policy making for the defence of India, preparation for defence or for acts conducive to prosecution of war. These matters continue to remain the preserve of the Department of Defence headed by the Defence Secretary.


Which begs the question – what affairs other than military affairs does the Ministry of Defence engage with. Be it defence policy, defence preparation, defence actions, defence R&D, defence procurements, defence supplies, and defence production all these are part and parcel of Military Affairs. All of them must be controlled, coordinated and directed by a single authority who will then take sole responsibility for any success or failure.


The Chief of Defence Staff, answerable to the Minister of Defence and to the Union Cabinet, must be that single authority. The nation needs that this person has the capability and credentials to shoulder these responsibilities and a sufficiently long tenure, of say five years, to make a difference. Restructuring of the MoD to support him in this endeavour and seating him on the high table of national decision making are also of essence to enable India to maximize her national power through synergy of all its national energies in the fulfilment of her national will.


                                  _________________________