ASSESSMENT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN APR 12,2022

  SOURCE:

 (A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11

(C)   https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

 https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

  (E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 (F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP;     https://liveuamap.com/     

 (G)  ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

  (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

       ( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:              https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf                                                                                                

     ( B )  2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces    https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#  

     ( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense  :   

     https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503 

    (D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  

     ( E ) ORBITS  WORLD BATTLES : 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

    (F)  (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District    https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf 

                                               (G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf    https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

 (H)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  (J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

                                                             

                              _________________________

     DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN  FORMATIONS ON MAP

Update for 12 April done for http://uawardata.com. Main changes from 9 April:

- Added 2 missing regiments to Zaporizhzhia Oblast (429, 291). These are fairly low confidence.

- Rearranged icons near Izium (mostly for presentation reasons)

- 41st CAA possibly arriving at Valuyki

https://www.uawardata.com/?fbclid=IwAR19rjiSiyPaKflli3cAftFe4dZ2g0l6nnkdAx_NoedpihI3r4JaiDHCRJs

Please use TIMELINE to view dispositions from 31 March 2022  onwards for each day

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

                     APR 12,2022

             MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS, 

                                      AND

                KATERYNA STEPANENKO 

               APR 12, 5:30 pm ET

Russia continued offensive operations in eastern Ukraine on a limited basis as it worked to reconstitute forces withdrawn from the Battle of Kyiv and to establish necessary logistical bases for increased offensive operations in the Donbas area. Russian forces withdrawn from the Kyiv region have not yet been reintroduced into Ukraine to fight. The Russian military has continued to conduct small-scale limited offensive operations on the Izyum and Severodonetsk axes and has not yet gone over to a better-resourced or broader offensive campaign. The Battle of Mariupol continues even as Ukrainian officials accuse Russia of using chemical weapons on Mariupol’s defenders.

Key Takeaways

• The Russian military continues offensive operations in Donbas and is not in a pure reconstitution phase. It has not undertaken an across-the-board operational pause while waiting for reinforcements to arrive. In part, as a result, it has made limited gains while continuing to sustain significant losses.

• Mariupol has not yet fallen.

The Russian military continues efforts to reconstitute forces damaged in the failed attack on Kyiv in the Belgorod and Voronezh areas but has not yet sent those forces back into Ukraine to resume fighting. Ukrainian reports suggest that morale and will to fight remain low in some Russian units and areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 12 that elements of the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army and the 90th Tank Division are relocating to Belgorod and Voronezh Oblasts.[1]

The Ukrainian Defense Intelligence also claimed on April 12 that Russian troops continued to struggle with low morale and that promised financial incentives to participate in combat in Ukraine have not been delivered to some units as promised.[2] The report stated that servicemen of the 47th Guards Tank Division of the 1st Tank Army failed to receive promised additional payment for participating in operations in Ukraine and that military leadership ignored appeals for payments.[3] The Ukrainian GUR claims that Russian troops are refusing to participate in fighting due to the number of bodies returning to Russia from Ukraine and that the Russian military is shipping bodies in smaller batches to avoid causing panic in local communities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Ukrainian sources alleged that Russian troops used unspecified chemical weapons with suffocating effects on Ukrainian defenders and civilians in Mariupol on April 11.[4] ISW has not been able to independently verify these specific allegations but has repeatedly warned that Russian troops might use chemical weapons.[5] Mariupol is an optimal location in which Russian forces might use chemical weapons to demonstrate their willingness to escalate while reducing the risk that the international community could obtain incontrovertible proof of their violation of Russia’s international legal commitments to abstain from using such weapons. Russia’s encirclement of Mariupol allows Moscow to prevent outsiders from obtaining physical evidence or interviewing or examining survivors, and Russia’s control of the information coming out of Mariupol makes it difficult for survivors to show clear evidence of their symptoms to the world.

The Ukrainian defense of Mariupol continued on April 12 despite reports of dwindling Ukrainian resources and Ukrainian troops surrendering.[6] Due to the restricted information environment surrounding Mariupol, ISW cannot confirm conflicting statements made by Ukrainian officials and Russian sources regarding the state of Russian control of the Port of Mariupol.[7]

Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations in Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, and Popasna, primarily relying on artillery attacks, although they engaged in urban combat in Rubizhne on April 12.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported limited fighting in other parts of Donetsk on April 12.[9] Social media users geolocated footage released by Chechen forces on April 11 to Rubizhne, confirming the presence of Chechen Rosgvardia units in the northeastern neighborhood of the settlement.[10] The Chechen units are reportedly entrenching in the vicinity of Rubizhne, which suggests that they intend to go over to the defensive at least in some parts of the battle space.[11] It is not yet clear why the Chechens would adopt a defensive posture at that place this time.

Russian forces continue to deploy ad-hoc units to Donbas, with social media users observing the 2nd Cossack Battalion leaving Orenburg on April 7, but the Russian command has not yet committed new units or units previously withdrawn from other axes to the offensive.[12]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Russian forces continued to regroup in Kharkiv and reinforce their offensive operations on the Izyum axis on April 12. Unspecified units of the 1st Tank Army and the 20th Combined Arms Army deployed to the vicinity of Izyum to conduct offensive operations.[13] Russian forces continued efforts to fix Ukrainian forces in place around Kharkiv City.[14]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces did not make any significant territorial advances in Kherson Oblast but focused on improving defensive positions and conducting aerial reconnaissance on April 12.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces showed signs of improving air defense in Melitopol on April 12.[16]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There has been no significant activity reported on this axis in the last 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive operations in the Donbas region, feeding reinforcements into the fight as they become available rather than gathering reinforcements and replacements for a more coordinated and coherent offensive.

• Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol will not be able to hold out indefinitely, but it remains unclear how quickly Russia will be able to secure the city.

 

---

References

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293401042972981

[2] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/290277019950392

 [3] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/290277019950392

[4] https://www.rferl dot org/a/ukraine-chemical-weapons-russia-accusations/31798775.html;

 https://www.kyivpost dot com/ukraine-politics/possible-chemical-weapons-attack-in-mariupol-roundup.html;

 https://apostrophe dot ua/news/265680;

 https://t.me/BiletskyAndriy/4338; 

https://t dot me/mariupolrada/9188; 

https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1513813558206816260;

https://twitter.com/Polk_Azov/status/1513795751536517120

 [5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-update-russia-may-cond...

[6] https://twitter.com/cossackgundi/status/1513768135375077379;

 https://twitter.com/HromadskeUA/status/1513761548971425799;

 https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1513779174145761287;

 https://twitter.com/MaksimNevchas/status/1513784585280266240;

 https://twitter.com/MaksimNevchas/status/1513809572800172033

 [7] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/236; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/223

 [8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293401042972981; https://interfax dot com.ua/news/general/823469.html; https://twitter.com/Freedom_Slips/status/1510652844340244483; https://www.currenttime.tv/a/nastuplenie-ottyagivaetsya-na-paru-dney-no-...

 [9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546

[10] https://twitter.com/Hetreeli/status/1512838375576907776; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1513532501867827201

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1513784272930447362; https://t dot me/milchronicles/222

[12] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1513806050725670914; https://www.ural56 dot ru/news/676901/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293401042972981; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293401042972981; https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1513585769214103554

 [15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293401042972981;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546;

 https://youtu.be/R5vvrb1YsqU; 

https://www.facebook.com/OleksandrVilkul/videos/264876622512058/

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/293032059676546

     Tags

Ukraine Project

File Attachments: 

Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 12,2022.png

Mariupol Battle Map Draft April 12,2022.png

Luhansk Battle Map Draft April 12,2022.png

DraftUkraineCoTApril12,2022.png

APR 11, 2022 ; WHICH WAY THE WIND WILL BLOW ! ! SUMMARIZING A REVISED RUSSIAN OPERATION PLAN

 SOURCE : 

 (a) https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1513354960469213188/photo/1

 (b) https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1513354960469213188

INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

  (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

GRAPHICAL MAP  PRESENTATION 

   SITUATION ON 11 APR 2022 IN  UKRAINIAN 

                           THEATER  OF WAR 

                                 By 

          '          Jomini of the West @JominiW

1/ Surmising a revised Russian OPLAN. Here are my thoughts on what Russia’s revised operational plan may look like. I have constructed this off what I consider the most logical operational approach that can yield positive results. #UkraineRussianWar #UkraineUnderAttack #strategy

2/ Given Russian operational performance to date I realize that this assessment may end up being wildly off. Producing a reliable open-source analysis is difficult to say the least. Information is scarce & what is available is heavily weighted in favour of Ukraine.

3/ Still, to understand where this war is going, what conditions military operations will create in the coming weeks, and how they may set conditions for a negotiated settlement and attempt to surmise a logical course of action is necessary.

4/ I do not see the Kremlin altering its war aims in Ukraine. If anything, the defeat of Russian forces in Kyiv has caused Putin & his top advisors to see the fulfilment of their war aims as vital to the survival of their regime. Therefore, I feel they will remain in place.

5/ I have added what I feel are the Ukrainian government’s war aims to this assessment. Essential they are the opposite of Russia’s aims but contain important nuances that offer a “golden bridge” (i.e., making the Russians feel they have achieved a goal).

6/ BLUF, Ukraine seeks a condition in which they are politically independent of Russia, Russia recognizes Ukraine’s international borders, does not oppose its membership into the EU, and its future security is guaranteed by a legally binding agreement with world powers.

7/ Russia has already stated that it has achieved the goal of “demilitarization” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (25 March General Staff press conference). This goal was described as the reduction of Ukraine’s ability to threaten the Donbas & Russia.

8/ Though the claims made as to the level of destruction suffered by the UAF & its defense industrial base were exaggerated, it can be inferred that significant damage has been inflicted on the Ukrainian military, to the point the General Staff can claim a goal has been met.

9/ The Ukrainian concession of seeking a legally binding international security guarantee backed by the U.S. & major European powers to prevent future Russian aggression in lieu of NATO membership is a golden bridge for Russia’s 2nd war aim.

10/ This leaves the question of Crimea and the Donbas as the only stated grievance remaining to be resolved by both parties. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is prepared to negotiate this point without a clear battlefield victory. This will be the focus of future operations.

11/ Russia is still faced with three key questions that need to be answered to properly allocate forces & resources to achieve its goals of Ukrainian acquiescence to its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Separatist Republics.

12/ First, what military conditions much be produced to achieve the strategic goals? Second, what is sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions? Finally, how should forces and resources be arrayed to accomplish that sequence of actions?

13/ Second, The logical condition Russia must achieve to meet its strategic goals is the ability of the Russian military to seize and hold the entirety of the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, and retain the territory it occupies in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and hold Kherson and its environs.

14/ LIKELY / EXPECTED CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS The logical sequence of actions to obtain these conditions is to conduct simultaneous operations in designated Battle and Disruption Zones in each of these Oblasts, including Kharkiv, and a series of sequential offensive actions in Donetsk.

15/ Terminology. Disruption Zone – Operations in these areas create windows of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone by attacking specific components of the enemy’s defensive systems and causing them to break down.

16/ Terminology. Battle Zone – Operations in these areas are decisive, using all components of available combat power, an armed force closes & engages with the enemy to defeat him. Doing so increases the likelihood to compel him into negotiations.

17/ Given the operational realities Russia is faced with (i.e., limited manpower, poor morale, fragmented command & control, substandard maintenance, inexperienced leaders, etc.) its military can only reasonably focus offensive operations in one area ONLY.

18/ It is assessed the primary battle zone for Russian forces will be in north-central Donetsk. Located here are the Donets River Line, Severodonetsk Salient, and former Line of Contact running SE to SW from Popasna to Donetsk along with 7 x Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades.

19/ This area also constitutes one of the most fortified areas of eastern Ukraine. Russian attempts to break through the Ukrainian LOC over nearly two months of combat have proven unsuccessful. It is likely that Russian forces now massing near Izium will attempt to outflank the line

20/ Russian forces will advance on Slovyansk, but this will more than likely be meant as a feint to fix Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades along the Severodonetsk Salient. It is more likely that Russian forces will seize the decisive geographic point of Barvinkove & then push SW.

21/ The objective of this drive will most likely be the decisive geographic point of Pokrovsk which is 79 km NW of Donetsk. The goal is likely to control the main highway from Barvinkove to Pokrovsk & create a cauldron out of north-central & NE Donetsk.

22/ The Russian concept of a cauldron is a very large strategic-level concentration of trapped enemy forces. In the cauldron, Ukrainian forces would be contained but not directly engaged. Russian VKS, artillery, and other stand-off weapons would reduce Ukrainian resistance.

23/ The Russians could close the cauldron or leave an opening to encourage Ukrainian troops to flee through, either way Russian forces would be able to clear the most fortified region of Donetsk without having to physically push Ukraine forces out of their positions (in theory).

24/ The Russians used this approach during the Battle of Debaltseve (14 January – 20 February 2015), [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debaltseve ] forcing Ukrainian units to retreat from a key portion of the LOC. The success of this smaller cauldron allowed Russia to gain a more favourable negotiating position for Minsk II.

25/ The second battle zone would be around Kherson. Here we would expect to see the priority of forces and resources behind those sent to the Donetsk battle zone to maintain control of this decisive strategic point. A point is necessary for a favourable negotiation position.

26/ Kharkiv remains the principal disruption zone. Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix a substantial portion of Ukrainian mechanized forces, denying their involvement in operations in Donetsk.

27/ A second disruption zone will center near the northern border of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Like Kharkiv, Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix several manoeuvre brigades from counterattacks in Donetsk.

28/ A potential third disruption zone is Kyiv itself. Although it is unknown if Russia intends to continue any sort of offensive action against the Ukrainian capital, air & missile strikes have the potential to divert critical resources away from east Ukraine.

29/ Of course all of this is speculation. The Russian approach to operations in the Donbas may be drastically different. They may opt to go head-on with prepared Ukrainian defences, hoping that artillery and airstrikes can overcome stiff resistance.

30/ Russia may finally use chemical weapons to force Ukrainian units from their prepared defences and into the open where they are vulnerable to air & artillery strikes. Such a move would bring a new level of barbarity to the fighting.

31/ Without reliable data this assessment is really a wild stab in the dark, but it might provide a glimpse of what is in the realm of the possible. One thing I have not discussed is Ukrainian options, this is because there is even less verified Ukrainian data than Russian.

32/ One thing that can be guessed about the Ukrainian military is they are stretched thin too. Combat losses for Ukraine are equally a challenge to overcome. It is highly likely Ukraine will be unable to muster enough forces for a major counteroffensive for quite some time. END.