SOURCE :
(a) https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1513354960469213188/photo/1
(b) https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1513354960469213188
INDEX
( ) ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html
(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html
( ) TIME LINE : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html
( ) MAR 25: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) MAR 27: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) MAR 28: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html
( ) MAR 29: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) MAR 30: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) MAR 31: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) APR 01 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) APR 02 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) APR 03 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html
( ) APR 04 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) APR 05 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( )APR 06 : ((i) https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) APR 06: (ii) https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html
( ) APR 07: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html
( ) APR 08: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html
( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html
( ) APR 10: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html
( ) APR 11: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html
( ) APR 12: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html
( ) APR 13: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html
GRAPHICAL MAP PRESENTATION
SITUATION ON 11 APR 2022 IN UKRAINIAN
THEATER OF WAR
By
' Jomini of the West @JominiW
1/ Surmising a revised Russian OPLAN. Here are my thoughts on what Russia’s revised operational plan may look like. I have constructed this off what I consider the most logical operational approach that can yield positive results. #UkraineRussianWar #UkraineUnderAttack #strategy
2/ Given Russian operational performance to date I realize that this assessment may end up being wildly off. Producing a reliable open-source analysis is difficult to say the least. Information is scarce & what is available is heavily weighted in favour of Ukraine.
3/ Still, to understand where this war is going, what conditions military operations will create in the coming weeks, and how they may set conditions for a negotiated settlement and attempt to surmise a logical course of action is necessary.
4/ I do not see the Kremlin altering its war aims in Ukraine. If anything, the defeat of Russian forces in Kyiv has caused Putin & his top advisors to see the fulfilment of their war aims as vital to the survival of their regime. Therefore, I feel they will remain in place.
5/ I have added what I feel are the Ukrainian government’s war aims to this assessment. Essential they are the opposite of Russia’s aims but contain important nuances that offer a “golden bridge” (i.e., making the Russians feel they have achieved a goal).
6/ BLUF, Ukraine seeks a condition in which they are politically independent of Russia, Russia recognizes Ukraine’s international borders, does not oppose its membership into the EU, and its future security is guaranteed by a legally binding agreement with world powers.
7/ Russia has already stated that it has achieved the goal of “demilitarization” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (25 March General Staff press conference). This goal was described as the reduction of Ukraine’s ability to threaten the Donbas & Russia.
8/ Though the claims made as to the level of destruction suffered by the UAF & its defense industrial base were exaggerated, it can be inferred that significant damage has been inflicted on the Ukrainian military, to the point the General Staff can claim a goal has been met.
9/ The Ukrainian concession of seeking a legally binding international security guarantee backed by the U.S. & major European powers to prevent future Russian aggression in lieu of NATO membership is a golden bridge for Russia’s 2nd war aim.
10/ This leaves the question of Crimea and the Donbas as the only stated grievance remaining to be resolved by both parties. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is prepared to negotiate this point without a clear battlefield victory. This will be the focus of future operations.
11/ Russia is still faced with three key questions that need to be answered to properly allocate forces & resources to achieve its goals of Ukrainian acquiescence to its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Separatist Republics.
12/ First, what military conditions much be produced to achieve the strategic goals? Second, what is sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions? Finally, how should forces and resources be arrayed to accomplish that sequence of actions?
13/ Second, The logical condition Russia must achieve to meet its strategic goals is the ability of the Russian military to seize and hold the entirety of the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, and retain the territory it occupies in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and hold Kherson and its environs.
14/ LIKELY / EXPECTED CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS The logical sequence of actions to obtain these conditions is to conduct simultaneous operations in designated Battle and Disruption Zones in each of these Oblasts, including Kharkiv, and a series of sequential offensive actions in Donetsk.
15/ Terminology. Disruption Zone – Operations in these areas create windows of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone by attacking specific components of the enemy’s defensive systems and causing them to break down.
16/ Terminology. Battle Zone – Operations in these areas are decisive, using all components of available combat power, an armed force closes & engages with the enemy to defeat him. Doing so increases the likelihood to compel him into negotiations.
17/ Given the operational realities Russia is faced with (i.e., limited manpower, poor morale, fragmented command & control, substandard maintenance, inexperienced leaders, etc.) its military can only reasonably focus offensive operations in one area ONLY.
18/ It is assessed the primary battle zone for Russian forces will be in north-central Donetsk. Located here are the Donets River Line, Severodonetsk Salient, and former Line of Contact running SE to SW from Popasna to Donetsk along with 7 x Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades.
19/ This area also constitutes one of the most fortified areas of eastern Ukraine. Russian attempts to break through the Ukrainian LOC over nearly two months of combat have proven unsuccessful. It is likely that Russian forces now massing near Izium will attempt to outflank the line
20/ Russian forces will advance on Slovyansk, but this will more than likely be meant as a feint to fix Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades along the Severodonetsk Salient. It is more likely that Russian forces will seize the decisive geographic point of Barvinkove & then push SW.
21/ The objective of this drive will most likely be the decisive geographic point of Pokrovsk which is 79 km NW of Donetsk. The goal is likely to control the main highway from Barvinkove to Pokrovsk & create a cauldron out of north-central & NE Donetsk.
22/ The Russian concept of a cauldron is a very large strategic-level concentration of trapped enemy forces. In the cauldron, Ukrainian forces would be contained but not directly engaged. Russian VKS, artillery, and other stand-off weapons would reduce Ukrainian resistance.
23/ The Russians could close the cauldron or leave an opening to encourage Ukrainian troops to flee through, either way Russian forces would be able to clear the most fortified region of Donetsk without having to physically push Ukraine forces out of their positions (in theory).
24/ The Russians used this approach during the Battle of Debaltseve (14 January – 20 February 2015), [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debaltseve ] forcing Ukrainian units to retreat from a key portion of the LOC. The success of this smaller cauldron allowed Russia to gain a more favourable negotiating position for Minsk II.
25/ The second battle zone would be around Kherson. Here we would expect to see the priority of forces and resources behind those sent to the Donetsk battle zone to maintain control of this decisive strategic point. A point is necessary for a favourable negotiation position.
26/ Kharkiv remains the principal disruption zone. Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix a substantial portion of Ukrainian mechanized forces, denying their involvement in operations in Donetsk.
27/ A second disruption zone will center near the northern border of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Like Kharkiv, Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix several manoeuvre brigades from counterattacks in Donetsk.
28/ A potential third disruption zone is Kyiv itself. Although it is unknown if Russia intends to continue any sort of offensive action against the Ukrainian capital, air & missile strikes have the potential to divert critical resources away from east Ukraine.
29/ Of course all of this is speculation. The Russian approach to operations in the Donbas may be drastically different. They may opt to go head-on with prepared Ukrainian defences, hoping that artillery and airstrikes can overcome stiff resistance.
30/ Russia may finally use chemical weapons to force Ukrainian units from their prepared defences and into the open where they are vulnerable to air & artillery strikes. Such a move would bring a new level of barbarity to the fighting.
31/ Without reliable data this assessment is really a wild stab in the dark, but it might provide a glimpse of what is in the realm of the possible. One thing I have not discussed is Ukrainian options, this is because there is even less verified Ukrainian data than Russian.
32/ One thing that can be guessed about the Ukrainian military is they are stretched thin too. Combat losses for Ukraine are equally a challenge to overcome. It is highly likely Ukraine will be unable to muster enough forces for a major counteroffensive for quite some time. END.
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