SOURCE:
(a) https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-31-march-1-april-2022-eb687cb361b8
Here's my summary of most important developments related to the Ukraine War, for 31 March and 1 April, 2022:
By TOM COOPER
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY( ISUM )
Ukraine War, 31 March — 1 April, 2022
Good morning everybody!
Here’s my summary of most important developments regarding the Ukrainian War from period 31 Mar — 1 Apr 2022.
Abbreviations
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
West OSK — Western Military District (Russia)
------------------------
STRATEGIC
By now it’s sure that, following the failure to at least encircle Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa, Putin — and thus the Keystone Cops in Moscow, too — has completely revised the campaign in Ukraine. Correspondingly, they now claim to have attacked northern Ukraine, ‘solely to degrade Ukrainian forces prior to going for their main goal’. With other words: the RFA is definitely going for the Plan F: securing Kherson and Melitopol with the aim of establishing another para-state in southern Ukraine, plus securing Mariupol and completing the capture of both Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast (which Russians claim as in their entirety as the DNR and LNR, respectively).
Multiple Western countries have decided to donate armoured vehicles, long-range artillery, and air defence systems, and to provide related training and bolster logistical support for Ukraine. For example, the Czech Republic is going to deliver 56 modified BMP-1 IFVs, Australia its Bushmaster MRAPs. I.e. ‘NATO’ is ‘revising’ its posture vis-a-vis Ukraine: it is going to bolster its army through the provision of heavy arms and ever bigger amounts of supplies.
AIR
The VKS continues flying about 300 combat sorties a day, though the primary focus of its airstrikes is now on the LOC in the Donbas. The Ukrainian air defences there remain active, and have scored at least one confirmed kill against a Russian Mi-28 helicopter, yesterday.
Russians have continued to strike targets in central- and western Ukraine with ballistic- and cruise missiles. An entire salvo of Iskanders targeted Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv Oblast, yesterday; several Bastion-P ground-based anti-ship missiles were fired at — according to the Keystone Cops in Moscow — a Ukrainian command post in the Odesa area, the last night.
The K-300P Bastion-P (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SS-C-5 Stooge’) has a secondary land-strike capability, but this is not what it is really made for: the fact the Russians are now using such means to strike targets deep behind the frontline is only a confirmation that they’re getting short on other weapons, and the inability of the VKS to do so.
NORTH
In the night from 31 Mar to 1 April, the 35th and 36th CAA seem to have withdrawn from all of the area north-west of Kyiv, at least up to north of Ivankiv and Chernobyl. In their wake, they have looted the mass of villages that used to be under their control; have left plenty of mines and bobby traps, dozens of abandoned vehicles, significant quantities of ammunition and supplies — and plenty of bodies of their troops. Seems, the rivalry within the RFA is such that its conventional units were not in a particular rush to bury the fallen VDV-troops.
That said, this was no ‘rout’: like those of the 2nd CAA and the 1st GTA, the last week, the troops in question are withdrawn to Belarus and then to Russia, given 2–3 days of rest, reorganised and then sent to south-eastern Ukraine. Indeed, as reported earlier, some are already fighting there (see Izium area). Indeed, in some cases, the troops in question are replaced by ‘low-quality’ units, including some from the DNR and LNR.
NORTH-EAST
Two days ago (31 Mar) the Ukrainian 1st Tank run a pincer-attack on the Svoboda/Sloboda village south of Chernihiv and kicked the Russians out, thus re-opening three roads (including the M01) to the besieged city. That said, the 41st CAA is keeping the Chernihiv under constant artillery barrages.
Further south, as of the last night, the rearguards of the rapidly withdrawing 2nd CAA were in the area between Berestovets and Konotop, i.e. moving up the M02 in direction of Hlukhiv. After liberating Novo Basan, two days ago, the Ukrainians were pushing from Romny on Talalaivka, Konotop (still held by its garrison) and Buryn. The area east of there was largely vacated by the Russians over the last 24 hours, but the Ukrainian advance is slowed down by mines, fuel shortages, and several destroyed bridges.
Kharkiv remains under Russian air strikes and artillery barrages, but this is meanwhile secondary to what is happening further south-east: Izium remains a focal point of Russian operations in this part of Ukraine. The 6th CAA brought in at least three ‘fresh’ BTGs of the 47th Tank Brigade (incl. 26th Tank Regiment, 252nd and 254th Motor Rifle Regiments), and deployed TOS-1 MRLS’ with thermobaric warheads to pound the defenders there, forcing Ukrainian 81st and 95th Airborne to withdraw south of the town, on 31 Mar (in turn, TOS-1s are nowadays primary targets for Ukrainian operators of Skif anti-tank guided missiles). Yesterday, the Russians pushed forward again, gradually taking Topolske, Kamyanka, and Tykhotske, before attacking Mala Komyshuvakha. i.e. the 6th CAA is already using units re-deployed from the north to increase the pressure upon Ukrainians in this crucial battle. Indeed, they seem to have deployed so many units and firepower in this area, that the Ukrainians could not beat these back in their usual way: by ‘swarming’ flanks of advancing enemy columns in the open with lots of small teams equipped with anti-tank guided missiles, anti-material- and sniper rifles.
EAST
The Ukrainian Gen Stab can’t stop repeating its reports about repelling one Russian attack over the LOC after the other (for a total of seven on 1 April alone), killing RFA troops and destroying its armour. However, there is no doubt that Ukrainian units in Severotonetsk area remain under immense pressure, and that the Russians are in the process of securing Panteleivmonivka, about five kilometres west of Horlivka — and thus five kilometres deep through the Ukrainian defence line. Of course, the more time it takes the 8th CAA and Separatists to secure that village, the more time the Ukrainians are going to have to build up their defences around it. But, and once again: this is a battle of attrition, which the Ukrainians are ill-suited to win.
SOUTH
The frontlines west and east of Dnepr remain the same for about a week: the reason is that the 58th CAA is in the process reinforcing of its battered 42nd GMRD by troops of the 5th Military Base in South Ossetia, and the 7th Military Base, from Abkhazia. Thus, this is an opportune moment to update everybody on one of the ‘unusually popular’ topics of this war: 58th CAA and its commander, Lieutenant-General Mikhail Zusko.
For the start, let me remind you that, together with late Lieutenant-General Rezantsev (C0 49th CAA, killed during the third Ukrainian artillery strike on Kherson Airport, back on 24 Mar), Zusko proved the best Russian commander of this war. His and Rezantsev’s units not only run a well-planned — and orchestrated — advance into southern Ukraine, but achieved the biggest successes so far, too. They captured Kherson and Melitopol, and Zuko's the 58th CAA reached western outskirts of Mariupol in a matter of the first three days of the war. Moreover, Zusko’s troops didn’t blow away half the planet when securing the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe, in Enerhodar…
No doubt, under pressure from the South OSK to effect the capture of Odesa and Zaporizhzhia, both the 49th and 58th CAA were then badly mauled while trying to assault Voznesensk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhiain . Thus, neither moved much the last three weeks. On the contrary, the 49th CAA (headquartered in Nova Khakovka) is under slowly growingthe pressure. Except for reaching north-western outskirts of Kherson, four days ago, the Ukrainians are pushing along the Dnepr River from the south, in the Hola Prystan area, and in the Velyka Lepetykha area from the north.
The point is this: ever since 12 March, there is no end of rumours — all coming out of Ukraine — about Zuko' arrest and detention, about him trying to commit a suicide etc. Latest version was that he should have been accused of the late treachery and court-martialled.
Disregard all you’ve heard about this: Zusko is still alive and in command. Sure, seems to have lost some 10–15 kg and has even less hair than before, but that’s normal under conditions of intensive combat. Foremost, Zvezda TV demonstratively released a video showing him decorating wounded troops of the 58th CAA, back on 30 March.
‘Where’s the problem’? Zusko is an ethnic Ukrainian, and then from the Volhynia area: something like the centre of Ukrainian history, and an epicentre of Ukrainian nationalism. Unsurprisingly, this is causing lots of pain in Ukraine.
Think, some have to get accustomed to this, just like to the fact that about 10% of RFA troops involved in an the aggression on Ukraine are ethnic Ukrainians — and about 20% of Ukrainian Army is consisting of ethnic Russians.
BTW, yesterday, Zusko’s troops have stolen 14 tons of humanitarian aid sent to the civilians of Melitopol and spoiled the negotiated withdrawal of local civilians.
MARIUPOL
Russians are heavily plastering the defence perimeter by TOS-1s, and then trying to infiltrate at three points: Kalmuskyi District Townhall in the north, Azovstal in the east, and the Drama Theatre in the west. The aim is obvious: reduce the perimeter into three isolated areas.
The defenders — including the Azov Regiment, 36th Naval Infantry, 12th Brigade of the National Guard and the 56th Motor — have turned down a third offer to lay down their arms. This time, the offer was issued by Ramzan Kadyrov, who told them something like, ‘I know you want to give up’, guaranteed their safety, and added that they should, ‘follow the path of the Chechen Republic’. Ironically, just few days before, the very same Kadyrov said that 90% of Mariupol was ‘liberated’: actually, most of the downtown is still in Ukrainian hands, even if about 80% of houses there have been destroyed. With Kadyrov’s call proving pointless, the next to appear in the public was Eduard Basurov, representative of the ‘DPR’: he said that the ‘surviving extremist nationalists’ have ‘ceased to be combatants’ and are henceforth considered ‘war criminals’.
Guess, this is not going to encourage anybody to give up — even if the situation of the Ukrainian garrison is meanwhile desperate: CO Azov, Denis Prokopenko, confirmed heavy losses (on both sides), reported they are now down to eating once a day, drinking industrial water, and saving ammunition. But, they’re still capable of running organised defence, and not giving up. As next, I expect them to shorten their lines by vacating the southern part of the perimeter.
Of course, all the ‘agreements’ about another ‘humanitarian corridor’ for citizens of Mariupol proved entirely useless. The Russians are not letting anybody out — at least not to the Ukrainian side.
Servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces who took part in combat actions in Ukraine
War criminal, Major General of the Russian Armed Forces
ZUSKO Mykhailo Stepanovych
former commander of the 1st AC (Donetsk, Ukraine) of the 12th Reserve Command (Center of the Territorial Forces nowadays) of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces
In 2014, took direct part in criminal activity in the territory of Ukraine.
In the temporarily occupied territories of the East of Ukraine uses the undercover name: ORLOV Mikhail Stepanovich.
Position and place of service before he was seconded to participate in the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine: commander of the 34th separate motorized rifle brigade (mountain, settlement of Storozhevaia, Zelenchukskii rayon, the Karachayevo-Cherkessian Republic) of the 49th Army (Stavropol) of the Southern Military District (Rostov-on-Don) of the Russian Armed Forces.
Year of birth: 1972.
Education:
Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (1993);
Frunze Military Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Military service at the commanding positions:
2007 – 2011 – deputy commander, commander of the 11th separate air assault brigade (settlement of Sosnovyi Bor, Republic of Buryatia);
2011 – 2014 – commander of 34th separate motorized rifle brigade (mountain, settlement of Storozhevaia, Zelenchukskii rayon, the Karachayevo-Cherkessian Republic) of the 49th Army (Stavropol) of the Russian Southern Military District;
from summer till the end of autumn 2014 – commanded the 1st AC (Donetsk, Ukraine) of the 12th Reserve Command (nowadays, the Center of the Territorial Forces, Novocherkask, Russia) of the Russian Southern Military District;
since 2015 – Deputy Commander of the 49th Army (Stavropol) of the Russian Southern Military District.
Combat experience: a participant of the 1st Chechen war.
Additional information: received the promotion at position for participation in combat operations in the territory of Ukrain
No comments:
Post a Comment