Monday, May 2, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2022

  OVERWATCH PODCAST SERIES:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isws-overwatch-podcast-series

 GOOGLE  TO  GLIMPSE THE WAR 

(P) TOM COOPER UKRAINE WAR: 


https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-27-28-april-2022-ceb56f742e3

 https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-25-26-april-2022-aa0c1122320e

(Q) RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg


(R)    WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: 

          https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

(S)  (UKRAINE CRISIS COVERAGE:
https://www.understandingwar.org/ukraine-crisis-coverage


SOURCE:

 (A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2

(C)   https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

 https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

  (E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 (F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP;     https://liveuamap.com/     

 (G)  ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 


INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

   (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

( ) MAY 02 : 


RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

     ( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:                                        https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf                                                                                                

     ( B )  2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces    https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#  

     ( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense  :   

     https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503 

     (D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  

     ( E ) ORBITS  WORLD BATTLES : 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

 (F)  (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District    https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf 

                                                     (G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf    https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

 (H)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  (J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf



FOR DETAILED SUBUNITS    GOOGLE  URL  :    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 


Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 2, 5:15 pm ET

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Ukraine on May 2. The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on the Russian command post in Izyum may be continuing to disrupt Russian efforts on the Izyum axis. Russian troops on the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and Southern Axis continued to regroup, likely in preparation for renewed offensives or to resist or reverse Ukrainian counter-offensives.

 

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along any axes of advance and instead shelled Ukrainian positions on the frontlines.
  • The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on Russian command headquarters near Izyum likely disrupted Russian operations on the Izyum axis and may hinder Russian offensives from Izyum for the next few days.
  • Russian forces on the Southern Axis continued to regroup and reconnoiter likely in preparation for ground assaults in the direction of Kryvyi Rih, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia.

 

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

 

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

 

Russian forces conducted naval artillery and airstrikes on Mariupol while civilian evacuations from the Azovstal Steel Plant continued on May 1 and May 2.[1] Ukraine’s Military Law Enforcement Service reported that over 100 civilians evacuated to Zaporizhia city from Azovstal on May 2, but Ukrainian defenders remain at the plant.[2] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces saved 80 civilians (whom it falsely asserted had been held hostage at the plant) and that 11 evacuees ”volunteered“ to remain in the Donetsk People’s Republic.[3] The continued Russian bombardment of Mariupol belies Moscow’s claims that its forces have secured the city.

 

 

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces shelled along the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks on May 2.[4] Russian troops continued to focus on completing the seizure of Rubizhne and Popasna.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff forecasts that Russian troops will likely attempt to use these points to launch an offensive in the direction of Severodonetsk.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian forces moved one battalion tactical group (BTG) to the Popasna area to improve their tactical position and prepare to advance toward Severodonetsk.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff observed that Russian troops are setting conditions to advance on Slovyansk from the Lyman-Siversk frontline, which lies within 25 km to the east of Slovyansk.[8] This observation is consistent with ISW’s previous reporting of Russian troops making marginal southwestward advances around the Yampil area over the last few days.[9]

 

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian forces continued to regroup and conduct unspecified offensive operations in the Izyum area, but did not make any confirmed advances on May 2.[10] The April 30 Ukrainian rocket artillery strike on the Russian Airborne (VDV) and 2nd Combined Arms Army command post in the Izyum area may be continuing to disrupt Russian operations along the Izyum axis.

Russian troops, including elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army and Baltic and Pacific Fleet coastal troops, continued to shell Kharkiv City and surrounding settlements.[11] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar notably stated that Ukrainian forces suffered significant losses when they took control of Ruska Lozova (less than 10 kilometers north of Kharkiv City), suggesting that Russian troops saw sufficient value in this location to fight hard to hold it.[12]

 

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to regroup, reconnoiter, and concentrate logistics on May 2, likely in preparation for ground assaults on the Ukrainian position in the directions of Mykolaiv, Kryvyi Rih, and Zaporizhia.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed an unspecified artillery unit to Tokmak that will likely support Russian attempts to seize Orihiv, Zaporizhia Oblast.[14] Orihiv is on the intersection of several major highways, and its seizure could allow Russian forces to push toward Zaporizhia city as well as Donetsk. Russian forces also reportedly established an equipment repair shop in an occupied Zaporizhia Oblast settlement.[15]

Ukraine’s Operational Command “South,” said that Russian forces did not attempt ground offensives in southern Ukraine on May 2 but conducted periodic artillery and mortar shelling and reportedly launched a third rocket strike on the bridge leading over the Dniester Estuary to Romania.[16] Ukrainian forces claimed to have struck Russian ammunition depots in Chornobaivka, Kherson Oblast, on May 2; a video post on social media may corroborate that claim, but ISW cannot verify it with greater confidence.[17] Ukrainian forces also destroyed two Russian Raptor-class patrol boats that reconnoitered the Danube River delta on May 2.[18] There were no significant situational changes in Transnistria.[19]

 

 

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant activities on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian attacks from Izyum will likely be at least temporarily disrupted by the attack on Russian command post in the area.
  • Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol.
  • Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
References:

[1] https://t dot me/mariupolnow/8805; https://t dot me/mariupolnow/8816

2https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/02/ponad-100-lyudej-evakujovanyh-z-azovstali-prybuly-do-zaporizhzhya/

[3] https://t dot me/mod_russia/15063

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307651304881288; 

https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/02/zagarbnyky-obstrilyuyut-harkiv-nastupayut-u-napryamkah-barvinkovogo-ta-slovyanska/; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307229161590169;

 https://t dot me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3231

[8] https://armyinform and com.ua/2022/05/02/zagarbnyky-obstrilyuyut-harkiv-nastupayut-u-napryamkah-barvinkovogo-ta-slovyanska/;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307651304881288

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307651304881288; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307229161590169; 

https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/02/zagarbnyky-obstrilyuyut-harkiv-nastupayut-u-napryamkah-barvinkovogo-ta-slovyanska/; https://t dot me/synegubov/3056

[16] https://t dot me/stranaua/39672; https://t dot me/epoddubny/10280;

 https://t dot me/Bratchuk_Sergey/11089

File Attachments: 


Image iconISW LOGO FINAL ACRONYM NAME_ISW LOGO FINAL ACRONYM NAME CMYK.png

Image iconDraftUkraineCoTMay2,2022.png

Image iconKharkiv Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png

Image iconLuhansk Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png

Image iconKherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png

Image iconMariupol Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png

PDF iconRussian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2.pdf
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The Ukraine War 2022: How rotten is the Russian army?

SOURCE: (a)   https://www.reddit.com/.../how_rotten_is_russias_army.../







The Ukraine War 2022:
How rotten is the Russian army?

The power of the modern Russian army was supposed to show the world that President Vladimir Putin had restored the greatness of his country after the humiliations of the collapse of the USSR. Instead, little progress and heavy losses in Ukraine exposed Russia’s deep flaws. For those threatened by Putin’s aggression, the weakening of the army is a relief. Unfortunately, this also leaves the nuclear-armed power with a desire for revenge.
So far, the invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster for the Russian military. According to the British government, about 15,000 soldiers were killed in two months of fighting. At least 1,600 armored vehicles, dozens of aircraft and the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet were destroyed. The assault on Kyiv, the capital, was a chaotic failure.
Leon Trotsky wrote that “the army is nothing but an element of society and suffers from all its ailments, especially when the temperature rises.” In the coming weeks, the fighting in eastern and southern Ukraine will determine not only the course of the war but also how the Russian military manages to salvage its reputation and that of the society it represents.

Leon Trotsky wrote that “the army is nothing but an element of society and suffers from all its ailments, especially when the temperature rises.”

The Russian army shows a high degree of rot. The defense budget, which has a purchasing power of more than $250 billion, is three times that of Britain or France, but much of it is wasted or stolen. Putin and his top leadership kept the invasion plans hidden from senior officers, indicative of overwhelming distrust. The soldiers, dissatisfied and eating expired rations, abandoned their vehicles. The units committed torture, rape, and murder, but ended up receiving honors from the Kremlin. Russia has failed to gain control of the skies or combine air power with tanks, artillery, and infantry.

Steeped in corruption, unable to develop initiative or learn from mistakes, their frustrated generals abandoned advanced military doctrine and turned to destroying cities and terrorizing civilians.

Highly motivated Ukrainian forces took advantage of all these Russian failures. Though outnumbered and less heavily armed, they resisted the invading army by delegating decision-making to small, adaptable local units armed with the latest information. Even if the Russian campaign under a single command succeeds in the Donbas, it is largely due to its mass. The claim that it is an advanced modern force is as convincing as the image of a tank turret rusting in the middle of a Ukrainian village.
Putin and his top leadership kept the invasion plans hidden from senior officers, indicative of overwhelming distrust.

For Putin, this is a crushing setback. Partly because, although he controls a powerful propaganda machine with which to silence his critics, the loss of prestige threatens his position in the country. And, above all, the use of military force is essential in his strategy to make Russia matter in the world.

Russia may be very big, but it is a medium-sized state that still wants to be a superpower. It is between Bangladesh and Mexico in terms of population; the economy between Brazil and South Korea; and, by share of world exports, between Taiwan and Switzerland. While he enjoys some sympathy in non-aligned countries such as South Africa and India, his soft power is waning…and this is happening very quickly after the manifestations of incompetence and brutality in Ukraine.

Steeped in corruption, disillusioned Russian generals are destroying cities and terrorizing civilians.

To bridge the gap between strength and ambition—and counter what he sees as US interference—Putin has repeatedly turned to the only area in which Russia can still lay claim to world-class power: military might. Over the past 14 years, he has invaded Georgia and Ukraine (twice) and fought in Syria. His mercenaries have been stationed in Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and now Ukraine. Putin is a global bully obsessed with his country’s shortcomings. This contrasts with China, which also harbors ambitions but has so far been able to get things done using its growing economic and diplomatic weight.

Humiliation in Ukraine weakens Russia’s latest claim to superpower status. The war may drag on; and while this is happening, Russia will not be able to conduct major operations anywhere else. Equipment, ammunition, and troops are quickly running out. It will take years to bring Russian forces back to full strength and train them to avoid the mistakes they made in Ukraine. If sanctions remain because Putin is still in power, it will take even longer.

Russian missiles are equipped with Western components. The flight of smart and open-minded Russians will hurt the economy. At the same time, the less Russia is able to project military power, the less it will be able to destroy the rest of the world.

Russia may be very big, but it is a medium-sized state that still wants to be a superpower.

It will be well received. However, the invasion of Ukraine provides less comforting lessons. On the one hand, it shows that by continuing this strategy, Putin is willing to take risks that for many (including many Russians) do not make sense. A further decline in Russian power could lead to even more senseless aggression.

Ukraine is also demonstrating that if Russian forces do not win on the battlefield, they will resort to atrocities in future wars. The weaker Russian army could have been even more brutal. For those facing Russian aggression around the world, this is a terrifying prospect.

Ukraine is also demonstrating that if Russian forces do not win on the battlefield, they will resort to atrocities in future wars. Ultimately, weakness could lead Russia to the last area in which it remains the undisputed superpower: chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Since the beginning of this war, Putin and his government have never ceased to brandish the threat of using weapons of mass destruction. Putin is rational in the sense that he wants his regime to survive, so there is little chance that they will be used. However, there is no doubt that as the Russian military runs out of conventional options, so does the lure of escalation.

The message to the rest of the world is that Putin’s military opportunism in Ukraine must be seen as a failure by his own officers and strategists, who will be in a position to try to soften his next stubborn plan. The stalemate in Donbas will only provoke the next fight, which could turn out to be even more dangerous than the current one.
However, even if Putin is defeated, he will remain dangerous. NATO’s message is that it needs to modernize its forward battle groups. The basic idea is that a Russian attempt to take over some of, say, the Baltic states may initially be successful, but provoke a larger war that NATO will ultimately win. This defense runs the risk of miscalculation and escalation, more dangerous than ever if Russian conventional forces are weak. It is better to have a large forward force from the very beginning, which Russia will find it difficult to defeat. The best way to protect yourself from Putin and his rotten army is to talk him out of the war.
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