Thursday, November 2, 2023

IRAN( HAMAS )UPDATE, , NOVEMBER 1, 2023

 SOURCE:  

(  ) Iran Update, November 1, 2023 : https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-1-2023

(  )  Nuclear weapons and Israel:   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Israel

(  )   Israel Palestine War Rages On, Israeli Army Artillery Near Gaza Border Targets Hamas Hideouts:   


                                                                 https://youtu.be/MvUq7sfkUpg  



#israeldefenseforces #hamasattack #israelIsrael-Hamas War Updates: As the Israel-Hamas war continues to rage, the medical authorities in the Gaza Strip said the death toll there has reached the 8,005 mark, including 3,324 children. Over 1,400 people have died on the Israeli side, with the total death toll mounting at 9,400. The Israeli forces continued their ground assault on Sunday, with intense air and artillery strikes, particularly in northern Gaza, in the "second-stage" of the war. #israelpalestineconflict #israel #palestine #israelhamaswar #hamasattack #israelarmy #mossad #lebanon #iranvsisrael #naorgilon #israelandlebanon #israeldefenseforces #itlivestream

                                                                                                                                                                                            ______________________________________________________


    ISRAEL HAMAS WAR DIARY OCT 2023 : 

  https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/10/07/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-maps.html

Iran Update, November 1, 2023

                                           

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

November 1, 2023: 2pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated al Mayadeen reported that an Israeli armored unit advanced from the northwestern Gaza Strip south along the coast.
  2. Axis of Resistance and Palestinian media reported that the al Qassem Brigades clashed with an IDF unit in Beit Hanoun.
  3. Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate. Multiple Palestinian militias appeared to conduct joint indirect fire attacks on locations in Israel, which would suggest greater coordination between these groups.
  4. Anti-Israel militancy and protest activity in the West Bank returned to regular levels after surging on October 31. The Lions’ Den released a statement calling for further anti-Israel militancy in the West Bank.
  5. Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks into Israel as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
  6. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Syria.
  7. Iran and LH are continuing to promote the expectation in the information space that LH will announce some kind of escalation against Israel on November 3.
  8. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are signaling that they may escalate against US forces in Iraq and Syria, as LH similarly messages against Israel.
  9. The Houthi movement may have conducted an attack targeting southern Israel, which would mark the fourth attempted Houthi attack on Israel since the war began.
  10. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip

  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)-affiliated al Mayadeen reported that an Israeli armored unit advanced from the northwestern Gaza Strip south along the coast to Salah Khalaf Street and later attempted to move east, inland, to al Nasr Street and al Toum Street.[1] The commander of the IDF 162nd Division stated that Israeli forces had reached “the gates of Gaza City,” possibly corroborating this reporting.[2]

Approximate Thurst of Israeli Advance in GAZA STRIP on Nov 01, 2023

Axis of Resistance and Palestinian media reported that the al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—clashed with an IDF unit in Beit Hanoun on November 1. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its militants destroyed at least four Israeli Merkava tanks with Yasin-105 anti-tank weapons.[3] The al Qassem Brigades also claimed to have bombed a gathering of IDF soldiers near Beit Hanoun using a quadcopter drone.[4] The al Quds Brigadesthe militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)claimed that its fighters fought an IDF unit in Karamah, southwest Beit Lahia.

The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its militants engaged Israeli forces attempting to enter the Zaytoun neighborhood west of Gaza CityThe al Quds Brigades militants reportedly fired Yasin-105 anti-tank weapons and conducted a mortar attack on advancing Israeli forces.[5] Palestinian media reported that militants were successful in destroying an Israeli armored personnel carrier during the fighting.[6] The al Quds Brigades claimed that its forces supported the fighting at Zaytoun and caused an unspecified number of Israeli casualties.[7]

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate on November 1. The al Qassem Brigades claimed responsibility for eight indirect fire attacks.[8] The al Quds Brigades claimed responsibility for another three indirect fire attacks.[9] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed to launch mortars into southern Israel.[10] Palestinian media reported that the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-claimed militant wing of Fatah— conducted three rocket attacks.[11]

Multiple Palestinian militias appeared to conduct joint indirect fire attacks on locations in Israel, which would suggest greater coordination between these groups. The al Qassem Brigades and Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades independently claimed mortar and rocket attacks on Nirim, southern Israel, at the same time.[12] The al Quds Brigades and al Qassem Brigades jointly claimed mortar attacks on the Erez crossing into the Gaza Strip.[13]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.


Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.


West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Anti-Israel militancy and protest activity in the West Bank returned to regular levels on November 1, after surging the day prior. CTP-ISW recorded five small arms clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces, and two instances of Palestinian militants conducting IED attacks in the West Bank.[14] Israeli forces also uncovered buried IEDs in the  Erez crossing.[15] CTP-ISW recorded five demonstrations in support of the Gaza Strip.[16] Demonstrators in Nablus and Ramallah flew Hamas flags.[17]

The Lions’ Den—a West Bank-based Palestinian militia—released a statement on October 31 calling for further anti-Israel militancy in the West Bank.[18] The group reiterated its calls for mobilization and attacks against Israeli targets. The group also suggested that Israel could face a multi-front escalation on November 3, likely in reference to Hassan Nasrallah’s planned speech that day.[19] CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are creating the expectation in the information environment that Nasrallah will announce some kind of escalation on November 3, which could include Hezbollah increasing its rate of attacks or using more advanced military systems against Israel.[20] The Lions’ Den has indicated growing alignment with Hamas in recent days, as CTP-ISW previously reported, even though the group has historically claimed that it is not affiliated with any specific Palestinian faction.[21]

Israeli forces arrested Fatah Secretary General in Jenin Ata Abu Ramila in an overnight raid on November 1.[22] Ramila is one of the few high-level Fatah officials whom Israeli forces have arrested since October 7.[23] The IDF accused Ramila of inciting, promoting, and financing terrorism in Jenin, which is a hotspot for Palestinian militant activity in the West Bank.[24] Ata Abu Ramila previously called for all Palestinian militias to unite and fight together against Israel in January 2023.[25] Israel continued raids throughout the West Bank, arresting 46 people affiliated with Hamas and other West Bank militias on November 1.[26] Israeli forces have arrested 1,830 people in the West Bank since October 7, according to Palestinian Authority media Wafa.[27] CTP-ISW cannot verify the accuracy of this report.

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there

  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militants, including LH, conducted six attacks into Israel on November 1 as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets. LH claimed four indirect fire and anti-tank missile attacks on IDF positions in northern Israel.[28] Unknown militants conducted two indirect fire and anti-tank missile attacks into northern Israel as well.[29] The IDF continues to conduct airstrikes and artillery strikes on Iranian-backed militants, who are attempting to launch indirect fire from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[30]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts

  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Syria on November 1. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed it fired two drones targeting US forces at the al Tanf Garrison in southeastern Syria and achieved “direct hits.”[31] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has attacked al Tanf Garrison four times since October 18. The group has conducted 27 total attacks on US forces in the Middle East since October 18.

Iran and LH are continuing to promote the expectation in the information space that LH will announce some kind of escalation against Israel on November 3. CTP-ISW previously reported that LH has released two dramatic videos in recent days ahead of LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s planned speech on November 3, creating the expectation of a significant announcement on the Israel-Hamas war.[32] This speech is significant in that it will be Nasrallah’s first public statement on the war. Iranian state media has further amplified the news of the upcoming speech and the dramatic videos, describing them as a “sign of future events.”[33]

  • Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati held a phone call with LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem on October 31 for further political coordination.[34] Velayati praised Nasrallah’s leadership and wished him success in his fight against Israel, according to Iranian state media.

  •  Unidentified LH members published an open letter on November 1, expressing solidarity with Palestinian militants fighting Israel in the Gaza Strip.[35]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are signaling that they may escalate against US forces in Iraq and Syria, as LH similarly messages against Israel. Three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias released statements on November 1 to escalate their attacks on US military positions. The leader of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said that the Islamic resistance is liberating Iraq militarily and that “what is coming is greater.”[36] Ashab al Kahf responded to Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, quoting the statement and saying that Ashab al Kahf will strike American bases “until our land is liberated.”[37] Saraya Awlia al Dam similarly said that it is ready to fight against the “aggression in Iraq and in other arenas.”[38] All three groups have attacked the US forces in Iraq previously.[39] The groups are affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[40]

The Houthi movement may have conducted an attack targeting southern Israel overnight on October 31, which would mark the fourth attempted Houthi attack on Israel since the war began. The IDF said that it intercepted an “aerial attack” over the Red Sea but that there was no threat to civilians and the attack did not enter Israeli territory.[41] Local journalists and social media accounts reported that the attack was intercepted near Eilat in southern Israel.[42] A Houthi Shura Council member posted “Eilat” in Arabic and Hebrew on X (Twitter) shortly before the IDF confirmed an attack.[43] The attack came after the Houthis launched drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles targeting Israel earlier on October 31 and threatened more attacks.[44]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on November 1.[45] Abdollahian praised Erdogan’s “strong and accurate positions” on the Israel-Hamas war and announced that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi will soon travel to Turkey. Erdogan has expressed strong support for Hamas in recent days, describing the Palestinian militia as a “liberation group” on October 25 and organizing a pro-Palestine rally in Istanbul on October 28.[46] Abdollahian’s visit to Turkey is likely part of Iran’s ongoing effort to unite Muslim countries against Israel. Iran has historically—and especially since the start of the war on October 7—sought to rally Muslim countries against Israel and frame itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[47] Abdollahian has traveled to Turkey four times since August 2021 and last traveled to Turkey in March 2023 to evaluate the impacts and damage of the February 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquake.[48]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed the Israel-Hamas war with a group of students on November 1, marking the fifth time he has publicly discussed the war since October 7.[49] Khamenei called on Muslim countries to impose an oil and food embargo on Israel, echoing previous calls from other Iranian officials, such as Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, to impose such an embargo.[50] Khamenei also warned Muslim countries that Israel may threaten them in the future if they do not help Hamas defeat Israel. Khamenei repeated previous Iranian claims that Israel does not care about Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and that the United States is directing Israel’s war against Hamas.[51] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas and its allies are preparing the information environment to blame Israel for the possible deaths of hostages in the Gaza Strip, especially if Hamas begins killing those hostages.[52]



References

[1] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9---%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86--%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86--%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%89-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88

[2] https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1719732686447648915?s=20

[3] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/165 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/182

[4] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/154

[5] https://twitter.com/SafaPs/status/1719723280267894915

[6] https://twitter.com/SafaPs/status/1719682410147717618

[7] https://t.me/sarayaps/16551

[8] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/152 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/156 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/163 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/164 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/176 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/178 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/180

[9] https://t.me/sarayaps/16544 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/16545 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/178

[10] https://t.me/kataebabuali/10458

[11] https://t.me/QudsN/322059

[12] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/164 ; https://t.me/kataebabuali/10458

[13] https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/38002 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/178

[14] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719611873937473704 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/5819 ; https://t.me/QudsN/321990 ; https://twitter.com/SafaPs/status/1719651959727161481 ; https://t.me/QudsN/322086 ; https://t.me/QudsN/322092

[15] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719611873937473704

[16] https://t.me/almanarnews/134162 ; https://t.me/QudsN/322009 ; https://t.me/QudsN/322148 ; https://t.me/QudsN/322163; https://t.me/QudsN/322164

[17] https://t.me/QudsN/322148 ; https://t.me/QudsN/322009

[18] https://t.me/areennabluss/290

[19] https://t.me/almanarnews/133800

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2023

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-26-2023 ; https://t.me/areennabluss/288

[22] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719611867373445231

[23] https://www.wafa dot ps/Pages/Details/81480

[24] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719611869550260584

[25] https://twitter.com/PalestineChron/status/1719677364706115850

[26] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719665805523046493

[27] https://www dot wafa.ps/Pages/Details/83296

[28] https://twitter.com/alishoeib1970/status/1719737603354677337 ; https://twitter.com/alishoeib1970/status/1719714482509767043 ; https://twitter.com/alishoeib1970/status/1719739998327501208 ; https://twitter.com/alishoeib1970/status/1719766232604303510 ; https://t.me/QudsN/322034 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/134244 ;

[29] https://t.me/QudsN/322053 ; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1719708842307502266

[30] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719728169693905029

[31] https://t.me/elamharbi/58

[32] https://x.com/MattMcBradley/status/1718634078776283189?s=20; https://x.com/MattMcBradley/status/1719424464234942797?s=20; https://twitter.com/MarioNawfal/status/1719403435588497437 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2023

[33] https://www.farsnews dot ir/media/14020808000280 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/626699

[34] https://www.farsnews dot ir/en/news/14020810000370 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85276922

[35] https://twitter.com/amalsaad_lb/status/1719756221001953724 ; https://t.me/maymun5/56988

[36] https://twitter.com/alhaidarshn1994/status/1719660102612123825

[37] https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1719763677966942395

[38] https://t.me/awliaaldam/57

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-27-2023; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-saraya-awliy... https://ctc.westpoint.edu/discordance-in-the-iran-threat-network-in-iraq... https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/rising-profile-fasai...

[40] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-29-2023; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-saraya-awliy... https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-harakat-hezb... https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-ashab-al-kahf

[41] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719489325073584293

[42] https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1719488626961051827; https://twitter.com/YWNReporter/status/1719493219950453086; https://twitter.com/no_itsmyturn/status/1719486025683136559

[43] https://twitter.com/hezamalasad/status/1719488547290308854

[44] https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1719358280126849451?s=20; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-31-2023

[45] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020810000486

[46] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-hamas-is-... ;

https://twitter.com/RTErdogan/status/1718270191056900398

[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-12-2023

[48] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020810000486

[49] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=54049 ;

https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26713 ;

https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26718 ;

https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26731 ;

https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26751

[50] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2023/10/18/712947

[51] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/29/2975756 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/29/2975409 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/10/21/2975548

https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26718

[52] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-24-2023


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Wednesday, November 1, 2023

IT’S TIME FOR THE WEST TO EMBRACE UKRAINE’S WAY OF WAR, NOT DOUBT IT

 SOURCE:

  (  ) IT’S TIME FOR THE WEST TO EMBRACE UKRAINE’S WAY OF WAR :  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/it%E2%80%99s-time-west-embrace-ukraine%E2%80%99s-way-war-not-doubt-it

It’s Time for the West to Embrace Ukraine’s Way of War,                                             Not Doubt It

                                                  By Nataliya Bugayova

Sep 25, 2023

Ukrainian forces have adapted. Ukraine’s military decision-making is sound. Now is not the time for Western doubt but for the West to embrace Ukraine’s way of war and commit to sustaining Ukraine’s initiative on the battlefield.

The summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive faced a major challenge after Russia had months to build up its defenses in occupied Ukraine. The culmination of Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensives — the first being the liberation of Kharkiv, followed by the Kherson offensive, attributable in no small part to the delayed provision of Western military aid — allowed Russia to build its defense in depth and prevented Ukraine from launching a third phase of its counteroffensive in winter 2022–2023.

But the Ukrainian forces have done what successful militaries do — they have adapted and are now advancing. Ukraine recognized the realities of Russian defenses much faster than Western policymakers, who were expecting a rapid Ukrainian breakthrough. ISW previously wrote in July that Ukrainian forces had adapted their tactics after they encountered initial setbacks and were increasingly successful in using small infantry assaults backed by precision fires to make inroads against Russian defenses.[1]

Ukraine’s ingenuity is yielding results. Ukraine maintains the battlefield initiative and its forces are advancing in Zaporizhia Oblast and near Bakhmut. Ukraine continues to liberate its territory and people and is slowly but steadily breaking through an incredibly formidable Russian prepared defense — and the Russian forces are unable to stop the advance, which is now moving in two directions.

Additionally, Ukrainian asymmetrical tactics in the Black Sea are preventing Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from operating freely, forcing Russia to reposition naval assets, and increasingly challenging Russian forces in Crimea — all operational developments of strategic significance.[2]

Ukraine’s way of war has yielded repeated successes against Russian forces. Ukrainian forces have, with Western support, defeated Russian objectives repeatedly: in Kyiv, in Kharkiv, in Kharkiv Oblast, in Kherson, and now, to a growing extent, in Ukraine’s south. Ukraine has prevented Russian forces from establishing air dominance and is eroding Russian naval superiority and increasingly making the Russian military’s presence less tenable in Crimea — realities that were previously unthinkable to many. 

Ukraine’s adaptive decision-making in the current counteroffensive is enabling the Ukrainian advance and preventing Russia from accumulating enough forces to defend against a potential breakthrough. Ukrainian decision-making has not been flawless — and neither has the West’s, for that matter. However, Ukrainian adaptations to battlefield realities, especially when considering the immense constraints Ukraine is operating under, have been effective. Ukraine’s decision to pivot away from the type of large-scale mechanized breaches that its counteroffensive brigades were trained by NATO to perform, in hindsight, has enabled Ukraine’s progress.

Ukraine’s decision to keep pressure on Russian forces throughout the entire frontline instead of focusing all of Ukraine’s combat power on one line of attack in the direction of Melitopol, which some Western advisors preferred, was a good adaptation. Ukraine’s decision to hold and conduct counterattacks in Bakhmut allowed it to pin down a substantial portion of the combat power of Russia’s relatively elite airborne (VDV) forces and deny the creation of a strategic Russian reserve.[3] The recent Ukrainian advances in Zaporizhia Oblast are likely forcing the Russians to laterally redeploy their units away from around Bakhmut, where Ukrainian forces are advancing too.[4]

The United States should embrace its partnership with a competent ally who also leads. We are used to partners that require us to lead — from proxy forces we trained to our allies who rely on us for security. In Ukraine, however, the United States has a partner that is leading on the battlefield and knows its operational environment, its enemy, and its own capabilities and limitations. The Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated that they understand this war and can adapt. Most importantly, Ukraine still maintains a relentless will to fight.

Now is not the time for Western doubt. The West must reinforce its military and diplomatic commitments and lean in to help sustain Ukraine’s battlefield momentum. Ukraine is still facing an existential challenge from Russia, which requires Western aid to militarily defeat.

Leaning in means embracing Ukraine’s campaign design.

It means ensuring that the Western training of Ukrainian troops is done in conditions in which Ukraine fights at its best.

It means accelerating the development and delivery of specific capabilities that Ukraine needs with two goals: delaying the culmination of Ukraine’s current counteroffensive to ensure it achieves its maximum possible effect (maximally liberates critical terrain, depletes Russia’s capabilities, and forces Russia into suboptimal force allocations across the frontline to expose Russian forces to new lines of counterattacks) and setting conditions for the current counteroffensive’s follow-on phase. Ukraine’s supporters must empower Ukraine to prevent Russian forces from enjoying a breather on the battlefield in winter 2023–2024 as they did in winter 2022–2023.

The West should also reframe expectations about how Ukraine’s weather conditions in the fall and winter may affect the prospects for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukrainian operations can and will likely continue even in rain and mud, even if they occur at a slower pace. Ukraine can intensify its pace again when muddy conditions end in the spring of 2024 if the West provides Ukraine proper support. The key is denying Russia the reprieve it desperately needs over the winter. Last year the West did not proactively resource Ukrainian momentum after Ukraine’s successful counteroffensives in the Kharkiv region and Kherson in 2022, which allowed Russia to regroup and dig in. We must learn from that mistake.

The West should also help shape strategic communications to set proper expectations around Ukraine’s progress. Ukraine can win this war militarily, but it will take more than one counteroffensive operation. It will take as many campaigns as it takes for Ukraine to liberate its territory and its people. The West should be prepared to support them all because the fundamentals shaping this conflict have not changed: Ukraine can win this war, Russia can only be defeated on the battlefield, and what is at stake includes Ukraine’s existence and vital US interests.

The West embracing Ukraine’s way of war is key to preserving the dominance of Western and Ukrainian decision-making. The Kremlin is trying to slow or impair Western and Ukrainian decision-making — one of the few ways in which Russian President Vladimir Putin can advance his objectives. Slowed Western decision-making resulting in lagging military aid deliveries can provide Russia with relief. Giving Russia such relief — be it at the operational (winter 2022–2023) or strategic level (the years between Russia’s first and second invasions of Ukraine) — proved catastrophic. Given the gift of time, Russia will regroup and attack again. However, Russia’s Achilles heel remains its inability to rapidly pivot when faced with relentless pressure or consecutive setbacks. Faced with constant pressure over time with no relief, the Russians will likely start to crack. This is the effect Ukraine’s current counteroffensive strategy is seeking to achieve, and it can only be realized if the West embraces Ukraine’s way of war for this phase of the counteroffensive and beyond.

 


[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-sustaine...

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-operatio...

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign..