Vasundhra

Sunday, December 17, 2023

UKRAINIAN STRIKES HAVE CHANGED RUSSIAN NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA

SOURCE :

( ) UKRAINIAN STRIKES HAVE CHANGED RUSSIAN NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

Ukrainian Strikes Have Changed Russian Naval Operations in the Black Sea

Nicole Wolkov, Daniel Mealie, and Kateryna Stepanenko

December 16, 2023

Key takeaway:

Ukrainian strikes against Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets have changed Russian naval operating patterns, causing the BSF to move some ships away from its main base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and hampering the BSF’s ability to interfere with maritime trade in the western part of the Black Sea. Ukrainian strikes have likely caused the BSF to set conditions for a more permanent basing pattern along the eastern Black Sea coast as it transfers naval assets away from Crimea and expands a small port in de facto Russian-controlled Ochamchire, Abkhazia. Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets have successfully facilitated the use of Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor as international support for the corridor continues to increase despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and military threats against it.

Ukrainian forces launched a successful preemptive strike campaign against the Russian BSF in the summer and fall of 2023, which aimed to disrupt Russia’s efforts to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports and to undermine the BSF’s ability to conduct naval operations in the Black Sea. In summer 2023, Russia sought to use its withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative to posture the BSF in a way that would deter Ukraine and international community from maritime activity in the Black Sea – effectively establishing a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports without having to enforce an actual blockade. The United Nations (UN) and Turkey had originally brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative with Russia in July 2022 that allowed cargo ships to sail between ports in Odesa Oblast and the Bosphorus Strait without fear of Russian attacks.[1] Russian officials began signaling their intent to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in May 2023 shortly after agreeing to extend the deal until July 18, likely in an effort to set information conditions for the de facto blockade.[2] Ukrainian forces, however, began setting military conditions to prevent Russia from establishing such a de facto blockade by launching an intricate missile and drone campaign targeting BSF assets and vessels starting in June 2023.[3] The Ukrainian strike campaign inhibited Russia’s ability to use the BSF to halt maritime activity in western Black Sea and helped Ukraine deprive Russian forces of the maritime initiative in the Black Sea.

Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian strikes caused Russian forces to move BSF assets away from occupied Sevastopol to ports in the eastern part of the Black Sea on an enduring basis. Satellite imagery from June to December 2023 indicates that Russian forces have moved BSF assets, both surface vessels and submarines, away from the main base in Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, further away from Ukrainian launch points on an enduring basis and are setting conditions for a more permanent basing pattern on the eastern Black Sea coast.[4] ISW previously assessed in early October that the Ukrainian strikes successfully degraded the BSF’s ability to operate as a combined arms headquarters and to support logistics routes in southern Ukraine, although the effects on the BSF as a naval actor at the time remained unclear.[5] Satellite imagery shows, however, that Russian forces started to move naval assets away from Sevastopol on an enduring basis following Ukrainian strikes on naval infrastructure in Crimea and the BSF Command headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22, 2023.[6] Satellite imagery suggests that, although the BSF continues to base some assets at the main port in Sevastopol, the Russian military has redeployed several vessels, including surface combatants such as Krivak-class frigates and smaller vessels such as Grisha-class and Tarantul-class corvettes from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.[7] Satellite imagery from December shows that Russian force have redeployed most of their specialized Kalibr cruise missile carriers including Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, Buyan-M-class corvettes, and Kilo-class submarines from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.[8] Recent satellite imagery indicates that vessels moved to Novorossiysk over the fall have not returned to Sevastopol.

ISW's estimates reflect the availability and spatial resolution of satellite imagery as well as meteorological conditions over the target areas. This table excludes auxilliary ships, amphibious ships, and most minor combatants apart from those capable of housing vertical launch systems. ISW's estimates count vessels observed in port.

Ukrainian strikes targeting BSF assets and ports have changed Russian naval operation patterns and are hindering the BSF’s ability to operate aggressively in the western part of the Black Sea. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) assessed on September 26 that Ukrainian strikes have diminished the BSF’s ability to conduct wide security patrols, carry out routine maintenance, and enforce blockades of Ukrainian ports in the western Black Sea although the BSF retained the ability to launch sea-based missile strikes.[9] The Russian military has also been unable to return two BSF vessels to the Black Sea, reportedly the Kildin Moma-class surveillance ship and the Admiral Grigorovich, lead ship of the class, because Turkey invoked the relevant provisions of the Montreux Convention blocking transit through the Turkish Straits on February 28, 2022.[10]

Imagery of the Russian naval base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea. June 8, 2023.

Imagery of the Russian naval base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea. December 3, 2023.

Imagery of the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. June 8, 2023.

Imagery of the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. December 5, 2023.

The BSF is permanently building a naval port near Russian-controlled Ochamchire, Abkhazia, likely signaling Russian long-term intent to move more naval assets away from Crimea. Russian-backed Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania announced on October 5 that he had signed an agreement with Russian authorities for the construction of a permanent Russian naval base near Ochamchire, Abkhazia.[11] Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on October 23 that Russian authorities started dredging and constructing port infrastructure in Ochamchire in order to construct a base for some warships currently stationed in Crimea, which could not be redeployed to Novorossiysk.[12] Bzhania stated on November 9 that Abkhaz authorities have started work to expand the Ochamchire port so that it can accommodate large-capacity vessels with a displacement of up to 13,000 tons, a notable increase from its current capacity to handle vessels with deadweight of 3,000 tons.[13] The port’s expansion will reportedly take over 2.5 years.[14] The Russian military is likely intending to develop the existing port into a subsidiary rather than a main base since the surrounding terrain largely consists of sandy beaches unsuitable for the construction of naval infrastructure.[15]

Ukrainian strikes have severely degraded Russian military efforts to disrupt the movement of commercial vessels through the Ukraine’s grain corridor. Ukraine announced that it would continue to export grain and other goods along the western coast of the Black Sea after Russia refused to renew the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17, 2023.[16] Russian forces launched extensive missile and drone strikes for several consecutive days against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine shortly after Russia’s withdrawal to disrupt the corridor.[17] Subsequent Ukrainian strikes on Russian BSF assets and military installations in Crimea seriously undermined Russian efforts to curtail maritime traffic, however.[18] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) unsuccessfully attempted to discourage commercial traffic in the western Black Sea by announcing on July 19 that it would consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports to be potential carriers of military cargo (and therefore potential military targets) and forcibly stopping and searching a commercial vessel en route to Izmail port in Odesa Oblast on August 13.[19] Persistent Ukrainian drone and missile strikes against BSF assets caused the Russians to adjust their maritime posture in a way that made these threats largely ineffective.[20]

International actors have signaled their support for the continued use of Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor, demonstrating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully block Russian attempts to threaten commercial vessels from using the corridor. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 15 that the Ukrainian government reached a deal with insurance broker giant Marsh McLennan to provide up to $50 million in hull and liability insurance from Lloyd’s of London firms for each vessel carrying agricultural goods through the grain corridor.[21] The West continues to show support for long-term Ukrainian naval operations that will likely strengthen Ukrainian forces’ ability to operate in the Black Sea, most recently with the December 11 announcement that the UK and Norway would lead the Maritime Capability Coalition to provide short-term assistance to Ukraine and help in long-term efforts aimed at making the Ukrainian navy more interoperable with NATO.[22]

Ukraine’s long-range strikes against BSF assets have facilitated humanitarian and military successes in the Black Sea and allowed Ukraine to seize the initiative in the Black Sea even without an effective navy of its own. US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink reported on November 13 that 100 vessels had successfully transited the corridor and exported 3.7 million tons of food and other goods, presumably since the first civilian vessel successfully departed from a Ukrainian port through the corridor on August 15.[23] Brink reported on December 15 that 256 ships have successfully used the Black Sea grain corridor and exported almost nine million tons of grain and other cargo from Ukrainian ports, suggesting that continued successful Ukrainian strikes coupled with increasing international support for Ukraine’s corridor has contributed to a dramatic increase in food exports.[24]

Western provision of additional long-range missiles to Ukraine would support ongoing Ukrainian efforts to keep the Black Sea open for maritime traffic and keep the BSF away from NATO coastlines in the Black Sea. No single Western-provided system will provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage or a direct path to victory. Consistent Ukrainian strikes have allowed Ukraine to seize the initiative in the Black Sea, prevent a Russian blockade, and curtail Russian expansion in the Black Sea, however. The increased Western provision long-range missiles would allow Ukraine to retain the initiative in the Black Sea, enabling continued military and humanitarian successes.

References

[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61759692

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/May%2011%20Russian%...

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ukraine-tried-attack-russian-ship-near-major-gas-pipelines-black-sea-2023-06-11/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-a...

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-a...

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2023 ; https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1705324205170971010?s=20 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/43142 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/26042 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrhmqwHpxBU ; https://t.me/grey_zone/20690 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2023

[9] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1706545023913701480?s=20

[10] https://www.blackseanews dot net/en/read/210586 ; https://en.vijesti dot me/news/society/676349/Russian-spy-ship-Kildin-followed-the-American-aircraft-carrier-battle-group-in-the-Adriatic-Sea ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2023 ; https://topwar dot ru/230405-rossijskij-fregat-admiral-grigorovich-vernulsja-v-sredizemnoe-more-posle-planovogo-remonta.html ; https://klops dot ru/kaliningrad/2023-10-31/282452-vertolyotchiki-baltflota-otrabotali-odin-iz-samyh-slozhnyh-elementov-dlya-morskoy-aviatsii

[11] https://iz dot ru/1583490/valentin-loginov/uchastie-v-soiuznom-gosudarstve-otvechaet-interesam-abkhazii ; https://ria dot ru/20231005/abkhaziya-1900600812.html; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18916579 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2023

[12] https://www.svoboda.org/a/v-obse-osudili-sozdanie-rossiyskoy-voenno-morskoy-bazy-v-abhazii/32714549.html ; https://www.golosameriki.com/a/georgia-russia-abkhazia/7324226.html

[13] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/16292393 ; https://portnews dot ru/news/338425/

[14] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/16292393 ; https://portnews dot ru/news/338425/

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2023

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102423

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2023

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092223

[21] https://www.ft.com/content/1b29860d-763d-4157-a816-4eacb868ef23

[22] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-minehunting-ships-to-bolster-ukrainian-navy-as-uk-and-norway-launch-maritime-support-initiative ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2023

[23] https://twitter.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1723996971050926405 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111323

[24] https://twitter.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1735728540744556792 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2023

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Saturday, December 16, 2023

SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT WEEKLY UPDATE, DECEMBER 15, 2023

SOURCE :

( ) SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT WEEKLY UPDATE, DECEMBER 15, 2023: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-15-2023

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, December 15, 2023: Al Qaeda Strengthens in Central Mali

Author: Liam Karr

To receive the Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook.

CTP has temporarily paused the Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and Pakistan sections of the Salafi-Jihadi Weekly Update to support the production of CTP’s Iran Update, which is covering the latest Israel-Hamas war. This update will continue to cover the Salafi-jihadi movement in sub-Saharan Africa on a weekly basis in the interim.

CTP is temporarily pausing the Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update for the holiday period and will resume publishing the week of January 3.

Data Cutoff: December 13, 2023, at 10 a.m.

Key Takeaway:

Al Qaeda–linked militants are increasing their rate of attack in central Mali, likely to coerce civilians into submission to strengthen support zones and gain more resources to help the group isolate Malian forces in the area. Malian security forces and their Kremlin-funded Wagner Group auxiliaries will likely fail to protect civilians from the attacks because Malian forces cannot effectively contest insurgents in central Mali as they continue to give priority to fighting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. UN forces that helped secure roads in the region are also no longer around to mitigate security gaps after withdrawing in early December. The insurgents will likely use strengthened support zones in central Mali to besiege major population centers and attack isolated security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso to delegitimize both countries’ governments.

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is increasing its rate of attacks in central Mali, likely to coerce civilians into submission to strengthen support zones and gain more resources to help the group isolate Malian forces in the area. JNIM has conducted at least 16 attacks in central Mali since November 19.[1] Up to October 2023, the group had decreased its rate of attacks after its most recent offensive in central Mali, in July.[2] Various factors potentially contributed to a lull in attacks, such as seasonal flooding, increased clashes with Malian forces in northern Mali, and the need to reset after the July offensive.[3] The recent uptick is similar to the group’s July offensive in that most attacks target civilians or civilian militias and are concentrated in the Mopti region.[4] Most of the attacks since late November have targeted communities on the Bandiagara plateau that JNIM has historically clashed with and the surrounding roadways that bracket these localities.[5] The attacks have included several mass kidnappings that forced local communities to negotiate with JNIM for the release of hostages.[6]

JNIM has averaged nearly five attacks per week since November 19, which is a similar pace to previous offensives in late 2022 and July 2023, when the group averaged between four and six attacks per week.[7] The ongoing offensive, like the July offensive, is more concentrated in the Mopti region, with roughly 69 percent of the attacks occurring in Mopti in both periods compared to 58 percent in late 2022.[8] JNIM has also targeted civilians and civilian militias at a slightly greater proportion in the two recent offensives, with 64 percent of attacks in July 2023 and 62 percent of attacks since November 19, compared to 58 percent of attacks in late 2022.[9]

JNIM has regularly fought the Dogon and Bambara communities in central Mali since arriving there in 2016 as part of its efforts to exploit ethnic tensions to gain local support.[10] The traditionally sedentary Bambara and Dogon farming communities have historically clashed with mainly nomadic Fulani herders over access to resources.[11] The JNIM subgroup in central Mali—the Macina Liberation Front—takes advantage of these tensions to recruit from Fulani communities, which has led to escalating cycles of ethnic violence in central Mali since JNIM’s arrival.[12]

Figure 1. JNIM Escalates Attacks in Central Mali

Source: Liam Karr.

Security forces will likely fail to protect civilians from the JNIM attacks because Malian forces cannot effectively contest JNIM in central Mali. The security forces are giving priority to fighting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali, and UN forces that helped secure roads in the region are no longer around to mitigate security gaps after withdrawing in early December.[13] Malian and Wagner Group forces have significantly decreased their rate of counterinsurgency operations and overall presence in central Mali since the junta gave priority to fighting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali in August.[14] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project data shows that security forces have nearly halved their activity in the Mopti region since August, compared to the first seven months of 2023.[15] An increase in security force activity in early 2024 would indicate that seasonal flooding, and not capacity issues stemming from the Malian offensive in northern Mali, is driving the current downturn in activity. UN forces also withdrew from their final base in central Mali in early December as part of the broader UN departure from Mali by the end of 2023.[16] UN forces helped relieve the economic pressure that JNIM attacks inflict on targeted communities by patrolling and repairing affected roadways.[17]

The ACLED Project database shows that average monthly engagements by Malian and Wagner Group forces across central Mali decreased from 32.5 during the January–July period to 21 since August.[18] A decrease in security force activity in the Mopti region is leading this broader downturn, as the average monthly engagements in Mopti nearly halved from 20.5 to 11 over the same periods.[19] The average number of state-initiated engagements in Mopti per month—which removes roadside improvised explosive device (IED) attacks where JNIM is the instigator from consideration—has more than halved from 14.4 to 6.25.[20] These trends show that security forces are projecting less counterinsurgency pressure and are generally less active across central Mali since August, especially in the Mopti region.

UN forces previously helped mitigate some security gaps in central Mali by patrolling roads and repairing sabotaged infrastructure.[21] However, the mission finished closing the last of three major bases in the Mopti region in Sevare on December 9 as part of the broader UN withdrawal by the end of 2023.[22]

JNIM will likely use strengthened support zones in central Mali to besiege major population centers and attack isolated security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso to delegitimize both countries’ governments. JNIM has regularly used siege campaigns to force localities into negotiations or isolate large population centers.[23] Sieges demonstrate that the state cannot protect civilians or provide basic services and often lead to negotiations with local leaders that cut cooperation with security forces.[24] These agreements isolate security forces from the communities they need to protect and win over to defeat an insurgency. Losing community support also degrades security forces’ ability to gather local intelligence to defend from imminent attacks. Stronger support zones will grow the available resources and space JNIM needs to orchestrate the roadside ambushes and IED attacks that underpin these sieges.

JNIM has launched large and sophisticated attacks against towns with military bases in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso in 2023 and used vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED) in at least five such attacks.[25] JNIM does not seek to hold large population centers with these attacks and risks sustaining significant casualties from drone strikes by having its fighters hold their positions for too long.[26]

The attacks enable JNIM to influence the local population despite its lack of territorial control, however. The attacks undermine the legitimacy of the state by showing security forces’ ineffectiveness. Militants will also directly intimidate and threaten civilians during the attacks. JNIM overran a military base in central Mali’s Segou region on December 12 in a town the group has besieged for at least two years and demanded that the locals permanently leave after the attack.[27] Strengthened support zones will give JNIM access to more resources and space to stage such attacks. Towns with prominent military bases along key roads—such as Douentza and Sevare—remain high-value targets for JNIM.

JNIM has implemented shadow governance in dozens of smaller villages in central Mali by securing favorable agreements through threats of violence or siege since 2017.[28] The deals decrease violence against civilians and allow local activity to resume in exchange for residents agreeing not to cooperate with security forces and sometimes adhering to aspects of shari’a law.[29]

JNIM launched three simultaneous raids involving suicide VBIEDs[ against Malian army camps in Bapho, Niono, and Sevare towns in central Mali on April 24.[30] JNIM launched another two simultaneous attacks involving suicide VBIEDs in the Mopti and Segou regions on July 24.[31] The group also briefly captured the military base in the besieged provincial capital of Djibo in northern Burkina Faso on November 26 and entered the town for several hours before withdrawing.[32] Burkinabe officials released footage of drone strikes that targeted the attacking militants and claimed the strikes killed hundreds.[33]
JNIM overran a Malian army camp in Farabougou, Niono cercle, Segou region, on December 12.[34] The attack killed at least five civilians and several dozen soldiers.[35] JNIM cut internet access to the area and threatened residents to not return to the town before retreating.[36] JNIM has besieged Farabougou with periodic cease-fires since 2020.[37]

References

[1] https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1726265802394058871; https://twitter.com/StudioTamani/status/1727765331349774469; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Bombs FAMa and Wagner Vehicles in Mali, Attacks VDP Positions in Burkina Faso,” November 24, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://twitter.com/StudioTamani/status/1727765331349774469; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1729572611263193309; https://twitter.com/oumaragg/status/1729577885998952793; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1729573887107534857; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1729761797090037986; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1730548688009765316; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Claims Rocket Strike on Joint FAMa-Wagner Base in Kidal, Killing Russian Mercenary in Same Malian Region,” December 6, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://x.com/ocisse691/status/1733797134007140597?s=20; https://x.com/BocaryGUINDO/status/1733828578846912556?s=20; https://x.com/BocaryGUINDO/status/1733815859397669030?s=20; https://x.com/ocisse691/status/1733797129691263112?s=20

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-u...

[3] https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/mail_low.pdf; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/21/fact-sheet-attacks-on-civilians-spike-i...

[4] Author’s database of significant activity (SIGACT). Available by request.

[5] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/293-enrayer-la-communautar...; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2019/06/conflicts-...

[6] https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1722240831757967577; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1729573887107534857; https://x.com/BocaryGUINDO/status/1733815859397669030?s=20; https://www.studiotamani dot org/151388-insecurite-a-bandiagara-le-nouveau-mode-operatoire-des-groupes-armes

[7] Author’s database of SIGACTs. Available by request.

[8] Author’s database of SIGACTs. Available by request.

[9] Author’s database of SIGACTs. Available by request.

[10] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/293-enrayer-la-communautar...; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2019/06/conflicts-...

[11] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mitigating-farmer-herder-violence-in-...

[12] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2019/06/conflicts-...

[13] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/closure-of-minusma-camp-sevare-mopti-region

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-u...; https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard; author’s database of SIGACTs. Available by request.

[15] https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

[16] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/closure-of-minusma-camp-sevare-mopti-region

[17] https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/closure-minusma-camp-sevare-mopti-region; https://x.com/UN_MINUSMA/status/1286271810137477121?s=20

[18] https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

[19] https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

[20] https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

[21] https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/closure-minusma-camp-sevare-mopti-region; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/minusma-crossroads

[22] https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/closure-minusma-camp-sevare-mopti-region; https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/closure-of-minusma-camp-sevare-mopti-region

[23] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-enabling-dialogue-jih...; https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2022/05/04/we-accept-save-our-lives-h...; https://www.icwa.org/mali-insurgents-agreements

[24] https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2022/05/04/we-accept-save-our-lives-h...; https://www.icwa.org/mali-insurgents-agreements

[25] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1341823/politique/mali-trois-camps-de-larme...; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Reports Control over Malian Army Post Following Attack in Mopti, Details 4-Man Suicide Raid on Russian PMC Wagner Group in Segou,” July 27, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://x.com/ocisse691/status/1683594569659629568?s=20

[26] https://x.com/ZagazOlaMakama/status/1729820594781192354?s=20; https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-djibo-rebels-islamic-state-al-qa...

[27] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1734951822782058853?s=20

[28] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-enabling-dialogue-jih...

[29] https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2022/05/04/we-accept-save-our-lives-h...; https://www.icwa.org/mali-insurgents-agreements

[30] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1341823/politique/mali-trois-camps-de-larme...

[31] SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Reports Control over Malian Army Post Following Attack in Mopti, Details 4-Man Suicide Raid on Russian PMC Wagner Group in Segou”; https://x.com/ocisse691/status/1683594569659629568?s=20

[32] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231128-armed-groups-carry-out-major...; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Video Documents Large-Scale Raid in Burkinabe Town of Djibo,” November 30, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[33] https://x.com/ZagazOlaMakama/status/1729820594781192354?s=20; https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-djibo-rebels-islamic-state-al-qa...

[34] https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/12/14/jihadist-attack-central-mali; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1734951822782058853?s=20; https://x.com/NiangAbdoul15/status/1734873870778122313?s=20

[35] https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/12/14/jihadist-attack-central-mali; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1734951822782058853?s=20; https://x.com/NiangAbdoul15/status/1734873870778122313?s=20

[36] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1734951822782058853?s=20

[37] https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/mali; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-enabling-dialogue-jih...

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