CONCEPT PAPER: CONTROLLER GENERAL OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS - CENTRALISED PENSION DISBURSEMENT SYSTEM

SOURCE:http://karnmk.blogspot.in/2015/03/cgda-centraliised-pension-disbursement.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+CGENewsTools+(Central+Government+Employee+News+%26amp;+Tools)

CONTROLLER GENERAL OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS

CENTRALISED PENSION DISBURSEMENT SYSTEM

CONCEPT PAPER

Ministry of Defence disburses appx Rs. 51,000 crore every year as pension benefits to 24.16 lakh defence pensioners – both service personnel as well as defence civilians. While pension sanction is being done in a centralised way – by PCDA (Pension) Allahabad in r/o Army and defence civilians; by PCDA (Navy) in r/o Navy personnel and by JCDA (AF) Subroto Park, New Delhi in r/o Air Force personnel, pension disbursement is being carried out by a number of agencies who are working as PDAs (Pension Disbursing Agencies) – 28 Public Sector and 4 Pvt Sector Banks, 63 DPDOs, State Treasuries and Post Offices.

 

Banks have the largest number of pensioners on their roll – appx 18.06 lakh pensioners or 75% of the total number of defence pensioners. And they disburse Rs. 3800 crores every month (or Rs. 45,600 crores per annum which is almost 90% of the total pension disbursement to defence pensioners) as pension to these pensioners. Instances have come to notice where different practices have been followed by banks or where different interpretation have been arrived at and implemented for one government order, resulting in complaints from pensioners. An analysis of grievances received at the Ministry or at CGDA office or at PCDA (Pension) office reveal that more than 95% of the complaints pertain to pensioners drawing their pension from the banks. The task of addressing these grievances and providing services to pensioners to their complete satisfaction is an arduous one. This, however, could be changed by adopting a new paradigm for pension disbursement.

2. This new paradigm is centralised disbursement of pension. This simply means disbursing pension from a central agency viz. Centralised Pension Disbursement Agency (CPDA) to all the pensioners.

3. The present system of pension imbursement is an opaque one in the sense that it does not easily provide details reg. no of pensioners, category wise distribution of pensioners,  amount of pension disbursed in a month and govt’s pension liability. Collation of the information from various sources is quite difficult and the output is not always accurate.

4. Further, in the existing system, there is a multiplicity of PDAs ‐ 29 Banks, 63 DPDOs and a large number (500+) of State Treasuries. As mentioned earlier, many a times PDAs tend to interpret Govt. Orders differently. This, in some cases delays the implementation of the order itself and in some other cases the order gets to be implemented differently by different PDAs. In both cases, generally, pensioner is the sufferer. There are other issues/difficulties in the existing pension disbursement system:‐

I. With multiple PDAs, the system is not amendable to effective monitoring as well as grievance handling. It makes the task of all decision makers including the Ministry, a very difficult one.

II. There is a delay in booking the pension amount to Govt. account. This also makes it relatively difficult to know the exact pension liability.

III. Even at a given time, it becomes an arduous task to exactly find out the number of active defence pensioners (including categories‐wise) as the information is to be collated from a large no. of PDAs.

IV. Maximum pensioners are drawing pension from banks. It has been experienced that they (Banks) do not have dedicated staff to deal with pensioners’ issues. Also, they are not well conversant with orders/issues peculiar to Defence pension.

The Proposed System

5. The proposed system of Centralised disbursement of pension is not only transparent but easy for information processing and retrieval.

6. Under the proposed system, after sanctioning pension and issuing Pension Payment Order (PPO), the pension sanctioning authority will forward the PPO and other details – including bank details – of the pensioner to the Centralised PDA (CPDA) on soft format through a secured channel. It could be on the CGDA intranet and for enhanced security could also be with digital signature. The CPDA will process the papers and will initiate first payment as well as subsequent monthly pension payments for credit to the pensioners’ bank accounts (as given by the PSA along with the PPO) through the NEFT/RTGS or the CMP (on‐line payment mechanism with SBI). Since the CPDA is making payment of pension – he can directly book the amount to the government account, avoiding any delay or suspense head booking. For the pensioners, there will be no change as they would receive pension in their bank account, as is the status presently. The proposed system only replaces the multitude of PDAs with a single PDA without affecting the pensioners’ interest and rather bringing about a focused delivery mechanism. There are a number of benefits of the proposed system –

i. Uniform interpretation and implementation of govt orders ii. Instant booking of pension payment to govt accounts – giving authorities a true picture of the pension liability and payment.

ii  .........blank...........

iii. Better grievance monitoring system can be instituted with a single PDA.Easier for everybody.

iv. Centralised database will help in better exploitation of information and communication technology for the betterment of services to the pensioners.

v. There will be no change as far as pensioners are concerned. They will continue to receive their pension in their given bank accounts.

vi. No loss to the banks in terms of accounts maintenance as they will continue to be the final pension paying agency.

vii. Future scalability is possible and relatively simple. For example, a centralised call centre could provide solutions to the pensioners for their queries or complaints.

7. In addition to these benefits, the proposed system will also result into a large saving to the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Presently, MoD pays Rs. 60 per transaction to Banks; and with 12 regular payments and 4 DA payments in a year, MOD pays Rs 960 per pensioners per year. For 18.06 lakh Bank pensioners, this amounts to almost Rs. 180 Cr. every year. If all pensioners are brought under the centralised PDA system ‐ where CPDA will credit pension in pensioners Bank A/c through NEFT/RTGS  ‐ saving of Rs. 180 Crore could be achieved.

 

Implementation Modalities

8. Phase I can cover all new pensioners – appx. 80,000 per year – coming into pension fold. This can be done from a particular date which can be decided after taking decision on centralised pension disbursement and creating necessary IT and Communication infrastructure.

9. In Phase II all DPDO pensioners can be covered. All original files may be shifted to the CPDA DPDO‐wise. Given that out of 63 DPDOs, 52 have been centralised under Project Ashraya (Pension disbursement system), this is likely to be smoother phase wherein shifting of files and their appropriate indexing will be the main activity / focus.

10. In Phase III existing bank pensioners can be covered depending upon the response  of the banks.

This would be the toughest phase both in terms of making banks agree to the new model and in database management Banks revenue loss will also be a big issue from their perspective. As such this phase will require perseverance and a different strategy (including for database management) which can be derived and decided later from the success of the first two phases.

11. An issue which may require a conscious decision would be whether the centralised disbursement should be from one location or multi‐location. It is considered that in a networked environment, location may not be an important factor from the view‐point of users. However, for the ease and adaptability with the existing pension set‐up, it is recommended to have three centres associated with the existing pension sanctioning authorities, viz. PCDA

(P), Allahabad, PCDA (N), Mumbai and JCDA (AF), New Delhi. It is also recommended to have a centralised call centre, which can have access to the complete database of the three centres of CPDA. The call centre can be co‐ located with one of the three centres for the purpose of administrative convenience.

Role of DPDOs in the proposed centralised system

12. DPDOs are Pension Disbursement Agencies (PDAs) in the exiting set‐up. Each DPDO is a distinct PDA. Presently, 63 DPDOs – 51 in northern India and 12 in Southern India (Eastern central and Western India have no DPDOs) – are working as PDAs for 4.7 lakh pensioners.

13. If we divide the role of a DPDO in terms of (i) processing of monthly pension payments and (ii) identification exercise (which is not restricted to any specific month (e.g. November for bank pensioners) and continues for the whole year) then it can be stated that in the proposed CPDA paradigm, role of DPDOs will not be there for first part (i.e. payment processing). However, they can be effectively used for the second part  ‐ identification of pensioners. This would mean that DPDOs would need to be remodelled as service centres for pensioners/ which will carry out their annual identification, accept change requests/applications on behalf of CPDA (for cases related to re‐marriage, re‐  employment, death, Bank account changes etc.) and can also act as grievance handling /settlement centre as they would be linked with the CPDA server and can have a higher protocol communication with the CPDA call centre. It is

considered that in the proposed model ‐ one DPDO may only require one AO, one AAO (or two AAOs) and one MTS  ‐  all proficient on the new system. Savings achieved in manpower (to be assessed) can be used for opening up a few more service centres in areas where pensioner concentration is relatively very high or in existing offices of DAD or even with the Zila Sainik Board Offices.

Infrastructure requirements

14. To start the work at the CPDA, it is assessed that manpower strength of one IDAS, One AO, two AAOs, 4 Adrs and 2 MTS would be sufficient and can even last for the first two phases with 2‐4 additional Adrs. It is assessed that this manpower can be spared from the existing resources of the organization of CDA (PD). For more Click here

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India’s Stakes In Maldives’ Power Struggle

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/24032015-indias-stakes-in-maldives-power-struggle-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

Former Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed. File photo.

1, Analysis, India, Maldives

India’s Stakes In Maldives’ Power Struggle – Analysis

March 24, 2015 Observer Research Foundation Leave a comment

By Observer Research Foundation

By Ravi Joshi*
In a bizarre twist to the ongoing power struggle in Maldives, the founder leader of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) and the first democratically elected President of the country Mohammed Nasheed has been branded a ‘Terrorist’ and sentenced to 13 years in prison under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). On Friday 13th March 2015 Mohd. Nasheed was found guilty of ordering the ‘forcible kidnap and unlawful detention’ of a Chief Judge of the Criminal Court in January 2012, and was sentenced by a three judge bench, two of whom were state witnesses in the same case earlier.
Assuming that Nasheed had actually ordered the arrest and detention of the Judge of a subordinate court who was reportedly delaying and preventing the prosecution of corrupt ministers of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s government, could the President be charged with ‘Terrorism’? Does it not make the entire Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF) that carried out the order a ‘terrorist group’? That was precisely the argument of Nasheed’s defence lawyers who argued the matter in the initial stages of the trial, all four of who finally resigned in disgust before the end of this farcical trial by a Criminal Court.
At best Nasheed could have been charged with arbitrary or excessive use of power not granted to the Executive against the Judiciary by the Constitution of Maldives. In fact, Nasheed was initially charged under Article 81 of the Penal Code, which makes it “an offense for any public servant by reason of the authority of office he is in, to detain or arrest in a manner contrary to law”. “Person guilty of this offense shall be subjected to exile or imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding MVR 2,000,” reads the article.
This charge was dropped by the Prosecutor General and the case was closed. And Nasheed was re-arrested on 22nd February 2015, within days after he came out in support of the other opposition leader Gasim Ibrahim of the Jumhoree Party to form a united front to defend the Constitution against the arbitrary orders of President Yameen. He was then booked for an act of terrorism under the PTA that carries a maximum sentence of 15 years. This absurd charge has neither been established nor proved, certainly not in the eyes of the international community that has been closely watching this repeated murder of democracy by an inept Judiciary.
The US, UK and the EU have strongly condemned the arrest and sentencing of Nasheed by a ‘flawed judicial process’ and have called for his release pending further appeal and to provide him with a fair and transparent trial. India too has expressed ‘deep concern’ at the event and is monitoring the developments closely.
The rank and file of the MDP have been protesting in the streets of Male, ever since the verdict and some minor skirmishes have also been reported between the Special Operations force and the people. The MDP supporters who have won the democratic gains incrementally through a lot of pain and suffering from 2004 to 2008 against a more hardened autocrat are unlikely to give up the fight easily.

President Yameen’s threat perception

Why did President Yameen have to do this? Why did he arrest an opposition leader who had gracefully accepted his defeat in November 2013, though it was clear that the popular mandate was repeatedly thwarted and subverted by the same Judiciary that is so pliant in carrying out the bidding of the Gayoom family? Was Yameen scared by the coming together of MDP leader Nasheed and Jumhoree Party leader Gasim Ibrahim? Did he foresee a replay of events of Sri Lanka in Male where another very powerful family was dislodged by the unity of Opposition leaders? Perhaps, that was the trigger. So he had to break the unity of Gasim and Nasheed. Yameen knows very well that he would not have won the election of 2013 without the last minute support of Gasim and now if Gasim now joined hands with Nasheed, the opposition would be too formidable. Hence the arrest of Nasheed and a hefty fine of $100 million on Gasim Ibrahim for not developing the islands allotted to him for resort building as unpaid rents and fines.

India and Maldives

What are India’s stakes in Maldives and in the ongoing power struggle? As a democracy we have every reason to support the democratic aspirations of the people of Maldives; to uphold the rule of law and to ensure a fair and transparent trial for the beleaguered former President. This is expected of us not only by a majority of Maldivians but by the international community, as well. In fact, we could act together with the US, UK and the EU to bring overwhelming pressure on the government. On a more pragmatic level, President Yameen’s open alignment with China’s interests and granting islands close to our borders for China’s Maritime Silk-route Project is a direct threat to our security interests.
Another security threat that emanates from Maldives is the Islamic radicalization of its youth. Radical Islam was kept in check as long as former President Maummon Abdul Gayoom was firmly ensconced in power and remained unchallenged. Only when the threat of democracy loomed large from 2005 onwards, he let the genie of Islamisation out of the bottle. In the last few years of his rule, Gayoom permitted the mushrooming of madrassas and mosques in Maldives, mostly funded by Saudi Arabia.
In fact, the first major protest organized by Gayoom’s party and his allies, when they were in opposition, against President Nasheed were in the name of protecting Islam. They falsely accused him of favoring the Christian West and Jews and raised the bogey of ‘Islam in danger’.
The result of all this cozying up to Islamic fundamentalists has resulted in Maldives producing hundreds of young jihadi fighters who have gone to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As per the last count, over 200 Maldivians have reportedly joined the Jabhut ul- Nusra in Syria and the ISIS. And that is a shockingly disproportionate number in a total population 3,40,000 Maldivians. More shocking is the fact that most of them were ex-military men of MNDF and as per some estimates, 5 of them have died fighting in Syria.
President Yameen too has been soft on Islamists while putting down the democratic activists with a firm hand. For dictators, Islam has always been far too easy to co-opt than political dissent.
With the Indian Prime Minister pursuing a very active Indian Ocean region diplomacy, Maldives cannot be kept away from his outreach programme. Maldives is key to our strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and any instability or discord in its internal affairs would have a bearing on our security, especially when distant powers are fishing in its troubled waters.
*The author is a Distinguished Visitor at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi. He had served on a diplomatic assignment in Maldives for three years
Courtesy: The Economic Times

Observer Research Foundation

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic

China's New Aircraft Carrier On Drawing Board

China's New Aircraft Carrier On Drawing Board


 

The  following comment from an American Observer who viewed the illustrations above;

 

This  is a quantum leap above anything we have on the  drawing board. They have thought "outside the  box" on this one. Better speed, larger capacity,  much more stable, etc. Definitely a "blue-water"  long reach vessel. Plus they can service their  nuke sub fleet in-between the twin hulls ( sight  unseen ) or even launch amphibious opps from  same. It will be launched in half the time it  takes the USA at just one-third the cost. Add  the new Chinese stealth fighter bomber (naval  version already flight-testing) in the mix and  you have the makings of a formidable weapons  system indeed. Also look at that extra ''parking  and readiness'' station between both hull  structures. And of course the launching and  landing capabilities from the utilization of  twin flight decks at once.

 

Six of these  vessels (two pacific, two Atlantic, one Indian  ocean and one on the Mediterranean sea ) would  be a pretty good diplomatic "big stick." Note :  the Chinese are already drilling for oil off  Cuba , Brazil and Venezuela .. Can they build a  fleet of these things?

 

A few facts: the  Chinese have completed the world's biggest dam  (three gorges), the world's longest over-water  bridge (65 times as much steel as in the Eiffel  tower), constructed a 15,000 ft. High railroad  into Tibet (all considered major engineering  feats).

 

China is the only nation other  than Russia that can launch men into outer space   . They have also shot  down a surveillance satellite (one of their own)  from the ground. Plus, they "own our ass" in the  international debt game.


 

China 's new  carrier could be twice as fast as anything we  have, plus the stability of a catamaran type  hull will greatly reduce the pitching, yawing  and swaying common to our present  designs.   

 
 

Need for Comprehensive National Security Policy

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/need-for-comprehensive-national-security-policy-says-lt-gen-mehta/58300.html


                CDS AS VISUALISED
                                BY
                  MEN IN UNIFORM

Need for Comprehensive National Security Policy, says Lt Gen Mehta

Lt Gen SS Mehta (retd) speaks during K Subrahmanyam memorial lecture in New Delhi on Tuesday. photo: Manas Ranjan Bhui

 

 

 

 

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, March 24

 

 

Explaining the need to have a comprehensive national security policy Lt Gen SS Mehta (retd) listed water, energy, food security, access to technology, climate change, education not being linked to employment and gender issues as aspects that could affect national security that is very different from national defence.




 Lt Gen Mehta, a former GoC-in-C of the Chandimandir-based Western Command of the Indian Army, was delivering the fourth annual K Subrahmanyam memorial lecture on the theme: "Securing India's insecurity: Emerging vulnerabilities in an interconnected world", this evening.



 Subrahmanyam is considered a doyen among Indian strategic thinkers. Former Minister of State in the External Affairs Ministry Shashi Tharoor chaired the talk, while S Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary and son of Subrahmanyam, addressed the audience.



 Lt Gen Mehta said it was important to comprehensively reform the country's higher defence management recommended by K Subrahmanyam.

 "This means not just appointing a single point military adviser to the government (by way of Chief of Combined Defence Services) but also setting up unified theatre commands," he said.



 A single point military adviser to the government should be backed by theatre commands.

 "The theatre commands could be specific to regions such as the Eastern Naval Command or to areas such as the Army's Northern Command in which other service elements must be integrated," he said.



 The government has hinted at integration of the three Services and a mechanism for creation of a post of CDS, but Lt Gen Mehta cautioned that this should not end up like the present system of a rotating Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee with the bureaucracy as an arbitrator or like the Headquarters of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) which is only attached to the Ministry of Defence.



 Explaining the concepts of national security and defence, he said, the fast-changing landscape, the rise of new vulnerabilities as well as interconnections, the power shifts all demand a clear comprehension about the two concepts.
Comprehensive national security includes political and military, economic security, soft and hard power, focused development and growth of human and material resources along with public understanding and support.



 The standard notion of National Defence conventionally relates to maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity; ability to control internal disorder; reacting to man-made and natural calamities; possessing the political competence to weigh options and display the capability to meet international obligations.

 
To secure the country's future and remove insecurities of every citizen of India, we must continue repudiating some Western constructs such as Samuel Huntington's prognosis about the shift in conflict from nations to cultures. This aspect has also been stressed by the sagacious strategic thinker and Subrahmanyam's illustrious peer Henry Kissinger, a former US Secretary of State.



 Lt Gen Mehta pointed that Subrahmanyam was especially critical of successive governments' antipathy to long-term strategic planning and absence of specialised positions and resources. He said we would be perpetuating Subrahmanyam's iconic and tireless lead in making our country safer by a comprehensive and flexible national security outlook reflecting all national security concerns and providing an actionable blueprint for tackling them.

 Lt Gen Mehta also wanted better utilisation of existing resources in the defence sector such as the trained, disciplined and still physically fit 70,000 service personnel retiring every year.













  

CDS aka Permanent Chairman to COSC: Implications and Analysis

SOURCE:
https://snt148.mail.live.com/?tid=cmsXbj-njR5BGSrmw75af65g2&fid=flinbox





Permanent Chairman to COSC: Implications and Analysis

Posted: 23 Mar 2015

 

Indian armed forces are  3 rd largest military force and World’s largest standing volunteer army. But in 21^st century numbers alone doesn't matter, if we need a total supremacy over enemy, we need modern equipment and a robust chain of command.  If we are having a strong chain of command and a decision taking body, we will clearly have an advantage over enemy because, this will help us to execute our missions, swiftly and in more organised manner, with the optimum usage of our resources.

The Kargil war reflected the weakness of our decision taking body, which impacted our missions as well as reduced the number of choices we had at that time. Even though we succeeded in foiling Pakistani attempt to internationalize Kashmir issue, it was more a wake up call for the government to restructure our command chain. Kargil review committee submitted their report on Feb 23, 2000.The cabinet committee on security later appointed a group of ministers to study the report. The group of ministers held a total of 27 meetings and in order to facilitate their work, it had set up four task forces, one each on Intelligence apparatus, Internal Security, Border Management and Management of Defence. The group of ministers submitted their report to Prime Minister on Feb 26, 2000.

Arjun Singh committee on Defence management and Naresh Chandra committee recommended creation of Chief of Defence staff with four main functions;

       1.        Providing single point military advice

       2.        Administer strategic forces

       3.        Ensuring Jointness in the armed forces

       4.        Enhance planning process through Interservice coordination and prioritizing. ^$

CCS considered Group of ministers Report on May 11, 2001 and implemented all recommendations contained except the creation of a Chief of Defence Staffs, Mainly because of the fear that CDS may become more powerful than Cabinet Secretary.

The Kargil Review committee asserted need for establishing a Committee of Chief of Staffs and a permanent chairman to this committee, but the government was reluctant because of the fear of losing political power over the military, which may lead to a possible coup. This lead to the establishment of COSC without a permanent chairman, at present 

. 

1.     The COSC members include Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC) who is a non-voting member.

2.     The position of the chairman devolves on the longest serving chief of staff and rotates amongst the chiefs of service.

3.      Currently serves as a advisory board and a forum for service chiefs to discuss matters having a bearing on the activities of the services. 

Why We Need a Permanent Chief?

            India is situated in a hostile neighbourhood, with possible risk of attack from two or more fronts. As we are having a vast coastline and mountainous terrain,it’s essential to have a good understanding of assets available with three forces and use them wisely in case of conflict to get a desired outcome with usage of optimum resources which will in turn reduce causalities as well as cost of war. For this we need a much deeper understanding and coordination between three forces, which we lacked at the time of Kargil conflict.

Currently the three forces are having three independent decision taking mechanisms, through COSC helped to lay down a platform for discussion and sharing doctrines and strategic views of three service chiefs, lack of a permanent chairman or a independent chief to assess and take further decisions, weakening the purpose of this committee

Some of the roles may give to permanent chairman

 

 COSC;

1.     Exercise administrative control over nuclear arsenal.

2.     Head a separate joint Special Forces command.

3.     Ensure Jointness of armed forces.

4.  Exercise administrative control over all joint service commands, such as Andaman Nicobar Command; Strategic Forces Command; Cyber Command (when created); Aerospace command (When created).

5.    Prioritise allocation of capital budgets for acquiring vital capabilities for armed forces.

6.      Prepare annual defence operational status reports.

7.    Will be an invitee to Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and National Security Council (NSC). ^{^}

Joint Chiefs of Staffs (United States)

            The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.^*

The collective body of the JCS is headed by the Chairman (or the Vice Chairman in the Chairman's absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. Responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over duties as the Chiefs of Military Services. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC), however, all JCS members are by law military advisers, and they may respond to a request or voluntarily submit, through the Chairman, advice or opinions to the President, the Secretary of Defense, or NSC.

The executive authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has changed. In World War II, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff acted as executive agents in dealing with theater and area commanders, but the original National Security Act of 1947 saw the Joint Chiefs of Staff as planners and advisers, not as commanders of combatant commands. In spite of this, the 1948 Key West Agreement allowed members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as executive agents for unified commands, a responsibility that allowed the executive agent to originate direct communication with the combatant command. Congress abolished this authority in a 1953 amendment to the National Security Act.^*

Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command combatant forces. The issue of executive authority was clearly resolved by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986: "The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands..."; the chain of command "runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command."^*

Role of Chairman to JCS

            The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 identifies the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces. As such, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President. He may seek the advice of and consult with the other JCS members and combatant commanders. When he presents his advice, he presents the range of advice and opinions he has received, along with any individual comments of the other JCS members.^*

Under the DOD Reorganization Act, the Secretaries of the Military Departments assign all forces to combatant commands except those assigned to carry out the mission of the Services, i.e., recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, service, mobilize, demobilize, administer and maintain their respective forces. The chain of command to these combatant commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the commander of the combatant command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may transmit communications to the commanders of the combatant commands from the President and Secretary of Defense but does not exercise military command over any combatant forces.^*

The Act also gives to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff some of the functions and responsibilities previously assigned to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The broad functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are set forth in Title 10, United States Code, and detailed in DOD Directive 5100.1. In carrying out his duties, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consults with and seeks the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, as he considers appropriate.^*

Goldwater-Nicolas Act of 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was implemented on 1 October 1986. It has been called the most significant Defense policy change since the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols gave us a globe divided into Combatant Commands, each with a CINC (until 2002, when they became COCOMs). It also made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principle military advisor to the President, whereas previously the Service Chiefs had a much larger role in providing that advice.^# This simplified command chain by giving orders directly to Combatant Commandants

basic structure

According to Goldwater-Nicolas act chairman is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands. And it defined the fuction of chairman as follows ^%

 

 

(a) Planning; Advice; Policy Formulation. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the following:

 

(1) Strategic Direction. Assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces.

 

(2) Strategic Planning.

 

(A) Preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

 

(B) Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

 

(C) Performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

 

(3) Contingency Planning; Preparedness.

 

(A) Providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

 

(B) Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

 

(C) Advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

 

(D) Establishing and maintaining, after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

 

(4) Advice on Requirements, Programs, and Budget.

 

(A) Advising the Secretary, under section 163(b)(2) of this title, on the priorities of the requirements identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

 

(B) Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defence for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.

 

(C) Submitting to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities referred to in clause (B).

 

(D) Recommending to the Secretary, in accordance with section 166 of this title, a budget proposal for activities of each unified and specified combatant command.

 

(E) Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the armed forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

 

(F) Assessing military requirements for defence acquisition programs.

 

(5) Doctrine, Training, and Education.

 

(A) Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.

 

(B) Formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces.

 

(C) Formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces.

 

 

(6) Other Matters.

 

(A) Providing for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(B) Performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or the Secretary of Defence.%

 

 

By limiting service chiefs to advisory role, US government managed to get a tight grip over the military. The Indian government must learn lessons from this model.  Sometimes too much political control over military can produce undesired outcomes, to contain it we need to make a balanced plan, with a simple and robust decision taking mechanism and in turn enhance the capability of our armed forces in fighting a war .

Sources:

% http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm
 

* http://www.jcs.mil/
 

^ $ http://www.spsmai.com/military/?id=2972&q=A-relook-at-the-Chief-of-Defence-Staff-/-Permanent-Chairman-COSC
 

http://blog.usni.org/2011/07/14/goldwater-nichols-at-25-success-or-failure
 

http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=15088679
 

http://ids.nic.in/organisation.htm
 

http://media.newindianexpress.com/Modi-

DefenceLeaders1PTI.jpg/2014/10/17/article2482243.ece/alternates/w620/Modi-

DefenceLeaders1PTI.jpg
 

http://www.mod.nic.in/forms/Sublink1.aspx?lid=1544&Id=56
 

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/744b0f7d-4a3f-4473-8a27-

c5b444c2ea27/Has-It-Worked--The-Goldwater-Nichols-Reorganizatio

http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=goldwater_nichols_defense_reorganization_act_1