Friday, May 22, 2015

Saraswati ::The Ancient River Lost In the Desert

SOURCE :
http://www.iisc.ernet.in/currsci/oct25/articles20.htm









                           Saraswati  
:The Ancient River Lost In the Desert
                  A. V. Sankaran






 NEARLY ten thousand years ago when mighty rivers started flowing down the Himalayan slopes, western Rajasthan was green and fertile. Great  civilizations prospered in the cool amiable climate   on riverbanks of northwestern India. The abundant waters of the rivers and copious rains   provided ample sustenance for their farming and other activities. Some six thousand years later, Saraswati, one of the rivers of great splendour in
 this region, for reasons long enigmatic, dwindled and dried up. Several other rivers shifted their courses, some of their tributaries were ‘pirated’ by neigbouring rivers or severed from their main courses. The greenery of Rajasthan was lost, replaced by an arid desert where hot winds piled  up dunes of sand. The flourishing civilizations vanished one by one. By geological standards, these are small-scale events; for earth, in its long 4.5 billion years history, had witnessed many  such changes, some of them even accompanied by wiping out of several living species. But those that occurred in northwest India took place within the span of early human history affecting the livelihood of flourishing civilizations and driving them out to other regions.





 The nemesis that overtook northwestern India’s plenty and prosperity along with the  disappearance of the river Saraswati, has been a subject engaging several minds over the last hundred and fifty years. However, convincing explanations about what caused all the changes were available only in the later half of the current century through data gathered by archaeologists, geologists, geophysicists, and climatologists using a variety of techniques. They have discussed and debated their views in symposia held from time to time, many of which have also appeared in several publications. Over the last thirty years, considerable volume of literature have grown on the subject and in this   article some of the salient opinions expressed by various workers are presented.




 Rivers constitute the lifeline for any country and some of the world’s great civilizations (Indus Valley, Mesopotamian, and Egyptian) have all prospered on banks of river systems. Hindus consider rivers as sacred and have personified them as deities and sung their praises in their religious literature, the Vedas (Rig, Yajur and Atharva), Manusmriti, Puranas and Mahabharata. These cite names of several rivers that existed during the Vedic period and which had their origin in the Himalayas. One such river Saraswati, has been glorified in these texts and referred by various names like Markanda, Hakra, Suprabha, Kanchanakshi, Visala, Manorama etc.1,2, and Mahabharata has exalted Saraswati River as covering the universe and having seven separate names2. Rig veda describes it as one of
 seven major rivers of Vedic times, the others being, Shatadru (Sutlej), Vipasa (Beas), Askini(Chenab), Parsoni or Airavati (Ravi), Vitasta (Jhelum) and Sindhu (Indus)1,3,4 (Figure 1). For full 2000 y (between 6000 and 4000 BC), Saraswati had flowed as a great river before it
 was obliterated in a short span of geological time through a combination of destructive natural events.






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 Judged in the broader perspective of geological evolution, disappearance or disintegration of  rivers, shifting of their courses, capture of one  river by another (river piracy), steady decline of waters culminating in drying up of their beds,  are all normal responses to tectonism (uplift,  faulting, subsidence, tilting), earthquakes,    adverse climate and other natural events. Such catastrophic events overtook Saraswati river in
 quick succession, within a short geological spanin the Quaternary period of the Cenozoic era (Figure 1) leading to its decline and disappearance. Similar changes to drainage of rivers have occurred during earlier geological periods also, much before human evolution. A few of the south Indian rivers like the east-flowing Pennar, Palar and Cauvery draining into the Bay of Bengal and west-flowing Swarna, Netravathi and Gurupur draining into the Arabian Sea are known to have changed their courses or got dismembered due to uplift of land. Today,  their former courses or palaeochannels can be  seen as dry beds5–8.










 Saraswati :Evolution and Drainage



 The river Saraswati, during its heydays, is described to be much bigger than Sindhu or the Indus River. During the Vedic period, this river had coursed through the region between modern Yamuna and Sutlej. Though Saraswati is lost, many of its contemporary rivers like Markanda, Chautang and Ghaggar have outlived it and
 survived till today. All the big rivers of this period –
 
 Saraswati, Shatadru (Sutlej), Yamuna derived their
waters from glaciers which had extensively covered the
Himalayas during the Pleistocene times. The thawing of
these glaciers during Holocene, the warm period that
followed, generated many rivers, big and small, coursing
down the Himalayan slopes. The melting of glaciers has
also been referred in Rigvedic literature, in mythological
terms, as an outcome of war between God Indra and the
demon Vritra1,9. The enormity of waters available for
agriculture and other occupations during those times
had prompted the religiously bent ancient inhabitants to
describe reverentially seven mighty rivers or ‘Sapta
Sindhu’, as divine rivers arising from slowly moving
serpent (Ahi), an apparent reference to the movement of
glaciers3.



According to geological and glaciological studies11,13, Saraswati was supposed to have originated in Bandapunch masiff (Sarawati-Rupin glacier confluence at Naitwar in western Garhwal). Descending through Adibadri, Bhavanipur and Balchapur in the foothills to the plains, the river took roughly a southwesterly course, passing through the plains of Punjab, Haryana,
Rajasthan, Gujarat and finally it is believed to have debouched into the ancient Arabian Sea at the Great Rann of Kutch. In this long journey, Saraswati was believed to have had three tributaries, Shatadru (Sutlej) arising from Mount Kailas, Drishadvati from Siwalik Hills and the old Yamuna. Together, they flowed along a channel, presently identified as that of the Ghaggar river, also called Hakra River in Rajasthan and Nara in Sindh1,11 (Figure 2). The rivers, Saraswati and Ghaggar, are therefore supposed to be one and the same, though a few workers use the name Ghaggar to describe Saraswati’s upper course and Hakra to its lower course, while some others refer Saraswati of weak and declining stage, by the name Ghaggar12.




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Considerable philological debate has taken place about the roots of the   nomenclature  ‘Saraswati’, which is referred to by the name Harkhaiti or Haravaiti (in Avesta) in regions further west of India. The contentious
point debated is whether the syllable Ha in the river’s name changed to Sa, later in India or Sa to Ha outside India. The choice of the name, Saraswati or Harkhaiti, depended upon whether one considered Aryans, the ancient inhabitants along this riverine system, as indigenous people who, upon their migration, carried the name Saraswati westwards where linguistic growth changed Sa soon to Ha; or, whether they were migrants from west of India who brought with them the name Harakhaiti which changed to Saraswati once they settled here2. Apart from the nomenclature, the riverine systems of the period   draining northwestern India had generated
considerable discussion among the scholars about the positions (hierarchy) of the other feeder rivers, big and small, their sources and     causes for their shifts which affected the supply of waters to the main rivers hastening their disintegration, e.g. Saraswati and its major tributary, Drishadvati.




Hindu mythology records several legends and anecdotes that are intertwined   with the river’s geologically brief existence. Every aspect of the river’s life, right from its birth to its journey down the Himalayas and over the plains towards the Sindhu Sagara (ancient Arabian Sea), have found mention in one religious textor other, like Rigveda, Yajurveda, Atharvaveda, Brahmana literature, Manusmriti, Mahabharata and the Puranas1–3. These descriptive legends have often proved helpful in cataloguing some of the natural events of the period and linking some of them with the river’s perturbations. For example, the graphic description of a war between Gods and demons detailed in one of these texts and use of fire (Agni) in the destruction of a demon hiding in the mountains which trembled under the onslaught may possibly refer to volcanic and seismic episodes of the period2. Today, more than 8000 years since the Vedas came into existence, some of the rivers mentioned therein have become defunct or have shifted from their original path. In the earlier years of study, their erstwhile courses were mainly inferred from archaeological evidences. These included sites of ancient settlements (some 1200 are known) of Harappan, Indus or Saraswati civilizations along river banks, the scripts and seals left behind, and references in Hindu mythology to river-bank Ashrams and Yagnya Kundams preserving evidences about the ritual worship practiced by the ancient inhabitants3,10–1






 Over a 3000 year-long period since the Vedic times (Figure 1), the drainage pattern of many rivers had changed much from that described in the earlier religious literature. The decline of Saraswati appears to have commenced between 5000–3000 BC, probably precipitated by a major tectonic event in the Siwalik Hills of Sirmur region. Geologic studies14 indicate destabilizing tectonic events had occurred around the beginning of Pleistocene, about 1.7 my ago in the entire Siwalik domain, extending from Potwar in Pakistan to Assam in India, resulting in massive landslides and avalanches. These disturbances, which continued intermittently, were all linked to uplift of the Himalayas. Presumably, one of these events must have severed the glacier connection and cut off the supply of glacier melt-waters to this river. As a result, Saraswati became non-perennial and dependent on monsoon rains. All its majesty and splendour of the Vedic period dwindled and with the loss of its tributaries, major and minor, Saraswati’s march to oblivion commenced around 3000 BC. Bereft of waters through separation of its tributaries15, which shifted or got captured by other neighbouring river systems, Saraswati remained here and there as disconnected pools and lakes and ultimately became reduced to a dry channel bed. Lunkaransar, Didwana and Sambhar, the Ranns of Jaisalmer, Pachpadra etc., are a few of these notable lakes, some of them highly saline today, the only proof to their freshwater descent being occurrences of gastropod shells in these lake beds16–19. With the decline and disappearance of Saraswati, the ancient civilizations, that it supported, also faded.


 INFERENCES FROM GEOLOGICAL, REMOTE SENSING  & GEOPHYSICAL SUR


Considerable tectonic activity connected with Himalayan orogeny continued during the Holocene and later times although uplifts to heights of 3000–4000 m were at their peak during 0.8–0.9 my span. The high elevation of the mountains perturbed the wind circulation patterns and induced climatic changes. Moderate terrain of earlier times became rugged and hilly affecting the channels of rivers14. That was the scenario of the Himalayan region when Saraswati emerged as a major river about 9000 y ago20 and flowed in all splendour during the vedic times till its decline to an impermanent monsoon dependent state some 4000 years  later.

 

 Bulk of earlier studies on Saraswati pertain more to the civilizations that flourished along its banks and many of the reasons attributed for the decline of this river were speculative. The impacts of middle to lat Quaternary geologic events on the river systems in this region, however, had received only cursory attention. Awareness to the potentialities of geologic,meteorologic, climatic and other cyclic events, basically triggered by plate tectonism, earth’s orbital and tilt variations and similar global phenomena came up much later. Attempts to investigate their roles over the decline and     desiccation of Saraswati began only since close of nineteenth century21–23 and gained momentum during the last three decades. Oldham23, a geologist of Geological Survey of India, was one of the first to offer as early as 1886, geological comments about Saraswati. According to him, the present dry-bed of Ghaggar River represents Saraswati’s former course and that its disappearance was precipitated when its waters were captured by Sutlej and Yamuna. This view differed from that of several others who felt that Saraswati vanished due to lack of rainfall. However, later-day meteorological research about palaeoclimates11,24–27, oxygen isotopic studies36, thermouminescenct (TL) dating28 of wind-borne and river-borne sands in the Thar desert region, radiocarbon dating of lake-bed deposits48 and archaeological evidences29,30 have all indicated that during early to middle Pleistocene period this region had enjoyed wetter climate, heavy rainfall and even recurring floods and that increase in aridity commenced by mid-Holocene (5000–3000 BC) only



 Intense investigations during the last thirty years have yielded fruitful data obtained through ground and satellite based techniques as well as from palaeoseismic, and palaeoclimatic records all of which had enabled a good reconstruction of the drainage evolution in northwestern India. In addition, TL-dating of dry-bed sands and isotopic studies of the groundwater below these channels provided useful links in these reconstruction efforts. The observed river-shifts and other changes could also be correlated with specific geologic, seismic or climatic event that occurred during the mid- to late-Quaternary period. Particularly helpful were the information gathered from LANDSAT imagery about location of former river courses in the plains and beneath the Thar desert upto the Rann of Kutch, about existence of palaeo-river valleys and identifying major structural trends (lineaments) in the region3,16,18,31–34. In spite of a large volume of such data, the chain of natural events during the Quaternary period has given rise to different interpretations about the former river courses.



Mainly, Indus and Saraswati, were the two major river systems of northwestern India during the Vedic period but the network of their tributaries, some of which are known to have deviated from their initial course or become non-existent today, have given scope for grouping these rivers into convenient classifications. Sridhar et al.18 have classified the rivers into four main groups (Figure 2) – (i) Sindhu (Indus) and its tributaries Vitasta (Jhelum) and Askini (Chenab); (ii) Shatadru (Sutlej) and its two major tributaries Vipasa (Beas) and Parasuni or Iravati (Ravi); (iii) Saraswati and its three tributaries Markanda, Ghaggar and Patialewali, in its upper reaches and a major tributary in its middle course; (iv) Drishadvati and Lavanavati. Baldev Sahai19 grouped them into Sutlej, Ghaggar and Yamuna systems while Yash Pal and co-workers32 recognized only two major systems –
the Sutlej and the Ghaggar.



 
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Detailed evaluation of data obtained from remote sensing, geophysical, isotopic and other studies by various workers32,33,35–40 have been instrumental in sorting out many of the earlier speculative inferences and unsolved aspects of Saraswati river. Yash Pal et al.32 have traced the palaeochannel of this river through Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. They found that its course in these States is clearly highlighted in the LANDSAT imagery by the lush cover of vegetation thriving on the rich residual loamy soil along its earlier course. According to their findings, the river disappears abruptly in a depression in Pakistan, instead of in the sea, an observation shared by a few others also. But, digital enhancement studies35 of satellite IRS-1C data launched in 1995, combined with RADAR imagery (from European Remote Sensing satellite ERS-1/2) could identify subsurface features and thus recognize palaeochannels beneath the sands of Thar Desert. These channels are seen to extend upto Fort Abbas and Marot in Pakistan and appear in a line with present dry bed of Ghaggar (Figure 3). This river continues as Nara River in Sindh region and opens into the Rann of Kutch34. Another study33 of satellite derived data has revealed no palaeochannel link between Indus and Saraswati confirming that the two were independent rivers; also, the three palaeochannels, south of Ambala, seen to swerve westwards to join the ancient bed of Ghaggar, are inferred to be tributaries of Saraswati/ Ghaggar, and one among them, probably Drishadvati (Figure 4). The latter disappeared along with Saraswati due to shifts of its feeder streams from Siwalik and Aravalli ranges as well as due to the onset of desertification of Rajasthan15.

 Geophysical surveys carried out by the Geological Survey of India to assess groundwater potential in Bikaner, Ganganagar and Jaisalmer districts in western Rajasthan desert areas have brought out several zones of fresh and less saline water in the form of arcuate shaped aquifers similar to several palaeochannels elsewhere in the State. That these subsurface palaeochannels belong to ancient rivers has been confirmed through studies37 on hydrogen, oxygen and carbon isotopes (d2H, d18O, 14C) on shallow and deep groundwater samples from these districts. The isotopic work has also indicated that there is no direct headwater connection or recharge to this groundwater from present day Himalayas. Though the antiquity of these waters and probable links to ancient rivers are thus established, the subsurface palaeochannel route beneath the desert sands obtained from hydrogeological investigations, however, differs from that derived through satellite based studies 16,35,38.



 The waning period of Vedic civilization around 3700 BC was also the period that disrupted both Saraswati and Drishadvati18. Several evidences indicate that rivers of this area changed their courses often in the last 5000 y (ref. 32) and one detailed study40 about Saraswati has identified at least four progressive westward shifts in Rajasthan, due to encroaching sands. In their evaluation of the palaeochannel imagery obtained from LANDSAT, Yash Pal et al.32 observed a sudden widening of Ghaggar near Patiala which, they argue, can take place only if a major tributary had joined it. According to them, ancient Shatadru or Sutlej must have been this tributary and possibly ancient Yamuna (palaeo-Yamuna) also flowed into Ghaggar, a conclusion they claim is strengthened by archaeological findings of active life that existed at one time on their banks. During a subsequent period, Shatadru (Sutlej) swung suddenly westwards near Ropar (Figure 4) to join Indus (as also Vipas/Beas and Parasuni/Ravi, its two tributaries), deserting its earlier channel to the sea. This sudden diversion of Sutlej as well as depletion of waters from Drishadvati due to loss of its feeding streams15, appear to be major events that heralded the drying up of Saraswati. Several workers attribute this event to tectonism involving rise of Delhi-Hardwar ridge and uplift in the Aravallis11,15,16,18,32.


 Capture of Shatadru (Sutlej) by a tributary of Beas through headward erosion or due to diversion of Shatadru (Sutlej) through a fault are also considered as possible reasons32. Structural control over the migration of Saraswati river is also evident from studies41,42 in the Great Indian desert and adjacent parts of western Rajasthan. This area is dissected by several lineaments, some of which (e.g. Luni–Sukri lineament) were reactivated during Pleistocene–Holocene period bringing about alignment of Saraswati with Ghaggar.



 Saraswati and the Palaeodelta of the Great Rann

Considerable debate has taken place about Saraswati’s entry in the northern part of the Great Rann. Scholars have pointed to references in Rigveda, Manusmriti and Mahabharata about Saraswati disappearing in the sands at Vinäsana and not in the sea; but at the same time, there is also reference in some of these ancient texts about a narrow sea, possibly a creek, coming right upto Bikaner, but which disappeared during the Vedic times10,22. Rigvedic and archaeological references describe how Saraswati supported inland and marine trade and travel and that, around 3000 BC, there was continuous flow of this river upto even the Little Rann13.

 

The topography at the Great Rann is typically deltaic, developing usually at the mouth of rivers, confirming entry of a few rivers in the sea at this place. Neotectonism, reactivating faults and lineaments which are seen criss-crossing this region, as well as frequent seismicity, apart from Holocene sea-level changes all appear to have influenced development of a peculiar drainage topography in this area. The tilting and sinking of land resulting from the tectonic events have carved characteristic uplands (locally called Bets) representing areas of river mouth deposits, and lowlands which are sites of distributary channels17,28. Satellite imagery, as well as detailed mapping, have revealed network of distributaries and extensive graded deposits, products of Holocene marine regression17. It appears that Indus (Sindhu), Shatadru (Sutlej), Saraswati, Drishadvati (palaeo-Yamuna) and Lavanavati (possibly an ancestor of present day Luni river) had independent courses and opened into the Rann separately. According to Malik  et al.17, at least three rivers – proto-Shatadru (Hakra), Saraswati and Drishadvati must have drained into the Rann around 2000 BC, of which only Sindhu (Indus) has survived. The original delta complex with relict channels, including that of Nara, a continuation of Ghaggar, is today better preserved on the western side but covered by wind-borne deposits on the eastern part of the Great Rann17,43,44.


Yash Pal et al.32 argue that though in the satellite imagery Saraswati/Ghaggar appear to debouch into the sea or a lake near Marot or Beriwala (Pakistan) (Figure 3), this place is far interior, and unlikely to be a palaeo-seacoast, even allowing for rise of sea level during the Holocene marine transgression. In fact studies about coast line changes along the west coast have shown a much lower sea level some 12,000 y back which rose to the present level only later and had remained there for the last 7000 y. These findings, therefore, discount the possibilities of a seacoast at this place45,46 though they do not rule out the river’s entry into the sea that must have existed further south of this site in those times. It may be mentioned that Quaternary neotectonism has submerged vast areas of palaeodelta complex, possibly along with palaeochannels. In this context, it is relevant to take note of the observation that Saraswati’s ancient course in this region is in continuity with another dry river bed–Hakra or Sotra which can be traced through Bikaner to Bhahawalpur and Sind in Pakistan, and finally upto the Rann of Kutch. Such a course appears likely if we backtrack the delta distributaries inland, when it is noticed they connect up with the existing palaeochannels there. Some of these are actually extensions of relict channels seen beneath the sands of Thar Desert, as found out by geophysical and hydrogeological surveys16,17,35,38.




 While tectonism had certainly a major role in shaping the fate of Saraswati and other rivers, this could not have been the only agent bringing about various changes that led to its downfall. Even though the role of climate on the disappearance of Saraswati system was underestimated by some of the earlier workers, undoubtedly it must have exercised considerable sway during the Holocene, a period during which major climatic swing has been noted globally26,27,36,47. It is well known that variation in earth’s orbit and tilt of earth’s axis affect the earth’s climate (Milankovitch and albedo forces). A drastic weather change related to these phenomena had peaked around 7000 BC26.


 Recent studies have shown that the onset of an arid climate occurred in two pulses –


at 4700–3700 and at 2000–1700 BC26, both of which had fairly wide impact not only in India in the desertification of western Rajasthan but in other countries also, like Africa in the development of Saharan and Nubian deserts. The desertification is thought to have occurred 5400 y ago (3400 BC) and its onset greatly affected the monsoon rains and consequently the river systems too.


The change from wetter to arid condition destroyed steadily the vegetation, which in turn affected soil moisture, its evaporation, atmospheric circulation and precipitation, all important links in the monsoon evolution chain and, ultimately the climate over the region. However, a recent study48 of water-table fluctuations and radiocarbon estimates from the Lunkansar Lake deposit do not support the views about aridity around 3500 BC, the period when Saraswati and Indus Valley culture were thought to have collapsed. The chronology emerging from these studies show that the once perennial lakes had ceased to be so and they had dried and desiccated more than 1500 y before the dated collapse of the civilization.



Computer based climate simulation studies26, to reproduce the changes to solar heating of the atmosphere due to variations in earth’s tilt and orbit have shown that climate-induced weakening of monsoons over India and north Africa led to desertification in a span of just 300 years. Needless to point out, when one traces the topographic evolution of a place, the influence of a combination of many natural phenomena can be recognized in its build up. It becomes, therefore, very difficult to point out any one reason for some of the major changes to the topography or river systems. The climatic swing that led to sweeping changes in northwestern India was triggered by variations in earth’s orbit and tilt and these departures are known to recur periodically.
 The latter should, therefore, rise the possibilities for a favourable orientation of these parameters of earth at some future time to initiate climatic conditions for a re-greening of the  Rajasthan desert, rejuvenation of the dry river beds and, hopefully, for a rebirth of Saraswati, like Phoenix out of the ashes.










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CAN'T SLEEP ! TRY THIS ONE How to Fall Asleep in Under a Minute

SOURCE  : 
http://www.ba-bamail.com/content.aspx?emailid=15602&memberid=962758













            CAN'T  SLEEP ! TRY THIS ONE


How to Fall Asleep in Under a Minute

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For years I used to have trouble falling asleep at night. I would lie awake in bed, tired, yet incapable of drifting off into slumber. This would wreak havoc on my mornings, I'd have a hard time getting out of bed and was consistently late for work.
 
I confided this to my friend, and she asked me if I ever tried the “4-7-8” method, which she claimed was helping her fall asleep in no time. I tried this method, and it has been consistently working ever since. I now get a full night’s sleep, I’m never late for my job, and best of all – I feel refreshed.
The 4-7-8 Breathing Technique
 
Harvard-educated Dr. Andrew Weil developed the 4-7-8 method, an easy way to calm both the mind and the body, thus helping you fall asleep in under 60 seconds. Other benefits of this technique include stress-reduction, slower heart rate, improved concentration, and more.
 
The technique is very straightforward and easy:
  • You take a deep breath through your nose for four seconds.
  • You hold your breath in for 7 seconds.
  • You then forcefully exhale through your mouth for eight seconds.
  • Repeat the process 4-6 times.
I
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
u
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
usually pass out by the third or fourth repetition. What happens is that the way you breathe forces your heart rate to slow, which immediately puts you in a calmer and more sleep-oriented mental state. 
Watch Dr. Weil Explaining the Technique:
 
 
Published on May 23, 2014
The 4-7-8 Breathing Exercise is utterly simple, takes almost no time, requires no equipment and can be done anywhere. Although you can do the exercise in any position, sit with your back straight while learning the exercise. Place the tip of your tongue against the ridge of tissue just behind your upper front teeth, and keep it there through the entire exercise. You will be exhaling through your mouth around your tongue; try pursing your lips slightly if this seems awkward.

1) Exhale completely through your mouth, making a whoosh sound.
2) Close your mouth and inhale quietly through your nose to a mental count of four.
3) Hold your breath for a count of seven.
4) Exhale completely through your mouth, making a whoosh sound to a count of eight.
5) This is one breath. Now inhale again and repeat the cycle three more times for a total of four breaths.

Note that you always inhale quietly through your nose and exhale audibly through your mouth. The tip of your tongue stays in position the whole time. Exhalation takes twice as long as inhalation. The absolute time you spend on each phase is not important; the ratio of 4:7:8 is important. If you have trouble holding your breath, speed the exercise up but keep to the ratio of 4:7:8 for the three phases. With practice you can slow it all down and get used to inhaling and exhaling more and more deeply.

Learn more about breathing exercises that Dr. Weil recommends:
http://www.drweil.com/drw/u/ART00521/...
 
 
 
 


Title photo: freedigitalphotos.net
Leigh D.

 


 

Why Centre's 'One Rank, One Pension' SOP Fails to Woo the Armed Forces

SOURCE :
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/why-centres-one-rank-one-pension-sop-fails-to-woo-the-armed-forces-551926


Why Centre's 'One Rank, One Pension' 
                                SOP 
              Fails to Woo the Armed Forces
                                  By
                         



Story First Published: February 25, 2014 12:14 IST


Why Centre's 'one rank, one pension' sop fails to woo the armed forces
 
A great deal of resentment still prevails among serving officers of the armed forces.
 
                     If the Congress-led UPA government had thought it would be able to woo the large fraternity of soldiers with the 'One Rank, One Pension' sop, announced in the interim budget by Finance Minister P Chidambaram, it is perhaps mistaken because a great deal of resentment still prevails among serving officers of the armed forces over a glaring disparity that the government has failed to remove since 2008.

The disparity concerns the status and pay scales of senior military officers in comparison to officers of other paramilitary and civilian organisations, clubbed under a category called 'Organised Group A Services'.

Till 2008, there was no problem in day-to-day functioning between the military and officers of these services. Now a dissonance has set in. In 2008, the sixth pay commission allowed Organised Group A Services Officers with 19 years of service to be treated equivalent to joint secretary-level IAS officers.

This ruling gave the Organised Group A Services Officers a head start over much senior military officers since the government determines seniority by grade pay. The new ruling allowed these officers to get a grade pay of Rs. 12,000 in 19 years. In the military, the grade pay of Rs. 12,000 is granted to major generals, who pick up the two-star rank after 29 years of service - a huge gap of a decade.

This has created huge functional problem of command and control in joint cadre or multi-cadre environment where military officers have to work with the officers of the Organised Group A Services. For instance, a Brigadier with 27-28 years of service working with civilian engineers in Kashmir, north-east or Rajasthan is considered junior to officers in the organisations who may have done just 20 years of service since their grade pay is higher than the Brigadier.

The civilians, now as much conscious of their rank and status as their military counterparts, have been refusing to obey orders from military officers senior to them in number of years of service but considered junior because of the lower grade pay.

All representations by the armed forces to the government since 2008 have fallen on deaf ears. Despite a united stand taken by the three service chiefs and the Prime Minister setting up a high-powered committee of secretaries, this issue remains unresolved.

And what is the logic of not granting what is called, in technical terms, 'non-functional upgrade' or NFU? Because the Centre says Defence Officers are not part of Organised Group A Service.

So what are they? Just 'Commissioned Officers'?

Senior army officers point out that they lose out on two counts. One, they don't get higher grade pay until much later, and two, they are now deemed junior to much younger officers. On the contrary, granting NFU to defence services will remove the disparity and widespread resentment.

Why should Army officers get NFU? Because of the following reasons.

None of the Organised Groupp A Services face as much stagnation as Army officers because of its pyramidal structure. Almost 97 per cent of military officers retire at the levels below Joint Secretary.

Traditionally, since independence, there has been a broad parity between the Class 1 (or Group A) officers of Civil Services and the Defence Services officers which has been acknowledged by different pay commissions in their reports.

In such a case, the differential behaviour of the 6th Pay Commission not only disturbs the financial parity, it pushes down the military in status. In fact, now Sub Inspectors of CRPF or BSF or ITBP too have an edge over the military officers since they too will retire with the salary of Additional Secretary or Lieutenant General if they get promoted as Assistant Commandant or Deputy Superintendent of Police in eight years.

All this, say military officers, has added to the frustration, demoralization and increased disgruntlement among military officers.
 

O.R.O.P. : Shashi Tharoor on OROP and Indian Soldiers

SOURCE 
http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/modi-ji-this-broken-promise-is-an-act-of-dishonour-720963




     O.R.O.P. : Shashi Tharoor on OROP
                                     and
                         Indian Soldiers



Story First Published: December 31, 2014 16:06 IST






Modi-Ji, This Broken Promise is An Act of Dishonour


(Dr. Shashi Tharoor is a two-time MP from Thiruvananthapuram, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, the former Union Minister of State for External Affairs and Human Resource Development and the former UN Under-Secretary-General. He has written 14 books, including, most recently, Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century.)
 
 


But still, it is something new to discover a government breaking a promise that it has repeatedly made not just in its campaign but on the floor of Parliament, expressed by the Finance Minister in his Budget speech and repeated by the Prime Minister himself. A failure to fulfil such promises is normally, in most parliamentary democracies, a resigning matter, but our government carries on, blithely unconcerned. Meanwhile, of this particular promise, there is no sign of any intention to actually fulfil it.
 
 
What am I going on about? Very simple: it is the pledge to ensure "One Rank One Pension" for our retired military personnel, who currently suffer gross injustice through the provision of pensions that have not been indexed to inflation, so that a Brigadier who retired twenty years ago gets a lower pension than a Captain who leaves the force this year. 
 
 
This entirely reasonable demand - made by people who have risked their lives to protect our borders, our nation, and us - was acceded to by the UPA government, echoed by the NDA, and announced again by the new regime after its ascension to power. Barely two months ago, Prime Minister Modi declared emotionally on his visit to the troops in Siachen that "One Rank One Pension has been fulfilled".
 
 
But Modi-ji, it has not been fulfilled. Not one soldier has received an enhanced pension; meanwhile leaks in the newspapers "reveal" that the Finance Ministry has had a change of heart, saying that justice to our men in uniform would "cost too much". 
 
 
 
It seems the Comptroller of Defence Accounts has estimated that the cost of One Rank One Pension could be as high as 9,300 crore. It may sound a lot, but the estimated budget for Mr Modi';s much-vaunted statue of Sardar Patel is 1,500 crore, which puts this sum in perspective.
At a recent media conclave, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar hedged his bets, suggesting that ex-servicemen would get 80% of the promised pension, and adding that "100% satisfaction to everyone is never given in real life."  This is an utter travesty. Is Mr Modi prepared to stand before the nation and say that we should not believe anything he promises, but that he will try to deliver 80% of it? If the Kargil war had happened on his watch, would we have to be content with getting 80% of the heights back?
 
 
Our soldiers never make 80% effort; they give 100%, indeed more. The nation owes them at least this much.
 
 
It is true I have a soft corner for our armed forces. I believe they embody the best of what India can be, but so rarely is: they are motivated, professional, meritocratic, competent, reliable, free of caste and religious prejudice, and they take risks the rest of us would not dare to. Yet we treat them in a disgracefully cavalier fashion. 
 
 
During my UN peace-keeping years, when I dealt with a large number of senior military officers and issues from around the world, I was appalled to see how poorly our professional officers were valued by our self-regarding bureaucracy. 
 
 
 
Whereas our officers, man to man, outshone their counterparts from Western militaries in their competence, intelligence and humanity, our system subjected them to various petty indignities. A full Colonel with over 25 years of service behind him is ranked by our babus below a Director in protocol terms. I have suffered through peacekeeping seminars in which a knowledgeable Indian military officer had to defer to a callow bureaucrat in discussions on military matters. At a time when post-Cold War peacekeeping called for serious levels of military expertise at the UN Headquarters in New York, India remained the only Permanent Mission to the UN (of any major peace-keeping contributor) not to post a military adviser. Our diplomats believed they knew it all themselves.
 
 
 
This attitude extends to conditions of service across the board. A Joint Secretary, with nineteen years of professional experience, is deemed the equivalent of a Major-General, who not only has thirty years but has commanded men and materiel, made life-and-death decisions and protected our nation. We pay pensions to a lot more Joint Secretaries than Major-Generals (only 0.8% of army officers ever attain Major General rank). Yet we are now quibbling about the cost.
 
 
 
Who are the people we are cheating here by pinching pennies? Some 20 lakh ex-servicemen and four lakh widows. It is time to ask the Government of Messrs Modi and Jaitley: gentlemen, have you no shame?
 
 
 
It is ironic that the BJP, which prides itself on a robust attitude to defence, should betray its own promises to the men who actually defend our country. Building a War Memorial is symbolism, which the Modi government seems much better at than substance. Actually making a difference in the lives of our retired service personnel is the kind of tangible benefit this government shrinks from too often.
 
 
 
As far back as 2003, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence recommended One Rank One Pension, calling it "a debt" the nation had to pay. It is a debt our Government must honour. Not to do so is an act of dishonor. It dishonours the nation and the flag these men have fought to defend. And it thoroughly discredits those who would treat the well-being of our jawans and officers as one more election promise to be lightly cast aside.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Thursday, May 21, 2015

Game-Changing Canal in Thailand

SOURCE :
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/no-china-isnt-building-a-game-changing-canal-in-thailand-yet/






 
No, China Isn't Building a Game-Changing Canal in Thailand (Yet)
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons

                No, China Isn't Building

a Game-Changing Canal in Thailand (Yet)

                                 By

                    

 

The rough location of the planned canal.
 
The rough location of the planned canal.
 
 
Earlier this week, Chinese media reported that China and Thailand had signed an agreement to build a canal through the Kra Isthmus, creating a way for ships to bypass the Malacca Strait. The reports have since been denied by both the Chinese and the Thai governments.


The initial report, published by the Hong Kong paper Oriental Daily (summarized in English here by WantChinaTimes) specifically said that “representatives” from China and Thailand (implying government participation) had signed a memorandum of cooperation on the project in Guangzhou. There were even details on the construction of the canal. Planned to be 102 kilometers long, 400 meters wide, and 25 meters deep, it would take ten years and cost $28 billion to build. Oriental Daily said the MoC marked the “formal beginning” of the long-discussed project.





The Kra Canal would shorten travel from the Indian Ocean and the Pacific by 1,200 kilometers, saving vessels up to five days in travel time. Given the potential benefits, the idea has been under discussion since the 17th century, as my colleague Ankit noted in a 2013 analysis, though no concrete progress has even been made.



But the Kra Canal has gained new life recently, as China continues to expand its vision for a Maritime Silk Road (MSR) connecting China’s coast line with the Indian Ocean and even the Mediterranean Sea. The Kra Canal would be a serious prestige project for the MSR – and would have the added strategic benefit of reducing China’s reliance on the Malacca Strait. Currently, around 80 percent of China’s oil imports must pass through the Malacca Strait, leaving China vulnerable to a blockade in the case of a contingency. Chinese analysts are upfront that the need to reduce reliance on the Malacca Strait is a driving force behind the MSR.
 By that logic, the Kra Canal is a very attractive project for Chinese leaders.


But let’s not assume that the long-dreamed-of canal is about to become a reality. An official from Thailand’s Transport Ministry told Channel   NewsAsia  that there were no such plans to begin work on the canal. Another government official, who requested anonymity, said that China will likely push hard for the project, but that Thailand isn’t as eager. “It is unlikely for Thailand to agree on the project because we are concerned about national security,” the official said, concluding that “it is unlikely for the Kra Canal project to be materialized anytime soon.”


Meanwhile, China’s Foreign Ministry denied any knowledge of discussions about the canal. In response to a question about the supposed China-Thailand agreement, spokesman Hong Lei told reporters, “It is also from the media reports that we learned about that. I have not heard of any plan of the Chinese government to take part in the project.” The Chinese embassy in Thailand issued a similar denial, saying that no Chinese government departments had had any cooperation with their Thai counterparts on the canal project – not even joint research.


Channel NewsAsia suggests that the initial reports may have been based on a misunderstanding that conflated private groups with official government figures. Thailand does have a “Kra Canal Committee,” but the groups is made up of businessmen and former officials and not directly connected to the current government. A similar collection of private citizens may have indeed met in Guangzhou to discuss the canal project.


The canal would be of obvious value to China, particularly if its businessmen take the lead in construction. A Chinese businessman is undertaking the massive task of building a canal through Nicaragua to rival the Panama Canal for transit between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In return, the Chinese company will get a 50-year concession granting them control over the canal, with the option of renewal when the 50 years are up.

China pursued a similar arrangement – construction in exchange for territorial control – in the controversial Colombo Port City deal in Sri Lanka.


Control over a canal on the Kra Isthmus would be a strategic godsend for China –but is also a major part of the “security concerns” referenced by the Thai official. Chinese analysts are already speculating that a Chinese-built Kra Canal would allow Beijing to refuse passage to ships at its discretion, potentially dragging Thailand into the middle of a nasty situation. Plus, there are the obvious concerns about ceding control over such a valuable strategic asset to another country.


Overall, China’s MSR faces an uphill battle among its nearest neighbors due to security concerns and general uncertainty regarding China’s intentions for the region. Aside from Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India all have expressed varying degrees of reservation about whether the MSR will truly be “win-win” for both their countries and China. That’s in stark contrast to the other half of the “Belt and Road,” the Silk Road Economic Belt, which has been enthusiastically received by China’s neighbors to the west.




Despite media reports, the Kra Canal remains a dream – for now.