Monday, May 16, 2016

PROCUREMENT OF ARMAMENT: IS THERE A DEPARTMENT OF 'CHORO KI BARAT" IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHO RULES THE ROOST

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/arms-purchases-scam-ban-and-rhetoric/237683.html







PROCUREMENT OF ARMAMENT: IS THERE A DEPARTMENT OF 'CHORO KI BARAT" IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHO RULES THE ROOST?


           RATHER   BAN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
                                              &
                                   DISBAND IT
WATCH  IN RECORD TIME EVERY THING WILL FALL IN PLACE AS " IRON FILLING" FALLS IN PLACE WHEN A MAGNET IS PLACED UNDER THE SHEET HAVING  IRON FILINGS  - VASUNDHRA
                                                                        
    

Arms Purchases: Scam, Ban and Rhetoric

                                    BY

                      DINESH KUMAR


India’s 58-year-old Defence Research and Development Organisation has 50 laboratories, eight defence public sector units and 40 ordnance factories. However, India's armed forces are still dependent on imports for 70 per cent of their defence equipment













The Bofors gun played a critical role in the 1999 Kargil War. For long the “Bofors syndrome”impacted India’s big-ticket defence buying.




Another scam, another ban. This has become the standard practice of every Union government each time allegations of kickbacks surface after a defence deal is signed. 

The latest major company to be banned is Agusta Westland owing to allegations of kickbacks in the purchase of 12 AW 101 transport helicopters. The government, which signed the contract in February 2010, froze it in February 2013 barely two months after a first batch of three helicopters arrived in December 2012. But even these three choppers fitted with special security features, meant for high-value dignitaries such as the President and the Prime Minister, have been unable to fly. Reason: they are grounded due to a crisis of spares and after-sales support along with the absence of political clearance. 

India's continuing legacy of banning firms started in the mid-1980s when the government blacklisted the Swedish company, Bofors and the German company, HDW following allegation of graft in the purchase of 410 pieces of the 155mm FH-77B Howitzer and four Type 209 submarines, respectively. The “Bofors syndrome” ended up causing such an atrophy in decision making that for almost two decades thereafter successive governments either shied from purchasing big-ticket items from any major private foreign vendor or ended up banning companies each time allegations of kickbacks surfaced. Purchases during this period were mostly made on a government-to-government basis which, though relatively kickback-free, is an expensive route that limits options.

Due to severe shortcomings in indigenous capability despite a 58-year-old Defence Research and Development Organistion with 50 laboratories, eight defence public sector units and 40 Ordnance Factories, India's armed forces are dependent on imports for 70 per cent of their defence equipment. Due to this high degree of import dependence, every such ban has adversely impacted the modernisation of the armed forces and therefore India's defence capability. The fact is only a limited number of foreign firms are producing high-end defence equipment. In the corporate world's fast- paced environment, firms keep acquiring or merging or form conglomerates. They are also constantly collaborating with, sub-contracting or outsourcing components to other firms located in various countries. This has combined to complicate the world's defence military-industrial complex. Thus, a ban on one company may in effect tantamount to blacklisting other firms from which India may have bought an entirely different set of defence equipment. Blacklisting on occasions has been wholesale. For example, when allegations surfaced that the former Director-General of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) had taken a bribe, the government ended up blacklisting six firms — four foreign and two Indian — at one go in March, 2012. Among the four foreign companies was the Israeli Military Industries (IMI) which, in 2009, had won a $300 million contract for building a chain of ordnance factories in Bihar to manufacture ammunition for the Bofors 155 mm artillery guns. In addition to depriving the artillery of much-needed ammunition for the gun which played a critical role during the 1999 Kargil War, the government then almost put into jeopardy upgrade programmes of the Jaguar, MiG-21, MiG-29 and Mirage-2000, fighters, the An-32 transport aircraft, the M-1 series helicopters and supply of the Phalcon radars for India's Airborne Warning and Control System. The other three foreign firms banned were Singapore Technologies (meant to supply ultra-light Howitzers), Germany's Rheinmetall Air Defence and Russia's Corporation Defence. 

Such is the level of petty politicisation that in February 2000, then defence minister George Fernandes went to the ridiculous extent of ordering an inquiry into every defence procurement made since 1985. Yet corruption in defence purchases seems near epidemic. In 2005 alone, the CBI was investigating as many as 47 cases of defence procurement. In the subsequent five years (2005 to 2010), India went on to cancel deals involving import of 400 anti-material rifles, 197 light helicopters (to replace the ageing Cheetah and Chetak) and 400 pieces of 155 mm towed artillery guns (from South Africa's Denel) after years of technical trials and negotiations. Then in just three years, from 2012 to 2014, the Central Vigilance Commission referred nine cases for inquiry; the CBI registered 23 cases in connection with defence purchases and the Defence Ministry debarred 10 firms for 10 years. 

After spending much time and money, the fact remains that in most cases, starting with Bofors, investigative agencies have been unable to obtain evidence. Neither are firms taken off the blacklist. Due to the blacklisting of Bofors and Denel, the Artillery has been unable to add a new gun for the last three decades. It currently has less than the original 410 155 mm guns in service which is a far cry from the original 1,840 Bofor guns that were planned to equip 92 artillery regiments and 3,600 guns envisaged by 2025. Similarly, the Indian Navy, which is currently down to just 13 conventional submarines, lost an opportunity to acquire more HDW submarines. What a waste!



As it is India's procurement procedure involves 13 different agencies reporting to different functional heads. There are, by turn, eight stages of processing. Each consists of nine to ten approval points, with each approval point having at least three submission points. 





With India expected to spend about $100 billion over the next decade on modernising the armed forces, surely there is a need to further simplify procedures and consider devising pragmatic policies in case allegation of kickbacks surface. Bribes must be investigated and the guilty punished but cancelling deals and blacklisting a firm in today's global village after such lengthy and cumbersome procedures that is always followed by a long delivery schedule is akin to shooting oneself in the foot. It only harms the country's armed forces and national security considering that “Make in India”, although ideal, is currently only a slogan.


dkumar@tribunemail.com




















































 

Sunday, May 15, 2016

OROP : Update from Jantar Mantar


SOURCE:  IESM





Dear Members 

               Update from Jantar Mantar

RHS has been suspended at JM since 29 April. This has been done against the will of majority of ESM but to create a congenial atmosphere for talks and for the Government to fulfill its promises given to Ex-servicemen community. IESM believes in talks and is ever ready for talks. We hope that Government will use this opportunity to find solution to the anomalies pointed out by IESM/UFESM(JM) and many other ESM organization in India. All ESM organisations in India have given same anomalies for implemented OROP to MOD. This in-fact is an indication of convergence of thought process of ESM organisations of India and indication of unity of purpose. This is a good news. 24 lac ESM have joined hands for a purpose and the purpose is revocation of soldier's status as it was existing pre 1973. Less than that is not acceptable to Armed Forces of India. 

IESM/UFESM(JM) continues to stay at JM as our tents are in place and JM is being treated by dedicated soldiers as temple, Gurudwara and is place of worship for us. This is bold signature of ESM pride and communicates that ESM will oppose tooth and nail stepchild treatment to ESM by the Govt.
ESM reserve their right to resume agitation at JM if anomalies pointed out are not solved to their satisfaction by the Justice Reddy committee. J Reddy is likely to give its recommendations on 14 June 2016. ESM is hoping that MOD does not play any tricks and does not extend the tenure of J Reddy committee and the recommendations are given on time. IESM/UFESM( JM ) is also hopeful that our concerns will be suitably addressed by J Reddy. 

Court Case For OROP

Dr Ram Jethmalani visited JM on 29 April and assured all ESM of India that OROP is now his battle and he will fight it legally and get full OROP for ESM. He requested that RHS at JM be suspended for some time to create a congenial atmosphere for talks and resolution of the issue. Draft writ petition for OROP for filing in HSC is ready and is being vetted by Dr Ram Jethmalani. We are working towards filing it before summer recess of courts. However if due to pressure of large number of cases in SC, it is not filed now then it will be files asap the courts open after summer recess. 

Case for Broadbanding of Disability pension

As earlier explained that honorable courts have ruled that broadbanding of disability is the right of soldier and it must be given to them. However due to some existing rules it is given to only those soldiers who file a case on Govt. IESM has already prepared a case for filing for giving broadbanding advantage to soldiers. For this purpose IESM had invited Vakalatnama from the affected soldiers. We have received vakalatnamas and are ready to file the case in AFT Delhi. As per court procedures expenditure on each litigant soldier comes out to be around Rs 600/. Add lawyers fee on it and it turns out to be a large expenditure. IESM has decided to extend this service for all soldiers free of cost. It is for information of all that IESM is not charging any fee for filing the case. Please do not give any money to anyone  for filing your disability broadbanding to any organisation or any convener of IESM. IESM will bear all the expenditure on this case. IESM has closed the list for the first case. IESM will be circulating the list of names of soldiers whose vakalatnamas are complete and have been included in the first list. 

There is no need to get disheartened if your name does not appear in the list. This could be because your details are not complete. IESM will be filing another case soon for broadbanding of disability pension. 

Case for Nb Subedar to Hony Nb Subedars

This case is almost ready for filing. IESM is ready with the list and the case and hopes to file it before summer recess. List of the names of ESM will be circulated with in one week. There is no  need to panic if you do not find your name in the first list. It only means that your vakalatnama is not complete. We will include your name in the second case which will be filed soon. 

It is repeated that IESM will not be charging any fee for the your name to be included in the case. Please do not pay any fee to anyone for your name to be included in the list. 

If you do not find your name in the list ( to be circulated within a week ), please do not worry as we will again ask for names and will include your name in the next list. 

Case for arrears from Jan 2006

This case is also under preparation and will be filed soon, may be after summer recess of the courts. Please send your vakalatnamas for your name to be included in this. 

Court cases filed against office bearers of IESM

It is very unfortunate that ESM are fighting within for their egos. This fight is more prominent in IESM wherein 13 members of GB are on one side and only six members of GB are on other side. The life of that GB has expired on 2 Dec 14. Fresh elections for electing new GB have been held on 27 Oct 14, New GB has been elected and is pending approval from High Court. Despite all this an ex colleague has filed a complaint. This complaint has been investigated by police twice once in Dec 2013 and second time in May 2014. Both times police did not find any prima facie evidence in it and consigned to record room. But what can you do if  one of the ESM is hell bent in spoiling the image of ESM and prove to Govt/Bureaucrats that ESM are not united and Govt can take advantage of  this fragmentation among ESM. He kept on repeating and putting pressure for filing a FIR. On his intense pressure Govt finally buckled and an FIR has been filed for charges which had been rejected by police at ACP level twice. 
IESM office bearers are busy replying to these false charges and are in discussion with lawyers, and hence their  attention to OROP anomalies and JM has been diluted.This ex colleague's plan is only to divert IESM leaders attention from the real issue of OROP so that he can hog the lime light. But friends IESM  assures ESM of India that their welfare is dear to us than our own safety and we will not permit anomalies in OROP to be deferred to another pay commission. 
 
For your information the false charges of withdrawal of funds, which our colleague has preferred on us are for the period in which he himself was the Chairman and the funds were withdrawan for attending the rallies in his constituency, from where he later contested elections without even resigning from Chairmanship of IESM. So much for his moral values for declaring IESM apolitical. 
 
In fact  if you all will notice that the fight started because he wanted to use IESM platform for his own election which was not permitted by Gov Body. This was the main reason of falling apart of a united Gov Body of IESM and thereby sowing seeds of disunity. He has done this on whose bidding is for the community to decide. 

ESM Vote Power

30 lac ESM and about 15 lac seriving soldiers (with around 5 to 6 crores votes)  have been denied their place in India only because soldier thought that his job is fighting for the country and protecting the borders. We never asked for our rights and money. Bureaucrats took advantage of this negligence and have deprived the soldier for his rightful place in India and for his financial status. Friends we have now realized that we will have to fight for our rights and take our rightful dues.
 
IESM/UFESM(JM) has realized that we have to be united to get our prestige and position back. These politicians and bureaucrats will not give us our dues and even snatch our dues if we do not unite and show our voting power. An attempt is being made in Punjab to unite all ESM under banner of UFESM(JM)  and show to political parties that ESM vote bank is around 60 lacs and we have now woken up and know our strength. 
 
Friends we can get our rightful place in India only and only if we put our soldiers in state assemblies and parliament. We will not beg for our Izzat and our rights but will write it ourselves. This will be possible only if we are united  and vote as a block for welfare of foujis with a singular aim of sending them in assemblies and Parliament. 
 
IESM/UFESM(JM) has decided to integrate ESM and kissan of India and has given a slogan from PANCHAYAT TO PARLIAMENT. 
 
An attempt will be made in Punjab election to unite all ESM under banner of UFESM(JM) and show our strength. If this experiment delivers fruits it will be attempted on all India level.
 
 IESM requests all ESM to unite and become a power. 
 
 
TIME HAS COME TO DISCARD GREEDY POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUT SOME MEN WITH INTEGRITY IN STATE ASSEMBLIES AND PARLIAMENT. 
 
COME JOIN HANDS AND HELP US TO DEVELOP INDIA AND TAKE IT TO PATH OF PROSPERITY. 
 
WE ALL KNOW THERE IS NO DEARTH OF FUNDS IN INDIA. WE ARE NOT GROWING BECAUSE OF CORRUPTION AND BECAUSE OF BAD POLITICS. 

Regards
Gp Capt VK Gandhi VSM
Gen Sec IESM
OROP is our right. Dilution in OROP will NOT be accepted.

 
IF YOU SEE SOMEONE WITHOUT A SMILE GIVE HIM ONE OF YOURS.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Friday, May 13, 2016

INDO-PAK NUKES : Pakistan’s Army is Building an Arsenal of "tiny" Nuclear Weapons

SOURCE:
http://atimes.com/2015/12/pakistans-army-is-building-an-arsenal-of-tiny-nuclear-weapons-and-its-going-to-backfire/

http://qz.com/579334/pakistans-army-is-building-an-arsenal-of-tiny-nuclear-weapons-and-its-going-to-backfire/











TROUBLE BREWING

Pakistan’s Army is Building an Arsenal of "tiny" Nuclear Weapons—and it’s going to backfire


Obsession
Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal and, within the next five to ten years, it is likely to double that of India, and exceed those of France, the United Kingdom, and China. Only the arsenals of the United States and Russia will be larger.
 
In recent years, Pakistan has boasted of developing “tactical nuclear weapons” to protect itself against potential offensive actions by India. In fact, Pakistan is the only country currently boasting of making increasingly tiny nuclear weapons (link in Urdu).
 
 
Pakistanis overwhelmingly support their army and its various misadventures. And the pursuit of tactical weapons is no exception. However, there is every reason why Pakistanis should be resisting—not welcoming—this development. The most readily identifiable reason is that, in the event of conflict between the two South Asian countries, this kind of weaponization will likely result in tens of thousands of dead Pakistanis, rather than Indians. And things will only go downhill from there

Why would Pakistan want the world’s smallest nuclear weapons”?


In late 1999, Pakistan’s general Pervez Musharraf (who took power of Pakistan through a military coup in Oct. 1999 and remained in power until 2008), along with a tight cabal of fellow military officials began a limited incursion into the Kargil-Dras area of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. While planning for this began in the fall of 1998, by the time Pakistani troops were discovered there in May of 1999 Pakistani forces had taken territory that was several miles into India-administered Kashmir.
 
 

Because the Pakistanis had the tactical advantage of occupying the ridge line, India took heavy losses in recovering the area from the invaders. The so-called Kargil War was the first conventional conflict between India and Pakistan since the two conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. International observers were wary that the conflict would escalate either in territory or aims, with the potential for nuclear exchange.
 
 

Fearing such escalation, then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif sought support from China and the United States. Both were adamant that Pakistan respect the line of control, which separated the portions of Jammu-Kashmir administered by India and Pakistan.
 
 

Under international pressure and branded an irresponsible state, Pakistan withdrew its forces from Kashmir. It initially claimed that the intruders were mujahedeen—but this was later found to be pure fiction. While Pakistan was isolated internationally, the international community widely applauded India’s restraint. The Kargil War provided the United States with the opportunity to reorient its relations away from Pakistan towards India, while at the same time, demonstrated to India that the United States would not reflexively side with Pakistan.
 
 

In retrospect, the Kargil war catalyzed the deepening security cooperation between the United States and India. It also galvanized a serious rethink in India about its domestic security apparatus, intelligence agencies’ capabilities, and overall military doctrine.
 
 

Crucially, India learned from this conflict that limited war is indeed possible under the nuclear umbrella. In Oct. 2000, air commodore Jasjit Singh, who retired as the director of operations of India’s air force and headed India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses until 2001, laid out the lineaments of an India’s limited war doctrine. However, no apparent effort was made to make this a viable military concept immediately and India persisted with its defensive posture. In late Dec. 2001, Pakistani terrorists from the Pakistan-backed military group Jaish-e-Mohammad attacked India’s parliament in New Delhi.
 
 

In response, India’s government began the largest military mobilization since the 1971 war, which resulted in the liberation of Bangladesh, then East Pakistan. Just as the crisis was subsiding, another group of Pakistani terrorists, Lashkar-e-Taiba, attacked the wives and children of Indian military personnel in Kaluchak, Kashmir. India again seemed poised to take military action but ultimately backed down. The crisis was officially defused after India held elections in Kashmir later that fall. Pakistan concluded that its nuclear arsenal had successfully deterred India from attacking.
 
As Walter Ladwig has written, analysts identified several problems with India’s posture during that crisis. First, the Indian army took a long time to mobilize which gave Pakistan time to internationalize the conflict and to bring international pressure to bare upon India. Second, the mobilization of India’s strike corps had no element of surprise. Even Pakistan’s modest surveillance capabilities could easily detect their movements, and given their “lumbering composition,” could quickly discern their destination. Third, according to Ladwig, India’s holding corps’ were forward deployed to the border but lacked offensive power and could only conduct limited offensive tasks.
 

In response to these collective inadequacies, and the prospects of enduring threats from Pakistan, the Indian defense community began formalizing what came to be known as “Cold Start.” Ladwig, who wrote the first comprehensive account, claims that the doctrine aimed to pivot India away from its traditional defensive posture, and towards a more offensive one. It involved developing eight division-sized “integrated battle groups” that combined infantry, artillery, and armor which would be prepared to launch into Pakistani territory on short notice along several axes of advance.
 

These groups would also be closely integrated with support from the navy and air force. With this force posture, India could quickly mobilize these battle groups and seize limited Pakistani territory before the international community could raise objections.
 

India could then use this seized territory to force Pakistan into accepting the status quo in Kashmir. While Indians insist that this doctrine never existed, other analysts discount Indian demurrals and note slow—but steady—progress in developing these offensive capabilities. Irrespective of India’s protestations, Pakistanis take “Cold Start” to be a matter of Quranic fact.
 

Worried that its primary tools of using terrorism fortified by the specter of nuclear war, and fearing that India would be able to force acquiescence, Pakistan concluded that it could vitiate “Cold Start” by developing tactical nuclear weapons. As Pakistan’s former ambassador the United States and current ambassador to the United Nations, Maleeha Lodhi, explained, the basis of Pakistan’s fascination with tactical nuclear weapons is “to counterbalance India’s move to bring conventional military offensives to a tactical level.’’
 
Pakistani military and civilians often boast of their fast growing arsenal of the world’s smallest nuclear weapons and routinely update the world on the progress of the short-range missile, the Nasr, that would deliver this ever-shrinking payload.
 

Why should ordinary Pakistanis care?

While Pakistanis overwhelmingly applaud their army’s continued efforts to harass India in pursuit of Kashmir—a territory that Pakistan was never entitled to but fought three wars to acquire by force—there are numerous reasons why Pakistanis should be more sanguine, or even alarmed by Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons.
 
The first reality that should discomfit ordinary Pakistanis is that there is really no such thing as a “tactical nuclear weapon.” Even the smallest so-called tactical nuclear weapon will have strategic consequences. (Simply calling them “battlefield nuclear weapons” does not obviate this serious problem.) If Pakistan should use such weapons on India, there is virtually no chance that India will be left responding alone. The international community will most certainly rally around India. The response to Pakistan breaking a nuclear taboo that formed after the Americans used atomic bombs on Japan will most certainly be swift and devastating.
 

Second, as Shashank Joshi, a war studies researcher at the University of Oxford, has argued, these weapons do not have the military benefits that Pakistan’s military boasts, yet they exacerbate the enormous command and control challenges, including the possibility that nefarious elements may pilfer them once they are forward deployed. For one thing, tactical nuclear weapons do not have significant battlefield effects on enemy targets. For another, it is not evident that these weapons are in fact capable of deterring an Indian incursion into Pakistan.
 
Third, while Naeem Salik, a former director for arms control at Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Directorate, has said that Pakistan has shifted away from merely doctrinal thinking towards “actual nuclear war fighting,” such thinking is hardly viable for the simple reason of faulty math.
 
Even if, for the sake of argument, one assumes that Pakistan deploys its one hundred odd weapons of 15 to 30 kilotons at India’s major cities, it is unlikely that Pakistan would be able to deploy all of these weapons to conduct a “splendid first strike,” by which Indian capabilities are completely destroyed.
 

Moreover, it takes considerably fewer weapons of similar magnitude to utterly destroy Pakistan. Pakistan has thoughtfully concentrated all but three corps in central the Punjab region, which is also its most populous province and the country’s industrial and agricultural center. In short, Pakistan will cease to be a viable political entity while India, though grievously hurt, will survive as a state. Even if Pakistan obtains a functioning triad and retains launch capabilities from submarines, they will be launched in defense of a state that, simply put, no longer exists.
 

There is a fourth problem that should disquiet Pakistanis perhaps even more than the triggering of the destruction of their country through the deliberate or inadvertent use of their micro-weapons—these tactical nuclear weapons are intended to be used first against Indian troops on Pakistani soil. According to a conference report by the Naval Post School, which hosted Pakistan’s military and diplomatic officials, one Pakistani luminary opined that the “Nasr creates a balancing dynamic that frustrates and makes futile the power-maximizing strategy of India.”
 
He envisages the Nasr’s shells being used to carry atomic explosives that would annihilate advancing Indian armored thrusts in the southern deserts and blunt Indian advances toward major Pakistani cities, such as Lahore. Retired military general S. F. S. Lodhi, in the April 1999 issue of the Pakistan Defence Journal, laid out four stages of escalation in Pakistan’s use of tactical nuclear weapons which aligns with this view as well.
 

The consequences of Pakistan nuking itself to keep the Indians out should disturb Pakistanis. According to calculations by Jaganath Sankaran, Pakistan would have to use a 30-kiloton weapon on its own soil, as this is the minimum required to render ineffective fifty percent of an armored unit.
 
Using Lahore as an example, a 30-kiloton weapon used on the outskirts of the city could kill over 52,000 persons. As Indian troops move closer to Lahore and as the population increases, such a weapon could kill nearly 380,000. Sankaran notes, as an aside, that this would “genuinely destroy a larger battalion or brigade.” Consequently, many more Pakistanis would be likely to die than these horrendous figures suggest.
 
All of sudden, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons don’t look so fun for any Pakistani who thinks through the math.
 

Fifth, Pakistanis should be derisive of this new weapon in the national arsenal because it cannot do what the army promises: protect Pakistan from an Indian offensive. Would any Indian military planner take seriously Pakistan’s threat to use nuclear weapons on its own soil when the casualties are so high? Pakistan may have been willing to eat grass to get its nuclear weapons, but is it willing destroy its own center of gravity to maintain its ability to harass India with terrorism over territory to which it never had any legal claim? If the Indians do not take this threat seriously, how is it a deterrent against them? What additional deterrent capability do these weapons afford Pakistan that its strategic assets do not that compensates for the enormous risks they convey?
 

Finally, if India took Pakistan’s threats seriously, it does not have to invade Pakistan to coerce the country’s leaders to detonate one of these weapons on its own soil. Presumably simply looking adequately likely to cross the international border and threaten a major Punjabi city could provoke a “demonstration detonation.”
 

I am not encouraging a nuclear Armageddon upon Pakistan; rather expositing the limited utility that these weapons confer upon Pakistan.
 

Even if Pakistan fully inducts these weapons in its arsenal, it still has an army that can’t win a conventional war against India and nuclear weapons it cannot use. This leaves only an industrial farm of terrorists as the only efficacious tool at its disposal. And given the logic of the above scenario, India and the international community should consider seriously calling Pakistan’s bluff. The only logical Pakistani response to a limited offensive incursion is to accept the fait accompli and acquiesce.
So far, the West has seen Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a proliferation threat rather than a security threat. The implications of this has largely been appeasement. The United States, worried that Pakistan’s weapons may fall into the hands of non-state actors or that Pakistan will once again reopen its nuclear weapons bazaar to aspirant nuclear powers, perpetually argues for engaging Pakistan diplomatically, militarily, politically, and financially. In essence, Pakistan has effectively blackmailed the United States and the international community for an array of assistance exploiting the collective fears of what may happen should Pakistan collapse.
 

In recent months, some US White House officials have even argued for a potential nuclear deal to reward Pakistan for making concessions in fissile material production, limiting the development and deployment of its nuclear weapons among other activates to address Washington’s proliferation concerns. Unfortunately, Washington has yet to seriously formulate punishments rather than allurements to achieve these ends, even though Pakistan has shown no interest in making such concessions.
 

There are reasons why the United States and the international community should begin to see Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a direct security threat. For one thing, these nuclear weapons have always been intended to allow Pakistan to harass India through the use of militant proxies. Consequently, Pakistan has become an epicenter of Islamist terrorism.
 

Had Pakistan not had these nuclear capabilities, India could have sorted out Pakistan some time ago. Moreover, the critical time period for Pakistan’s nuclear program was in the late 1970s, when Pakistan was on the threshold of obtaining a crude weapon. (We now know that Pakistan had a crude nuclear weapon by 1984 if not somewhat earlier.) The United States even sanctioned Pakistan in 1979 for advances in its program.
 

The United States relented in its nonproliferation policy with respect to Pakistan after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Reagan, after getting sanctions waived in 1982, began supporting the so-called mujahedeen produced by Pakistan for use in Afghanistan. (Pakistan actually began its own jihad policy in 1974 on its dime without US assistance.)
 

Saudi Arabia matched America’s contributions. While al-Qaeda is not truly the direct descendent of the Afghan mujahedeen, there can be little doubt that the structures built to wage this jihad gave birth to the group. Had the United States remained focused on nuclear weapons in Pakistan, and used a different strategy in Afghanistan, a wholly different future could have been realized.
 

As tensions between the United States and Pakistan deepen, and as Pakistan’s arsenal expands and permits it to target US assets in South, Central, and Southwest Asia, the United States should begin considering Pakistan’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles as a direct threat to its security, rather than merely a proliferation problem to be managed




















 

INDIAN NAVY :Can India Counter China’s Submarine Force?

SOURCE:
http://southasianvoices.org/can-india-counter-chinas-submarine-force/


INDIA1



Can India Counter China’s Submarine Force?                                  By
                        Pushan Das*










Last week, India’s first conventional submarine in over a decade and a half —the INS Kalvari—finally began sea trials, amid reports of Indo-US cooperation in tracking Chinese submarine activity in the region. As sightings of Chinese submarines become more frequent in the Indian Ocean region, the Indian Navy is looking at innovative ways to gain an edge in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Can the Indian Navy effectively counter a modern Chinese submarine force, which is primarily optimized for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean?


India’s expenditure on defense acquisition has remained largely static in real terms in recent years, resulting in constraints on not just the navy but the armed forces in general. The defense outlay for fiscal year 2016/17 was INR 2.49 trillion (USD 36.63 billion), but according to IHS Jane’s 360, this was counterbalanced by rising inflation, and weakening of the Indian rupee against the U.S. dollar over the past two years. Furthermore, the force posture and modernization agendas of the Indian armed forces under the continued broad influence of a “two-front war” construct have left the Indian Navy with a mere 16 percent of the defense budget (excluding defense pensions). This limits the navy’s capacity to address increasing diffusion of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN)’s capabilities in the region.


The commissioning of the INS Kalvari, first of six indigenously-built French Scorpene-class submarines, should be a shot in the arm for the navy’s ageing and dwindling submarine fleet. However, the submarine will be inducted sans its primary weapon: torpedoes. The navy plans to buy Black Shark torpedoes from a subsidiary of Italian defense big wig Finmeccanica. But the company is currently embroiled in a helicopter bribery scam in India that will create further delays in acquisition, leaving the weapons platforms ineffective for the near future. Given how long submarine building takes, the follow-on program for Project-75 I submarines is probably more than a decade away, considering the Ministry of Defence is yet to issue a Request for Proposal.


The navy’s most-recently inducted surface combatants destroyers—INS Kolkata, INS Kochi, and ASW corvettes INS Kamorta and INS Kadmatt— lacked Active Electronic Towed Array Sonar (ATAS) systems to detect submarines at the time of commissioning. The Indian Navy is also woefully short of ASW helicopters, which means that ships have taken to sailing without their requisite air complements of late. The purchase of 16 Sikorsky S-70B naval multi-role helicopters (MRH) is stuck in price negotiations. While the navy has made significant progress in acquiring government approval to build a robust warship program, its acquisition of an adequate multi-role ship-borne helicopter has been futile. This significantly reduces the ability of Indian vessels to triangulate and engage underwater targets. However, in recent years, India’s aerial maritime surveillance has received somewhat of a boost with the induction of eight Boeing Poseidon-8I maritime patrol and ASW aircraft, which have been deployed to the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar Islands and more recently, Seychelles. The process of acquiring four more P-8I aircraft is on.


In contrast, according to a new Congressional Research Service report, “China since the mid-1990s has acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-powered attack submarines and put into service at least four new classes of indigenously-built submarines.” The same report quotes various defense sources, estimating the PLAN submarine force to grow to between 69 and 78 submarines by 2020. A combination of nuclear-powered (such as Jin class/Type 094) and conventionally-powered (such as Yuan class/Type 039A) submarines will represent formidable capability.


Compounding Indian concerns over China’s increasing underwater ambition in the Indian Ocean, Pakistan is believed to be in the process of purchasing eight Type 039A/Type 041 Yuan-class diesel-electric submarines from Beijing. Added to the existing three French Agosta-90B/Khalid and two Agosta-70 submarines of the Pakistan Navy, the Indian Navy faces a significant under water threat in the years to come.


Prominent strategic analyst Ashley Tellis recently argued that India’s “current and prospective defense budget constraints” suggest that it won’t be able to fund its stated warfighting orientations “adequately”, and this will constrain its ability to be a net security provider in the region. Acquiring “effective military capabilities for power projection coupled with wise policies for their use” are key to India’s ambitions in the region.


Fitting India’s defense needs within a reasonably-sized budget remains a challenge as concerns remain over its fiscal situation. Despite allocating around 54 percent of its budget (INR 394.25 billion/USD 5.93 billion, excluding pensions) to capital expenditure this year, the navy would be woefully short of funding its Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP 2012-27). This is because the assumption was that the allocation for defense would equal three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the entire plan period, which has not happened.


Co-operating with the United States and regional partners in ASW in the Indian Ocean will help the navy bridge its ASW capacity deficit, and also allow for the optimization of its available assets and capabilities. The commitment to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) during U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s visit to India last month— which grants India access to certain U.S. military bases like Diego Garcia, Djibouti, Bahrain as well as logistical assets in the region— will be central to Indo-U.S. co-operation in ASW. With a bit of imagination, the Indian naval assets can increase their endurance, and range in tracking and deterring PLAN’s submarine forays into the region.  Division of labour, by way of forming different areas of responsibility to track and monitor, will help focus India’s limited ASW capacities in strategically-vital regions.


While procurement difficulties and funding issues will drive New Delhi’s co-operative sourcing of maritime capabilities, India’s defense preparedness and capability-development efforts will ultimately depend on building an efficient system of defense procurement, indigenous production capability, and acquisition reform, in order to sustain this modernization. Given the centrality of the Indian Ocean to India’s national security and China’s increasing activity and ambition there, New Delhi must recapitalize and optimize its ASW capability in order to shape the region’s security environment.

China, Defence, India, Maritime, Security, US






INDIA1


Islamabad recently inked a deal with Beijing for eight such conventional submarines, four of which will be built in Pakistan. As reported earlier by TOI, politico-bureaucratic apathy in India has, however, ensured that the Navy is currently grappling with just 13 ageing diesel-electric submarines, only half of them operational at any given time, and a single nuclear-powered submarine (without any nuclear-tipped missiles) on lease from Russia. China, in sharp contrast, has 51 conventional and five nuclear submarines. It is also going to soon induct another five advanced JIN-class nuclear submarines equipped with the new 7,400-km JL-2 missiles.





 

Thursday, May 12, 2016

Indian Military Modernization: Growing Dust

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/12052016-indian-military-modernization-growing-dust-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29



Indian Military Modernization: Growing Dust
                                         By
                                                            




US Defense Secretary Ash Carter, left, walks with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma, right, as he arrives in Goa, India, April 10, 2016.DoD photo by Air Force Senior Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz






Among all the imminent actions of the recent meeting of Parrikar and US Secretary of Defense with their rapid and uneven defense procurement there is something new in the box. This visit is seen very closely in certain quarters by neighboring countries because of their continuous military modernization and nuclear arms procurement stimulates massive and growing impacts-creating unrest in Asia in the past and may do so in future as well.

This new found access to boost defense ties seems to be a welcoming effort to this unending race of achieving massive military assets. The problem, however, is the Indian long haunted increase in defence spending which threatens to upset and upsurge the delicate military balance.

With expanded India/US defense relationship with co-production of US defense system in India, if ever there was a question about Indian continuous hike to 6.3 percent in defense spending every year, suffice for any volatile situation. Accelerating at a fast-track, where these deepening ties between New Delhi and Washington also allowed both partners to commerce a civil nuclear deal where former is a non-signatory to NPT, which is not a stable geometry for region.

These classifications validate that being the largest buyer for conventional weaponry, it has plans to develop and modernize its defense forces. Even as regional tensions continue to mount, these new developments and allocations would enable their forces to move forward in the direction of their fresh acquisition that still thought of themselves as the lost decade of defense modernization surrendering crores.

Following a cross-border attack, it is prudent to turn back the pages where a raid was taken out by Indian forces in Myanmar on July 2015, an actual operation by paramilitary and army Special Forces. It hardly can be over-ruled where same tactics can be used against neighbouring countries like Pakistan following the induction of proactive strategies like Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) which is a tactics under wrap.

CSD to my knowledge is more about inflicting as much damage as one can to enemies forces and infrastructure within no time. It is more or less like a hit and run tactics giving no time to enemy to react. So keeping in mind the manifold forces of Indian army as compared to Pakistan, it poses serious security threats to Pakistan besides increasing the arms race which enables Pakistan to reserve the rights to defend itself in every possible manner.

Cautiously, to understand Indian military mindset which is reflected in retired Indian military officer named Rathor’s interview through igniting rhetoric which stated, “We will strike when we want to.” [ CLICK & READ http://tribune.com.pk/story/901063/india-will-strike-enemies-at-place-and-time-of-its-choosing-says-minister/ ]
Compounded with varying difficulties, Pakistan being a developing country has restricted possessions to counter the growing challenges of geo-strategic, political, social, economic, environmental and technological changes.

Consequently, keeping in mind all the developments that India has in its pockets, the induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW’s) by Pakistan– a concern exaggerated by different analysts and strategic theorists which in real terms is acknowledged by Pakistan to chalk out triggering conflicts and proactive strategies inducted by Indian forces. So the core challenges run much deeper than what the prevailing strategic environment has forced Pakistan to balance the strategic equilibrium in the region.

Referring to the development of TNW’s, our outstanding disputes and conflicts, our history of trust deficit, Indian continued advancements of conventional and nuclear capabilities has forced Pakistan to act in a way which can brush out all their options to inflict any damage to us.

In relation to this, the remarkable increase in Indian defense budget is another danger to this mix which is set to hike on $40billion comparing neighboring country Pakistan’s basic and military budget devoted at a tail ratio of roughly $7billion. Therefore, such advancement by Indian counterparts i.e. rudimentary defense spending is the basic foundation of apprehensions in the region.

Talking of criticalities, their nuclear ‘shopping spree’ is also a major catalyst for the region to be chained in arms race among neighbours. This new dawn of Modi’s modification has set the stage for which the international community must be concerned. As this all modification is on its way to fetter the region in fright of war and nuclear apocalypse alike First World War

In a similar vein, their determination to lease second nuclear submarine from Russia is also a cause of concern for vertical proliferation infers that global challenges and threats would now require new approaches. Russia being state party to START is also violating both the treaty obligations of START and NPT. These fleshy developments continuously in nuclear and strategic weapon domain are not merely an issue for the whole Asian region but will keep lurking the common security of all nations.

It seems that the adage international treaties and norms are constantly adjusting to the dynamic diplomatic relations that states have to manipulate where relations are now transformed to mutual suspicions of militarism machinery.

To further pursue the hegemonic designs to be a leader in the region the Modi government relaxes norms for foreign direct investment in its civilian and defense industry which will create India’s military industrial complex. This all implies moving towards the dangerous weaponization of Indian society where companies like TATA is engaged in collaborating Indian aerospace and defense manufacturing and potential integrated systems development opportunities, including unmanned aerial vehicles creating a neo-military complex in India. This can fuel long term cross border conflicts to sell the weapons they will make where spread of nuclear weapons to more states will be an obnoxious risk to global security.

Lastly, spending crores would further escalate existing disputes making South Asia a more trouble spot with high cost and increased threat of strategic volatility. The broader lesson would be to set a precedent where peace can flourish because the greater spending in military modernization could escalate into a nuclear war very quickly.