Sunday, April 23, 2017

HIZB - UL- MUJHAIDEEN : '2017 should be Moosa's last Summer' : INDIAN ARMY (R)

SOURCE:

http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=251716

'2017 should be Moosa's last Summer' : INDIAN ARMY

Zakir Rashid Bhatt alias Moosa, who is the divisional commander of the South Kashmir area for Hizbul Mujahideen after Wani died

'2017 should be his last summer': Indian Army continues fight against militant groups in Kashmir

They claim to be closing in on Zakir Rashid Bhatt, the Hizbul Mujahideen successor of Wani
Security forces, including the Jammu and Kashmir police, CRPF and the Army units, are operating in the Valley
'As per the intelligence that we have been getting, 2017 should be [Bhatt's] last summer,' sources in the Army said
By

Ajit K Dubey

22 April 2017

Undeterred by the ongoing protests, the security forces in Kashmir valley are closing in on the leadership of militant groups and are chasing their top guns, including the successor of slain Hizbul Mujahideen militant Burhan Wani.

Security forces, including the Jammu and Kashmir police, CRPF and the Army units operating in the Valley, have been successful in eliminating some of the heads of terror groups in the last few months, like the dreaded Lashkar terrorist Hamas, who was killed during an encounter in Tral last month.

'We are chasing the terrorist leadership including Wani's successor Zakir Rashid Bhatt alias Moosa, who is the divisional commander of the South Kashmir area for Hizbul Mujahideen after Wani.

'As per the intelligence that we have been getting, 2017 should be his last summer,' sources in the Army said.

Moosa, a resident of Tral area, has an engineering degree and is an expert in usage of social media which helped him be elevated as the successor to Wani.

LeT's Abu Dujana escaped from forces twice in recent months

'However, Moosa is not popular the way Wani was because he is known to be rough with his own people and has made many enemies within his own tanzeem after manhandling some of them in the recent times,' they said.

Some of the informers cultivated in his native village by the troops had passed on the information to security forces about his visit to his family in Noorpura village in Tral last month.

'The information was accurate as he did go to meet his family but we missed him by a couple of minutes as he ran away from there,' the sources said.

With terrorist groups and separatists luring locals with money for protests and stone pelting, forces feel that it won't be very difficult to get accurate intelligence about these terrorists.

Forces believe they would be able to eliminate their targets as they were successful earlier with Majid Zaragar, Aquib Bhatt of Tral and Hamas of the LeT which would help them break the central leadership and hit the morale of terror groups.

Another top target on the list of security forces is the Kashmir commander of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Abu Dujana, who has had a long run in the valley as a terrorist and has managed to escape from the grip of security forces on at least two occasions in the last four months.

'In December, we had received a tip-off that he was hiding inside a particular house in the Bejbehara area in the Anantnag district and he was surrounded by the forces in the house.

'The gun battle started in the middle of the night but he managed to escape from there under the cover of darkness,' the sources said.

This has not been the only time when the dreaded terrorist has managed to escape from the security forces as during a recent search operation on the highway in Pulwama district, he managed to run away despite accurate intelligence.

'An input was received that he would be travelling in a Maruti Alto car passing through Pulwama where checks were carried out on the vehicles plying on the road.

'The particular car was intercepted but by that time, Dujana had got the inkling about a trap laid for him and managed to escape in a hurry as his personal mobile phone was recovered from the car,' the sources said.

Dujana is also considered to be a master of deception as he was earlier believed to be killed in the encounter in south Kashmir's Anantnag district but it was found later that he had only circulated the rumour about himself.

The third terrorist on the hit list is the Hizbul Kashmir commander Yaseen Itto, who was made to return from Pakistan to carry out anti-India activities by the Hizbul Mujahidden commander-in-chief Sayyed Salahauddin.

Before his arrival in Kashmir, Salahuddin started spreading rumours about the death of Itto but it was found to be incorrect later on as he resurfaced in the valley many times after that.

Thursday, April 20, 2017

PLA MODERNIZATION :Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-eastern-theater-command/?mc_cid=9347b7298a&mc_eid=2aedc83db6

Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command

Delivering his work report to the National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang noted that “the Chinese mainland will resolutely oppose and contain ‘Taiwan independence separatist activities’” (“台独”分裂活动) (Xinhua, March 5). [1] President Xi Jinping, however, was even more explicit in early November 2016, when he said “1.3 billion Chinese people will oppose Taiwan independence. We have the ability, the determination and are prepared to deal with Taiwan independence. If we do not, we will be overthrown (推翻) by 1.3 billion people” (Apple Daily, November 2, 2016). China’s ability to “deal” with Taiwan involves political and economic pressure. These tools have already seen some success as the number of countries that recognize Taiwan shrinks, and Taiwan’s participation in international organizations is severely restricted. However, as China’s military becomes more effective, military coercion is increasingly a viable option. An overview of China’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC) provides some insight into the Chinese military’s current capabilities against Taiwan.

China’s Eastern Strategic Direction

Although eastern China is one of the most densely populated and important areas of the country, China’s east coast has not always been its primary strategic direction. Chinese military writings note that China’s historical focus on ground forces arose out of a lack of maritime threats to China from the east. In ancient times, and again during the 20th century, the threat of land invasions from the west and north outweighed threats to the east and south. [2] With the renewal of ties with Russia in the mid-1980s the strategic focus shifted again to the east, raising the importance of aerospace and maritime forces.

In the mid-1990s, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis put the region back in headlines. Missile launches in 1995 and 1996 prompted the United States to send two carrier strike groups to the area around Taiwan. The incident also revealed a number of deficits in PLA capabilities. While Taiwan remained a key issue for the PLA, its lack of sufficient maritime lift capacity, air superiority and even intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities meant that an invasion across the strait would not succeed.

The U.S. navy’s ability to operate without real challenge was another major problem, and Chinese defense planners recognized the need to have layered offensive and defensive systems to project power into the East China Sea.

The Japanese governments’ 2012 purchase of the Senkaku Islands from a private owner sparked tensions and prompted widespread protests throughout China. Projecting power not just toward Taiwan but throughout the East China Sea gained additional importance. The Chinese government followed up on this by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone in late November 2013 (China Brief, December 5, 2013). The area has since seen a steady increase in Chinese military aviation and maritime patrols (China Brief, October 26, 2016). Accompanying these events, China’s military has reformed and reorganized to better deal with security issues along its eastern strategic direction.

The military organizations responsible for most of eastern China have undergone a number of changes since the 1980s. Until 1988, China had 11 military regions (MR) including ones centered on Fuzhou in northern Fujian province and Nanjing. The Fuzhou MR was incorporated into the Nanjing MR, which, after the latest round of reforms, has been folded intact into the Eastern Theater Command. An important result of the 2015 military reforms is that the Theater Command acts as joint headquarters for Army, Navy and Air Force (China Brief, June 21, 2016). The Rocket Force also has units present in the ETC, although they are directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military body.

The Geography of Eastern China

The current ETC is composed of military units within the borders of Anhui, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces, as well as Shanghai Municipality. Together, their populations include over 280 million citizens and three of China’s top ten ports— Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen. Bisected by the Yangtze River ( 长江), the region’s geography is dominated by plains in the north portion and mountains in the west and south. A cluster of multi-million person megacities connected by high-speed rail dot the landscape between the ETC’s headquarters in Nanjing in southwestern Jiangsu province to Shanghai on the coast. A number of large lakes, including Lake Tai (太湖), break up this geography. The three provinces and municipality on China’s coast together ..................................

Province   |   Population
| (millions, 2015)
---------------- --|-----------------------------
Anhui | 69.5
Jiangsu | 79.8
Jiangxi | 52
Shanghai | 24.2
Zhejiang | 55.4
------------------------------------------
Total |    280.9
------------------------------------------------

.......................make up the Yangtze river delta (长江三角洲). So important is it to China’s economy, industry and population, The Science of Military Strategy, a PLA textbook, describes this area, along with the Pearl River Delta in China’s South, as one of its “centers of gravity” (重心所在). [3]

The Yangtze River connects eastern China with its central core, and the river plays a vital role commercially and logistically. The 1st Group Army, based in Huzhou, Zhejiang province contains a mix of units meant to defend the central coast of China. This includes an amphibious unit capable of operating in this environment of lakes and rivers that would also be used in a Taiwan scenario. The same group army contains well-equipped mechanized brigades and an armored brigade. Further to the north, the 12th Group Army is headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, and has mechanized brigades protecting Nanjing and northern Jiangsu. This central core of the ETC is also protected by the Air Forces’ 3rd Fighter Division, with a variety of air interception units.

China has its largest concentration of naval forces at the mouth of the Qiantang river (钱塘江). The East Sea Fleet is headquartered in Ningbo, and home to naval aviation units and several destroyer and submarine squadrons (zhidui; 支队), typically of 4–5 ships. PLA Naval Aviation units play an important role as they are responsible for patrolling the line between Taiwan and the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. Longrange naval H-6G bombers from Benniu air base regularly participate in long-distance patrols through the Miyako Strait and into the western Pacific.

The southern half of the ETC is dominated by rough terrain, and was the birthplace of the PLA’s predecessor, the Red Army, in Nanchang, Jiangxi province. Jiangxi’s mountains served a home base for a weakened Red Army in the early stages of China’s civil war. Now, Rocket Forces launch brigades present within the ETC are primarily located in the complicated terrain of Jiangxi and Anhui.

The coastal cities of Xiamen and Fuzhou, situated directly across the strait from Taiwan are also home to a large concentration of forces. The PLA Ground Forces’ headquarters is located in Fuzhou, and the area is well protected by Air Force and Ground Force air defense units, including long-range surface to air missiles that cover the entirety of the Taiwan Strait. Amphibious and Special Forces units vital to an invasion of Taiwan are also present under the 31st Group Army.

Joint Operations

The ETC’s Commander is Liu Yuejun (刘粤军) and its Political Officer is Zheng Weiping (郑卫平). Liu and Zheng are both ground force commanders with experience in China’s former Guangzhou military region in the south. Liu even participated in China’s last military conflict, its short border war with Vietnam in 1979 (The Taiwan Link, April 3, 2016). In any conflict, these men would need to coordinate closely with their subordinate commanders of the Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force, as well as the Rocket Force commander. In March 2016, in the midst of the shift to theater commands, Liu and Zheng coauthored an editorial in the Communist Party’s journal Seeking Truth in which they described the creation of the theater commands as a key enabler of joint operations (Seeking Truth, March 31, 2016).

The PLA has made progress in learning how to conduct joint operations, but the complications of conflict on its eastern seaboard also necessitates coordination between Theater Commands, particularly the Southern and Eastern Commands (China Brief, July 22, 2016). China’s two marine brigades, for example, are located near Zhanjiang in Guangdong province. Although Shanghai is home to a landing ship squadron, such forces would need to work together. Other units would need to be redeployed from other theater commands. This would allow, for example, strategically important areas to rapidly increase their air defenses by redeployment from the Central TC to the area around Fuzhou, as recently practiced by an HQ9 Surface-to-Air Missile (ChinaMil, October 12, 2016).

The PLA regularly practices the types of operations it would need in a Taiwan scenario. Amphibious units practice long-distance movement overland as well as maritime operations (China Brief, August 4, 2015). The Liaoning, China’s testbed aircraft carrier, has recently begun live-fire air superiority and anti-ship operations (China Brief, December 21, 2016). As China completes and brings online its own indigenously built carriers, both operations could be used off the northeastern coast of Taiwan. Air Force and Naval Aviation have conducted joint long-distance patrols near Taiwan and through the Miyako Strait (China Brief, October 26, 2016).

The Rocket Forces also play an important role in the ETC’s offensive power projection. There are at least four Rocket Force Launch Brigades in the ETC, under Base 52 in Huangshan, Anhui, as well as an additional brigade in Shaoguan, Guangdong. According to the latest Annual to Congress on the Chinese military, some 1,200 short- and medium-ranged ballistic and cruise missiles are aimed Taiwan and beyond. (See chart for specific numbers).

These forces would be expected to strike quickly at air bases and ports in Japan as well to neutralize threats. The Rocket Force even dubs its advanced DF-16 SRBM the “Okinawa Express” (People’s Daily Online, February 15).

Though beyond the scope of this discussion, network warfare units under the Strategic Support Force in Shanghai, Quanzhou and elsewhere would play an important role in any Eastern Theater Command campaign. A large number of signals intelligence units are also present opposite Taiwan (TheTaiwanLink, August 8, 2016). Rocket Force units, along with operations by the Strategic Support Force against key ISR infrastructure would take the lead in attacking Taiwan or Okinawa in a conflict.

Conclusion

Chinese rhetoric regarding Taiwan and Japan have gone through several cycles. Ahead of the Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress later this year, it is possible that such rhetoric has a political rather than strategic meaning. However, the PLA continues to modernize, and Taiwan’s military deterrent continues to suffer due to budgetary and political issues (China Brief, August 22, 2016; October 4, 2016). The United States itself is reexamining its own policies toward East Asia, introducing an additional element of uncertainty. However, despite the many changes that China’s military strategy has undergone, it unlikely that the Eastern strategic direction will lose importance any time soon. If conflict breaks out between China and another country, the Eastern Theater Command will play a leading role.

Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW

Notes

While such language has long been part of official statements on Taiwan, it is a recent edition to the NPC report. A review of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 NPC Work reports did not find similar language, although the 2015 report included the phrase “opposing independence”.
The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 32
The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 101

General References

Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation For the 21st Century, 2nd Edition, New York: Routledge, 2012.

CB_17_4.pdf

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA SETUP PRIOR TO MODENRIZATION

SOURCE:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/mr.htm

PLA SETUP PRIOR TO MODENRIZATION

Military Regions / Military Area Commands

China's military established five regional commands for its operations on 01 February 2016, President Xi Jinping's latest step in reforming the country's armed forces. State-run China Central Television reported on a ceremony held by the People's Liberation Army to mark the launch of the commands -- what the military calls "battle zones". President Xi Jinping conferred military flags on the commanders of each of the five zones.

The Central Military Commission Reform Work Conference in Beijing on 24-26 November 2015 was a gathering of more than 200 senior government officials and military brass. The CCP decided to implement by 2020 military reforms focusing on three priorities -- consolidating seven military regions into five "battle zones" - new units, to integrate army, navy and air force units; and strengthening the forces in charge of missile, space and cyber warfare, which were of growing importance in modern military conflicts. The Reform Work Conference was initially scheduled to last only a day and a half. But as the reform proposals met with criticism from military officials, the conference was extended to three days.

SEVEN MILITARY REGIONS
TO
FIVE THEATRE COMBAT COMMANDS

Before the reforms, there were seven military regions, including the Beijing Military Region, Shenyang Military Region, Jinan Military Region, Lanzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region and Nanjing Military Region. These regions have now been reclassified into five battle zones (or theater commands), namely the East, West, South, North, and Middle battle zones.

The new battle zones are operational formations, with acqusition functions previously associated with the Military regions, and a prime source of corruption opportunities, now centralized in Beijing.

The joint war-fighting commands in geographic zones represented a shift in focus from homeland defense to a more external orientation based on various strategic directions of potential threats.

This would help the PLA better focus on external threats, regional power projection, and likely enhance integrated joint operations between the services. Many of the important posts in each region were dominated by army officials. Maintaining firm control over the regions was difficult since they were locally-oriented in terms of procurement and personnel relocation. The Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi, launched a general command unit in December 2015 to control the integrated operations of ground, naval and air forces. The Commission also set up a joint operational command structure for each of the "battle zones". The joint commands overseeing combined army, navy and air force units established within each battle zone.

Experts believe the official establishment of the five "battle zones" marks a historic moment in establishing a united operational system to strengthen the army and better protect China's national security.

"The establishment of united commands for the battle zones marks a significant breakthrough for the Chinese army. The system will ensure more efficient coordination between different units. The Chinese military will therefore acquire stronger combat capabilities. Secondly, different battle zones will have different strategic emphases. The commands will better focus on their own strategic directions so as to better protect China's interests in different areas," said military expert Lou Yaoliang.

China's move to establish five new theater commands is "a breakthrough and a historic step" in setting up a joint battle command system for the military, a PLA Daily commentary said. In the previous commands, the administration and command systems were not managed separately, it said, identifying unclear functions and ineffective joint command systems as institutional barriers to winning wars.

With the new move, the theater commands can enable relatively separate management of the administration and command system and better coordination among different military services, it said. As such, a more efficient command chain for battles can be put into place, according to the commentary. The principle of the Central Military Commission taking charge of overall military administration, theater commands focusing on combat and different military branches pursuing their own development should also be strictly observed, the PLA Daily said.

Shenyang Military Area Command, which is close to North Korea, was one of the seven battle-zone commands and believed to be tasked with coping with contingency plans on the Korean Peninsula. The Shenyang Military Area Command was reclassified as The North "battle zone" with its area of responsibility including the Inner Mongolia region along with China's northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang.

Chinese President Xi Jinping urged breakthroughs in reform of the country's armed forces by 2020, vowing to reorganize the current military administration structure and military command system. Xi, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), made the remarks at a meeting on reforming the armed forces which was held from Nov. 24 to 26, 2015.

A new structure will be established, in which the CMC takes charge of the overall administration of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese People's Armed Police and the militia and reserve forces; battle zone commands focus on combats; and different military services pursue their own construction, Xi said.

According to Xi, the CMC's "centralized and unified" leadership should be strengthened to ensure that supreme administration and command status belong to the CMC and the CPC Central Committee. Xi cited measures designed to "integrate the administrative system and the joint battle command system," including a general command center for land forces and enabling the CMC to directly administer and command various military departments.

The current regional military commands will be adjusted and regrouped into new battle zone commands supervised by the CMC, Xi said. The reform will establish a three-tier "CMC - battle zone commands - troops" command system and an administration system that runs from CMC through various services to the troops.

China planned to merge four of its seven Military Regions into two in order to better coordinate the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps in a future combat environment, Tokyo's Yomiuri Shimbun reported 02 January 2014. The Jinan, Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions would be spared, as they focused on the disputed East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. However, the Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions will be merged, as will the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions, reducing the country's seven military regions to five.

Military Regions

	Military Region	Responsible Regions
	Beijing Military Region	Capital region and northern China
	Shenyang Military Region	NE China
	Jinan Military Region	Eastern China (North Sea Fleet)
	Nanjing Military Region	SE China (Taiwan, East Sea Fleet)
	Guangzhou Military Region	Southern China (South Sea Fleet)
	Lanzhou Military Region	Western China (Xinjiang)
	Chengdu Military Region	SW China (Tibet)

The commanders of these military regions have operational command operations of most ground forces in their geographical areas. The military area commands (theaters of war) of the PLA are military organizations set up according to the state's administrative divisions, geographical locations, strategic and operational orientations, and operational tasks. Under each military area command are a number of Army combined corps, units of various arms, logistical support units, and provincial or garrison commands. Their major functions include organizing and coordinating the joint operations and exercises of the ground, naval and air forces in each military area; exercising direct leadership over Party affairs, military training, administration, political work, logistical and armaments support of the Army units under its jurisdiction; and directing the militia, military service, mobilization, civil air defense and battlefield construction work in the military area.

The People's Liberation Army began a modernization effort following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, which made it clear to China's top commanders that a large and ill-equipped army was not a reliable instrument of national security policy. In May, 1985, China solemnly declared that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would reduce military personnel by one million. Reapportionment and merger reduced the number of military area commands from eleven to seven. More than 5,900 units above the regimental level were dispersed through dismantling, merging, demoting or reforming.

Since the 1980s, China replaced the regional and field army organization and divided up the nation's troops into 7 Military Regions.

The Southeast Area (Nanjing Military Region and Guangzhou Military Region): 5 army groups were deployed, numbering about 480,000 in total as of 1998.

The Northeast Area (Shenyang Military Region): The total strength was approximately 310,000 persons, organized into 5 army groups as of 1998.

The Southwest Area (Chengdu Military Region): The total manpower amounted to 180,000 persons, composed of 2 army groups as of 1998.

The Northwest Area (Lanzhou Military Region): Two army groups are deployed in the area, a force numbering more than 220,000 in total as of 1998.

The Capital Area (Beijing Military Region): The total strength amounted to about 410,000 persons, organized into 6 army groups as of 1998.

The Strategic Reserve (Jinan Military Region): The total manpower was some 240,000 persons, consisting of 4 army groups as of 1998.

Tuesday, April 18, 2017

Samadhi- "Maya, the Illusion of the Self" (R)

SOURCE:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bw9zSMsKcwk

Samadhi- "Maya, the Illusion of the Self"

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bw9zSMsKcwk ]

What is the significance of Jeeva Samadhi? Sadhguru

Published on Mar 10, 2017

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LODGE A "FIR" AGAINST INDIAN ARMY

SOURCE:

http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=251603

VIEW FROM FROM PAKISTAN

LODGE

A "FIR"

AGAINST INDIAN ARMY

- Gen DigVictory Singh

"STATEMENT OF COMPLAIN IN FIR"

Indian Army Kills 8 Pakistani Soldiers as forces retaliate to ceasefire violation along LoC in Rajouri

Eight Pakistan Army soldier were killed and several injured as Indian Army retaliated to unprovoked ceasefire violation along the Line of Control (LoC) in Rajouri district of Jammu and Kashmir today.

Pakistan Army started heavy mortar shelling and firing at two Indian positions in Jhanger and Sher Makedi village near the LoC in Naushera, triggering of a gun duel, a defence official said.

"Pakistan Army initiated indiscriminate firing of small arms, automatics and mortars on Indian posts on the LoC in two villages of Naushera sector in Rajouri district at around 8 am. Indian Army posts are retaliating strongly and effectively," said Defence Ministry spokesman, Lt Col Manish Mehta.

According to the defence sources, mortar shell fired by the Indian Army fell into an Army camp across the border and Pakistan suffered maximum causality.

Pakistani helicopters and ambulances were seen from across the border to shift the injured and dead Pakistan Army soldiers to near by hospitals.

These areas normally remain calm but Pakistan is now using soft areas for infiltration of armed terrorists from old routes. The Pakistan Army is giving cover fire to terrorists so that they can infiltrate to kick-up violence in the border districts of Rajouri and Poonch, defence officials said.

Intelligence agencies have already alerted the Army and the state police that this summer will be hot and more than 100 terrorists are waiting on launching pads near Line of Control to cross over to the Indian side.

MADE IN PAKISTAN

ABP News showing videos showing our army soldiers beating Kashmiri youth actually shot in Pakistan. New high by ISPR.

Vasundhra