Monday, April 24, 2017

The China-North Korea Relationship

SOURCE:
http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief--link19-20170424&sp_mid=53915841&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1




The China-North Korea Relationship

                                       By

Authors: Eleanor Albert, Online 

          Writer/Editor, and Beina Xu




 February 8, 2016














Introduction
China is North Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-un’s regime, and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on North Korea in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across their 870-mile border. Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test as well as a ballistic missile launch in early 2016 have complicated its relationship with Beijing, which has continued to advocate for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. A purge of top North Korean officials since its young leader came to power also spurred renewed concern from China about the stability and direction of North Korean leadership. Furthermore, some experts say that an anticipated thawing of relations between China and South Korea could shift the geopolitical dynamic in East Asia and undermine China-North Korea ties. Yet despite North Korea’s successive nuclear tests, China’s policies toward its neighbor have hardly shifted.
Alliance Under Stress
China's support for North Korea dates back to the Korean War (1950-1953), when its troops flooded the Korean Peninsula to aid its northern ally. Since the war, China has lent political and economic backing to North Korea's leaders: Kim Il-sung (estimated 1948-1994), Kim Jong-il (roughly 1994-2011), and Kim Jong-un (2011-). But strains in the relationship began to surface when Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Beijing supported UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. With this resolution and others (UNSC Resolution 1874 (PDF) and 2094 (PDF)), Beijing signaled a shift in tone from diplomacy to punishment. Following North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, China summoned the North Korean ambassador, implemented new trade sanctions, reduced energy supplies to North Korea, and called for denuclearization talks. However, Beijing has continued to have wide-ranging ties with Pyongyang, including economic exchanges and high-level state trips such as senior Chinese Communisty Party member Li Yunshan's visit to attend the seventieth anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party in October 2015.
Separately, China has stymied international punitive action against North Korea over human rights violations. China criticized a February 2014 UN report that detailed human rights abuses in North Korea, including torture, forced starvation, and crimes against humanity, and attempted to block UN Security Council sessions held in December 2014 and 2015 on the country’s human rights status. In March 2010, China refused to take a stance against North Korea, despite conclusive evidence that showed Pyongyang’s involvement in sinking a South Korean naval vessel.
“There is no reason to think that political risks emanating from North Korea will lead China to withdraw its economic safety net for North Korea any time soon,”—CFR’s Scott Snyder
Even China’s punitive steps have been restrained. Beijing only agreed to UN Resolution 1718 after revisions removed requirements for tough economic sanctions beyond those targeting luxury goods. It did agree to further sanctions, some of which called for inspections of suspected nuclear or missile trade, but Western officials and experts doubt  how committed China is to implementing trade restrictions.
China–North Korea trade has also steadily increased in recent years: in 2014 trade between the two countries hit $6.86 billion, up from about $500 million in 2000, according to figures from the Seoul-based Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. Recent reports indicate that bilateral trade dropped by almost 15 percent in 2015, though it is unclear whether the dip is a result of chilled ties between Beijing and Pyongyang or China’s economic slowdown. Nevertheless, “there is no reason to think that political risks emanating from North Korea will lead China to withdraw its economic safety net for North Korea any time soon,” writes CFR Senior Fellow Scott Snyder.
Aid and Trade for Pyongyang
China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea's total trade volume (PDF). “China is currently North Korea’s only economic backer of any importance,” writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. In September 2015, the two countries opened a bulk cargo and container shipping route to boost North Korea’s export of coal to China and China established a high-speed rail route between the Chinese border city of Dandong and Shenyang, the provincial capital of China’s northeastern Liaoning province.  In October 2015, the Guomenwan border trade zone opened in Dandong with the intention of boosting bilateral economic linkages, much like the Rason economic zone and the Sinujiu special administrative zone established in North Korea in the early 1990s and 2002, respectively. Dandong is a critical hub for trade, investment, and tourism for the two neighbors—exchanges with  North Korea make up 40 percent of the city’s total trade. Due to North Korea’s increasing isolation, its dependence on China continues to grow, as indicated by the significant trade imbalance between the two countries. Some experts see the trade deficit as an indirect Chinese subsidy, given that North Korea cannot finance its trade deficit through borrowing.

Beijing also provides aid (PDF) directly to Pyongyang, primarily in food and energy assistance. China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have provided more than 75 percent of food aid to North Korea since 1995, but donations from all countries except for China have shrunk significantly since the collapse of the Six Party Talks in 2009. North Korea, whose famine in the 1990s killed between 800,000 to 2.4 million people, reported its worst drought in decades in June 2015, with harvests sustaining serious damage. UN agencies designated up to 70 percent of the population as food insecure. There is also concern about the distribution of aid in North Korea, particularly since China has no system (PDF) to monitor shipments. Recently, however, “Beijing has been trying to wean Pyongyang off pure aid in favor of more commercially viable ties,” University of Sydney’s James Reilly writes.
China’s Priorities
China regards stability on the Korean peninsula as its primary interest. Its support for North Korea ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border and provides a buffer between China and the democratic South, which is home to around 29,000 U.S. troops and marines.  “For the Chinese, stability and the avoidance of war are the top priorities,” says Daniel Sneider of Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center.


The specter of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees flooding into China is a huge worry for Beijing. “China would prefer to avoid a calamity on its border especially since North Korea’s collapse would destroy China’s strategic buffer and probably bring U.S. troops too close to comfort,” write Yonsei University’s John Delury and Moon Chung-in.
Beijing has consistently urged world powers not to push Pyongyang too hard, for fear of precipitating a regime collapse. “Sanctions are not an end in themselves,” said Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in January 2016. The refugee issue is already a problem: Beijing’s promise to repatriate North Koreans escaping across the border has consistently triggered condemnation from human rights groups. Beijng began constructing a barbed-wire fence a decade ago to prevent migrants from crossing, but the International Rescue Committee estimates thirty to sixty thousand North Koreans refugees live in China, though some non-governmental organizations believe the total to be more than 200,000. (Some experts say significant trafficking risks exist for North Korean girls and women (PDF) who have either escaped to China or been kidnapped.) The majority of refugees first make their way to China before moving to other parts of Asia, including South Korea. However, strengthened border controls under Kim Jong-un have vastly decreased the outflow of refugees.
“Sanctions are not an end in themselves.”—Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
Some experts say that President Barack Obama's administration’s announced strategic rebalance to Asia—which some Chinese leaders interpreted as containment of Beijing—made China less trusting of U.S. intentions regarding North Korea. One response by Beijing has been to try to counter the U.S.–South Korea alliance by strengthening relations with Seoul. China’s Xi Jinping has met with South Korean President Park Geun-hye six-times, while he has yet to visit or receive the North’s Kim Jong-un.
Experts say China has also been ambivalent on the question of its commitment to defend North Korea in case of military conflict. The 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance says China is obliged to intervene against unprovoked aggression. But Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says the Chinese government has tried to persuade North Korean leaders to revoke the clause that would force Beijing to come to Pyongyang’s defense. Beijing has also said if conflict is initiated by Pyongyang it would not abide by its treaty obligation.
Washington’s Role
The United States has pushed North Korea to irreversibly give up its nuclear weapons program in return for aid, diplomatic benefits, and normalization of relations. But experts say Washington and Beijing, while sharing the goal of denuclearizing North Korea, have different views on how to reach it. “Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics,” says the International Crisis Group’s Daniel Pinkston (PDF). “They tend to see public measures as humiliating and counterproductive.” The United States has also tried to pressure China to lean more heavily on North Korea. U.S. presidential executive orders (PDF) and congressional moves impose sanctions on countries, firms, or individuals contributing to North Korea’s ability to finance nuclear and missile development; some measures passed in 2005 targeted North Korean funds in Chinese banks, while more recent ones focus on its mineral and metal export industries, which make up an important part of trade with China. Washington has also been in talks with Seoul to deploy a missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, also known as THAAD) to boost regional security, though Beijing strongly condemns its potential deployment and sees it as a threat to Chinese national security.
“There’s an increasing understanding that North Korea does not provide the kind of stable neighbor and element of the neighborhood that China likes.”—former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Six Party Talk negotiator Christopher R. Hill
There were expectations in the United States at the start of Obama’s first term in 2009 that it might pursue direct talks with North Korea, but Pyongyang’s subsequent rocket tests dimmed such hopes. Washington later settled on an approach that U.S. diplomats described as “strategic patience (PDF).” A 2016 report by the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service described the policy as designed  to pressure the regime in Pyongyang while “insisting that [it] commit to steps toward denuclearization as previously promised in the Six-Party Talks; closely coordinating with treaty allies Japan and South Korea; attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea; and applying pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and sanctions.” Despite pursuing rounds of dialogue either bilaterally or under the auspices of the Six Party Talks, such efforts have been fruitless.
After international powers reached an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program in July 2015, there was speculation over whether a similar deal could be brokered with North Korea. However,  a number of regional experts have pointed to major differences between Pyongyang and Tehran, such as regime characteristics, the status of weapon development, and connections to the world economy as reasons why such a deal could not be replicated. Others claim that the Kim regime’s use of nuclear development to sustain its survival rules out the possibility of an effective deal.
Looking Forward
“North Korea is in a category all its own,” writes the Brookings Institution’s Jonathan Pollack. “The North Korean leadership has thus convinced itself (if not others) that its existence as an autonomous state derives directly from its possession of nuclear weapons.” Though China may be unhappy about North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, analysts say it will avoid moves that could cause a sudden regime collapse.
A Japanese media outlet leaked alleged Chinese military contingency plans in 2014, but Beijing denied the validity of the documents. “It’s clear that the Chinese have enormous leverage over North Korea in many respects,” says Stanford’s Sneider. “But can China actually try to exercise that influence without destabilizing the regime? Probably not.”
For now, policy failure on the peninsula has dampened hopes for a de-escalation of regional tensions. Though Beijing, Seoul, and Washington have voiced apparent solidarity (PDF) for a denuclearized North Korea, differences remain over how best to strip the country of its nuclear threat. But “there’s an increasing understanding that North Korea does not provide the kind of stable neighbor and element of the neighborhood that China likes, ” says former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Six Party Talk negotiator Christopher R. Hill. Still, “China’s strategic interests in stability and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will require Beijing to improve ties with Pyongyang in order to restore its leverage,” adds CFR’s Snyder.

Additional Resources

CFR’s Scott Snyder outlines steps to address North Korea’s nuclear problem in this Policy Innovation Memorandum.
Yonhap News Agency provides a chronology of major events in North Korea’s nuclear development.
This 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF) outlines a potential deal between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.
Experts discuss China and Japan’s perspectives on North Korea in this CFR Meeting.
The UN’s Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea investigated systemic and widespread rights violations in this February 2014 report.
Human Rights Watch details the human rights situation in North Korea in its 2015 World Report
Expert Sue Mi Terry explores the implications of Korean unification and the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance in this 2015 CFR report.

More on this topic from CFR
























CHINA PLA : PLA Theater Joint Intelligence: Organization and Operations

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/pla-theater-joint-intelligence-organization-operations/

  


                         PLA  MODERNIZATION



                                              INDEX  


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     [ 1 ]    PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA  :China’s CENTRAL Theater   Command = "blank"                                      DATA AWAITED

     [ 2 ]     PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA : Strategic Assessment:  China’s Northern Theater                                    Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/pla-modernization-pla-strategic.html

     [3]     China’s Southern Theater Command 

              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-southern-theater.html


      [4]    PLA MODERNIZATION :Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command

               http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/pla-modernization-snapshot-chinas.html

      [5]    China’s Western Theater Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-western-theater.html

       [6]    PLA SETUP PRIOR TO MODERNIZATION
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/04/pla-modernization-pla-setup-prior-to.html

     [7]    PLA Theater Joint Intelligence:Organization and Operations

                http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/search/label/PLA%20%20MODERENIZATION


                         





           PLA Theater Joint Intelligence:                   Organization and Operations

              Publication: China Brief Volume: 17 Issue: 5
























China’s new theater command structure represents a major advancement in building a streamlined joint command structure. One key remaining bottleneck is intelligence sharing. Accurate and timely intelligence is always a key component of any successful military operation, and especially so for the advanced joint operations the PLA envisions. Skilled intelligence and technical personnel, and joint command and coordination regulations are required to support the intelligence process, as well as direct intelligence operations at subordinate echelons. As the PLA attempts to build an advanced joint operations capability, rapid collection, accurate analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence is critical to support precision command, maneuver, and fire strikes with situational awareness, targeting and battle damage assessments. The PLA’s current stove-piped intelligence system requires continued modernization including automated systems to assist analysis and dissemination, improved and expanded reconnaissance assets, and integrated communications for sharing intelligence.
Theater Joint Command
The new Theater Joint Commands’ Joint Operations Command Centers (JOCC—联合作战指挥中心) contain intelligence centers, as do command posts (CP) formed at each echelon down to regiment level. [1]



























The internal theater command structure, as well as the intelligence center organization are not uniform and vary as dictated by the special circumstances facing each command. Under the supervision of the theater joint command’s chief of staff, the joint intelligence center consists of intelligence staff officers from the services, the Strategic Support Force and technical staff. [2] This center is responsible for preparing the joint reconnaissance plan (联合侦察计划) to support the theater’s command and control center and operational forces. The joint intelligence center plays a coordinating role to lower level intelligence centers and subordinate reconnaissance forces. The center is responsible for, coordinating theater reconnaissance operations, centralized intelligence fusion, as well as coordinating with the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) JOCC, national intelligence agencies and the Strategic Support Force. [3] The theater command’s intelligence center can establish subordinate intelligence centers, for example, ground, air and maritime. These subordinate centers would maintain service-specific situation maps feeding into the joint intelligence center’s current battlefield situation map (战场通用态势图) providing a common operating picture to all forces. The theater command’s intelligence center disseminates reports to intelligence centers at lower echelons supporting subordinate forces, as well as coordinate with other theaters’ centers. [4]

















The intelligence centers of various operational groups (作战集团) or campaign formations (军团) conducting the theater operations and other theater subordinate reconnaissance assets transmit intelligence to the theater joint intelligence center, as well as the theater command and control center. The theater intelligence center has directly subordinate technical reconnaissance, special reconnaissance and other units collecting intelligence. The theater joint intelligence center provides guidance to subordinate reconnaissance assets based on the joint reconnaissance plan. The theater intelligence center can request space, network, and electromagnetic battlefield reconnaissance support from the Strategic Support Force, and additional intelligence support from the CMC’s JOCC, as well as support from national intelligence agencies. [6]
PLA assessments note that current intel transmission and dissemination is slow, especially in a joint environment. Improvements in the intelligence system include a transition to a flatter network structure that is intended to break barriers between services and branches. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable battlefield intelligence, are being standardized and automated to speed up the processing and dissemination of intelligence. This is further enhanced through the creation of intelligence databases that can be queried. [10]
Planning
Planning and organization of intelligence is crucial to support operations. The theater chief of staff supervises and manages the development of the joint reconnaissance plan, and submits the plan for the joint commander’s approval. The theater command and control center provides the joint intelligence center with the intelligence requirements supporting the operational plan. The requirements can vary from one operational phase to another. The joint reconnaissance plan assigns missions to reconnaissance assets, plans missions to support various operational phases, prioritizes collection against the most urgent requirements, establishes coordination and support methods, and assigns timelines for completing tasks. Reconnaissance assets are concentrated along the main operational direction, with assets and missions adjusted as operations progress or as the situation changes. Reconnaissance operations could be increased in other regions to deceive the opponent as to the actual main direction. [11]
Intelligence Collection
According to the PLA, joint operations require extensive intelligence collection on political, economic, and military issues that can impact operations. The PLA places importance on peacetime collection, including the use of “tourists” and open sources, as wartime collection becomes restricted. Comprehensive peacetime collection can support rapid intelligence production to support an unexpected crisis. Units at each echelon down to battalion level have subordinate forces to conduct reconnaissance in their area of operations. This intelligence is shared with neighboring and subordinate units, as well as reported up the command chain. Subordinate commands can request intelligence support from superior headquarters, and intelligence centers are required to coordinate closely with counterparts in neighboring units to share relevant intelligence. Intelligence centers coordinate with the People’s Armed Police, militia, and local authorities during a conflict on mainland China. In overseas conflicts, in addition to national and PLA reconnaissance assets, intelligence will come from “underground party organizations,” agents, fellow travelers, prisoners of war, and captured enemy documents and equipment. The fishing fleet and civilian ships also provide valuable information. [12]
The eventual goal is to achieve a “full-dimensional” 24/7 all-weather intelligence collection capability. Theater intelligence includes satellite, aircraft, maritime, ground, electromagnetic and network reconnaissance assets. The PLA considers reconnaissance satellites an important theater intelligence means to provide long-range monitoring of ground and sea targets. Air, maritime, ground and other technical collection means are also important to present a comprehensive battlefield situation for commanders at all echelons. [13]
Intelligence Processing and Analysis
Fast-paced modern operations require rapid and accurate intelligence analysis. As the PLA adapts more complex ISR systems, the quantity of data produced is quickly outpacing analysts ability to process it. Computer-assisted processing is required for timely and accurate processing and dissemination of intelligence, however, automation levels within the PLA currently is considered low compared to advanced countries. Analysis supports updating of a digital battlefield situation map displaying a common operating picture to CPs down to the regiment level, and possibly to battalion level command vehicles. The digital display provides layered information—including operational plans; friendly and enemy force disposition; space, air, maritime and ground situation; geographic and obstacle information; meteorological and hydrographic situation; and electromagnetic environment. Combat statistical tables, text, audio, and visual information can also be available for display. [14]
The intelligence centers sort, validate and analyze collected data, producing finished intelligence. Critical intelligence is reported immediately to the commander, and emergency information is immediately distributed to units. PLA publications state that only trained personnel should evaluate and interpret intelligence data, including validating the collected information. Specialized personnel analyze technical reconnaissance such as satellite or aerial imagery, electronic collection, and enemy weapons and equipment performance. The intelligence centers will initially sort and categorize intelligence in various ways, such as subject (information on enemy forces, friendly forces, or the operational environment), time (historical, current, or future intelligence), and priority (critical, general, reference intelligence information). Intelligence evaluation and feedback is used to strengthen the relevance and quality of reporting. The PLA believes that development of automated systems will speed up the collection, processing, dissemination, and database storage and retrieval of intelligence. [15]
Dissemination
The intelligence centers use various methods to disseminate relevant intelligence to units. It is important to note that higher level commands restrict dissemination to intelligence deemed relevant to a subordinate’s combat missions to limit overloading with unneeded information. Classification levels would also limit access. Currently, these decisions are made primarily by intelligence center staff, with automated systems assisting to a greater degree in the future. Intelligence databases currently exist in the PLA, although PLA publications indicate this will increase in the future including greater flexibility for users to query databases. PLA forces use a variety of wired and wireless communication methods, and increasingly rely on BeiDou for brief, secure messages. Ultimately an integrated approach is used depending on the situation. [16]
Information Security and Intelligence Confrontation
Information security is an important aspect of intelligence and reconnaissance. These measures include not only strict control of information and systems, but also active and passive counter-reconnaissance measures including deception, terrain masking, electronic warfare and cyber offense and defense. Close coordination between the military and local governments, and strict control over civilian communications and news media are considered important in maintaining information security. Control of electronic emanations, radio silence, and technological means such as frequency hopping, spread spectrum, and burst communications are advocated. [17]
The PLA also uses the concepts of intelligence struggle (情报斗争), intelligence deception (情报欺骗), and intelligence deterrence (情报威慑) which includes deception and interference to prevent, or destroy the enemy’s intelligence collection capabilities. Intelligence deception includes spreading disinformation to confuse the enemy leading to inaccurate assessments and decisions. Intelligence deterrence is the control of intelligence or feeding false intelligence to the enemy to lead the enemy to avoid confrontation or reduce the intensity of his actions. The Strategic Support Force is likely responsible for information security and intelligence confrontation actions at the strategic level. [18]
Modernization Requirements
The PLA recognizes shortcomings in communication construction—such as automated communication networks—to meet theater joint command requirements. The PLA assesses current intelligence sharing and dissemination means as poor, requiring improved communication system integration and personnel training. The theaters rely on satellite communications for long-range communications, supported by an integrated trunk communications network as the main communications systems. China is developing quantum information technology, including a satellite communications system for high capacity, rapid and secure communications. The PLA assesses that the communications systems, for example the theater field automated communication network, require continued modernization to eventually reach the level of developed countries. An integrated, networked intelligence system is required to ensure real-time sharing of intelligence information. The PLA admits that its military reconnaissance units are not as extensive as more advanced countries, requiring greater quantity and quality. Military reconnaissance and early warning long-range capabilities are considered weak, a severe limitation for Navy and Air Force operations at greater distances, and possible expeditionary operations or support for special operations abroad. The PLA does consider its computer talent a strength to support cyber reconnaissance or computer network exploitation. [19]
PLA assessments identify technologies to support improved reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Spread spectrum communications technology provides greater security by lowering the probability of detection and interception. Detection and direction-finding technologies can, long-range battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance radars capable of detecting, locating and identifying moving ground, air and maritime targets, and passive detection systems are identified as important technologies by the PLA. Stratospheric and tropospheric balloons for early warning, reconnaissance, and communication relay are also discussed in PLA publications and advertised at arms shows. The airships can be linked with Navy vessels, AWACS aircraft, other aircraft and aerostats to create a networked reconnaissance architecture to provide greater redundancy, direction of reconnaissance operations, and comprehensive intelligence system. [20]
The current extent and quality of operational and tactical level intelligence reforms is not clear. Theater joint intelligence should eventually provide centralized intelligence fusion of service reconnaissance assets, and an entry point for strategic intelligence reporting to support theater operations. PLA press reports improvements breaking barriers allowing intelligence sharing between branches and units at the tactical level. However, tactical units are solving issues on their own, rather than high-level direction standardizing communications and the intelligence process (PLA Daily, March 3, 2015; PLA Daily, October 17, 2015). Tactical unit intelligence centers also report inundation with vast amounts of intelligence in a short time, with over 60 percent of the information worthless. Not only did the large amount of information stress the communications bandwidth, but also the ability to sort for critical intelligence. Again, units have sought their own solutions to filter intelligence. It remains unclear whether the current emphasis on high-level direction for reforms is providing standardization and uniform guidance to subordinates (PLA Daily, November 25, 2015). Tactical UAVs are allowing units to quickly conduct reconnaissance of their area of operations, overcoming difficult terrain and obstacles that would restrict reconnaissance patrol’ mobility (PLA Daily, May 3, 2016). The integrated command platform is allowing greater real-time intelligence sharing, and currently providing digital battlefield situation maps to tactical units (PLA Daily, May 11, 2016; PLA Daily, October 30, 2016).
Conclusions
Rapid and accurate intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination will require numerous improvements and modernizations to support future PLA requirements for high-tempo maneuver operations by dispersed joint forces and long-range precision strikes. The creation of a theater joint intelligence structure should lead to improved intelligence fusion. New joint command and coordination regulations are required for full implementation of the theater commands, and the PLA is working to correct the problems facing joint command and intelligence operations at all echelons. Current weaknesses include the quantity and quality of reconnaissance assets, particularly long-range capabilities, as well as integrated communications and automated systems. The PLA recognizes the dangers of information overload, and intends to increase automated systems to assist in disseminating actionable intelligence to subordinates. Future PLA intelligence operations require an integrated networked system breaking service barriers, increasing speed and efficiency transmitting time sensitive intelligence to support decision-making at all command levels. The PLA is making progress, but there is much to be accomplished.
Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, Russia, China and Taiwan during over thirty years in the U.S. government. Mr. McCauley writes primarily on PLA and Taiwan military affairs. His publications include “PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations” and “Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin.” @knmccauley1 tweets current Chinese, Taiwan and Russian military news.
Notes
  1. The theater’s JOCC acts as the main CP (基本指挥所). In addition, there would normally be an alternate CP (预备指挥所), a rear CP (后方指挥所) and possibly a forward or direction CP (前进(方向)指挥所). The alternate and rear CPs for the theaters are likely fixed and underground. The rear CP might be collated with the theaters’ Joint Logistics Support Center. Each CP would have to have an intelligence center and follow the course of operations closely in the event they need to take command operation if other CPs are destroyed or inoperative. At lower echelons, this transfer of command could occur during displacement of a CP.
  2. The level of expertise and experience of the intelligence centers’ staff, particularly the technical staff is not known, nor is the shift system employed to maintain 24/7 operations. It is likely that the skill levels between shifts varies in quality.
  3. The PLA security classifications include Top Secret (绝密), Secret (机密) and Confidential (秘密), and dissemination of classified material is based on need to know. The classification levels available to various echelons is not known for the PLA, but would restrict dissemination of intelligence. It is likely that the PLA also has code word and compartmented classifications.
  4. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 82–83, 123 and 158–161
  5. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) p. 161, 156-158.
  6. Command Information System Course of Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) p. 23
  7. Command Information System Course of Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) p. 27
  8. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 116-118
  9. Precision Operations Command, Shijiazhuang Army Command College, (Beijing: PLA Press, 2009) pp. 107–112
  10. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 168–169; Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 141–142; Military Terms, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) p. 219
  11. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 170–172; Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 136–137
  12. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 122–123
  13. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 119, 123 and 166
  14. Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 145-146; Joint Operations Command Organ Work Course of Study, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2008) pp. 72–75; com, November 17, 2014
  15. Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 144–145
  16. Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 140–141 and 147
  17. Military Terms, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) p. 225
  18. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 125, 158–159 and 172–173
  19. Command Information System Course of Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) pp. 64–69 ; PLA Daily, February 24, 2017; China Daily, January 19, 2017