China’s new theater command structure represents a major advancement in building a streamlined joint command structure. One key remaining bottleneck is intelligence sharing. Accurate and timely intelligence is always a key component of any successful military operation, and especially so for the advanced joint operations the PLA envisions. Skilled intelligence and technical personnel, and joint command and coordination regulations are required to support the intelligence process, as well as direct intelligence operations at subordinate echelons. As the PLA attempts to build an advanced joint operations capability, rapid collection, accurate analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence is critical to support precision command, maneuver, and fire strikes with situational awareness, targeting and battle damage assessments. The PLA’s current stove-piped intelligence system requires continued modernization including automated systems to assist analysis and dissemination, improved and expanded reconnaissance assets, and integrated communications for sharing intelligence.
Theater Joint Command
The new Theater Joint Commands’ Joint Operations Command Centers (JOCC—联合作战指挥中心) contain intelligence centers, as do command posts (CP) formed at each echelon down to regiment level. [1]
The internal theater command structure, as well as the intelligence center organization are not uniform and vary as dictated by the special circumstances facing each command. Under the supervision of the theater joint command’s chief of staff, the joint intelligence center consists of intelligence staff officers from the services, the Strategic Support Force and technical staff. [2] This center is responsible for preparing the joint reconnaissance plan (联合侦察计划) to support the theater’s command and control center and operational forces. The joint intelligence center plays a coordinating role to lower level intelligence centers and subordinate reconnaissance forces. The center is responsible for, coordinating theater reconnaissance operations, centralized intelligence fusion, as well as coordinating with the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) JOCC, national intelligence agencies and the Strategic Support Force.[3]The theater command’s intelligence center can establish subordinate intelligence centers, for example, ground, air and maritime. These subordinate centers would maintain service-specific situation maps feeding into the joint intelligence center’s current battlefield situation map (战场通用态势图) providing a common operating picture to all forces. The theater command’s intelligence center disseminates reports to intelligence centers at lower echelons supporting subordinate forces, as well as coordinate with other theaters’ centers. [4]
The intelligence centers of various operational groups (作战集团) or campaign formations (军团) conducting the theater operations and other theater subordinate reconnaissance assets transmit intelligence to the theater joint intelligence center, as well as the theater command and control center. The theater intelligence center has directly subordinate technical reconnaissance, special reconnaissance and other units collecting intelligence. The theater joint intelligence center provides guidance to subordinate reconnaissance assets based on the joint reconnaissance plan. The theater intelligence center can request space, network, and electromagnetic battlefield reconnaissance support from the Strategic Support Force, and additional intelligence support from the CMC’s JOCC, as well as support from national intelligence agencies.[6]
PLA assessments note that current intel transmission and dissemination is slow, especially in a joint environment. Improvements in the intelligence system include a transition to a flatter network structure that is intended to break barriers between services and branches. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable battlefield intelligence, are being standardized and automated to speed up the processing and dissemination of intelligence. This is further enhanced through the creation of intelligence databases that can be queried.[10]
Planning
Planning and organization of intelligence is crucial to support operations. The theater chief of staff supervises and manages the development of the joint reconnaissance plan, and submits the plan for the joint commander’s approval. The theater command and control center provides the joint intelligence center with the intelligence requirements supporting the operational plan. The requirements can vary from one operational phase to another. The joint reconnaissance plan assigns missions to reconnaissance assets, plans missions to support various operational phases, prioritizes collection against the most urgent requirements, establishes coordination and support methods, and assigns timelines for completing tasks. Reconnaissance assets are concentrated along the main operational direction, with assets and missions adjusted as operations progress or as the situation changes. Reconnaissance operations could be increased in other regions to deceive the opponent as to the actual main direction. [11]
Intelligence Collection
According to the PLA, joint operations require extensive intelligence collection on political, economic, and military issues that can impact operations. The PLA places importance on peacetime collection, including the use of “tourists” and open sources, as wartime collection becomes restricted. Comprehensive peacetime collection can support rapid intelligence production to support an unexpected crisis. Units at each echelon down to battalion level have subordinate forces to conduct reconnaissance in their area of operations. This intelligence is shared with neighboring and subordinate units, as well as reported up the command chain. Subordinate commands can request intelligence support from superior headquarters, and intelligence centers are required to coordinate closely with counterparts in neighboring units to share relevant intelligence. Intelligence centers coordinate with the People’s Armed Police, militia, and local authorities during a conflict on mainland China. In overseas conflicts, in addition to national and PLA reconnaissance assets, intelligence will come from “underground party organizations,” agents, fellow travelers, prisoners of war, and captured enemy documents and equipment. The fishing fleet and civilian ships also provide valuable information. [12]
The eventual goal is to achieve a “full-dimensional” 24/7 all-weather intelligence collection capability. Theater intelligence includes satellite, aircraft, maritime, ground, electromagnetic and network reconnaissance assets. The PLA considers reconnaissance satellites an important theater intelligence means to provide long-range monitoring of ground and sea targets. Air, maritime, ground and other technical collection means are also important to present a comprehensive battlefield situation for commanders at all echelons. [13]
Intelligence Processing and Analysis
Fast-paced modern operations require rapid and accurate intelligence analysis. As the PLA adapts more complex ISR systems, the quantity of data produced is quickly outpacing analysts ability to process it. Computer-assisted processing is required for timely and accurate processing and dissemination of intelligence, however, automation levels within the PLA currently is considered low compared to advanced countries. Analysis supports updating of a digital battlefield situation map displaying a common operating picture to CPs down to the regiment level, and possibly to battalion level command vehicles. The digital display provides layered information—including operational plans; friendly and enemy force disposition; space, air, maritime and ground situation; geographic and obstacle information; meteorological and hydrographic situation; and electromagnetic environment. Combat statistical tables, text, audio, and visual information can also be available for display. [14]
The intelligence centers sort, validate and analyze collected data, producing finished intelligence. Critical intelligence is reported immediately to the commander, and emergency information is immediately distributed to units. PLA publications state that only trained personnel should evaluate and interpret intelligence data, including validating the collected information. Specialized personnel analyze technical reconnaissance such as satellite or aerial imagery, electronic collection, and enemy weapons and equipment performance. The intelligence centers will initially sort and categorize intelligence in various ways, such as subject (information on enemy forces, friendly forces, or the operational environment), time (historical, current, or future intelligence), and priority (critical, general, reference intelligence information). Intelligence evaluation and feedback is used to strengthen the relevance and quality of reporting. The PLA believes that development of automated systems will speed up the collection, processing, dissemination, and database storage and retrieval of intelligence.[15]
Dissemination
The intelligence centers use various methods to disseminate relevant intelligence to units. It is important to note that higher level commands restrict dissemination to intelligence deemed relevant to a subordinate’s combat missions to limit overloading with unneeded information. Classification levels would also limit access. Currently, these decisions are made primarily by intelligence center staff, with automated systems assisting to a greater degree in the future. Intelligence databases currently exist in the PLA, although PLA publications indicate this will increase in the future including greater flexibility for users to query databases. PLA forces use a variety of wired and wireless communication methods, and increasingly rely on BeiDou for brief, secure messages. Ultimately an integrated approach is used depending on the situation. [16]
Information Security and Intelligence Confrontation
Information security is an important aspect of intelligence and reconnaissance. These measures include not only strict control of information and systems, but also active and passive counter-reconnaissance measures including deception, terrain masking, electronic warfare and cyber offense and defense. Close coordination between the military and local governments, and strict control over civilian communications and news media are considered important in maintaining information security. Control of electronic emanations, radio silence, and technological means such as frequency hopping, spread spectrum, and burst communications are advocated.[17]
The PLA also uses the concepts of intelligence struggle (情报斗争), intelligence deception (情报欺骗), and intelligence deterrence (情报威慑) which includes deception and interference to prevent, or destroy the enemy’s intelligence collection capabilities. Intelligence deception includes spreading disinformation to confuse the enemy leading to inaccurate assessments and decisions. Intelligence deterrence is the control of intelligence or feeding false intelligence to the enemy to lead the enemy to avoid confrontation or reduce the intensity of his actions. The Strategic Support Force is likely responsible for information security and intelligence confrontation actions at the strategic level.[18]
Modernization Requirements
The PLA recognizes shortcomings in communication construction—such as automated communication networks—to meet theater joint command requirements. The PLA assesses current intelligence sharing and dissemination means as poor, requiring improved communication system integration and personnel training. The theaters rely on satellite communications for long-range communications, supported by an integrated trunk communications network as the main communications systems. China is developing quantum information technology, including a satellite communications system for high capacity, rapid and secure communications. The PLA assesses that the communications systems, for example the theater field automated communication network, require continued modernization to eventually reach the level of developed countries. An integrated, networked intelligence system is required to ensure real-time sharing of intelligence information. The PLA admits that its military reconnaissance units are not as extensive as more advanced countries, requiring greater quantity and quality. Military reconnaissance and early warning long-range capabilities are considered weak, a severe limitation for Navy and Air Force operations at greater distances, and possible expeditionary operations or support for special operations abroad. The PLA does consider its computer talent a strength to support cyber reconnaissance or computer network exploitation.[19]
PLA assessments identify technologies to support improved reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Spread spectrum communications technology provides greater security by lowering the probability of detection and interception. Detection and direction-finding technologies can, long-range battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance radars capable of detecting, locating and identifying moving ground, air and maritime targets, and passive detection systems are identified as important technologies by the PLA. Stratospheric and tropospheric balloons for early warning, reconnaissance, and communication relay are also discussed in PLA publications and advertised at arms shows. The airships can be linked with Navy vessels, AWACS aircraft, other aircraft and aerostats to create a networked reconnaissance architecture to provide greater redundancy, direction of reconnaissance operations, and comprehensive intelligence system.[20]
The current extent and quality of operational and tactical level intelligence reforms is not clear. Theater joint intelligence should eventually provide centralized intelligence fusion of service reconnaissance assets, and an entry point for strategic intelligence reporting to support theater operations. PLA press reports improvements breaking barriers allowing intelligence sharing between branches and units at the tactical level. However, tactical units are solving issues on their own, rather than high-level direction standardizing communications and the intelligence process (PLA Daily, March 3, 2015; PLA Daily, October 17, 2015). Tactical unit intelligence centers also report inundation with vast amounts of intelligence in a short time, with over 60 percent of the information worthless. Not only did the large amount of information stress the communications bandwidth, but also the ability to sort for critical intelligence. Again, units have sought their own solutions to filter intelligence. It remains unclear whether the current emphasis on high-level direction for reforms is providing standardization and uniform guidance to subordinates (PLA Daily, November 25, 2015). Tactical UAVs are allowing units to quickly conduct reconnaissance of their area of operations, overcoming difficult terrain and obstacles that would restrict reconnaissance patrol’ mobility (PLA Daily, May 3, 2016). The integrated command platform is allowing greater real-time intelligence sharing, and currently providing digital battlefield situation maps to tactical units (PLA Daily, May 11, 2016; PLA Daily, October 30, 2016).
Conclusions
Rapid and accurate intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination will require numerous improvements and modernizations to support future PLA requirements for high-tempo maneuver operations by dispersed joint forces and long-range precision strikes. The creation of a theater joint intelligence structure should lead to improved intelligence fusion. New joint command and coordination regulations are required for full implementation of the theater commands, and the PLA is working to correct the problems facing joint command and intelligence operations at all echelons. Current weaknesses include the quantity and quality of reconnaissance assets, particularly long-range capabilities, as well as integrated communications and automated systems. The PLA recognizes the dangers of information overload, and intends to increase automated systems to assist in disseminating actionable intelligence to subordinates. Future PLA intelligence operations require an integrated networked system breaking service barriers, increasing speed and efficiency transmitting time sensitive intelligence to support decision-making at all command levels. The PLA is making progress, but there is much to be accomplished.
The theater’s JOCC acts as the main CP (基本指挥所). In addition, there would normally be an alternate CP (预备指挥所), a rear CP (后方指挥所) and possibly a forward or direction CP (前进(方向)指挥所). The alternate and rear CPs for the theaters are likely fixed and underground. The rear CP might be collated with the theaters’ Joint Logistics Support Center. Each CP would have to have an intelligence center and follow the course of operations closely in the event they need to take command operation if other CPs are destroyed or inoperative. At lower echelons, this transfer of command could occur during displacement of a CP.
The level of expertise and experience of the intelligence centers’ staff, particularly the technical staff is not known, nor is the shift system employed to maintain 24/7 operations. It is likely that the skill levels between shifts varies in quality.
The PLA security classifications include Top Secret (绝密), Secret (机密) and Confidential (秘密), and dissemination of classified material is based on need to know. The classification levels available to various echelons is not known for the PLA, but would restrict dissemination of intelligence. It is likely that the PLA also has code word and compartmented classifications.
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 82–83, 123 and 158–161
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) p. 161， 156-158.
Command Information System Course of Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) p. 23
Command Information System Course of Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) p. 27
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 116-118
Precision Operations Command, Shijiazhuang Army Command College, (Beijing: PLA Press, 2009) pp. 107–112
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 168–169; Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 141–142; Military Terms, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) p. 219
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 170–172; Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 136–137
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 122–123
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 119, 123 and 166
Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 145-146; Joint Operations Command Organ Work Course of Study, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2008) pp. 72–75; com, November 17, 2014
Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 144–145
Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 140–141 and 147
Military Terms, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) p. 225
Theater Joint Operations Command, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 125, 158–159 and 172–173
Command Information System Course of Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) pp. 64–69 ; PLA Daily, February 24, 2017; China Daily, January 19, 2017
Undeterred by the ongoing protests, the security forces in Kashmir valley are closing in on the leadership of militant groups and are chasing their top guns, including the successor of slain Hizbul Mujahideen militant Burhan Wani.
Security forces, including the Jammu and Kashmir police, CRPF and the Army units operating in the Valley, have been successful in eliminating some of the heads of terror groups in the last few months, like the dreaded Lashkar terrorist Hamas, who was killed during an encounter in Tral last month.
'We are chasing the terrorist leadership including Wani's successor Zakir Rashid Bhatt alias Moosa, who is the divisional commander of the South Kashmir area for Hizbul Mujahideen after Wani.
'As per the intelligence that we have been getting, 2017 should be his last summer,' sources in the Army said.
Moosa, a resident of Tral area, has an engineering degree and is an expert in usage of social media which helped him be elevated as the successor to Wani.
LeT's Abu Dujana escaped from forces twice in recent months
'However, Moosa is not popular the way Wani was because he is known to be rough with his own people and has made many enemies within his own tanzeem after manhandling some of them in the recent times,' they said.
Some of the informers cultivated in his native village by the troops had passed on the information to security forces about his visit to his family in Noorpura village in Tral last month.
'The information was accurate as he did go to meet his family but we missed him by a couple of minutes as he ran away from there,' the sources said.
With terrorist groups and separatists luring locals with money for protests and stone pelting, forces feel that it won't be very difficult to get accurate intelligence about these terrorists.
Forces believe they would be able to eliminate their targets as they were successful earlier with Majid Zaragar, Aquib Bhatt of Tral and Hamas of the LeT which would help them break the central leadership and hit the morale of terror groups.
Another top target on the list of security forces is the Kashmir commander of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Abu Dujana, who has had a long run in the valley as a terrorist and has managed to escape from the grip of security forces on at least two occasions in the last four months.
'In December, we had received a tip-off that he was hiding inside a particular house in the Bejbehara area in the Anantnag district and he was surrounded by the forces in the house.
'The gun battle started in the middle of the night but he managed to escape from there under the cover of darkness,' the sources said.
Security forces, including the Jammu and Kashmir police, CRPF and the Army units operating in the Valley, have been successful in eliminating some of the heads of terror groups in the last few months (file pic)
This has not been the only time when the dreaded terrorist has managed to escape from the security forces as during a recent search operation on the highway in Pulwama district, he managed to run away despite accurate intelligence.
'An input was received that he would be travelling in a Maruti Alto car passing through Pulwama where checks were carried out on the vehicles plying on the road.
'The particular car was intercepted but by that time, Dujana had got the inkling about a trap laid for him and managed to escape in a hurry as his personal mobile phone was recovered from the car,' the sources said.
Dujana is also considered to be a master of deception as he was earlier believed to be killed in the encounter in south Kashmir's Anantnag district but it was found later that he had only circulated the rumour about himself.
The third terrorist on the hit list is the Hizbul Kashmir commander Yaseen Itto, who was made to return from Pakistan to carry out anti-India activities by the Hizbul Mujahidden commander-in-chief Sayyed Salahauddin.
Before his arrival in Kashmir, Salahuddin started spreading rumours about the death of Itto but it was found to be incorrect later on as he resurfaced in the valley many times after that.
Delivering his work report to the National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang noted that “the Chinese mainland will resolutely oppose and contain ‘Taiwan independence separatist activities’” (“台独”分裂活动) (Xinhua, March 5).[1] President Xi Jinping, however, was even more explicit in early November 2016, when he said “1.3 billion Chinese people will oppose Taiwan independence. We have the ability, the determination and are prepared to deal with Taiwan independence. If we do not, we will be overthrown (推翻) by 1.3 billion people” (Apple Daily, November 2, 2016). China’s ability to “deal” with Taiwan involves political and economic pressure. These tools have already seen some success as the number of countries that recognize Taiwan shrinks, and Taiwan’s participation in international organizations is severely restricted. However, as China’s military becomes more effective, military coercion is increasingly a viable option. An overview of China’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC) provides some insight into the Chinese military’s current capabilities against Taiwan.
China’s Eastern Strategic Direction
Although eastern China is one of the most densely populated and important areas of the country, China’s east coast has not always been its primary strategic direction. Chinese military writings note that China’s historical focus on ground forces arose out of a lack of maritime threats to China from the east. In ancient times, and again during the 20th century, the threat of land invasions from the west and north outweighed threats to the east and south.[2]With the renewal of ties with Russia in the mid-1980s the strategic focus shifted again to the east, raising the importance of aerospace and maritime forces.
In the mid-1990s, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis put the region back in headlines. Missile launches in 1995 and 1996 prompted the United States to send two carrier strike groups to the area around Taiwan. The incident also revealed a number of deficits in PLA capabilities. While Taiwan remained a key issue for the PLA, its lack of sufficient maritime lift capacity, air superiority and even intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities meant that an invasion across the strait would not succeed. The U.S. navy’s ability to operate without real challenge was another major problem, and Chinese defense planners recognized the need to have layered offensive and defensive systems to project power into the East China Sea.
The Japanese governments’ 2012 purchase of the Senkaku Islands from a private owner sparked tensions and prompted widespread protests throughout China. Projecting power not just toward Taiwan but throughout the East China Sea gained additional importance. The Chinese government followed up on this by declaring anAir Defense Identification Zone in late November 2013 (China Brief, December 5, 2013). The area has since seen a steady increase in Chinese military aviation and maritime patrols (China Brief, October 26, 2016). Accompanying these events, China’s military has reformed and reorganized to better deal with security issues along its eastern strategic direction.
The military organizations responsible for most of eastern China have undergone a number of changes since the 1980s. Until 1988, China had 11 military regions (MR) including ones centered on Fuzhou in northern Fujian province and Nanjing. The Fuzhou MR was incorporated into the Nanjing MR, which, after the latest round of reforms, has been folded intact into the Eastern Theater Command. An important result of the 2015 military reforms is that the Theater Command acts as joint headquarters for Army, Navy and Air Force (China Brief, June 21, 2016). The Rocket Force also has units present in the ETC, although they are directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military body.
The Geography of Eastern China The current ETC is composed of military units within the borders of Anhui, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces, as well as Shanghai Municipality. Together, their populations include over 280 million citizens and three of China’s top ten ports— Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen. Bisected by the Yangtze River ( 长江), the region’s geography is dominated by plains in the north portion and mountains in the west and south. A cluster of multi-million person megacities connected by high-speed rail dot the landscape between the ETC’s headquarters in Nanjing in southwestern Jiangsu province to Shanghai on the coast. A number of large lakes, including Lake Tai (太湖), break up this geography. The three provinces and municipality on China’s coast together .................................. Province | Population | (millions, 2015) ---------------- --|----------------------------- Anhui | 69.5 Jiangsu | 79.8 Jiangxi | 52 Shanghai | 24.2 Zhejiang | 55.4 ------------------------------------------ Total | 280.9 ------------------------------------------------ .......................make up the Yangtze river delta (长江三角洲). So important is it to China’s economy, industry and population, The Science of Military Strategy, a PLA textbook, describes this area, along with the Pearl River Delta in China’s South, as one of its “centers of gravity” (重心所在). [3]
The Yangtze River connects eastern China with its central core, and the river plays a vital role commercially and logistically. The 1st Group Army, based in Huzhou, Zhejiang province contains a mix of units meant to defend the central coast of China. This includes an amphibious unit capable of operating in this environment of lakes and rivers that would also be used in a Taiwan scenario. The same group army contains well-equipped mechanized brigades and an armored brigade. Further to the north, the 12th Group Army is headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, and has mechanized brigades protecting Nanjing and northern Jiangsu. This central core of the ETC is also protected by the Air Forces’ 3rd Fighter Division, with a variety of air interception units. China has its largest concentration of naval forces at the mouth of the Qiantang river (钱塘 江). The East Sea Fleet is headquartered in Ningbo, and home to naval aviation units and several destroyer and submarine squadrons (zhidui; 支队), typically of 4–5 ships. PLA Naval Aviation units play an important role as they are responsible for patrolling the line between Taiwan and the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. Longrange naval H-6G bombers from Benniu air base regularly participate in long-distance patrols through the Miyako Strait and into the western Pacific.
The southern half of the ETC is dominated by rough terrain, and was the birthplace of the PLA’s predecessor, the Red Army, in Nanchang, Jiangxi province. Jiangxi’s mountains served a home base for a weakened Red Army in the early stages of China’s civil war. Now, Rocket Forces launch brigades present within the ETC are primarily located in the complicated terrain of Jiangxi and Anhui.
The coastal cities of Xiamen and Fuzhou, situated directly across the strait from Taiwan are also home to a large concentration of forces. The PLA Ground Forces’ headquarters is located in Fuzhou, and the area is well protected by Air Force and Ground Force air defense units, including long-range surface to air missiles that cover the entirety of the Taiwan Strait. Amphibious and Special Forces units vital to an invasion of Taiwan are also present under the 31st Group Army.
Joint Operations
The ETC’s Commander is Liu Yuejun (刘粤军) and its Political Officer is Zheng Weiping (郑卫平). Liu and Zheng are both ground force commanders with experience in China’s former Guangzhou military region in the south. Liu even participated in China’s last military conflict, its short border war with Vietnam in 1979 (The Taiwan Link, April 3, 2016). In any conflict, these men would need to coordinate closely with their subordinate commanders of the Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force, as well as the Rocket Force commander. In March 2016, in the midst of the shift to theater commands, Liu and Zheng coauthored an editorial in the Communist Party’s journal Seeking Truth in which they described the creation of the theater commands as a key enabler of joint operations (Seeking Truth, March 31, 2016).
The PLA has made progress in learning how to conduct joint operations, but the complications of conflict on its eastern seaboard also necessitates coordination between Theater Commands, particularly the Southern and Eastern Commands (China Brief, July 22, 2016). China’s two marine brigades, for example, are located near Zhanjiang in Guangdong province. Although Shanghai is home to a landing ship squadron, such forces would need to work together. Other units would need to be redeployed from other theater commands. This would allow, for example, strategically important areas to rapidly increase their air defenses by redeployment from the Central TC to the area around Fuzhou, as recently practiced by an HQ9 Surface-to-Air Missile (ChinaMil, October 12, 2016).
The PLA regularly practices the types of operations it would need in a Taiwan scenario. Amphibious units practice long-distance movement overland as well as maritime operations (China Brief, August 4, 2015). The Liaoning, China’s testbed aircraft carrier, has recently begun live-fire air superiority and anti-ship operations (China Brief, December 21, 2016). As China completes and brings online its own indigenously built carriers, both operations could be used off the northeastern coast of Taiwan. Air Force and Naval Aviation have conducted joint long-distance patrols near Taiwan and through the Miyako Strait (China Brief, October 26, 2016).
The Rocket Forces also play an important role in the ETC’s offensive power projection. There are at least four Rocket Force Launch Brigades in the ETC, under Base 52 in Huangshan, Anhui, as well as an additional brigade in Shaoguan, Guangdong. According to the latest Annual to Congress on the Chinese military, some 1,200 short- and medium-ranged ballistic and cruise missiles are aimed Taiwan and beyond. (See chart for specific numbers).
These forces would be expected to strike quickly at air bases and ports in Japan as well to neutralize threats. The Rocket Force even dubs its advanced DF-16 SRBM the “Okinawa Express” (People’s Daily Online, February 15).
Though beyond the scope of this discussion, network warfare units under the Strategic Support Force in Shanghai, Quanzhou and elsewhere would play an important role in any Eastern Theater Command campaign. A large number of signals intelligence units are also present opposite Taiwan (TheTaiwanLink, August 8, 2016). Rocket Force units, along with operations by the Strategic Support Force against key ISR infrastructure would take the lead in attacking Taiwan or Okinawa in a conflict.
Conclusion
Chinese rhetoric regarding Taiwan and Japan have gone through several cycles. Ahead of the Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress later this year, it is possible that such rhetoric has a political rather than strategic meaning. However, the PLA continues to modernize, and Taiwan’s military deterrent continues to suffer due to budgetary and political issues (China Brief, August 22, 2016; October 4, 2016). The United States itself is reexamining its own policies toward East Asia, introducing an additional element of uncertainty. However, despite the many changes that China’s military strategy has undergone, it unlikely that the Eastern strategic direction will lose importance any time soon. If conflict breaks out between China and another country, the Eastern Theater Command will play a leading role.
Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW
Notes
While such language has long been part of official statements on Taiwan, it is a recent edition to the NPC report. A review of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 NPC Work reports did not find similar language, although the 2015 report included the phrase “opposing independence”.
The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 32
The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 101
General References
Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation For the 21st Century, 2nd Edition, New York: Routledge, 2012.
China's military established five regional commands for its operations on 01 February 2016, President Xi Jinping's latest step in reforming the country's armed forces. State-run China Central Television reported on a ceremony held by the People's Liberation Army to mark the launch of the commands -- what the military calls "battle zones". President Xi Jinping conferred military flags on the commanders of each of the five zones.
The Central Military Commission Reform Work Conference in Beijing on 24-26 November 2015 was a gathering of more than 200 senior government officials and military brass. The CCP decided to implement by 2020 military reforms focusing on three priorities --consolidating seven military regions into five "battle zones" - new units, to integrate army, navy and air force units; and strengthening the forces in charge of missile, space and cyber warfare, which were of growing importance in modern military conflicts. The Reform Work Conference was initially scheduled to last only a day and a half. But as the reform proposals met with criticism from military officials, the conference was extended to three days. SEVEN MILITARY REGIONS TO FIVE THEATRE COMBAT COMMANDS
Before the reforms, there were seven military regions, includingthe Beijing Military Region, Shenyang Military Region, Jinan Military Region, Lanzhou Military Region, ChengduMilitary Region, Guangzhou Military Region and Nanjing Military Region. These regions have now been reclassified into five battle zones (or theater commands), namely the East, West, South, North, and Middle battle zones.
The new battle zones are operational formations, with acqusition functions previously associated with the Military regions, and a prime source of corruption opportunities, now centralized in Beijing. The joint war-fighting commands in geographic zones represented a shift in focus from homeland defense to a more external orientation based on various strategic directions of potential threats. This would help the PLA better focus on external threats, regional power projection, and likely enhance integrated joint operations between the services. Many of the important posts in each region were dominated by army officials. Maintaining firm control over the regions was difficult since they were locally-oriented in terms of procurement and personnel relocation. The Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi, launched a general command unit in December 2015 to control the integrated operations of ground, naval and air forces. The Commission also set up a joint operational command structure for each of the "battle zones". The joint commands overseeing combined army, navy and air force units established within each battle zone.
Experts believe the official establishment of the five "battle zones" marks a historic moment in establishing a united operational system to strengthen the army and better protect China'snational security.
"The establishment of united commands for the battle zones marks a significant breakthrough for the Chinese army. The system will ensure more efficient coordination between different units. The Chinese military will therefore acquire stronger combatcapabilities. Secondly, different battle zones will have different strategic emphases. The commands will better focus on their own strategic directions so as to better protect China's interests in different areas," said military expert Lou Yaoliang.
China's move to establish five new theater commands is "a breakthrough and a historic step" in setting up a joint battle command system for the military, a PLA Daily commentary said. In the previous commands, the administration and command systems were not managed separately, it said, identifying unclear functions and ineffective joint command systems as institutional barriers to winning wars.
With the new move, the theater commands can enable relatively separate management of the administration and command system and better coordination among different military services, it said. As such, a more efficient command chain forbattles can be put into place, according to the commentary. The principle of the Central Military Commission taking charge of overall military administration, theater commands focusing on combat and different military branches pursuing their own development should also be strictly observed, the PLA Daily said.
Shenyang Military Area Command, which is close to North Korea, was one of the seven battle-zone commands and believed to be tasked with coping withcontingency plans on the Korean Peninsula. The Shenyang Military Area Command was reclassified as The North "battle zone" with its area of responsibility including the Inner Mongolia region along with China's northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang.
Chinese President Xi Jinping urged breakthroughs in reform of the country's armed forces by 2020, vowing to reorganize the current military administration structure and military command system. Xi, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), made the remarks at a meeting on reforming the armed forces which was held from Nov. 24 to 26, 2015.
A new structure will be established, in which the CMC takes charge of the overall administration of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese People's Armed Police and the militia and reserve forces; battle zone commands focus oncombats; and different military services pursue their own construction, Xi said.
According to Xi, the CMC's "centralized and unified" leadership should be strengthened to ensure that supreme administration and command status belong to the CMC and the CPC Central Committee. Xi cited measures designed to "integrate the administrative system and the joint battle command system," including a generalcommand centerfor land forces and enabling the CMC to directly administer and command various military departments.
The current regional military commands will be adjusted and regrouped into new battle zone commands supervised by the CMC, Xi said. The reform will establish a three-tier "CMC - battle zone commands - troops" command system and an administration systemthat runs from CMC through various services to the troops.
China planned to merge four of its seven Military Regions into two in order to better coordinate the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps in a future combat environment, Tokyo's Yomiuri Shimbun reported 02 January 2014. The Jinan, Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions would be spared, as they focused on the disputed East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. However, the Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions will be merged, as will the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions, reducing the country's seven military regions to five.
The commanders of these military regions have operational command operations of most ground forces in their geographical areas. The military area commands (theaters of war) of the PLA are military organizations set up according to the state's administrative divisions, geographical locations, strategic and operational orientations, and operational tasks. Under each military area command are a number of Army combined corps, units of various arms, logistical support units, and provincial or garrison commands. Their major functions include organizing and coordinating the joint operations and exercises of the ground, naval and air forces in each military area; exercising direct leadership over Party affairs, military training, administration, political work, logistical and armaments support of the Army units under its jurisdiction; and directing the militia, military service, mobilization, civil air defense and battlefieldconstruction workin the military area.
The People's Liberation Army began a modernization effort following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, which made it clear to China's top commanders that a large and ill-equipped army was not a reliable instrument of national security policy. In May, 1985, China solemnly declared that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would reduce military personnel by one million. Reapportionment and merger reduced the number of military area commands from eleven to seven. More than 5,900 units above the regimental level were dispersed through dismantling, merging, demoting or reforming.
Since the 1980s, China replaced the regional and field army organization and divided up the nation's troops into 7 Military Regions.
The Southeast Area (Nanjing Military Region and Guangzhou Military Region): 5 army groups were deployed, numbering about 480,000 in total as of 1998.
The Northeast Area (Shenyang Military Region): The total strength was approximately 310,000 persons, organized into 5 army groups as of 1998.
The Southwest Area (Chengdu Military Region): The total manpower amounted to 180,000 persons, composed of 2 army groups as of 1998.
The Northwest Area (Lanzhou Military Region): Two army groups are deployed in the area, a force numbering more than 220,000 in total as of 1998.
The Capital Area (Beijing Military Region): The total strength amounted to about 410,000 persons, organized into 6 army groups as of 1998.
The Strategic Reserve (Jinan Military Region): The total manpower was some 240,000 persons, consisting of 4 army groups as of 1998.
What is the significance of Jeeva Samadhi? Sadhguru
Published on Mar 10, 2017
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Samadhi Part 1 (Maya the Illusion of the Self) is the first installment of a series of films exploring Samadhi. You can purchase a high definition copy of the film for download to your computer here: http://www.innerworldsmovie.com/index...
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