THE SIKHS: Understanding the Sikh Soldier's Raw Bravery & Unending Loyalty

SOURCE:

https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2019/11/02/understanding-the-sikh-soldier-raw-bravery-unending-loyalty.html?fbclid=IwAR0hT2LVRiEezVsG3gVz036PJNFBc8fp_6KasrevceS_-vOaAfpN5qpIDNU

Understanding the Sikh Soldier's Raw                           Bravery &   Unending Loyalty 

                               By

               Gurmeet Kanwal

The Sikh community's contribution to  national security has been immense

Sikh Light infantrymen amuse themselves with song-and-             dance, 1 km near LAC, India-China border 

India faces multifarious national security threats and challenges in the conventional and sub-conventional fields. While various communities across the country have contributed to meeting these challenges, the Sikh community’s contribution has been disproportionately large relative to the small size of its population.

Inspired by the teachings of Guru Nanak Dev—the first guru and the founder of the Sikh religion—to engage in selfless service, strive for justice for the benefit and prosperity of all and be honest in your conduct, Sikh youth have traditionally opted to serve in the armed forces and the Central police and paramilitary forces (CAPF) in large numbers. Till proportional quotas based on each state’s population were imposed to give states a fair share, undivided Punjab contributed the largest number of recruits to the Indian armed forces, most of them Sikh.

The largest number of Sikh personnel in uniform serve in the Indian Army. From the snow-clad and windswept mountains of the Himalayas in the north to the steaming hot and humid jungles of the seven sisters in the northeast to the shimmering sands of the burning Thar Desert in the west, Sikh soldiers have resolutely guarded the nation’s frontiers.

Along the LoC with Pakistan, they brave daily spells of intermittent small arms and mortar fire from a wily enemy and prevent infiltration attempts by terrorists from succeeding. Sometimes, they live through many days of heavy artillery shelling when the very earth around them shakes ominously.

Despite the omnipresent danger, hardships and privations of life on the nation’s troubled frontiers, they stand tall and firm. Stoic and resolute, their courage never wavers, their spirit never flags. Their esprit de corps and earthy sense of humour help them shrug off hardships with a wink and a grin.

Sikh soldiers have exhibited raw courage on every battlefield and shown unflinching devotion to duty in the face of daunting odds. The movie Kesri brings out in graphic detail the story of the heroic fight to the ‘last man, last round’ by 21 Sikh soldiers who fought Orakzai and Afridi Lashkars while defending Saragarhi Fort in Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa (KPK—erstwhile NWFP) in 1897. Each of the soldiers was awarded the Indian Order of Merit, at that time, the highest award that was given to Indian soldiers serving in the British Indian Army.

The Sikhs fought gallantly on numerous battlefields in the First and Second World Wars. In all, 83,005 Sikh soldiers made the supreme sacrifice on the battlefields of the two World Wars; another 1,09,045 were wounded in battle.

While the Sikhs from Punjab, Haryana and Jammu and Kashmir serve in large numbers in the Punjab and Dogra regiments and other fighting arms like the Regiment of Artillery and the Corps of Engineers, the Sikh Regiment and the Sikh Light Infantry Regiment are the only two regiments that comprise only Sikh soldiers.

The Sikh Regiment is the most highly decorated regiment of the Indian Army in terms of gallantry awards and good service medals. The regiment has earned 10 Victoria Crosses, two Param Vir Chakras (Lance Naik Karam Singh, Kashmir operations, 1948; and Subedar Joginder Singh, Chinese aggression, 1962), 14 Maha Vir Chakras and 68 Vir Chakras. Battalions of the Sikh Regiment distinguished themselves in each of independent India’s wars including the Kargil conflict of 1999. The Sikh Regiment has also been awarded a large number of battle and theatre honours for distinguished service in particular battles or in the whole theatre.

The first battalion of the Sikh Regiment was raised in the British Indian Army in 1846, just after the Anglo-Sikh wars, during which the British came to admire the gallantry and professionalism of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s Sikh soldiers. In fact, during the British Raj, the Sikh community was classified as one of the martial races of India. In independent India, no such distinctions are made on racial lines. Today, the Sikh Regiment has more than 20 battalions.

The Sikh Light Infantry is amongst the oldest regiments of the Indian Army. Its origin dates back to the Sikh Pioneers raised in the middle of the 19th century. The Sikh Pioneers were disbanded in 1932, but were re-raised as the Sikh Light Infantry in 1941 to meet the growing demand for infantry battalions during the Second World War. The Sikh Pioneers earned laurels in diverse theatres of combat, including China (1860), Abyssinia (1868), Peiwar Kotal (1878), Charasia (1879), Kabul to Kandahar (1880), Chitral (1895), Tibet (1903-04), Egypt and Palestine (1914-18), France (1914-15), Mesopotamia (1916-21) and Chitral/Black Picquet (1919).

The Sikh Light Infantry today has about 20 infantry battalions with three battalions each of Rashtriya Rifles and the Territorial Army. The Sikh Light Infantry acquitted itself with glory in operations in Burma, Iraq and Syria before independence. Its battalions have taken part in all wars and operations since independence and earned many laurels.

The regiment has been awarded a large number of gallantry and good service medals including one Ashok Chakra. Two former chiefs of the Indian Army—General V.P. Malik and General Bikram Singh—belonged to the Sikh Light Infantry.

Personnel of the Sikh and Sikh Light Infantry regiments have excelled in sports and represented the nation in many fields. Battalions of both the regiments have done the nation proud with their outstanding performance in United Nations peacekeeping missions. The training centres of the Sikh and Sikh Light Infantry regiments are at Ramgarh in Bihar and Fatehgarh in Uttar Pradesh, respectively.

The regimental war cry of both the regiments is Jo Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal. It means “whoever utters (the second phrase) shall be content”, and the second phrase means “God is eternal.” Another interpretation of the famous phrase is, “Victory belongs to those who recite the name of God with a true heart.”

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The motto of the Sikh Regiment is Nischay Kar Apni Jeet Karon (With determination, I will be triumphant). The regimental motto of the Sikh Light Infantry, Deg Teg Fateh, stands for “prosperity in peace, victory in war”. These mottos underscore the belief that all victory belongs to God and emphasise the importance of charity for the needy and the sword against oppression.

Deeply religious in their outlook on life, Sikh soldiers draw their inspiration from the selfless service rendered by their gurus and the numerous sacrifices made by them, particularly by Guru Nanak Dev and Guru Gobind Singh, the first and 10th gurus, respectively.

One of the most celebrated and widely quoted hymns composed by Guru Gobind Singh is an invocation to Lord Shiva for his blessings to never shy away from doing good deeds: Deh Shiva bar mohe ehey shubh karman se kabhun na taro. It goes on to seek God’s blessings to be brave and resolute in battle: Na daro arr seo jab jaye laro, nischey kar apni jit karo.

The central theme of this inspiring hymn shows Sikh soldiers the path to righteousness: “Never flinch from stepping in front of the enemy to protect the poor, weak and needy of the world; never have any apprehension or anxiety about the righteous fight ahead.”

Sikh soldiers have made the central message contained in this hymn their primary guiding light in life.

The author is former director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

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Part 28 CDS JOINTNESS PLA Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command (r)

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-eastern-theater-command/


CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html


Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html

Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of N Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html

Part 1  of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-zero-cds-explained-what-is.html

              CDS PLA JOINTNESS 

                      Snapshot: 

  China’s Eastern Theater Command

                            By

                     Peter Wood

                   March 14, 2017 

Delivering his work report to the National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang noted that “the Chinese mainland will resolutely oppose and contain ‘Taiwan independence separatist activities’” (“台独”分裂活动) (Xinhua, March 5). [1] President Xi Jinping, however, was even more explicit in early November 2016, when he said “1.3 billion Chinese people will oppose Taiwan independence. We have the ability, the determination and are prepared to deal with Taiwan independence. If we do not, we will be overthrown (推翻) by 1.3 billion people” (Apple Daily, November 2, 2016). China’s ability to “deal” with Taiwan involves political and economic pressure. These tools have already seen some success as the number of countries that recognize Taiwan shrinks, and Taiwan’s participation in international organizations is severely restricted. However, as China’s military becomes more effective, military coercion is increasingly a viable option. 

An overview of China’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC) provides some insight into the Chinese military’s current capabilities against Taiwan.

China’s Eastern Strategic Direction

Although eastern China is one of the most densely populated and important areas of the country, China’s east coast has not always been its primary strategic direction. Chinese military writings note that China’s historical focus on ground forces arose out of a lack of maritime threats to China from the east. In ancient times, and again during the 20th century, the threat of land invasions from the west and north outweighed threats to the east and south. [2] With the renewal of ties with Russia in the mid-1980s the strategic focus shifted again to the east, raising the importance of aerospace and maritime forces.

In the mid-1990s, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis put the region back in headlines. Missile launches in 1995 and 1996 prompted the United States to send two carrier strike groups to the area around Taiwan. The incident also revealed a number of deficits in PLA capabilities. While Taiwan remained a key issue for the PLA, its lack of sufficient maritime lift capacity, air superiority and even intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities meant that an invasion across the strait would not succeed. The U.S. navy’s ability to operate without real challenge was another major problem, and Chinese defense planners recognized the need to have layered offensive and defensive systems to project power into the East China Sea.

The Japanese governments’ 2012 purchase of the Senkaku Islands from a private owner sparked tensions and prompted widespread protests throughout China. Projecting power not just toward Taiwan but throughout the East China Sea gained additional importance. The Chinese government followed up on this by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone in late November 2013 (China Brief, December 5, 2013). The area has since seen a steady increase in Chinese military aviation and maritime patrols (China Brief, October 26, 2016). Accompanying these events, ........
China’s military has reformed and reorganized to better deal with security issues along its eastern strategic direction.

The military organizations responsible for most of eastern China have undergone a number of changes since the 1980s. Until 1988, China had 11 military regions (MR) including ones centered on Fuzhou in northern Fujian province and Nanjing. The Fuzhou MR was incorporated into the Nanjing MR, which, after the latest round of reforms, has been folded intact into the Eastern Theater Command. An important result of the 2015 military reforms is that the Theater Command acts as joint headquarters for Army, Navy and Air Force (China Brief, June 21, 2016). The Rocket Force also has units present in the ETC, although they are directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military body.

The Geography of Eastern China

Province/ Municipality	Population Millions (2015)
Anhui	69.5
Fujian	38.3
Jiangsu	79.8
Jiangxi	52
Shanghai	24.2
Zhejiang	55.4
Total	319.2

The current ETC is composed of military units within the borders of Anhui, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, as well as Shanghai Municipality. Together, their populations include over 319 million citizens and three of China’s top ten ports—Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen. Bisected by the Yangtze River (长江), the region’s geography is dominated by plains in the north portion and mountains in the west and south. A cluster of multi-million person megacities connected by high-speed rail dot the landscape between the ETC’s headquarters in Nanjing in southwestern Jiangsu province to Shanghai on the coast. A number of large lakes, including Lake Tai (太湖), break up this geography.  The three provinces and municipality on China’s coast together make up the Yangtze river delta (长江三角洲). So important is it to China’s economy, industry and population, The Science of Military Strategy, a PLA textbook, describes this area, along with the Pearl River Delta in China’s South, as one of its
“centers of gravity” (重心所在). [3]

The Yangtze River connects eastern China with its central core, and the river plays a vital role commercially and logistically. The 1st Group Army, based in Huzhou, Zhejiang province contains a mix of units meant to defend the central coast of China. This includes an amphibious unit capable of operating in this environment of lakes and rivers that would also be used in a Taiwan scenario. The same group army contains well-equipped mechanized brigades and an armored brigade. Further to the north, the 12th Group Army is headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, and has mechanized brigades protecting Nanjing and northern Jiangsu. This central core of the ETC is also protected by the Air Forces’ 3rd Fighter Division, with a variety of air interception units.

China has its largest concentration of naval forces at the mouth of the Qiantang river (钱塘江). The East Sea Fleet is headquartered in Ningbo, and home to naval aviation units and several destroyer and submarine squadrons (zhidui; 支队), typically of 4–5 ships. PLA Naval Aviation units play an important role as they are responsible for patrolling the line between Taiwan and the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. Long-range naval H-6G bombers from Benniu air base regularly participate in long-distance patrols through the Miyako Strait and into the western Pacific.

The southern half of the ETC is dominated by rough terrain, and was the birthplace of the PLA’s predecessor, the Red Army, in Nanchang, Jiangxi province. Jiangxi’s mountains served a home base for a weakened Red Army in the early stages of China’s civil war. Now, Rocket Forces launch brigades present within the ETC are primarily located in the complicated terrain of Jiangxi and Anhui.

The coastal cities of Xiamen and Fuzhou, situated directly across the strait from Taiwan are also home to a large concentration of forces. The PLA Ground Forces’ headquarters is located in Fuzhou, and the area is well protected by Air Force and Ground Force air defense units, including long-range surface to air missiles that cover the entirety of the Taiwan Strait. 
Amphibious and Special Forces units vital to an invasion of Taiwan are also present under the 31st Group Army.

Joint Operations

The ETC’s Commander is Liu Yuejun (刘粤军) and its Political Officer is Zheng Weiping (郑卫平). Liu and Zheng are both ground force commanders with experience in China’s former Guangzhou military region in the south. Liu even participated in China’s last military conflict, its short border war with Vietnam in 1979 (The Taiwan Link, April 3, 2016). In any conflict, these men would need to coordinate closely with their subordinate commanders of the Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force, as well as the Rocket Force commander. In March 2016, in the midst of the shift to theater commands, Liu and Zheng co authored an editorial in the Communist Party’s journal Seeking Truth in which they described the creation of the theater commands as a key enabler of joint operations (Seeking Truth, March 31, 2016).

The PLA has made progress in learning how to conduct joint operations, but the complications of conflict on its eastern seaboard also necessitates coordination between Theater Commands, particularly the Southern and Eastern Commands (China Brief, July 22, 2016). China’s two marine brigades, for example, are located near Zhanjiang in Guangdong province. Although Shanghai is home to a landing ship squadron, such forces would need to work together. Other units would need to be redeployed from other theater commands. This would allow, for example, strategically important areas to rapidly increase their air defenses by redeployment from the Central TC to the area around Fuzhou, as recently practiced by an HQ-9 Surface-to-Air Missile (ChinaMil, October 12, 2016).

The PLA regularly practices the types of operations it would need in a Taiwan scenario. Amphibious units practice long-distance movement overland as well as maritime operations (China Brief, August 4, 2015). The Liaoning, China’s test-bed aircraft carrier, has recently begun live-fire air superiority and anti-ship operations (China Brief, December 21, 2016). As China completes and brings online its own indigenously built carriers, both operations could be used off the northeastern coast of Taiwan. Air Force and Naval Aviation have conducted joint long-distance patrols near Taiwan and through the Miyako Strait (China Brief, October 26, 2016).

The Rocket Forces also play an important role in the ETC’s offensive power projection. There are at least four Rocket Force Launch Brigades in the ETC, under Base 52 in Huangshan, Anhui, as well as an additional brigade in Shaoguan, Guangdong. According to the latest Annual to Congress on the Chinese military, some 1,200 short- and medium-ranged ballistic and cruise missiles are aimed Taiwan and beyond. (See chart for specific numbers).

These forces would be expected to strike quickly at air bases and ports in Japan as well to neutralize threats. The Rocket Force even dubs its advanced DF-16 SRBM the “Okinawa Express” (People’s Daily Online, February 15).

Though beyond the scope of this discussion, network warfare units under the Strategic Support Force in Shanghai, Quanzhou and elsewhere would play an important role in any Eastern Theater Command campaign. A large number of signals intelligence units are also present opposite Taiwan (TheTaiwanLink, August 8, 2016). Rocket Force units, along with operations by the Strategic Support Force against key ISR infrastructure would take the lead in attacking Taiwan or Okinawa in a conflict.

Conclusion

Chinese rhetoric regarding Taiwan and Japan have gone through several cycles. Ahead of the Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress later this year, it is possible that such rhetoric has a political rather than strategic meaning. However, the PLA continues to modernize, and Taiwan’s military deterrent continues to suffer due to budgetary and political issues (China Brief, August 22, 2016; October 4, 2016). The United States itself is reexamining its own policies toward East Asia, introducing an additional element of uncertainty. However, despite the many changes that China’s military strategy has undergone, it unlikely that the Eastern strategic direction will lose importance any time soon. If conflict breaks out between China and another country, the Eastern Theater Command will play a leading role.

Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW

Notes

1. While such language has long been part of official statements on Taiwan, it is a recent edition to the NPC report. A review of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 NPC Work reports did not find similar language, although the 2015 report included the phrase “opposing independence”.
2. The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 32
3. The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 101

General References

Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation For the 21st Century, 2nd Edition, New York: Routledge, 2012.

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