RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 28, 2022 ( un- EDITED)

 

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , JUNE 28, 2022

Kateryna Stepanenko, Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, Mason Clark, and Grace Mappes

June 28, 7:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces are likely conducting a fighting withdrawal that may include pulling back from Lysychansk and Luhansk Oblast in the near future and which probably aims to force the Russian offensive to culminate prematurely. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces began a large-scale withdrawal from Lysychansk towards Siversk, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk on June 28.[1] Although ISW cannot confirm independently Miroshnik’s claims of an ongoing withdrawal, Ukrainian forces may continue the fighting withdrawal that began in Severodonetsk to Ukrainian strongholds around Siversk, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk. The staunch but limited Ukrainian defense of Severodonetsk imposed high costs on the Russians despite new Russian tactics intended to limit Russian casualties. Kyiv could continue this approach until the Russian attack culminates or Ukrainian forces reach more defensible positions along a straighter line dotted with fortified cities and towns.

The pace and outcome of the next phase of the current campaign may depend in part on Russia’s ability to recoup combat power from the forces that participated in the Battle of Severodonetsk. The remaining Russian forces in Severodonetsk will need to cross the Siverskyi Donets River into Lysychansk from Severodonetsk or its surrounding settlements to participate further in the Russian offensive. This movement could require some time since the Russians destroyed the three main bridges across the river near the city. Miroshnik claimed that Russian forces have already crossed the Siverskyi Donets River from Kreminna and are building bridgeheads for further attacks on Lysychansk from the north.[2] ISW cannot independently verify Miroshnik’s claims. If they are true, and Russian forces threaten to complete the cauldron by pushing from the north and southwest of Lysychansk, then Ukrainian forces will likely abandon Lysychansk as well and conduct a fighting withdrawal to more defensible positions. Russian forces that have engaged in continuous offensive operations in Severodonetsk will also require some time to restore combat capabilities before participating in an assault on northern or northeastern Lysychansk. An unnamed Pentagon official stated that Russian forces continue to endure significant losses in fights for small territorial gains, and Russian groups that fought in Severodonetsk likely lost personnel and equipment.[3] The locations and strength of the Russian troops that seized Severodonetsk remain unclear at this time, however. A notable acceleration of Russian attacks from the south of Lysychansk or from across the Siverskyi Donetsk River would likely indicate that the Russians have completed a redeployment of forces from Severodonetsk. ISW has not yet observed such indicators.

Ukraine’s Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported that the Kremlin replaced Western Military District (WMD) Commander Alexander Zhuravlev with the former commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Andrey Sychevoy.[4] CIT added that WMD Chief of Staff Aleksey Zavizion was relieved. ISW cannot independently verify these reports and will continue to monitor the situation for further corroboration.

Russian forces continue to look for additional reserves to replenish personnel losses in Ukraine, but these reserves are unlikely to initiate rotations or provide combat-ready manpower. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov announced that he will form four new battalions “with an impressive number of personnel” on June 26.[5] Kadyrov also announced that Chechen forces formed a West-Akhmat battalion “in the shortest possible” time and claimed that the unit would deploy to a well-equipped base in Chechnya. Chechen forces will likely deploy the newly-created battalion to the frontline without sufficient training. Social media users also released footage of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) rounding up “volunteers” in Donetsk City as part of the recruitment campaign on June 28.[6] Wives of servicemen of the Russian 5th Guards Separate Tank Brigade issued a video plea for the immediate rotation of their husbands back home, noting that their husbands had left their permanent bases of deployment in January 2022 for “exercises in Belarus.”[7] The video indicates that the Russian military command has expressed its intentions for unit rotations.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued to launch assault operations south and southwest of Lysychansk. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) officials claimed that Ukrainian forces had begun to withdraw from the city, but ISW cannot confirm these claims.
• Russian forces launched unsuccessful offensive operations north of Slovyansk and conducted spoiling attacks on settlements west of Izyum, likely to disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• Russian forces failed to advance along the Kharkiv City-Belgorod highway and continued to undertake measures to hinder Ukrainian advances towards the international border or Izyum.
• Ukrainian forces continued to launch counteroffensives north of Kherson City and reportedly liberated two settlements.
• Russian forces continued to transfer military equipment and personnel east of Melitopol.
• Russian occupation authorities are maintaining unsuccessful efforts to introduce ruble salary payments and set conditions to inflate electoral numbers in a future referendum.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations southwest of Lysychansk to sever the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway in several areas. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces attempted to gain a foothold in the southern part of the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and pushed west of Vochoyarivka, but did not reach the T1302 as of June 28.[8] Haidai also added that Russian forces fought south and southwest of Lysychansk. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that LNR and Russian forces have advanced a third of the way into Lysychansk from the south and are fighting at the Shaktar football stadium, while other troops cross the Siverskyi Donetsk River around Kreminna. ISW is unable to independently verify these claims.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces also conducted an unsuccessful attack west of Mykolaivka and Yakovlivka, both along the T1302.[10] Russian Su-25 aircraft struck Ukrainian positions in Bila Hora, just southeast of Lysychansk.[11]

Russian forces continued to make limited territorial gains south of Bakhmut on June 28. Russian forces continued to attack settlements along the E-40 highway that runs from Slovyansk to Bakhmut, approximately 13km southeast of Bakhmut.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff also added that Russian forces are attacking in the direction of the Uglehirska Power Plant northwest of Svitlodarsk.[13] Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled Russian attacks in Pavlivka, just east of the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[14]

Russian forces are likely continuing to launch spoiling attacks west of Izyum to disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted an unsuccessful assault on Zalyman, approximately 26km northwest of Izyum, on June 28, having failed to advance in the area yesterday.[15] Russian forces likely continued to attack Zalyman with insufficient combat power to make real gains in their effort to disrupt Ukrainian counter-offensives and thereby defend Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum through Borova (approximately 41km east). Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian equipment in Vesele, just east of Zalyman.[16] Russian forces are likely also continuing to conduct aerial reconnaissance and operate near Velyka Komyshuvakha (approximately 21km west of Izyum) to disrupt Ukrainian advances from the west.[17]

Russian forces conducted assaults north of Slovyansk but were unable to advance along the E-40 highway on June 28. Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensive operations on Mazanivka, just west of the E40.[18] Russian forces also continued to shell settlements around Lyman and Slovyansk itself.[19]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces launched unsuccessful offensive operations in northwestern Kharkiv Oblast and continued to undertake measures to prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the international border or striking Russian positions southeast of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack on Dementiivka along the Kharkiv City-Belgorod highway.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian Ka-52 helicopters struck in the area of Yavirske, 65km southeast of Kharkiv City, likely to hinder Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[21] Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv City and settlements in its vicinity and conduct aerial reconnaissance.[22]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces continued to launch counteroffensive operations north of Kherson City on June 28. Ukrainian military journalist Andriy Tsaplienko reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Zelenyi Hai and Barvinok, approximately 25km north of Kherson City on the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border.[23] An unnamed Pentagon official had previously reported that Ukrainian forces liberated small villages north and northwest of Kherson City over the weekend, but neither Ukrainian nor US officials had named these settlements as of June 28.[24] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain previously lost positions in Potyomkyne, Plotnytske, and Lupareve in northwestern Kherson Oblast.[25] Russian forces continued to shell and launch air strikes along the Mykolaiv-Kherson and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast borders to disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensives.[26] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Gumenyuk noted that Ukrainian forces also struck three Russian Pantsir systems in a continuing effort to destroy Russian defenses on the Snake Island off the Romanian coast.[27]

Russian forces continued to transfer equipment and personnel east of Melitopol on June 28. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh reported that Russian forces are transporting military equipment to and from Melitopol to unspecified settlements in the east.[28] Starukh added that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Berdyansk and the Prymorsk area, but it is unclear if the BTG will continue further east or remain in that area. Russian forces may be relocating more military personnel to suppress rising partisan activity in cities like Berdyansk or could be reinforcing Russian defensive positions on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. Russian forces are also likely setting conditions to hold the E58 highway stretching from Rostov-on-Don to Kherson City even if Ukrainian counteroffensives push back the Russian line to the north.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities continued to introduce bureaucratic measures to install societal control over occupied territories on June 28 but face challenges due to Ukrainian resistance. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Russian occupation administration is attempting to carry out a medical reform in Kherson Oblast to follow the Russian healthcare model.[29] Ukrainian healthcare workers largely refuse to cooperate with Russian occupation authorities, disrupting Russian plans to introduce ruble salaries in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also noted that Russian forces are opening a network of offices in southern Ukraine offering Russian passports, likely to inflate electorate numbers before a referendum.[30]

 

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[1] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/7782; https://t.me/strelkovii/2808; https://t.me/rybar/34573

[2] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/7781

[3] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3075839/dod-of...

[4] https://twitter.com/CITeam_en/status/1541503442048393217

[5] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2444

[6] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1541729059406757888?s=20&t=zs9bi...

[7] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/7724

[8] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3829?single; https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517127-vijska-rf-namagautsa-otociti-zsu-v-rajoni-lisicanska-minoboroni.html

 

[9] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/7781; https://t.me/rybar/34573

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/349903877322697; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/349903877322697

[11] https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517127-vijska-rf-namagautsa-otociti-zsu-v-rajoni-lisicanska-minoboroni.html

[12] https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517127-vijska-rf-namagautsa-otociti-zsu-v-rajoni-lisicanska-minoboroni.html

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/349903877322697

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/349903877322697

 

[15]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09KF3ZPHgiZqFf9FG94z...;

[16] https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta_/status/1541716205316218880

[17] https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1541348686067896322; https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517115-zsu-na-harkivsini-vidkinuli-voroga-na-dvoh-napramkah.html; https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517127-vijska-rf-namagautsa-otociti-zsu-v-rajoni-lisicanska-minoboroni.html

[18] https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517115-zsu-na-harkivsini-vidkinuli-voroga-na-dvoh-napramkah.html

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09KF3ZPHgiZqFf9FG94z...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/349903877322697

[20] https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517115-zsu-na-harkivsini-vidkinuli-voroga-na-dvoh-napramkah.html

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09KF3ZPHgiZqFf9FG94z...

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09KF3ZPHgiZqFf9FG94z...; https://t.me/synegubov/3504; https://t.me/synegubov/3505; https://t.me/synegubov/3510; https://twitter.com/StudMedia/status/1541444598517702657; https://www.facebook.com/Zadorenko/posts/pfbid02caPJu9oUP12c7z7ba8GuZNgS...

 

[23] https://t.me/Tsaplienko/10827

[24] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3075839/dod-of...

[25] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1107639849819527

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09KF3ZPHgiZqFf9FG94z...; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/349903877322697; https://t.me/rybar/34542; https://t.me/rybar/34537

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/37924; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhs2JS_f9bI; https://tsn dot ua/ru/ato/ocherednoy-udar-vsu-po-ostrovu-zmeinyy-v-ok-yug-rasskazali-detali-o-rezultatah-voennoy-operacii-2097703.html

[28] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9703

[29] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/06/27/okupanty-ne-mozhut-znajty-kolaborantiv-sered-medykiv-na-hersonshhyni/

[30] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/1459994497781797/

 

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Severodonetsk Battle Map Draft June 28,2022.png

AGNIVEERS AND THE CORPORATE CHOIR

 SOURCE; 

  (a)     avayshukla.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-lock-down-diaries-xviii-duffer-zone.html?m=1

Must read:

Rajnath Singh may have gone to the buffer zone in Lakakh (which is on the Indian side). But the Duffer zone is truly in India & Made in India. One 'Make in India' project succeeded!

AGNIVEERS AND THE CORPORATE CHOIR

         Avay Shukla's " View from [Greater] Kailash "

Friday, 24 June 2022

This govt. for giving CORPORATE HOUSES   the corporate tax break a couple of years ago, something which this country can ill afford- almost Rupees 2 lakh crores per annum, which is more than the total pension bill of the armed forces ( including the civilian defense employees). The corporate worthies were supposed to have used these savings for capital investment, increase production and manufacturing, and create some of those 20 million jobs every year that had been promised us in a jumla moment. 

They haven't done that yet and have pocketed the savings. Why should they, in fact, when................... 

                  it's cheaper to sing in a CHOIR?  

 I belong to the 1950 batch of homo sapiens, and wasn't singled out for any special favours by the Creator when He was dishing out His divine gifts. So, as you can guess, I'm a pretty average Joe- average intelligence, average physique, average health, average abilities and skills; this last one is borne out by my 35 ACRs ( Annual Confidential Reports) in govt. service, all of which categorize me as Average. In the IAS, by the way, Average means Outstanding as I have yet to see an IAS officer who is not graded as Outstanding, but that's a story for another day!

   More relevant to the present, however, is the fact that God did not give me a singing voice- no baritone, no tenor, no soprano, no alto, no bass, no counter-tenor. I could not, therefore, find a place in any choir, a lasting regret I shall carry to the electric crematorium in the fullness of time. ( I hope there's no power cut at the appointed hour). It has been a great disappointment but my admiration for the choir persists, and therefore I was thrilled to hear the rising sounds of a new choir last week, ascending almost to the level of a Wagnerian climax by the weekend, before it petered away into a whine.

  This choir was not comprised of your usual singers but of the captains of Indian industry, the Old Money types and the Covid billionaires, the Panama papers and Pandora papers types, those who tweet more often than the sparrows in my garden and dish out more advice on a daily basis than the Sadhguru. There was total silence till the 19th of the month, but suddenly on the 20th there was a chorus of synchronised voices, all singing to the BJP tune of  "Hum Honge Agniveer".

  It was a masterful performance, extolling the mythical qualities of the Agniveers, how their six month training would revolutionise Indian industry, fill all the gaps in operations, marketing, supply chains and technical back-ups; how their commitment and patriotism would usher in a 5 trillion dollar economy in four years. I couldn't see the Conductor but he must have been waving his baton- or truncheon- somewhere backstage because all the singers were looking back over their shoulders while singing, a standard precaution with choir boys, I learn.

  But something was not right- the choir was singing in a high castrato, which sounds more like bleating than singing. The lyrics lacked conviction, as in a Prasun Joshi song. And the reason soon became clear, when eminent veterans and social media began asking uncomfortable questions. By then, however, it had become amply clear that Big Capital in India is as spineless as the media, that they don't give a damn about our youth or about unemployment as long as they can keep cornering more of the country's wealth and ascending the billionaire ladder, that their ballad to the Agniveer was nothing but a command performance, singing for their dinner, as it were.

  The Agnipath scheme has more holes than a target in a shooting range, but that can be better left to the experts to dissect. I am more concerned with the duplicity, hypocrisy and sycophancy of our corporates. Take for instance their offer to provide unlimited number of jobs to the Agniveers discharged after four years: as a number of veterans have asked: how many jobs have they provided to ex-servicemen so far? Given their unrestrained excitement at the prospect of employing these youth with just six months of basic training and three years of hunkering down at Siachen or the Arunachal border, surely they would have employed thousands of existing ex-servicemen with 15 years of experience and far more training? It's been a week since this question was asked of them, but not one has tweeted a reply or provided any figures!

  The DG (Resettlement), the govt agency tasked with finding jobs for ex-servicemen is able to place about 45000-50000 retirees every year, but here's the catch- 90% of them are as Security Guards! That too on contract, with no job security or pensions. So much for Mr. Anand Mahindra and FICCI's tweets about "blend of experience and discipline" and " creating a talent pool" for industry. Admit it, gentlemen- ex-servicemen are a cheap labour force for you, even with their 15-20 years of training/ experience. The Agniveer minnows, with just 4 years, will be even cheaper fodder for your industrial appetite- if you employ them at all, that is.

  But let us not make the mistake of thinking that the government has a better track record. An Indian Express report of 20th June by Harikishan Sharma ( digital format) reveals a bitter truth. According to rules, the ex-serviceman quota in central PSUs is 14.50% in Group C jobs and 24.50% in Group D category. But information provided by 90 PSUs shows that the actual utilisation of this quota is only 1.15% and 0.3% respectively! So much for the latest assurance of 10% quota in CAPFs and Ministry of Defence undertakings.

  Just about all corporates require a graduation degree for any job above the D, or lowest, grade. The Agniveers will at best be 10+2, and will have little or no meaningful technical skills or training, notwithstanding the Army Chief's tall claims. They will be soldiers after all, needed at our borders, and the Army will not have the luxury of keeping them in training institutes beyond the very basic training. Are our corporates, therefore, ready to take them on as interns, pay for their skill reorientation and give them jobs in management, and on the shop floor? Their past does not hold out much hope for this: social media these days is full of posts from ex-servicemen- even retired officers- whose applications were not even acknowledged, and who remain unemployed even after years.

  But hold on! Maybe I'm being too harsh on our billionaires: perhaps they are just reciprocating the largesse and generosity of this govt. for giving them that corporate tax break a couple of years ago, something which this country can ill afford- almost Rupees 2 lakh crores per annum, which is more than the total pension bill of the armed forces ( including the civilian defense employees). The corporate worthies were supposed to have used these savings for capital investment, increase production and manufacturing, and create some of those 20 million jobs every year that had been promised us in a jumla moment. They haven't done that yet and have pocketed the savings. Why should they, in fact, when its cheaper to sing in a choir ?

  But even a nonchoir type like me can notice that they have struck the wrong note, a falsetto. You can sing for your supper, but it makes for lousy music.

GEO-POLITICS OF OIL ; India And Central Asia: Towards A New Great Game – Analysis

SOURCE : 

(a)  https://www.eurasiareview.com/08122015-india-and-central-asia-towards-a-new-great-game-analysis/ 

(b)  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_North%E2%80%93South_Transport_Corridor

(c)  VIDEO 1 : India-  Iran Relations :How India is getting closer with Muslim World ?
 

                                                        [ https://youtu.be/ce4g29mzo34 ]

(d)  VIDEO 2 :  https://youtu.be/00lvxM02SIA

 1st Time ever Russia sends Goods to India via INSTC Bypassing Pakistan | What is INSTC?

India And Central Asia: Towards A New Great Game – Analysis

                                                                                                BY

                                                                                                      PRATEEK JOSHI 

India, South Asia and Central Asia. Source: US State Department.

DECEMBER 8, 2015

Central Asia has been a strategic concern to India ever since the colonial era. The region rose to an immense significance in the 19th Century due to the Great Game when it was feared that the Russians would invade British India through Central Asia. On the top of this, the unmapped territory of the region added to British fears regarding the extent of Russian inroads into Central Asia. Thus, began the scramble for the Central Asian landmass. By late 19th Century, the Russians had occupied vast swathes of the region and the southern reaches of their conquered territories reached to southern Tajikistan, touching the Wakhan corridor (which borders the present northern borders of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). However, the looming threat of World War I united these hitherto archenemies and the tense situation was defused. Post-World War I, the Central Asian region was well absorbed into the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not only mark an end to the Cold War, but it was also a defining moment for Central Asia, whose constituent regions obtained new identities as independent republics. These were namely, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Their frontiers touching the northern areas of Iran and Afghanistan also make their borders very much a part of Central Asia. The new geopolitical and economic potential that was unleashed in the post-Cold War phase suggests that it is now the need of the hour to engage more deeply with Central Asia, and to tap the region’s energy reserves to ensure its economic growth. Also, there is a need to ensure a direct overland access to Central Asia, as the absence of an overland linkage has resulted in sub-optimal benefits for India. On the other hand, China has converted its geographical proximity with Central Asia into a geopolitical and a geo-economic success that will be discussed as a comparative analysis via-a-vis India.

Huge oil-gas reserves and hydroelectricity generation potential are converting the region into an energy hub that has the potential to meet the region’s growing global energy requirements, especially India whose economic engine needs more energy to maintain a stable growth rate.

The article discusses the relations between India and Central Asian republics with a greater focus on the economic, energy and geopolitical linkage that is being manifested as a new “Great Game.” The combination of Central Asia’s geographical positioning along with its energy endowments, pipeline politics and international infrastructure corridors passing through make it a an indispensable region.

Two factors make Central Asia an unavoidable region:

1. Central Asia borders Russia to its north, China to its east, Europe to its west and South Asia to its south.

2. Energy endowments and relatively underdeveloped economy, combined with its geographical positioning have given rise to a new era of the Pipeline politics and infrastructure corridors.

   RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA  AND   CENTRAL ASIA

After attaining independence, India was left devoid of any overland route connecting it to Central Asia. The direct access routes that existed were those of the traditional Silk Route, in which India was disconnected from Central Asia after Pakistan was formed. Added to this, Kashmir, which served as a linking region, lost its connectivity to Central Asia due to two developments. The first was the Pakistani occupation of the Kashmiri territory of Gilgit-Baltistan, which bordered Afghanistan on its northwest and Chinese Xinjiang (an import transit route to Central Asia). The other was the coming of the Chinese Communist party to power, which ended Silk Route trading between Ladakh and Kashgar (present day Xinjiang, China).

The independence of India coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, following which the Indian leadership allied itself to the Soviet Union owing to socialist leanings and geographical proximity. Since these republics were part of the Soviet Union, the interaction was not significant as all of New Delhi’s dealings were undertaken through Moscow. Still, the economic engagement was so shallow that, by the time Soviet Union disintegrated and the New Central Asian republics formed a union, “the markets of the constituent parts of the new Commonwealth of Independent States accounted for only 1.5% of India’s exports in 1992”.1

“India’s immediate objective was to establish direct interaction with each of these new states. A major Indian initiative to establish contacts with the political leadership of Central Asia had been conceptualized a few months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This resulted in India hosting the first visit of President of Uzbekistan in August 1991, followed up in quick succession by visits by President of Kazakhstan, in February 1992, President of Kyrgyzstan in March 1992, President of Turkmenistan in April 1992, and the visit of Prime Minister of Tajikistan in February 1993. Each of these visits resulted in the creation of a legal framework for interaction between India and the new Central Asian states”2

POST-COLD WAR INTERACTION: ENERGY AND ACCESSIBILITY

Kazakhstan has 12% of the world’s uranium resources and became the leading uranium-producing country in 2009 3. By 2011, Kazakhstan was the world’s largest uranium producer. With the fourth-largest gas reserves in the world, Turkmenistan is also a vital energy hub. The Caspian region of Turkmenistan is endowed with huge oil and gas reserves.

In January 2009 Kazatomprom signed an agreement with India’s Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) to supply 2100 tonnes of uranium to India for the time period 2010-2014 4. “An Agreement between ONGC Videsh Limited and KazMunaiGaz on the purchase of 25% stake in the Satpayev Oil Block in the Caspian Sea was signed in Astana in April 2011” 5. In 2014, Uzbekistan, one of the world’s top ten uranium and gold producers, also signed up to supply 2,000 metric tonnes of Uranium ore concentrate to India over the next four years (2014-2018) 6 .

The TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline is said to be a game changer in the regional Balance of Power.

TAPI

The original project started on March 15, 1995 when an inaugural memorandum of understanding between the governments of Turkmenistan and Pakistan for a pipeline project was signed 7. The project didn’t start due to the instability caused by Taliban the proposed pipeline passes through Afghanistan. In April 2008, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan signed a framework agreement to buy natural gas from Turkmenistan 8. In 2010, an intergovernmental agreement was signed to begin the work. “The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline (TAPI) Project aims to export up to 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year through a proposed approximately 1,800-kilometer (km) pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India”9.

However, issues like political instability in Afghanistan, agreement over pipeline transit fees and consortium have stalled the progress. The cost in building the pipeline is estimated to be about $10 billion, which too has become a stumbling block. Added to this, is the lack of a foreign commercial partner for the project.

The latest development is that the Turkmen President has ordered state companies Turkmengaz and Turkmengazneftstroi to begin building the Turkmen section of the pipeline, the Turkmen state media reported in November, 2015 10.

This project, if implemented, will not only diversify India’s energy import basket, but also lead to the de-escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan.

INTERNATIONAL NORTH-SOUTH TRANSPORT CORRIDOR

India (along with Russia) devised a new route to reach Central Asia and Russia via Iran. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a multi-modal transportation corridor that was approved in 2000 by the signing of an intergovernmental agreement in St. Petersburg between India, Russia, and Iran. On January 18, 2012, a meeting of the INSTC member countries to discuss modalities for moving forward on the INSTC project was held in New Delhi. During this meeting, it was pointed out that support of countries like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey will be sought in order to complete the missing links in the North–South corridor 11.

The Bandar Abbas port and Chabahar port in Iran are the gateways for India into the Central Asian markets. The Bandar Abbas port is connected via rail to Bandar Anzali (a port located in Southern Caspian Sea) from which the freight will be shipped to the Northern end. The northern end of the port will be linked to the Turkmen Kazakh rail line which will transport the freight in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The freight destined for Russia would be transported to St. Petersburg, which is the terminal point of the corridor.

“The proposed international corridor INSTC is expected to slash time for transportation of cargo to Russia from India to about 30 days, just half of the time presently taken.”It is expected that cargo by this route would reach Russia in about 25-30 days as against the present route through Suez which takes about 45-60 days. In May, India and Tajikistan agreed to enhance connectivity between them including through the INSTC and other regional transit arrangements to boost trade.”12. Further, According to the officials working for the INSTC project, “it could also serve as the route for Southeast Asian countries to send their cargo to Europe instead of the Suez Canal route to cut down on both cost and time”.13
There is also a likely possibility of connecting the INSTC with the “Ashgabat Agreement Project” of 2011 which is a railroad “transit pact established in 2011 between Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Oman” 14.

“The Foreign Trade Policy of India, 2015-20, has highlighted the importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) in expanding India’s trade and investment links with Central Asia.” 15

The importance that India attaches to INSTC is evident from the fact that India was quick to sign the Chabahar port project in May 2015 even before the Iranian nuclear deal was finalized. Although the Government of India signed the deal in 2003, the international pressure on Iran due to its nuclear program stalled the deal. However, the deal got a new push in 2015 with the Indian government investing $195 million to upgrade the port.

GEOPOLITICS OF PORT CONNECTIVITY: GWADAR VERSUS CHABAHAR PORT

Central Asia, being a landlocked region can be accessed to India from Afghanistan and Iran. This made Iran a focal point in India’s link to Central Asia. Hence, the only disadvantage Central Asia faced was its landlocked geography and hence no access to any of the sea-based ports. This shortcoming is all set to be filled by China and India. On one hand, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was unveiled in April 2015, whereby the Karakoram Highway (which links Islamabad to Xinjiang) will be extended southwards to the Gwadar Port in Balochistan. Xinjiang’s proximity to Central Asian Borders means that freight docked at Gwadar port can be transported to Central Asia via Xinjiang and vice versa.16

Also, Central Asian oil can be transported to Gwadar to be shipped for export. Chinese authorities are presently supervising the development of the Gwadar Port. Incidentally, the Chabahar port lies just 70 kilometers west of Gwadar and is seen as India’s strategic response to China. Unlike the CPEC, which runs through a very high altitude, the INSTC has direct connectivity to Chabahar port, which is relatively stable compared to the Gwadar region which is marred by the Baloch insurgency.

THE CHINESE CHALLENGE: MARITIME SILK ROAD AND PIPELINE CONNECTIVITY

Following the Soviet disintegration, China was the first nation to establish economic ties with the Central Asian countries. The Chinese, compared to India, have massive investments in the region. For instance, Chinese investments in Kazakhstan amount to $3 billion, which are in the form of pipelines, rail and road connectivity. China has now become the largest trade partner of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the second-largest trade partner of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the third-largest trade partner of Tajikistan. Chinese engagement with Central Asia is evident from the fact that “In 2000, China’s trade with Central Asia was about $1 billion and by 2013 it had ballooned to $50 billion” 17. Compared to this, India’s present trade figure with Central Asia amounts to a mere $1.4 billion.18

Kazakhstan, owing to its sheer geographical size and energy reserves was the first country on China’s focus. “China and Kazakhstan started energy cooperation in 1997, marked by an intergovernmental agreement covering diverse means of collaboration in oil and gas fields, including an oil pipeline between western Kazakhstan and China’s Xinjiang which became operational in 2005” 19.

The Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline starts at the Turkmen-Uzbek border and runs through central Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan before reaching China’s Xinjiang region. Currently, the gas pipeline has three lines in parallel, each running for 1,830 kilometers 20. The construction of a fourth pipeline, which passes through Tajikistan, is in progress.

In 2013, China unveiled its Silk Road Economic Belt project whereby it aims to build infrastructure and freight corridors (railways and roadways) that would further link to Europe. In 2014, China has pledged $40 billion under the “Silk Road Fund” for this project. The first sign of China’s grand plans has been manifested through the successful completion of the Yiwu (a city in Zhejiang Province of China) to the Madrid freight railway corridor. “The longest rail link in the world and the first direct link between China and Spain is up and running after a train from Yiwu in coastal China completed its maiden journey of 8,111 miles to Madrid. En route it passed through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, and France before arriving at the Abroñigal freight terminal in Madrid”21. Through the Central Asian doors, China seeks to transform the Eurasian landmass into a unified economic belt and reaching its ultimate destination, that is the European countries

INDIA’S CONNECT CENTRAL ASIA POLICY (2012) AND RENEWED FOCUS ON CENTRAL ASIA

India kick-started its Central Asia policy with the beginning of the First India-Central Asia dialogue in 2012, summed in a speech delivered by Minister of State External Affairs, Shri E. Ahmed, which aimed at engaging with the region deeply through economic, social, and cultural ties. Following this announcement, several significant initiatives followed.

Moreover, following the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Kazakhstan this July, the 2009 uranium deal was renewed under which Kazakhstan will supply India with 5,000 metric tons of nuclear fuel for the time period from 2015-2019 22.

In July 2015, the visit of the Prime Minister of India to Central Asia was a renewed strategic engagement and reminiscent of former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who visited the five Central Asia states (former Soviet regions). The recent visit had a three-fold focus: energy, exports, and countering China’s inroads in the region 23. One of the key issues raised was a renewed proposal for these republics to connect with the INSTC.

A developed and integrated Central Asia is not only favorable for India’s economic and geopolitical calculus, but also for the stability of Eurasia — as well as for the South Asian region. The new Great Game has begun as India and China engage for connectivity with Central Asia, as well as a scramble for its resources.

About the author:
*Prateek Joshi, researcher at South Asian University, New Delhi

Notes:
1 http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2012-4a49/july-70c4/india-central-asia-and-the-new-silk-road-e4d1
2. http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2012-4a49/july-70c4/india-central-asia-and-the-new-silk-road-e4d1
3. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Kazakhstan/
4. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Kazakhstan/
5. http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Kazakhstan_2015_07_10.pdf
6. http://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/india-widens-n-fuel-base-signs-up-uzbek- firm-for-uranium-supplies/
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Afghanistan_Pipeline
8. http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/eta/ES_Conf10_Lall.pdf
9. http://www.adb.org/projects/44463-013/main
10. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-11-07/news/68089750_1_tapi-project-33-billion-cubic-metres-energy-needs
11. http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/InternationalNorthSouthTransportCorridor_msroy_180815
12. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-07-30/news/65036755_1_indian-ocean-india-and-tajikistan-cargo
13. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-09-02/news/66144139_1_india-iran-russia-corridor-project-north-south-transport-corridor
14. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/prime-minister-narendra-modis-visit-to-uzbekistan/article7392482.ece
15. http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/an-opportunity-for-india-in-central-asia/
16. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/emphasis-on-gwadarkashgar-corridor/article7126901.ece
17. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/will-all-roads-in-central-asia-eventually-lead-to-china/
18. http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/CII-Hails-PM-Modi%E2%80%99s-Landmark-Tour-of-Central-Asia/2015/07/13/article2917811.ece
19. http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-07/12/content_4819484.htm
20. http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia2.shtml
21. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/10/silk-railway-freight-train-from-china-pulls-into-madrid
22. http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/india-inks-new-nuclear-deal-with-kazakhstan/
23. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a-counterpoint-to-chinas-inroads/article7228668.ece

TOPICS:PakistanChinaIndiaAfghanistanRussiaIranKyrgyzstanTurkmenistanEnergyNuclearTajikistanNatural GasKazakhstanUzbekistanCentral AsiaSouth AsiaOilEconomicsTradeSilk Road