Vasundhra

Monday, January 1, 2024

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 31, 2023

SOURCE :

( ) IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 31, 2023 : https://draft.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/7881121750623742708/1575757829217875833

( ) Tandem-charge : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tandem-charge

( ) Where Did Hamas Get Rare RPG-7s with Tandem-Charge EFP, Anti-Tank Weapons and MANPADS: https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/where_did_hamas_get_rare_rpg_7s_with_tandem_charge_efp_anti_tank_weapons_and_manpads-8209.html

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SUMMARY OF THE DAY

Israeli forces advanced into Beit Lahiya for clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli Brigade Combat Team identified three Hamas fighters inside a building and directed an airstrike at their position in Beit Lahiya, according to an IDF report on December 31. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—intercepted an Israeli reconnaissance drone in Beit Lahiya on December 31. Israeli forces initially advanced into the Gaza Strip west of Beit Lahiya in late October. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 31 shows recently flattened terrain in Beit Lahiya City and north of the city, which suggests that Israeli tanks or bulldozers recently began operating in the area. The Wall Street Journal published a map of the tunnel system that Hamas has created below the Gaza Strip based on data from 2014, which includes an extensive tunnel network in Beit Lahiya. Palestinian militia fighters have used tunnel shafts to maneuver through the strip and to ambush Israeli forces. The IDF has located about 1,500 tunnel shafts and routes in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the ground operation in the Gaza Strip, according to an IDF report on December 19.

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Iran Update, December 31, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will not publish an Iran Update (Israel-Hamas War) on January 1, 2024, due to the Near Year holiday. We will resume publication of the Iran Update (Israel-Hamas War) on January 2, 2024.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

Israeli forces advanced into Beit Lahiya for clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip. Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli forces operating in Tuffah and al Daraj in Gaza City. Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks in Jabalia City and Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.
Palestinian militias are clashing with Israeli forces in al Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis for the fourth straight week as Palestinian militia fighters tried to defend against Israeli advances. Palestinian militias have sustained almost daily attacks on Israeli forces in Khan Younis since Israel forces advanced into the southern Gaza Strip in early December.
Israel has withdrawn five IDF brigades from the Gaza Strip, which is consistent with Israeli forces transitioning to a third phase of operations. The third phase will include the end of major combat operations, a “reduction in forces” in the Gaza Strip, the release of reservists, a “transition to targeted raids,” and the establishment of a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.
An unspecified Israeli intelligence officer told the Economist that most of Hamas’ command structure is “gone” and that Hamas is no longer operating as a military organization. CTP-ISW assesses that at least three of 30 Hamas battalions in the five brigades are combat ineffective, at least eight battalions are degraded, and at least 12 battalions are currently under intense IDF pressure.
An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that IDF sources believe the intensification of fighting on the ground in the Gaza Strip has contributed to a reduction in Palestinian rocket capabilities. Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank.
Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated that LH will not allow displaced Israeli civilians to return to their homes in northern Israel until Israel halts its military operations in the Gaza Strip.
Iranian-backed militants conducted two attacks on US forces stationed at Conoco Mission Support Site and al Omar oil field on December 30. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted two attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on December 31.
Houthi fighters conducted two attacks on the MV Maersk Hangzhou container ship in the southern Red Sea. The Houthis likely focused on attacking a Maersk-operated vessel in particular because Maersk announced that it would resume its operations in the Red Sea on December 24. These Houthi attacks are part of a broader regional escalation that Iran is leading against the United States and Israel.
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdul Salam in Tehran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces advanced into Beit Lahiya for clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli Brigade Combat Team identified three Hamas fighters inside a building and directed an airstrike at their position in Beit Lahiya, according to an IDF report on December 31.[1] The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—intercepted an Israeli reconnaissance drone in Beit Lahiya on December 31.[2] Israeli forces initially advanced into the Gaza Strip west of Beit Lahiya in late October.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 31 shows recently flattened terrain in Beit Lahiya City and north of the city, which suggests that Israeli tanks or bulldozers recently began operating in the area. The Wall Street Journal published a map of the tunnel system that Hamas has created below the Gaza Strip based on data from 2014, which includes an extensive tunnel network in Beit Lahiya.[4] Palestinian militia fighters have used tunnel shafts to maneuver through the strip and to ambush Israeli forces.[5] The IDF has located about 1,500 tunnel shafts and routes in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the ground operation in the Gaza Strip, according to an IDF report on December 19.[6]

Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli forces operating in Tuffah and al Daraj in Gaza City. The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces operating in the neighborhoods.[7] The al Qassem Brigades claimed to detonate a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) in the neighborhoods, targeting five Israeli vehicles.[8] EFPs are particularly lethal improvised explosive devices designed to penetrate armored vehicles, such as main battle tanks.[9]

Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks in Jabalia City and Sheikh Radwan neighborhood on December 31. CTP-ISW assessed on December 22 that Hamas’ Jabalia al Balad Battalion is degraded and that the Radwan Battalion remains combat effective.[10] Both battalions are facing active and intense IDF pressure, as Israeli forces continue advancing into these areas.[11] Palestinian militias have claimed nearly daily attacks in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood since the humanitarian pause expired on December 1, which suggests that it is one of the remaining areas where they maintain significant defensive infrastructure. The absence of Palestinian attack claims does not necessarily indicate that Hamas lacks the capability to launch attacks in the area, however. Palestinian militias have reported losing contact with specific units for short periods of time in the Gaza Strip, which could have happened in Jabalia City and Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.[12]

Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City. CTP-ISW reported on December 20 that Israeli forces are transitioning from clearing operations to holding operations in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip.[13] The hold phase is defined by a decreased level of violence but still requires holding forces to engage and eliminate enemy forces and infrastructure to provide security.[14] Palestinian militia attacks in these areas demonstrate that the militias have retained some forces capable of targeting Israeli operations.

Israeli forces searched the homes of Palestinian militia fighters in al Shaati refugee camp in northern Gaza City.[15] Unspecified Palestinian fighters had planted IEDs in the vicinity of a kindergarten in advance of the arrival of Israeli forces.

Israeli forces conducted an airstrike targeting a suspicious vehicle that Palestinian fighters were driving toward Israeli ground elements in southern Gaza City.[16]

The al Quds Brigades detonated a tunnel entrance rigged with explosives targeting Israeli infantrymen in Shujaiya neighborhood, where Israeli forces have been executing tasks consistent with holding operations for over a week.[17]

Palestinian militias are clashing with Israeli forces in al Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. The al Qassem Brigades published footage on December 31 of its forces moving through buildings to launch rocket propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli tanks—a tactic that the militia has employed heavily across the Gaza Strip.[18] The IDF said that it expanded clearing operations in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip on December 26 to target Hamas’ Bureij Battalion.[19] The IDF Arabic-language media spokesperson repeated on December 31 evacuation orders covering areas of the central Gaza Strip.[20] Residents of al Bureij refugee camp, Badr, northern coast, al Nuzha, al Zahra, al Buraq, al Salam, al Fayha, al Basma, al Bawadi, al Rawdah, and al Safah must move to shelters in Deir al Balah, according to the IDF evacuation orders.[21]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis for the fourth straight week as Palestinian militia fighters tried to defend against Israeli advances. The IDF reported on December 31 that an airborne brigade deployed to Khan Younis in recent days after two months of intense fighting in the northern Gaza Strip.[22] The brigade joined special operations, armored, engineering, and air elements in clearing Khan Younis Governorate of militia infrastructure, such as observation outposts, anti-tank positions, and weapons depots.[23] Palestinian fighters emerged from a tunnel shaft in one encounter and attempted to fire RPGs before Israeli forces returned fire.[24] Israeli air and armored elements killed the remaining Palestinian fighters.[25] The IDF also destroyed unspecified militia infrastructure belonging to the commanders of Hamas’ South Khan Younis Battalion, one of five in the governorate.[26]

Palestinian militias have sustained almost daily attacks on Israeli forces in Khan Younis since Israeli forces advanced into the southern Gaza Strip in early December. The al Qassem Brigades claimed three attacks on Israeli forces using mortars and anti-tank RPGs.[27] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed to target an Israeli tank with an unspecified explosive device north of Khan Younis.[28] The al Nasser Salah al Din Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Resistance Committees—claimed that its fighters targeted an Israeli tank with a tandem-charged anti-tank rocket in Khan Younis.[29] The al Qassem Brigades and National Resistance Brigades claimed separate mortar attacks on Israeli forces east of Khuzaa, where the IDF began clearing operations on December 27.[30]

Israel has withdrawn five IDF brigades from the Gaza Strip, which is consistent with Israeli forces transitioning to a third phase of operations. The IDF confirmed the withdrawals and that it will include some reservists.[31] Some of these brigades had deployed to and fought in the northern Gaza Strip.[32] Three of the five brigades are training brigades, which are responsible for training officers, tank personnel, and non-commissioned officers during peacetime.[33] Israel’s public broadcaster reported on December 23 that the IDF will transition to the third phase of its ground operation in the Gaza Strip in the “coming weeks.”[34] The report said that the third phase will include the end of major combat operations, a “reduction in forces” in the Gaza Strip, the release of reservists, a “transition to targeted raids,” and the establishment of a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.

An unspecified Israeli intelligence officer told the Economist on December 30 that most of Hamas’ command structure is “gone” and that Hamas is no longer operating as a military organization.[35] The officer noted that Hamas maintains many fighters who have reverted to guerilla tactics.

CTP-ISW assesses that at least three of 30 Hamas battalions in the five brigades are combat ineffective, at least eight battalions are degraded, and at least 12 battalions are currently under intense IDF pressure.[36] Hamas has a conventional military order of battle but has fought this war and historically as an irregular (guerilla) force. Hamas very likely retains a deep bench of experienced military commanders.[37] Israeli forces are still actively clearing in some parts of the northern Gaza Strip in addition to the Gaza Strip’s Central and Khan Younis governorates, where Hamas maintains combat effective units. Combat effectiveness measures a unit’s ability to perform its mission; a unit is combat ineffective when it is no longer able to complete its mission.[38] The IDF reported on December 26 that all four battalions in Hamas’ Central Gazan Brigade have sustained “some damage” but are “largely functioning.”[39] Hamas’ combat ineffective units are still capable of waging low-level warfare and reconstituting.

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 31 that IDF sources believe the intensification of fighting on the ground in the Gaza Strip has contributed to a reduction in Palestinian rocket capabilities.[40] Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on December 31. CTP-ISW initially assessed that Israeli clearing operations were likely degrading Hamas’ capacity to conduct indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on December 12.[41]

The IDF estimates that the war will not completely reduce rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel, however. Israeli clearing operations are primarily focused on dismantling Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[42] The IDF noted that the success of their operations in the strip does not preclude a “lone terrorist” from conducting indirect fire attacks into Israel. Several Palestinian militias operating in the Gaza Strip maintain rocket arsenals and have claimed indirect fire attacks into Israel.[43]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank on December 31.[44] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and one of its affiliated groups, the Tulkarm Rapid Response Battalion, claimed that they conducted IED and small arms attacks on Israeli forces around Tulkarm on December 30-31.[45] Unspecified Palestinian fighters threw IEDs at Israeli forces in Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jericho on December 31.[46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately claimed three small arms attacks on Israeli forces and settlements near Qalqilya and Nablus on December 30.[47] Unspecified Palestinian fighters fired small arms and threw Molotov cocktails at Israeli forces near Hebron on December 30.[48] Fatah organized a demonstration against Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip in Ramallah on December 31.[49]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 31. LH fired anti-tank guided missiles and other unspecified munitions toward three Israeli border positions.[50] Unspecified fighters separately launched rockets toward Metula on December 31.[51] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes on LH military infrastructure in Ramiya, southern Lebanon.[52] The IDF stated that LH uses villages along the border to facilitate attacks on Israeli border positions.[53]

LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated on December 31 that LH will not allow displaced Israeli civilians to return to their homes in northern Israel until Israel halts its military operations in the Gaza Strip.[54] Qassem stated that LH is in a state of war with Israel and that its forces along the border were positioned accordingly.[55] Qassem also warned that Israeli attacks harming Lebanese civilians would lead to a stronger but proportional response from LH.[56] Head of the Maronite Church Bechara Boutros al Rahi called for LH to withdraw its rocket units from civilian areas in southern Lebanon to avoid IDF retaliation.[57]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian-backed militants conducted two attacks on US forces stationed at Conoco Mission Support Site and al Omar oil field on December 30.[58] The militants fired three drones at Conoco Mission Support Site and 14 rockets at al Omar oilfield, according to an unnamed US defense official.[59] The attack on Conoco is the largest barrage of rockets fired at US forces in a single attack that CTP-ISW has recorded since the Israel-Hamas war began, although it is possible that comparable or larger attacks have occurred and that such details have not been published. Syrian opposition media reported that Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were responsible for the December 30 attacks.[60] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance may escalate further against US forces in the region in the coming days, especially around the four-year anniversary of the US killing former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2024.[61] Iranian leaders have vowed to expel US forces from the region as part of their revenge for the United States killing Soleimani.[62] The IRGC Quds Force engaged senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political leaders likely to discuss their military and political campaign to expel US forces on December 30, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[63]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted two attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on December 31. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two separate drone attacks on US forces at Rmelan Landing Zone, Syria, and Erbil International Airport, Iraq.[64]

Kataib Hezbollah (KH) commemorated its fight against the United States in several posts on its Telegram page on December 31. KH claimed that the United States deployed military advisors to Iraq under false pretexts to reoccupy Iraq and reshape the Middle East according to Israeli interests.[65] KH also celebrated the fourth anniversary of the storming of the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31, 2019, and 12th anniversary of the US troop withdrawal in 2011.[66] KH also applauded its fighters' continued dedication to removing the United States from Iraq.[67]

Houthi fighters conducted two attacks on the MV Maersk Hangzhou container ship in the southern Red Sea. Likely Houthi fighters conducted a missile attack on the ship on December 30.[68] The USS Gravely destroyer intercepted two anti-ship missiles targeting the Hangzhou, while responding to a distress call from the ship.[69] Four Houthi fast attack craft later approached the Hangzhou, firing on the container ship and attempting to board it.[70] The USS Gravely and USS Eisenhower aircraft carriers sent helicopters to the container ship and issued verbal messages to the Houthi boats, which then fired on the helicopters.[71] The helicopters returned fire in self-defense and sank three of the four Houthi boats, killing ten Houthi members.[72] The fourth Houthi boat fled the area.

Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said that Houthi fighters had been performing their regular duties to provide security and stability in the Red Sea by preventing Israeli ships or ships en route to Israel from passing.[73] Saree accused the United States of attempting to expand the conflict into the Red Sea and warned other countries of being complicit to US efforts.[74] Saree’s statement notably quoted a Quranic verse that LH and the Islamic Resistance of Iraq regularly cite as justification for their attacks on the United States or Israel. The use of the passage across the Axis of Resistance members is likely meant to signal their unity to external actors, while framing their regional escalation as some kind of religious duty.

The Houthis likely focused on attacking a Maersk-operated vessel in particular because Maersk announced that it would resume its operations in the Red Sea on December 24.[75] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Iranian and Houthi anti-shipping attack campaign is meant to demonstrate the capability and willingness of the Axis of Resistance to threaten multiple strategic maritime chokepoints across the Middle East. The Houthi framing that the anti-shipping attack campaign is meant to only prevent commercial traffic to Israel is inaccurate, as the Houthi attacks have targeted multiple ships with no immediate connection to Israel or Israeli interests. Maersk announced that it would again suspend its operations in the Red Sea—this time for 48 hours—on December 31.[76]

These Houthi attacks are part of a broader regional escalation that Iran is leading against the United States and Israel. This regional escalation is meant to achieve Iran’s broader regional ambitions rather than achieve any discrete effects vis-a-vis the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip. This Iran-led escalation includes the almost daily drone, missile, and rocket attacks that Iranian-backed militias have conducted against US forces in Iraq and Syria. Iran and its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance are framing falsely this escalation as a response to the Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. Iran and its Axis of Resistance have a long history of threatening American servicemembers and international shipping prior to the war because it supports their grand strategic objectives in the Middle East. The current escalation is thus meant to help Iran attain regional hegemony, destroy the Israeli state, and expel US forces from the Middle East. The Israel-Hamas war provides informational cover to Iran and the Axis of Resistance, allowing them to misrepresent their long-standing campaigns as meant to support the Palestinian cause.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed recent Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea during a phone call with his British counterpart, David Cameron, on December 31.[77] Abdollahian suggested that Houthi attacks on maritime traffic would continue so long as Israel continues its military operations in the Gaza Strip. Cameron stated that Iran bears responsibility for the Houthi attacks given its long-standing support for the Houthis. The Houthis have conducted an anti-shipping attack campaign around the Red Sea in recent weeks to disrupt commercial shipping to Israel and demonstrate both the willingness and capability of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt maritime traffic around strategic maritime chokepoints.[78]

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdul Salam in Tehran on December 31.[79] Ahmadian praised the Houthis for their support of the Palestinians against Israeli “aggression.”

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with the family of Qassem Soleimani on December 31.[80] Khamenei praised how Soleimani strengthened the Axis of Resistance and called on the IRGC Quds Force to further strengthen it. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani attended the meeting. IRGC-affiliated media emphasized that Khamenei’s insistence on continuing to strengthen the Axis of Resistance was directed at Ghaani.[81]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with the family of IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi, whom Israel killed in an airstrike in Syria, on December 31.[82] Raisi threatened that Israel “would pay the price” for killing Mousavi. Western and anti-regime media have reported that Mousavi headed IRGC Quds Force Unit 2250, which manages Iranian weapons shipments to LH and Iranian-backed militias in Syria.[83] Senior Iranian military and political officials have attended Mousavi’s commemoration and funeral ceremonies in recent days, highlighting his prominence in the regime and its regional project.[84]

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[74] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1741497110896198050

[75] https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/24/shipping-giant-maersk-prepares-to-resume...

[76] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/maersk-pauses-red-sea-sailings... ; https://x.com/staunovo/status/1741403895685902667?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1741399733342458283

[77] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85339445; https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4107989/ ; https://x.com/David_Cameron/status/1741402279591215219?s=20

[78] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-23-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-16-2023

[79] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1207417

[80] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/photo-album?id=54778 ; https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021010000616; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/10/3015088; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/641722; https://www.irna dot ir/photo/85339148/; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85339123/; https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4107636

[81] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/10/3015088

[82] https://president dot ir/fa/149140 ; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2023/12/31/717363/Iran-Ebrahim-Raeisi-condemn-assassination-Seyed-Razi-Mousavi-Israel-pay-price-crime

[83] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202209203504; https://amwaj dot media/article/inside-story-airstrike-kills-iran-s-most-influential-commander-in-syria

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2023

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THE LANDS UKRAINE MUST LIBERATE

SOURCE :

( ) THE LANDS UKRAINE MUST LIBERATE : https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lands-ukraine-must-liberate

( ) https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1741492798438744337/photo/1

The Lands Ukraine Must Liberate

Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, Noel Mikkelsen, and Daniel Mealie

December 31, 2023

A Ukraine strong enough to deter and defeat any future Russian aggression with an economy strong enough to prosper without large amounts of foreign aid is the only outcome of Russia’s war that the United States and the West should accept. Trusting Russian promises of good behavior would be foolish. Leaving Ukraine’s economy badly damaged would create a long-term and large drain on Western finances. Discussions about pressing Ukraine to trade land the Russians now occupy for a ceasefire or armistice have garnered attention recently, based on rumors of Kremlin interest in negotiations of some sort.[1] These discussions have thus far largely focused on the supposed intransigence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky who, it is argued, must be pressed to accept that Ukraine must cede some of its territory. That argument ignores the question that should be central to any such discussion: what are the concrete military, economic, and financial consequences that these territorial sacrifices would have for Ukraine’s long-term security and economic viability or for the future financial burden they would impose on the supporters of an independent Ukraine? The serious evaluation of this question shows that there are real military and economic reasons for Ukraine to try to liberate all of the territory Russia now occupies and that, in any event, the current lines cannot be the basis for any settlement remotely acceptable to Ukraine or the West.

Russia Will Not Abandon Its Maximalist Aims Now or in the Future

Russian President Vladimir Putin and many Kremlin officials have driven deep into the Russian political consciousness the ideas that Ukraine has no independent identity and no basis to continue to exist as an independent state; that any Ukrainian government not totally subservient to Moscow is a pawn of the West and a threat to Russia; that Ukrainian opponents of Russian rule are Nazis intent on conducting genocide against Russians in Ukraine; and that Russia has a legal, moral, and religious obligation to extirpate these supposed threats and restore Ukraine to its rightful place as a historically Russian land.[2] Putin has made these arguments part of his 2024 presidential election platform.[3] Russian administrators are inserting them in curricula throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine.[4] Kremlin mouthpieces speak to the Russian domestic audience with one voice along these lines.[5] Putin is training Russians to commit themselves to the task of subjugating Ukraine, and that training will neither stop nor vanish following some negotiated ceasefire. It will, in fact, shape the thoughts and likely policies of Putin’s successors for years or decades.

The task facing Ukraine and the West, therefore, is to be prepared after the end of this conflict to confront a Russia still determined to achieve its original aims, likely fortified in that determination by a desire to avenge its failures in the course of this war. The damage that the current war is doing to Russia’s military helps to reduce the risks of Russia renewing war quickly, but that effect is temporary and its duration depends in large part on how committed Putin is to rebuilding Russia’s military capabilities rapidly. The Russia-Ukraine frontier will thus be a frontier of potentially imminent conflict for the indefinite future, unfortunately. Peace can only be sustained at an acceptable price if that frontier is defensible by the kinds of forces Ukraine can sustain over the long term.

The Forces Required to Defend Ukraine Depend on Ukraine’s Borders

Military requirements to defend a state depend on many factors including the likely strength and capability of the adversary, the length and configuration of the borders to be held, and the amount of depth the borders provide—that is, the degree to which the defender can temporarily give ground in the face of an attack. Ukraine and the West have little control after the fighting stops over the size and strength of the Russian military, which all current indications suggest will be much greater in a few years than it was in February 2022 by every measure.[6] They can control the other two factors, however, by committing to or refraining from trying to liberate additional Russian-occupied territory.

The amount of depth provided by any given border configuration is far more important than limited changes in the length of the lines in determining the military requirements of the defense and the cost of money, equipment, and social sacrifice needed to hold them. The more the defender must hold the initial line of defense at all costs the more he must maintain large and fully combat-capable forces near that initial line at all times. Sustaining a large, fully-equipped, fight-tonight-trained military is exorbitantly expensive and requires keeping a high proportion of the defender’s population in the military even during peacetime. Keeping many people mobilized all the time imposes a double cost on the state—it must pay each individual for their service, on the one hand, and it loses the contributions of that individual to the economy on the other.

A far more economical approach to defense is to hold a line with smaller forces intended not to defend but rather to delay the attacker’s advance to buy time for reserves of personnel and equipment to be called up and sent forward. Those reserves can then stop and reverse the initial attack, winning back any ground that has been temporarily lost. Reserves are far less expensive than mobilized troops—the defender pays the cost of calling them up and training them to begin with and of some refresher training after their initial service period is done, but they otherwise live normal lives contributing to the economy and raising families.

The land itself, of course, also contributes to the economy. In Ukraine’s case it often does so directly through agriculture and mining, but different frontline configurations can cede more or less of Ukraine’s industrial and other economic potential to Russia—weakening the Ukrainian economy and ability to sustain its military and strengthening Russia’s.

The January 2022 Lines Are Far Easier to Defend Efficiently than the December 2023 Lines

Ukraine’s borders and the line of contact between Ukraine and Russia before the full-scale invasion of 2022 were long—about 3,120 kilometers—but included large areas offering considerable defensive depth, especially in the northeast. Ukraine will always need to defend its northern border, opposite Belarus and then Russia, very close to the border itself on a west-to-east line extending from the Polish border to around Chernihiv. Kyiv is only about 100 kilometers from the border, and essential ground lines of communication run through Rivne and Lutsk at about the same distance. Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, is even closer to the international border and affords no depth at all. The Russian occupation in 2014 of eastern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea brought several other important Ukrainian cities under permanent threat. Mariupol was almost right on the line of contact in 2022.

In January 2022, Kherson and Melitopol were respectively about 90 and 115 kilometers away from Russian control. Their physical situation offers a better prospect for a more efficient defense, however. Kherson lies across the Dnipro River from Crimea, on the one hand, affording the Ukrainians in principle opportunities to fall back to the river line if necessary in the face of renewed Russian attack from there. Melitopol benefits from no such natural defenses, but Russian forces attacking from Crimea must cross several bridges to get to the Ukrainian mainland (a factor from which Kherson also benefits), creating chokepoints that could be used to slow the Russian advance and buy time for Ukrainian reserves to arrive. (That this did not happen in 2022 reflects the fact that, contrary to Russian claims, Ukraine was not preparing for a war with Russia before the full-scale Russian invasion. A future Ukrainian military surely will. Ukraine had fewer armed forces in these areas in 2022 because it had concentrated its best forces in the east opposite occupied Donbas. A future Ukrainian military will likely concentrate differently.)

Northeastern Ukraine offers even more depth. It is among the most fertile lands anywhere in the world but also sparsely populated, especially near the international border:

The terrain provides ample opportunity for delaying actions behind which reserves can mobilize to defend more heavily populated settlements in the rear and prepare to regain ground lost in an initial renewed, Russian assault.

The task of defending these long lines, even with the areas providing strategic depth, is daunting. The future Ukrainian military will have to be much larger and much better trained and equipped than it was in 2022. But it is far less daunting than the challenge Ukraine would face in having to defend the current lines if the conflict were frozen today. We will consider below the reduction in requirements that come from regaining the internationally recognized borders.

Freezing the Lines Unfreezes the Forces

Russian forces on the line of contact today are making marginal gains at a high cost in lives and materiel. A future Russian attempted invasion following a protracted period of reconstitution would not present the Russians with the same challenges.

The current Ukrainian and Russian deployments along the line are shaped by the ongoing active fighting, constraining Russian forces’ ability to optimize their deployments across the theater.[7] Russian forces are concentrated in areas they are focused on trying to seize at the moment, such as Avdiivka. Both sides have pulled artillery, air defense, aviation, and other scarce but vital systems as far out of range of the other’s strike capabilities as possible. Both sides have generally learned the hard way to avoid massing large quantities of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other such weapons of war because doing so usually leads to their rapid destruction by massed artillery, drone, or air attack.[8] The ongoing fighting is consuming Russian forces generated just about as rapidly as Russia puts them into the field.

Should an armistice be established, however, few of the conditions shaping the deployments of these forces would hold anymore. New Russian forces would not be consumed by fighting after a ceasefire. The Russians would no longer be forced to mass in particular areas where they are currently attacking but would instead be able to rearrange their forces to optimize for other factors. They would be able to mass artillery, air defense, electronic warfare, and engineering capabilities, specifically bridging equipment, and other supplies in fortified defensive positions near the front line—something they cannot do now as Ukrainian forces attack any concentrations within range of their weapons systems when they see them. The Russians would be able to prepare, train, equip, and deploy reserves in echelons throughout southern and eastern Ukraine to reinforce and support future operations and to improve the road and rail infrastructure needed to move them rapidly around. They could optimize, in other words, for a short-notice attack at times and places of their choosing in ways that the ongoing combat now precludes.

No Space to Trade

Ukraine would need to defend right at the current lines in the event that Russia invades again following a period of reconstitution. Too many large population, industrial, and vital defensive centers are too close to the current lines for Ukraine to be able to trade space for time. Major urban areas with total pre-war populations of over five million (a bit over 11% of Ukraine’s total pre-war population) are within 160 kilometers (100 miles) of the current front lines. They include the vital population and industrial cities of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro; Odesa and Mykolaiv, which are Ukraine’s sole remaining ports and essential to Ukraine’s ability to export its grain and other goods; and the cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostyantynivka that are both populous and form Ukraine’s major eastern defensive bastion. Kharkiv remains a mere 32 kilometers from the Russian border but is now also threatened by Russian lines about 110 kilometers to the east and southeast.

A Ukrainian military seeking to deter or defeat a future Russian attack that begins on these lines will have to be fully manned and equipped and fight-tonight trained even in peacetime, as it will have no margin for error in almost any direction.

In a future invasion, Russian forces seeking to take Kherson, Mykolaiv, or Odesa will have to cross the Dnipro River—and do so without the benefit of the bridges they used in 2022. Those attacking further east or toward Kharkiv or Kyiv will confront prepared Ukrainian defensive fortifications. The Russians will, thus, face daunting challenges of their own, to be sure.

However, the aggressor benefits from many advantages in war. The Russians will be able to concentrate their own forces as close to the border as they like, along with all the air defense systems, bridging and other engineering equipment, artillery, ammunition, and other supplies they would need for a short-notice attack as noted above. The Ukrainians will not be able to attack those concentrations without breaking the ceasefire. The Russians can keep a sizable portion of their own troops in a constant (and expensive) state of mobilization and readiness if they choose, and Putin has shown a great degree of willingness to burn money (and lose Russian lives) in pursuit of his objectives. The Russians are currently challenged to sustain their mobilized military and the large losses it is taking in Ukraine while also attempting to mobilize their defense industrial base.[9] They can alleviate much of that pressure once the fighting stops, however, because they will no longer be taking losses, on the one hand, and will also be able to meter their defense industrial requirements at their own pace to be prepared for a renewed attack at a time of their choosing.

The Russians can also keep many of their assault forces in reserve, dispersed in training areas throughout Russia, bringing them to war readiness only at the intended moment of attack—at least, they will be able to do so if they can resolve the failures in their pre-2022 and current mobilization and training systems as they have set out to do.[10] The second approach would, of course, give Ukraine warning and the opportunity to mobilize its own reservists. But it would have to mobilize its reserves every time the Russians did in this configuration of the lines because it cannot afford to cede its frontline positions temporarily while mobilizing reserves to regain lost ground. That situation would give the Russians enormous control over the cost of money and social tension of deterring and defending against a Russian attack. The lines as they are now, in either case, would leave it to Putin and his successors to determine the financial and social cost Ukraine and its Western backers must bear for Ukraine’s continued survival, and that cost would likely be very high.

Crimea

The costs and challenges of Ukraine’s defense vary dramatically if Crimea returns to Ukraine or remains in Russia’s hands. The January 2022 lines considered above assume that Russia retains Crimea. If Ukraine liberates the peninsula along with Russian-occupied lines in the south, however, then the imminent threat to Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa vanishes and the threat to Melitopol is dramatically reduced. Mariupol remains the only major front-line city in the south in this case, dramatically reducing the area of limited defensive depth and requiring high levels of prepared and partially- or fully-mobilized Ukrainian forces to defend. The liberation of Crimea also largely obviates the threat of Russian amphibious operations against the southwestern Ukrainian coast, as well as the Russian missile threat to ships attempting to transit the western Black Sea. Unfounded discussions of Russia’s “historic right” to Crimea, which Russia itself recognized as part of an independent Ukraine in 1994, obscure the high military and financial cost Ukraine and its backers will have to pay for as long as Russia occupies the peninsula.

Donbas

Ukraine’s liberation of pre-February 2022 occupied Donbas would not dramatically change the defensive military requirements for Ukraine, since Donetsk City and Luhansk City are so close to the Russian border themselves as to offer no meaningful defensive depth. It would, however, have enormous economic implications for Ukraine, which will be considered here only briefly. Donbas is one of Ukraine’s historic economic heartlands, home to Ukraine’s ore extraction and metallurgical industry. The 2014 line of control resulting from Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine actually divided that industry, separating mines from processing facilities and splitting the rail lines connecting them all. Ukraine did not feel anything like the full economic pain of that division, however, because by tacit agreement Moscow and Kyiv allowed the Ukrainian oligarch who controlled the region to continue to operate on both sides of the line of control.[11] That oligarch no longer controls these industrial assets, and it is almost impossible to imagine that a ceasefire that restored the January 2022 lines would include restoring Ukraine’s ability to benefit economically from its part of the entire industrial enterprise.[12] Accepting Russia’s permanent acquisition of eastern Donbas thus deprives Ukraine of considerable revenues, weakening its economy and increasing its economic and financial dependence on the West.

Conclusion

The most advantageous lines Ukraine could hold militarily and economically are its internationally recognized 1991 boundaries. Any discussion of recognizing changes to those borders as concessions to try to persuade Russia to stop its unprovoked and illegal invasion must reckon with the heavy blow such concessions would make against core principles of international law banning wars of conquest, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and many other moral and ethical principles that are central to a peaceful world. But discussions of such concessions are already underway, and so we have examined the concrete and pragmatic problems surrounding their implementation.

Freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian attempt to fulfill Putin’s aims by force. The current lines are not a sensible starting point for negotiations with Russia even if Putin were serious about negotiating a ceasefire on those lines. They are, rather, the necessary starting point for the continued liberation of strategically- and economically vital Ukrainian lands, without which the objective of a free, independent, and secure Ukraine able to defend and pay for itself is likely impossible.

References

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/27/opinion/ukraine-military-aid.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/23/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war...

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[5] https://ria dot ru/20231228/svo-1918691314.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/426; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/421; https://telegra dot ph/Intervyu-oficialnogo-predstavitelya-MID-Rossii-MVZaharovoj-francuzskomu-informagentstvu-AFP-12-09; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-... ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120223

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-operatio...

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[9] https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/12/politics/russia-troop-losses-us-intellige... ; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/12/us/politics/russia-intelligence-asses... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ;

[11] https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/2... ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2016/03/25/hozyain-donbassa