OROP CHALTA CHALTA RUKTA
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Monday, January 25, 2016
OROP KRANTI : OROP CHALTA CHALTA RUKTA
OROP CHALTA CHALTA RUKTA
INDIAN SECURITY : HAVE POLITICAL WILL TO FACE IT HONESTLY OR PERISH - THE BIG INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE
SOURCE:
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-military-india-defence-manohar-parrikar/
INDIAN GEO POLTICAL SECURITY :
HAVE POLITICAL WILL TO FACE IT SQUARELY & HONESTLY
OR
PERISH
THE BIG
INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-military-india-defence-manohar-parrikar/
INDIAN GEO POLTICAL SECURITY :
HAVE POLITICAL WILL TO FACE IT SQUARELY & HONESTLY
OR
PERISH
THE BIG
INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE
THE BIG INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE
PM has a bold vision for defence reform.
Can his Defence Minister deliver?
BY
Anit Mukherjee
The writer is an assistant professor at the
S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Defence Minister
Manohar Parrikar
The terrorist attacks on Pathankot Air Force Base
revealed weaknesses in our intelligence, police and
security procedures. While all of them need to be
addressed, however there are larger issues—which can
have far more disastrous consequences for India’s
national security, which need attention. This is the issue
of defence reforms—initiated in the aftermath of the
1999 Kargil war (which followed from a previous Lahore
yatra by a BJP Prime Minister to meet Nawaz Sharif),
virtually ignored by the two UPA governments and
brought to life by the current government. Indeed, in an
important speech, while addressing the Combined
Commanders Conference last month Prime Minister
Modi challenged his defence minister and senior
military commanders to reform their “beliefs, doctrines,
objectives and strategies.” This is nothing less than
appealing for a paradigm shift, on a number of different
fronts, echoing the sentiments of generations of military
reformers. The Defence Minister, who has publicly
supported defence reform, has his task cut out for him.
Unfortunately he should not count on support from
civilian bureaucrats in his Ministry. In turn, it is far from
assured whether the current generation of senior
military officers are up to this task. In short, while the
prime minister’s vision is bold, its implementation faces
formidable obstacles. The attacks in Pathankot should
remind him—and his security managers, that India lives
in a dangerous neighbourhood and it should therefore
focus on strengthening our military.
It is an open secret that former Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh was keen to undertake some form of
defence reforms. His office was the driving force behind
the Naresh Chandra Committee, established in 2011,
ostensibly to revisit the defence reforms process. This
committee recommended the creation of a Permanent
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee—a less than
perfect nomenclature for the Chief of Defence Staff. For
the first time ever all three service chiefs supported
creating such a post. However, Defence Minister A.K.
Anthony, for reasons not entirely clear, was not that
enthusiastic. Civilian bureaucrats in his ministry also
shared his scepticism. Later, numerous controversies
surrounding General V.K. Singh put paid to any talk of
defence reforms.
Prime Minister Modi identified six broad areas for
reforms—in defence planning, enhancing jointness (the
ability of the army, navy and air force to operate
together), urging manpower rationalization (smaller
tooth to tail ratio), emphasizing professional military
education, restructuring higher defence management
and in the defence procurement process. His analysis of
problems in each of these sectors challenged the
assumptions, and world-view, of India’s senior military
commanders. For instance, India is probably the only
country in the world which is expanding its military
manpower which, by definition, curtails resources for
military modernization (China recently announced cuts
of up to 300,000 troops). The Indian military is among
the least ‘joint’ major militaries in the world and its
system of professional military education emphasizes
training over education. However, like with so many of
the prime minister’s project, the most important issue is
that of implementation. If this initiative is left to the
bureaucracies—civilian or military, then reforms are
unlikely to succeed.
Conventional wisdom would have the government
announcing reform measures and leaving it to the
military and the defence ministry to implement them.
Doing so will likely subvert the reforms, as has
happened in the past. In 1986, Arun Singh was
instrumental in creating a tri-services and joint civil-
military institution called the Defence Planning Staff
(DPS) in an attempt to rationalise defence planning. It
quickly lost its relevance as the services opposed this
initiative. More recently, the Ajai Vikram Singh
Committee was tasked to find way to lower the age of
combatant commanders. However, the implementation
of the committee report was left to the services. In the
army this created a major controversy—which is
currently being battled in the courts. The Andaman and
Nicobar Joint Command, which was founded to be an
experiment in jointness has, in practice, been
“subverted” by a non-cooperative attitude from the
services. Finally, there is a variance between the report
submitted by the late K. Subrahmanyam (under the
aegis of the Committee on National Defence University)
on India’s Defence University and how it is currently
being implemented by the military. In sum, reforms will
not succeed if its implementation is not closely
monitored.
There are three significant obstacles to defence
reforms. First, it is not clear if, and how, will the Chiefs
of the three services give up powers for the proposed
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). If the restructuring of
higher defence management results in an institutionally
weak CDS then it defeats the purpose. Second, it is not
clear how the government will create more joint
commands, especially since this is opposed by the
military. Their opposition, shorn of its elegance, is
primarily because it curtails the number of posts
available for their upward mobility. It is not surprising
therefore that they will advocate for more joint
commands—Cyber, Space, Special Forces for instance,
but will be unwilling to integrate existing commands.
Effectiveness and efficiency is therefore sacrificed to
the logic of bureaucratic expansion and increased
promotion pathways. Third, there is opposition, usually
in private, from civilian bureaucrats who do not want to
change the status quo. They prefer the existing
arrangement which gives them considerable powers
little accountability.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar—responsible for
implementing the prime minister’s vision, has claimed
that he has read the Goldwater Nichols Act, which
transformed the U.S. military. However, this initiative did
not occur overnight and was preceded by a public
debate and, perhaps more importantly, required a civil-
military partnership consisting of reform minded
individuals. As he faces obstacles from his own officials
perhaps Mr. Parrikar should consider forming a Defence
Reforms Unit comprising politicians, former officials
and technocrats all sharing the vision for defence
reforms. This could thereby monitor the progress of
different reform measures.
The media is fond of comparing the leadership styles of
President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi. It is
surely a coincidence that both have publicly come out
with statements calling for reforming their militaries. We
therefore have the unique opportunity to compare two
different institutional and leadership styles. It would be
India’s loss if, after a year, defence reforms remains an
aspiration.
Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU in Singapore.
OROP KRANTI :: Change of Definition of OROP in Various Correspondence of DESW
Dear Veterans,
Letter written to RM with copies to FM and three chiefs regarding Change of Definition of OROP in Various Correspondence of DESW Noticed dated 25 Jan 2016 is enclosed for your information and further circulation please.
With regards,
Yours Sincerely,
Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM(Retd)
Advisior United Front of Ex Servicemen & Chairman IESM
Mob: 09312404269, 0124411057
Email: satbirsm@gmail.com
Shri Manohar Parrikar
Change of Definition of OROP
in Various Correspondence of DESW Noticed
in Various Correspondence of DESW Noticed
Dear Sh Manohar Parrikar Ji
Pl refer to:
1. MOD letter no 12(01/2014-D (Pen/Pol) dated 26 Feb 14
2. MOM of the meeting chaired by RM on 26 Feb 14 to discuss OROP
3. Reply of MOS Defense Sh Rao Inderjit Singh Dated 2 Dec 14 in a written reply to Sh Rajeev Chandrashekhar in Rajya Sabha
4. GOI press release dated 5 Sep 15
5. GOI letter no 12(1)/2014 dated 7 Nov 15 and
6. GOI letter no 12(01)/2014-D(pen/pol)- Part–II dated 14 Dec 15
GOI has accepted following definition of OROP in the letters dated 26 Feb 14 and MOS statement in Rajya Sabha dated 2 Dec 14.
One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners. This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners.
However in the Press Release dated 5 Sep 14, a phrase has been added at the end of the OROP definition “at periodic intervals”.
Definition of OROP given in 5 Sep Press Release is given below:
One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, irrespective of their date of retirement. Future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners. This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners at periodic intervals.
This phrase has probably been added to justify pension equalisation every five years as is being propagated by the MOD.
Again, another attempt has been made to change/ distort the definition of OROP in GOI notification dated 7 Nov 15. OROP definition given in 7 Nov letter is reproduced below.
One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Defence Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, regardless of their date of retirement, which implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners at periodic intervals.
I am sure you would notice subtle progressive change in the language of definition of OROP, wherein the line “This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioner” has been changed with the line “This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners at periodic intervals”.
It further states as one of the salient features that it has been decided that the gap between rate of pension of current pensioners and past pensioners would be refixed every five years.
This completely changes the definition of OROP and if implemented in its changed form, it will deprive past pensioners of monetary benefits and will completely destroy the definition of OROP and in turn, destroy the very soul of OROP.
UFESM (JM) believes that this change in the definition in OROP has been inserted only to justify pension equalisation every five years. Pension equalisation every five years is against the definition of OROP and is a matter of serious concern for all Ex-servicemen. The correct and acceptable situation is that pension equalisation must be done as soon as pension of two soldiers with same rank and same length of service is noticed to be different and it must be equalised immediately. Ex-servicemen are ready to accept pension equalisation every year only to make administration of this concept easily implementable. Incidentally, any computation can be easily achieved on press of a button in today’s computer era – and this needs no emphasis.
However the matter did not end at one instance of change of definition of OROP, it has been once again repeated in GOI letter dated 14 Dec 15 “OROP implies that uniform pension be paid to the Defence Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, regardless of their date of retirement, which implies that bridging the gap between the rate of pension of current and past pensioners at periodic intervals”.
The GOI letter dated 14 Dec 15 is the notification for the formation of one-man judicial committee. It is a matter of great importance that if incorrect definition is given to the Chairman of anomalies committee, he is bound to work within the constraints given by MOD and will thus give his recommendations as per incorrect definition given to him. This will be gross injustice to ex-servicemen. Ex-servicemen might be justified to think that these changes are a planned move for the vexed problem of OROP in view of the past experiences in which meanings of Honorable Supreme Court orders were changed by making subtle changes in the decision of HSC.
We sincerely hope that these changes are probably only clerical errors and not a planned direction change. We therefore sincerely request you to correct these mistakes in definition of OROP and give following definition approved by Parliament to all committees.
One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners. This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners.
We will be thankful to get a suitable reply from you at the earliest.
With regards,
Yours Sincerely,
Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM (Retd)
Copy to :-
Sh Arun Jaitley For Information and action please
The Finance Minister
Govt of India, North Block
New Delhi – 110001
The Finance Minister
Govt of India, North Block
New Delhi – 110001
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