THE KRA CANAL

SOURCE:
https://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/TDS-The-Kra-Canal-MK-AK-KK-2019-02-1.pdf


             THE KRA CANAL

: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INDIA? 

Why is China attempting to build a canal through the Isthmus of Kra?

 How does this impact regional dynamics? 

What are India’s interests in the project? 
                       BY
Manoj Kewalramani , Anirudh Kanisetti & Kunaal Kini 

March 2019

Executive Summary

A canal along the Isthmus of Kra could alter the strategic calculus for states across Southeast Asia, with China expected to benefit the most. In light of recent discussions around building the canal with the help of Chinese investors, this study examines the potential impact and pitfalls of this project from an Indian interests perspective. The following are the key conclusions of this assessment:

1. The Kra Canal is not going to materialise immediately and has several challenges.

Thailand has many misgivings about the project, with divided elite and public opinions. It is a diplomatically, politically and economically risky undertaking. In addition, China is working on less controversial alternatives to address the Malacca Dilemma.

2. The Kra Canal is not necessarily “aimed” at India, and can serve Indian interests. 

The Kra Canal is not an economic risk to India and will likely boost trade with East Asia. The potential security threats it poses can be managed through contingency planning.

3. For India to benefit from the canal, it needs to take action immediately. 

India must avoid direct involvement in the project. But if it materialises, India should deepen bilateral ties with key ASEAN members, pursue a “sea denial” strategy to address security concerns and invest in port and transshipment capacity.


What is the Kra Canal? 

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that could route shipping from the Andaman Sea directly to the Gulf of Thailand. It’s in the news thanks to reports of a 2015 MoU between two private entities and the Thai leadership commissioning a feasibility study

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that aims to directly connect the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea through the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, providing an alternative route for shipping that is now concentrated on the Straits of Malacca. If built, the canal would cut travel time from South Asia to East Asia by at least 3 days and 1200 kilometres.

 In 2015, a Chinese company reportedly signed an MoU to construct the canal. Since then, there have been concerns about the canal’s impact on India. This Slidedoc discusses Thai and Chinese interests in pursuing the canal, the project’s feasibility and prospects, and proposes actions for India to maximise its interests.

How far along has the project come?

The Kra Canal is a project often discussed at times of geopolitical competition. Despite the support of Chinese academics and elements within the Thai military, it has not yet secured a green light. A feasibility study has recently been commissioned, but it is not the first and may not be the last.

The idea of a canal through the Isthmus of Kra is more than 300 years old, and has been periodically revived in times of geopolitical competition. The late 19th century, for example, saw competition between France and Britain, the former in support while the latter opposed. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen more systematic and technology-backed proposals, with multiple feasibility studies being carried out.

In 2015, an MoU was inked between the China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment and Development company and Asia Union Group, to build the canal. Both the Chinese and Thai governments have since officially distanced themselves from the deal. But many Chinese academics and influential Thai businessmen - who also happen to be retired military officers - have spoken in favour of it.

Most recently, Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board and the National Security Council have been tasked to conduct a feasibility study (Pakkawan 2018). So far, neither the ruling military junta nor the democratic opposition have taken a clear, decisive stance supporting the canal, or outlining how it would be constructed.

What does Thailand stand to gain or lose?

 There are compelling arguments for and against the Canal. It is potentially a very lucrative project, but comes with immense risks for Thailand


Economics
Gains
The canal could aid Thailand’s rise as a shipping and financial hub, create employment, incentivise business and boost growth.
Losses
  To benefit from the canal, transhipment facilities and an SEZ must be built, bringing the total cost anywhere between $30-$80bn. The debt incurred may be difficult to repay – especially given that Singapore would remain a competitor and the canal could adversely impact the environment, hurting tourism.

 National Security 
Gains
Economic development and employment generation may well lead to increased social and political stability.
 Losses
The Canal would physically divide the South of Thailand from the North. This impinges on Thailand’s territorial integrity. It could also fuel the existing insurgency by Malays in the south. Unsustainable debt burden owing to the canal could also comprise Thai sovereignty. All of this could lead to greater political and social instability.
Geopolitics 
Gains
The Kra Canal would significantly buttress Thailand’s position as a swing power in Southeast Asia
Losses
A shift in trade away from the Straits of Malacca could lead to frictions among ASEAN states. Debt owed to China could increase Thailand’s dependence on it and risk embroiling it in the growing Sino-US competition (Bloomberg 2018).
Environment
Gains
Cutting the maritime travel time by 2-3 days and 1200 km would result in less energy consumption and reduced emissions (Murdoch 2017).
Losses
There are fears that increased shipping would adversely impact marine ecology and potentially pose an existential risk to tourist sites such as Phuket.

What does China stand to gain or lose?
China has much more to gain from the construction of the Kra Canal and is also less exposed to risk. However, some concerns remain.

Economics


 Security


Geopolitics

Our PM and CMs are puppets of the IAS

SOURCE:

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/seeing-the-invisible/our-pm-and-cms-are-puppets-of-the-ias/

       Our PM and CMs 

    are puppets of the IAS 

                   By 

        Sanjeev Sabhlok

 Sanjeev Sabhlok

Sanjeev Sabhlok joined the IAS in 1982 but resigned after 18 years upon concluding that India's corrupt socialist governance system cannot be reformed from within. He concluded that the IAS itself is a major cause of India’s misery. Since then he has attempted to build a liberal party for India even as he earns his living as an economist in the Treasury in the Victorian government in Australia. In 2013 he was instrumental in forming Swarna Bharat Party (SBP) which takes inspiration from Rajaji’s Swatantra Party and stands for comprehensive political, social and economic liberty. Sanjeev holds the pen on SBP’s manifesto and believes the document now contains all the essential reforms to transform India into a First World nation. He is author of Breaking Free of Nehru (2008, Anthem Press), and manuscripts such as The Discovery of Freedom and Seeing the Invisible (economics for children). He sometimes writes about SBP and its policies in the Times of India editorial page and in other outlets.

June 1, 2019,

I’m simplifying things quite a bit when I say that our elected politicians are puppets of the bureaucracy, but as I will show presently, this is a fair comment given our institutional arrangements. Our bureaucracy – taken as a whole – is not only more powerful than any elected chief minister, it is more powerful than the Prime Minister.

This situation is a complete violation of the principles of liberal political theory. In a democracy, the executive should be checked and balanced by the judiciary and parliament. The idea that the unelected machine of government (the bureaucracy) will itself check the executive by exercising independent power was never intended by any theorist of political science.

This huge power of the bureaucracy in India – much greater than the power that even the British Indian bureaucracy wielded – came about during the haste of the 1947 partition and Constitution drafting. Sardar Patel made a strong case in the Constituent Assembly to continue with the colonial bureaucracy. There was no time to think about alternative models. He asked: “Is there any Premier in any province who is prepared to work without the services? He will immediately resign. He cannot manage.”

This panic led to not only the Constitutional inclusion of the all-India services (India is unique in having the public services form part of its Constitution) but the way Part 14 of the Constitution was drafted, enormous restrictions were imposed on the sovereignty of the executive and the People of India. In all democracies, the executive is supreme, with almost unlimited discretionary powers to hire and fire public servants. Not so in India. Article 311 massively dilutes this power and makes it virtually impossible for the executive to remove public servants.

As a result over the past 70 years, even the PMs of India haven’t been able to easily remove corrupt IAS officers, leave alone the incompetent ones. A PM’s entire tenure can go by in chasing up a single case through the courts. There are cases in the Modi government where even compulsory retirement has been insufficient to get rid of bad officers. Our bureaucracy thus sits on a pedestal well above elected representatives. Effectively, it is the IAS that is sovereign in India, not the People.

There is a widely cited but spurious argument that has enabled the IAS to hold on to their powers: that Indians trust their politicians less than they trust IAS officers. The people perceive the IAS to be incompetent, self-interested and arrogant but they trust their political leaders even less. Further, many honest IAS officers, in their genuine concern for India, want the IAS to continue so it can block corrupt politicians. But their remedy does not address the cause of the problem. Fixing the problem of corrupt politicians requires a different approach (which I’ve elaborated elsewhere) and we should not use the existence of bad politicians to justify the world’s most powerful but incompetent bureaucracy.

The main puppet-master in the IAS is the Establishment Officer (EO) in the Ministry of Personnel, about whom most people do not the slightest clue. The EO’s sole purpose is to defend (and expand – to the extent possible) the powers that Patel gave to the IAS. The EO operates behind the scenes, manipulating and controlling (mainly frustrating) the elected government. He dramatically reduces options for the elected representatives on almost all major appointments. And of course, the Cabinet Secretary plays a crucial role in defending the IAS empire directly at the Cabinet. This itself is a huge anomaly. In genuine democracies, a bureaucrat must not have a seat at the political table. In Victoria, an elected MP serves as Cabinet Secretary.

Such is the clout of the EO and Cabinet Secretary that Ministers and Chief Ministers need to send their emissary to the lowly EO to try to influence his decisions. This clearly shows where power lies in India. Our elected politicians have no real powers to deliver their election commitments. Our democracy is thus being choked from within – by the unaccountable and ultra-powerful IAS.

The IAS is unfit for the task of taking India from the Third World to the First World. From my personal experience (and I continue to have good friends within the IAS), no IAS officer comes even remotely close to the competence of middle-level managers in the Australian government. If the pool of administrative leaders in India is so poor, how can India possibly succeed? We need to urgently broaden the talent pool for each job and ensure the right incentives and systems of accountability. The function of EO might have worked for the colonial British government but it simply can’t work in a modern democracy.

This hugely powerful Indian bureaucracy (of which I was once a member) contrasts with the situation in Victoria where the Premier (Chief Minister) of Victoria is the unquestionable boss. He appoints Secretaries, who then appoint other officers down the line. No one can tell the Premier that he can appoint officials only from a “shortlist” prepared by a petty bureaucrat. And if a Secretary doesn’t perform, he is fired without notice. The Premier is fully empowered to get the job done. The link between the voter, his taxes and the performance of the government is direct and unambiguous. No EO sits behind the scenes, stymying the elected executive.

The saving grace for India is that the PM does have a few powers to shop outside the IAS. The recent lateral entry program has been one such rare instance. Some people have questioned the Constitutional power of the PM to do so, but I believe the Constitution allows such limited powers.

The State governments, on the other hand, are in really bad shape. Their freedom to appoint outside the IAS is almost completely circumscribed. In particular, all important posts in the states have been captured by the IAS through IAS cadre rules. These include senior positions in local government bodies, such as municipal corporations. While the IAS system doesn’t, of course, control precisely who is appointed, it ensures that only one of them can hold these posts. In that sense, the Chief Ministers of the States have even less flexibility than the PM.

As a result, IAS officers are able to thumb their nose at State governments. They can go to the EO and get themselves posted to another state or to the Government of India or even abroad. Everything depends on the officer’s relationship with the EO and Cabinet Secretary. That’s why the IAS is such a cosy and exclusive club.

It is high time to bring this dysfunctional and undemocratic system to an end. Within two years the BJP government will have the opportunity to amend the Constitution. IAS is the first thing that must go.