Showing posts with label THAILAND. Show all posts
Showing posts with label THAILAND. Show all posts

Sunday, October 27, 2019

KRA CANAL : ANOTHER CHINA PROJECT TAKES FORM

SOURCE:

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Calls-for-Kra-Isthmus-shortcut-grow-in-Thailand

SOURCE:
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/another-china-project-takes-form/681530.html

SOURCE:
http://www.theindependent.sg/the-real-threat-to-spore-construction-of-thais-kra-canal-financed-by-china/




POLITICS

      Calls for Kra Isthmus Shortcut 

                 Grow in Thailand 

                             By






A local points to a swath of land where the now-defunct Second Thai-Burma Railway cut through the southern Thai province of Ranong.

BANGKOK -- The Kra Isthmus, the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula in southern Thailand, is drawing attention as a potentially important gateway for transporting goods across Southeast Asia ahead of the planned year-end launch of the ASEAN Economic Community.

     The creation of the AEC is certain to expand trade in the region, and building a transport shortcut linking the Andaman Sea with the Gulf of Thailand would help goods move more efficiently. Calls are growing for reviving a long-defunct railway built across the isthmus by the Japanese military during World War II.

     "I've long dreamed of seeing another railway built here," said Jeaw Khaiaree, an 86-year-old man living in the southern province of Ranong. He said he helped the Japanese military survey the land for the Kra Isthmus Railway, also known as the Second Thai-Burma Railway.

     The narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula -- between the ports of Chumphon on the Gulf of Thailand and Ranong along the Andaman Sea -- is just 50km across. From the Port of Ranong, boats can travel up the Kraburi River to Kawthaung, a town on the southernmost tip of Myanmar.

     In addition to the original Thai-Burma Railway, which ran through central Thailand, the Japanese military built the Kra Isthmus Railway to transport ammunition and other military supplies from Japan to Burma -- now called Myanmar -- and other destinations during the war. Some 30,000 workers were mobilized for the project, which took just six months to complete.

     Decades later, the area is once again in the spotlight, as the impending economic integration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is expected to increase the movement of goods in the region. 

     The Port of Ranong is ideally situated for exporting foodstuffs and other goods to a rapidly developing Myanmar, Ranong Gov. Suriyan Kanchanasilp said.Road, rail or canal   At present,   
most goods shipped by boat to Myanmar originate in Laem Chabang Port, near Bangkok, and arrive via Singapore. That trip can take one to two weeks. A transport artery across the Malay Peninsula would greatly shorten that time by lopping over 1,000km off the total shipping distance.



     One approach already being taken is to build larger, better roads there. The provincial government has begun a project to construct a four-lane road across the isthmus by 2017. But the governor says that alone is not enough.

     The idea of building a railroad has popular public support. One reason for that is because the pre-existing path carved out by the old railway means costs would be held down. One estimate puts the figure at 7 billion baht ($198 million). The provincial government has submitted a railway plan for approval by the central government.

     Another idea is to carve out a canal so that goods could be shipped directly across the peninsula without having to be unloaded. It would also mean tankers could sail from the Middle East to Japan and other destinations without having to make the more time-conuming journey through the Strait of Malacca.
     The concept of building a canal there has been kicked around since the 17th century. More recently, the idea has failed to gain traction due to opposition from neighboring countries -- especially Singapore, which does not want to lose shipping business.
     Despite tapering to a svelte 50km at its narrowest point, the Kra Isthmus is bumpy terrain and would make for tough, costly digging. Building a canal there would produce a bill estimated at $24 billion to $32 billion, a sum the Thai government would probably balk at.
     More economically realistic would be to build a railway along with the four-lane roadway. But with Thailand's military-led government cutting back on infrastructure spending, that may be a tall order. The Ministry of Transport has already expressed skepticism, with an official there questioning whether the project's returns would justify its cost.


     After being completed in December 1943, the Second Thai-Burma Railway operated for less than 18 months before being destroyed by Allied air raids. Although seven decades have since passed, proponents of reviving the line will probably have to keep waiting.





        KRA CANAL : ANOTHER CHINA                       PROJECT  TAKES FORM  

                                          BY

                             Vivek Katju

Nov 12, 2018
Kra canal is part of the grand design in the waters around India and in the Indian Ocean






I first heard of the ‘Kra canal’ in Kuala Lumpur 25 years ago where I was posted as the Deputy High Commissioner. A Malaysian geographer friend who was on a team conducting a quiet study on the project’s feasibility told me that the physical construction of the canal which would link the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand traversing the Kra Isthmus was doable but its economics, domestic politics, and, even more, its geopolitics, were problematic. Clearly, the project was not pursued further by the interested party.
 In giving up on the project, the party had followed the example of others who had considered it since it was first imagined in the 17th century by a Thai monarch. Now, however, the situation appears to be changing for a weight of opinion is developing in its favour. China is relentlessly pushing it and has worked hard to foster a strong lobby for it in Thailand. Reports indicate that Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who had earlier declared that it was not a Thai priority, has asked the country’s National Security Council and the National Economic and Social Development Board to examine it. No doubt the former body will look at its security implications while the latter will consider its economic aspects.

The Kra canal which is expected to take a decade to get completed, will reduce the distance for ships sailing currently via the busy and narrow Malacca Straits from the Persian Gulf to the east by at least 1,200 km. Merchant ships which wish presently to avoid the Malacca Straits have to go further south to the Sunda or the Lombok Straits considerably increasing the distance to the east. Thus, prima facie the Kra canal, which at present estimates will cost around $30 billion — this figure will surely go up — makes sense, but its economic and strategic viability have yet to be fully established. Its Thai proponents argue that its financial viability must take into account both the volume of traffic and the economic activity generated through the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that will be set up as part of the project.


China is willing to put in the money for the canal but will it be ready to subsidise it for its strategic purposes? That remains to be seen (and is perhaps unlikely because it will become a precedent for unviable BRI projects), despite the strategic advantages that it will bring. The Malacca choke makes China uneasy, for it is not only dependent on West Asian oil which passes through the straits, but also its general trade uses these waters. Hence, the canal alternative is strategically valid.

A principal historical Thai strategic inhibition is that it will notionally ‘separate’ the country’s southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat from the rest of the country. Thailand is Buddhist and ethnically Tai but these provinces are Muslim and Malay. They are part of the Malay world but along with some other Malay territories were annexed by an expanding Thai kingdom around 1785. Under the Anglo-Thai treaty of 1909, Thailand relinquished its claims to some Malay territories which are now part of Malaysia and its sovereignty over these provinces was recognised. These provinces have always been restless but have witnessed an insurgency since 2004. Its current intensity is low but alienation is substantial and violent acts continue. More than 6,000 have died in the past 14 years. Thailand can create military installations to the canal’s south to ensure effective counter-terrorism but the way the strategic landscape by the Thai elite is imagined will need to change.




The Kra canal’s impact on ASEAN will go beyond the re-orientation of shipping, though that too will be substantial and adverse on Singapore and to an extent on Malaysian ports. Conversely, some ports in Vietnam may benefit. If the SEZs take off, they will attract investments that would have gone elsewhere. However, Singapore’s attractions as a financial centre and its ability to strengthen itself as a hi-tech base are great, even as it may have to lose its pivotal place as a shipping hub.

The US has not taken an official position on the project but is wary of enhanced Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The European states are not concerned with that aspect and look to gaining work for their companies in the project construction. Other countries will not be overly concerned. International civil society and concerned global organisations will look at the canal’s environmental impact more than anything else.

There is no doubt that the Kra canal is part of China’s grand design in the waters that surround India and in the Indian Ocean. It is gaining access or acquiring ports or building bases —Hambantota, Gwadar and the base in Djibouti — and has now signed an agreement to develop the Kyaukphyu port in Myanmar’s troubled Rakhine state. All this is impacting on Indian interests and so will the canal. It would be timely for Indian economic and strategic planners to examine the implications of the canal. Perhaps the process has already begun but it has to be pursued in a holistic and sustained manner. 

Indian official agencies and business should engage Thailand on the Kra canal even while the Thai system’s consideration is in the initial stages. While the canal will be built on Thai territory it will impact the interests of many countries, including India. Hence it will be in order to exchange views to make it a win-win, as far as possible, for all. One way to do so would be to ensure that except Thailand no other country is allowed to use it for the passage of its naval vessels. That will assuage strategic apprehensions of the region and beyond.

















Thursday, June 6, 2019

THE KRA CANAL

SOURCE:
https://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/TDS-The-Kra-Canal-MK-AK-KK-2019-02-1.pdf


             THE KRA CANAL



: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INDIA? 

Why is China attempting to build a canal through the Isthmus of Kra?

 How does this impact regional dynamics? 

What are India’s interests in the project? 
                       BY
Manoj Kewalramani , Anirudh Kanisetti & Kunaal Kini 

March 2019

Executive Summary

A canal along the Isthmus of Kra could alter the strategic calculus for states across Southeast Asia, with China expected to benefit the most. In light of recent discussions around building the canal with the help of Chinese investors, this study examines the potential impact and pitfalls of this project from an Indian interests perspective. The following are the key conclusions of this assessment:

1. The Kra Canal is not going to materialise immediately and has several challenges.

Thailand has many misgivings about the project, with divided elite and public opinions. It is a diplomatically, politically and economically risky undertaking. In addition, China is working on less controversial alternatives to address the Malacca Dilemma.

2. The Kra Canal is not necessarily “aimed” at India, and can serve Indian interests. 

The Kra Canal is not an economic risk to India and will likely boost trade with East Asia. The potential security threats it poses can be managed through contingency planning.

3. For India to benefit from the canal, it needs to take action immediately. 

India must avoid direct involvement in the project. But if it materialises, India should deepen bilateral ties with key ASEAN members, pursue a “sea denial” strategy to address security concerns and invest in port and transshipment capacity.


What is the Kra Canal? 

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that could route shipping from the Andaman Sea directly to the Gulf of Thailand. It’s in the news thanks to reports of a 2015 MoU between two private entities and the Thai leadership commissioning a feasibility study

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that aims to directly connect the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea through the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, providing an alternative route for shipping that is now concentrated on the Straits of Malacca. If built, the canal would cut travel time from South Asia to East Asia by at least 3 days and 1200 kilometres.

 In 2015, a Chinese company reportedly signed an MoU to construct the canal. Since then, there have been concerns about the canal’s impact on India. This Slidedoc discusses Thai and Chinese interests in pursuing the canal, the project’s feasibility and prospects, and proposes actions for India to maximise its interests.

How far along has the project come?

The Kra Canal is a project often discussed at times of geopolitical competition. Despite the support of Chinese academics and elements within the Thai military, it has not yet secured a green light. A feasibility study has recently been commissioned, but it is not the first and may not be the last.

The idea of a canal through the Isthmus of Kra is more than 300 years old, and has been periodically revived in times of geopolitical competition. The late 19th century, for example, saw competition between France and Britain, the former in support while the latter opposed. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen more systematic and technology-backed proposals, with multiple feasibility studies being carried out.

In 2015, an MoU was inked between the China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment and Development company and Asia Union Group, to build the canal. Both the Chinese and Thai governments have since officially distanced themselves from the deal. But many Chinese academics and influential Thai businessmen - who also happen to be retired military officers - have spoken in favour of it.

Most recently, Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board and the National Security Council have been tasked to conduct a feasibility study (Pakkawan 2018). So far, neither the ruling military junta nor the democratic opposition have taken a clear, decisive stance supporting the canal, or outlining how it would be constructed.

What does Thailand stand to gain or lose?

 There are compelling arguments for and against the Canal. It is potentially a very lucrative project, but comes with immense risks for Thailand


Economics
Gains
The canal could aid Thailand’s rise as a shipping and financial hub, create employment, incentivise business and boost growth.
Losses
  To benefit from the canal, transhipment facilities and an SEZ must be built, bringing the total cost anywhere between $30-$80bn. The debt incurred may be difficult to repay – especially given that Singapore would remain a competitor and the canal could adversely impact the environment, hurting tourism.

 National Security 
Gains
Economic development and employment generation may well lead to increased social and political stability.
 Losses
The Canal would physically divide the South of Thailand from the North. This impinges on Thailand’s territorial integrity. It could also fuel the existing insurgency by Malays in the south. Unsustainable debt burden owing to the canal could also comprise Thai sovereignty. All of this could lead to greater political and social instability.
Geopolitics 
Gains
The Kra Canal would significantly buttress Thailand’s position as a swing power in Southeast Asia
Losses
A shift in trade away from the Straits of Malacca could lead to frictions among ASEAN states. Debt owed to China could increase Thailand’s dependence on it and risk embroiling it in the growing Sino-US competition (Bloomberg 2018).
Environment
Gains
Cutting the maritime travel time by 2-3 days and 1200 km would result in less energy consumption and reduced emissions (Murdoch 2017).
Losses
There are fears that increased shipping would adversely impact marine ecology and potentially pose an existential risk to tourist sites such as Phuket.

What does China stand to gain or lose?
China has much more to gain from the construction of the Kra Canal and is also less exposed to risk. However, some concerns remain.

Economics


 Security


Geopolitics