Showing posts with label CHOKE POINTS - MALACCA STRAIT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CHOKE POINTS - MALACCA STRAIT. Show all posts

Sunday, October 27, 2019

KRA CANAL : ANOTHER CHINA PROJECT TAKES FORM

SOURCE:

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Calls-for-Kra-Isthmus-shortcut-grow-in-Thailand

SOURCE:
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/another-china-project-takes-form/681530.html

SOURCE:
http://www.theindependent.sg/the-real-threat-to-spore-construction-of-thais-kra-canal-financed-by-china/




POLITICS

      Calls for Kra Isthmus Shortcut 

                 Grow in Thailand 

                             By






A local points to a swath of land where the now-defunct Second Thai-Burma Railway cut through the southern Thai province of Ranong.

BANGKOK -- The Kra Isthmus, the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula in southern Thailand, is drawing attention as a potentially important gateway for transporting goods across Southeast Asia ahead of the planned year-end launch of the ASEAN Economic Community.

     The creation of the AEC is certain to expand trade in the region, and building a transport shortcut linking the Andaman Sea with the Gulf of Thailand would help goods move more efficiently. Calls are growing for reviving a long-defunct railway built across the isthmus by the Japanese military during World War II.

     "I've long dreamed of seeing another railway built here," said Jeaw Khaiaree, an 86-year-old man living in the southern province of Ranong. He said he helped the Japanese military survey the land for the Kra Isthmus Railway, also known as the Second Thai-Burma Railway.

     The narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula -- between the ports of Chumphon on the Gulf of Thailand and Ranong along the Andaman Sea -- is just 50km across. From the Port of Ranong, boats can travel up the Kraburi River to Kawthaung, a town on the southernmost tip of Myanmar.

     In addition to the original Thai-Burma Railway, which ran through central Thailand, the Japanese military built the Kra Isthmus Railway to transport ammunition and other military supplies from Japan to Burma -- now called Myanmar -- and other destinations during the war. Some 30,000 workers were mobilized for the project, which took just six months to complete.

     Decades later, the area is once again in the spotlight, as the impending economic integration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is expected to increase the movement of goods in the region. 

     The Port of Ranong is ideally situated for exporting foodstuffs and other goods to a rapidly developing Myanmar, Ranong Gov. Suriyan Kanchanasilp said.Road, rail or canal   At present,   
most goods shipped by boat to Myanmar originate in Laem Chabang Port, near Bangkok, and arrive via Singapore. That trip can take one to two weeks. A transport artery across the Malay Peninsula would greatly shorten that time by lopping over 1,000km off the total shipping distance.



     One approach already being taken is to build larger, better roads there. The provincial government has begun a project to construct a four-lane road across the isthmus by 2017. But the governor says that alone is not enough.

     The idea of building a railroad has popular public support. One reason for that is because the pre-existing path carved out by the old railway means costs would be held down. One estimate puts the figure at 7 billion baht ($198 million). The provincial government has submitted a railway plan for approval by the central government.

     Another idea is to carve out a canal so that goods could be shipped directly across the peninsula without having to be unloaded. It would also mean tankers could sail from the Middle East to Japan and other destinations without having to make the more time-conuming journey through the Strait of Malacca.
     The concept of building a canal there has been kicked around since the 17th century. More recently, the idea has failed to gain traction due to opposition from neighboring countries -- especially Singapore, which does not want to lose shipping business.
     Despite tapering to a svelte 50km at its narrowest point, the Kra Isthmus is bumpy terrain and would make for tough, costly digging. Building a canal there would produce a bill estimated at $24 billion to $32 billion, a sum the Thai government would probably balk at.
     More economically realistic would be to build a railway along with the four-lane roadway. But with Thailand's military-led government cutting back on infrastructure spending, that may be a tall order. The Ministry of Transport has already expressed skepticism, with an official there questioning whether the project's returns would justify its cost.


     After being completed in December 1943, the Second Thai-Burma Railway operated for less than 18 months before being destroyed by Allied air raids. Although seven decades have since passed, proponents of reviving the line will probably have to keep waiting.





        KRA CANAL : ANOTHER CHINA                       PROJECT  TAKES FORM  

                                          BY

                             Vivek Katju

Nov 12, 2018
Kra canal is part of the grand design in the waters around India and in the Indian Ocean






I first heard of the ‘Kra canal’ in Kuala Lumpur 25 years ago where I was posted as the Deputy High Commissioner. A Malaysian geographer friend who was on a team conducting a quiet study on the project’s feasibility told me that the physical construction of the canal which would link the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand traversing the Kra Isthmus was doable but its economics, domestic politics, and, even more, its geopolitics, were problematic. Clearly, the project was not pursued further by the interested party.
 In giving up on the project, the party had followed the example of others who had considered it since it was first imagined in the 17th century by a Thai monarch. Now, however, the situation appears to be changing for a weight of opinion is developing in its favour. China is relentlessly pushing it and has worked hard to foster a strong lobby for it in Thailand. Reports indicate that Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who had earlier declared that it was not a Thai priority, has asked the country’s National Security Council and the National Economic and Social Development Board to examine it. No doubt the former body will look at its security implications while the latter will consider its economic aspects.

The Kra canal which is expected to take a decade to get completed, will reduce the distance for ships sailing currently via the busy and narrow Malacca Straits from the Persian Gulf to the east by at least 1,200 km. Merchant ships which wish presently to avoid the Malacca Straits have to go further south to the Sunda or the Lombok Straits considerably increasing the distance to the east. Thus, prima facie the Kra canal, which at present estimates will cost around $30 billion — this figure will surely go up — makes sense, but its economic and strategic viability have yet to be fully established. Its Thai proponents argue that its financial viability must take into account both the volume of traffic and the economic activity generated through the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that will be set up as part of the project.


China is willing to put in the money for the canal but will it be ready to subsidise it for its strategic purposes? That remains to be seen (and is perhaps unlikely because it will become a precedent for unviable BRI projects), despite the strategic advantages that it will bring. The Malacca choke makes China uneasy, for it is not only dependent on West Asian oil which passes through the straits, but also its general trade uses these waters. Hence, the canal alternative is strategically valid.

A principal historical Thai strategic inhibition is that it will notionally ‘separate’ the country’s southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat from the rest of the country. Thailand is Buddhist and ethnically Tai but these provinces are Muslim and Malay. They are part of the Malay world but along with some other Malay territories were annexed by an expanding Thai kingdom around 1785. Under the Anglo-Thai treaty of 1909, Thailand relinquished its claims to some Malay territories which are now part of Malaysia and its sovereignty over these provinces was recognised. These provinces have always been restless but have witnessed an insurgency since 2004. Its current intensity is low but alienation is substantial and violent acts continue. More than 6,000 have died in the past 14 years. Thailand can create military installations to the canal’s south to ensure effective counter-terrorism but the way the strategic landscape by the Thai elite is imagined will need to change.




The Kra canal’s impact on ASEAN will go beyond the re-orientation of shipping, though that too will be substantial and adverse on Singapore and to an extent on Malaysian ports. Conversely, some ports in Vietnam may benefit. If the SEZs take off, they will attract investments that would have gone elsewhere. However, Singapore’s attractions as a financial centre and its ability to strengthen itself as a hi-tech base are great, even as it may have to lose its pivotal place as a shipping hub.

The US has not taken an official position on the project but is wary of enhanced Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The European states are not concerned with that aspect and look to gaining work for their companies in the project construction. Other countries will not be overly concerned. International civil society and concerned global organisations will look at the canal’s environmental impact more than anything else.

There is no doubt that the Kra canal is part of China’s grand design in the waters that surround India and in the Indian Ocean. It is gaining access or acquiring ports or building bases —Hambantota, Gwadar and the base in Djibouti — and has now signed an agreement to develop the Kyaukphyu port in Myanmar’s troubled Rakhine state. All this is impacting on Indian interests and so will the canal. It would be timely for Indian economic and strategic planners to examine the implications of the canal. Perhaps the process has already begun but it has to be pursued in a holistic and sustained manner. 

Indian official agencies and business should engage Thailand on the Kra canal even while the Thai system’s consideration is in the initial stages. While the canal will be built on Thai territory it will impact the interests of many countries, including India. Hence it will be in order to exchange views to make it a win-win, as far as possible, for all. One way to do so would be to ensure that except Thailand no other country is allowed to use it for the passage of its naval vessels. That will assuage strategic apprehensions of the region and beyond.

















Thursday, June 6, 2019

THE KRA CANAL

SOURCE:
https://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/TDS-The-Kra-Canal-MK-AK-KK-2019-02-1.pdf


             THE KRA CANAL



: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INDIA? 

Why is China attempting to build a canal through the Isthmus of Kra?

 How does this impact regional dynamics? 

What are India’s interests in the project? 
                       BY
Manoj Kewalramani , Anirudh Kanisetti & Kunaal Kini 

March 2019

Executive Summary

A canal along the Isthmus of Kra could alter the strategic calculus for states across Southeast Asia, with China expected to benefit the most. In light of recent discussions around building the canal with the help of Chinese investors, this study examines the potential impact and pitfalls of this project from an Indian interests perspective. The following are the key conclusions of this assessment:

1. The Kra Canal is not going to materialise immediately and has several challenges.

Thailand has many misgivings about the project, with divided elite and public opinions. It is a diplomatically, politically and economically risky undertaking. In addition, China is working on less controversial alternatives to address the Malacca Dilemma.

2. The Kra Canal is not necessarily “aimed” at India, and can serve Indian interests. 

The Kra Canal is not an economic risk to India and will likely boost trade with East Asia. The potential security threats it poses can be managed through contingency planning.

3. For India to benefit from the canal, it needs to take action immediately. 

India must avoid direct involvement in the project. But if it materialises, India should deepen bilateral ties with key ASEAN members, pursue a “sea denial” strategy to address security concerns and invest in port and transshipment capacity.


What is the Kra Canal? 

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that could route shipping from the Andaman Sea directly to the Gulf of Thailand. It’s in the news thanks to reports of a 2015 MoU between two private entities and the Thai leadership commissioning a feasibility study

The Kra Canal is a proposed project that aims to directly connect the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea through the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, providing an alternative route for shipping that is now concentrated on the Straits of Malacca. If built, the canal would cut travel time from South Asia to East Asia by at least 3 days and 1200 kilometres.

 In 2015, a Chinese company reportedly signed an MoU to construct the canal. Since then, there have been concerns about the canal’s impact on India. This Slidedoc discusses Thai and Chinese interests in pursuing the canal, the project’s feasibility and prospects, and proposes actions for India to maximise its interests.

How far along has the project come?

The Kra Canal is a project often discussed at times of geopolitical competition. Despite the support of Chinese academics and elements within the Thai military, it has not yet secured a green light. A feasibility study has recently been commissioned, but it is not the first and may not be the last.

The idea of a canal through the Isthmus of Kra is more than 300 years old, and has been periodically revived in times of geopolitical competition. The late 19th century, for example, saw competition between France and Britain, the former in support while the latter opposed. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen more systematic and technology-backed proposals, with multiple feasibility studies being carried out.

In 2015, an MoU was inked between the China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment and Development company and Asia Union Group, to build the canal. Both the Chinese and Thai governments have since officially distanced themselves from the deal. But many Chinese academics and influential Thai businessmen - who also happen to be retired military officers - have spoken in favour of it.

Most recently, Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board and the National Security Council have been tasked to conduct a feasibility study (Pakkawan 2018). So far, neither the ruling military junta nor the democratic opposition have taken a clear, decisive stance supporting the canal, or outlining how it would be constructed.

What does Thailand stand to gain or lose?

 There are compelling arguments for and against the Canal. It is potentially a very lucrative project, but comes with immense risks for Thailand


Economics
Gains
The canal could aid Thailand’s rise as a shipping and financial hub, create employment, incentivise business and boost growth.
Losses
  To benefit from the canal, transhipment facilities and an SEZ must be built, bringing the total cost anywhere between $30-$80bn. The debt incurred may be difficult to repay – especially given that Singapore would remain a competitor and the canal could adversely impact the environment, hurting tourism.

 National Security 
Gains
Economic development and employment generation may well lead to increased social and political stability.
 Losses
The Canal would physically divide the South of Thailand from the North. This impinges on Thailand’s territorial integrity. It could also fuel the existing insurgency by Malays in the south. Unsustainable debt burden owing to the canal could also comprise Thai sovereignty. All of this could lead to greater political and social instability.
Geopolitics 
Gains
The Kra Canal would significantly buttress Thailand’s position as a swing power in Southeast Asia
Losses
A shift in trade away from the Straits of Malacca could lead to frictions among ASEAN states. Debt owed to China could increase Thailand’s dependence on it and risk embroiling it in the growing Sino-US competition (Bloomberg 2018).
Environment
Gains
Cutting the maritime travel time by 2-3 days and 1200 km would result in less energy consumption and reduced emissions (Murdoch 2017).
Losses
There are fears that increased shipping would adversely impact marine ecology and potentially pose an existential risk to tourist sites such as Phuket.

What does China stand to gain or lose?
China has much more to gain from the construction of the Kra Canal and is also less exposed to risk. However, some concerns remain.

Economics


 Security


Geopolitics





Monday, November 12, 2018

KRA CANAL : The Real Threat to Malacca-S'pore Strait : Construction of Thai's Kra Canal financed by China (r)

SOURCE:
http://www.theindependent.sg/the-real-threat-to-spore-construction-of-thais-kra-canal-financed-by-china/





         The Real Threat to 

      Malacca - S'pore Strait 

: Construction of Thai's Kra   Canal financed by China




October 2, 2016
updated 12 Nov 2018




The Kra Canal or the Thai Canal refers to a proposal for a canal to cut through the southern isthmus of Thailand, connecting the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea. It would provide an alternative to transit through the Strait of Malacca and shorten transit for shipments of oil to East Asian countries like Japan and China by 1,200 km, saving much time. China refers to it as part of its 21st century maritime Silk Road.
China is keen on the Kra Canal project partly for strategic reasons. Presently, 80% of China’s oil from the Middle East and Africa passes through the Straits of Malacca. China has long recognized that in a potential conflict with other rivals, particularly with the US, the Strait of Malacca could easily be blockaded, cutting-off its oil lifeline. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao even coined a term for this, calling it China’s “Malacca Dilemma”.


History of Kra Canal

The idea to shorten shipping time and distance through the proposed Kra Canal is not new. It was proposed as early as in 1677 when Thai King Narai asked the French engineer de Lamar to survey the possibility of building a waterway to connect Songkhla with Marid (now Myanmar), but the idea was discarded as impractical with the technology of that time.


In 1793, the idea resurfaced. The younger brother of King Chakri suggested it would make it easier to protect the west coast with military ships. In the early 19th century, the British East India Company became interested in a canal. After Burma became a British colony in 1863, an exploration was undertaken with Victoria Point (Kawthaung) opposite the Kra estuary as its southernmost point, again with negative result. In 1882, the constructor of the Suez canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps, visited the area, but the Thai king did not allow him to investigate in detail.

In 1897, Thailand and the British empire agreed not to build a canal so as to maintain the importance of Singapore as a shipping hub, since by that time, Singapore was already prospering as an international hub with great importance to the British.

In the 20th century the idea resurfaced with various proposals to build the canal but did not go far due to various constraints including technology and cost constraints as well as indecisive political leadership of Thailand.

China shows Thailand the Money
In the last decade, China has now become the potential game changer who can possibly turn Kra Canal proposal into reality in the 21st century. It has the money, technology and strong political leadership and will to support the project if it wants to.

Last year, news emerged that China and Thailand have signed an MOU to advance the Kra Canal project. On 15 May 2015, the MOU was signed by the China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment and Development company (中泰克拉基礎設施投資開發有限公司) and Asia Union Group in Guangzhou. According to the news reports, the Kra Canal project will take a decade to complete and incur a cost of US$28 billion.

But 4 days later on 19 May, it was reported that both Chinese and Thai governments denied there was any official agreement between the 2 governments to build the canal.

statement by the Chinese embassy in Thailand said that China has not taken part in any study or cooperation on the matter. It later clarified that the organisations who signed the MOU have no links to the Chinese government. Separately, Xinhua news agency traced the announcement of the canal project to another Chinese firm Longhao, which declined comment when contacted.

Dr Zhao Hong, an expert on China-Asean relations from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, told the media that China would not embark on such a project lightly, given the political and bilateral implications.

“China will have to consider the feedback from countries such as Singapore, which it has friendly ties with, given the impact that the Kra canal might have,” he said at the time when news of the MOU emerged. But Dr Zhao added that China might be open to private companies studying the feasibility of such a project, but will not directly back it for now.
It was said that the the chairman of Asia Union Group, the Thai party which signed the MOU, is former Thai premier Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a long-time supporter of the Kra Canal.

Thai PM: Kra Canal project should be looked into by future democratic governments

In Jan this year, the Thai PM reiterated again that the Kra Canal project is not on his government agenda. His announcement came after a member of the King’s Privy Council, Thanin Kraivichien, wrote an open letter to the government advocating for the canal’s construction.Thanin was the 14th PM of Thailand between October 1976 and October 1977. His call is part of a growing chorus of Kra Canal proponents in Thailand’s political and business communities that started talking openly last year after several Chinese firms expressed interest in funding and constructing the canal.
Responding to Thanin’s call for the project, the Thai PM said the Kra Canal project should be looked into by democratic governments in the future, meaning to say Thailand has not ruled out the construction of Kra Canal completely. And in the case of Thailand, changes to its government occur frequently like the changing of clothes.

China getting Angry with Singapore
In the last couple of months, China is increasingly angered by PM Lee’s move to side with the US over the South China Seas issue, even though Singapore has no claims over any of the territories there.


It all started 2 months ago when PM Lee was invited to the White House and was hosted to a rare White House state dinner on  2 Aug(http://theindependent.sg/pm-lees-speech-at-white-house-state-dinner-angers-china). During his toast, PM Lee welcomed the US to adopt a strategy to “rebalance” the Asia Pacific and went on to call President Obama as the “America’s first Pacific President”.

China immediately responded through their Global Times. “Lee Hsien Loong addressed Obama as the American ‘first Pacific President’. Such flattery (‘戴高帽’) given to Obama directly does not concern us (‘倒也没啥’),” the Global Times’ article said.

“The key is he praised the American strategy to ‘re-balance Asia-Pacific’ and publicised that all Southeast Asian countries welcome such American ‘balancing’. Because the ‘rebalance Asia-Pacific’ strategy is pointed at China to a large extent, Lee Hsien Loong is clearly taking side already.”


“If Singapore completely becomes an American ‘pawn’ (‘马前卒’) and loses any of its resilience to move between US and China, its influence will be considerably reduced. Its value to the US will also be greatly discounted,” it added.
The article went on to say that China has its limit in tolerance. It said, “Singapore should not push it (‘新加坡不能太过分’). It cannot play the role of taking the initiative to help US and South East Asian countries to go against China over South China Sea matters. It cannot help American ‘rebalancing Asia-Pacific’ strategy, which is directed at China’s internal affairs, by ‘adding oil and vinegar’ (‘添油加醋’), thereby enabling US to provide an excuse to suppress China’s strategic space as well as providing support to US.”


“Singapore can go and please the Americans, but it needs to do their utmost to avoid harming China’s interests. It needs to be clear and open about its latter attitude,” it cautioned. Singapore’s balancing act should be to help China and US to avoid confrontation as its main objective, and not taking side so as to increase the mistrust between China and US, it said..

The article gave the example of Singapore allowing US to deploy its P-8 reconnaissance aircraft to Singapore, which from the view of the Chinese, increases the tension in South China Sea, and thereby, increasing the mistrust between the 2 big countries.

“Singapore needs more wisdom (‘新加坡需要更多的智慧’),” the article concluded.

PLA General: We must strike back 
at Singapore

And yesterday, SCMP reported that a PLA General had called for Beijing to impose sanctions and to retaliate against Singapore so as to “pay the price for seriously damaging China’s interests” (http://theindependent.sg/pla-general-we-must-strike-back-at-singapore).

The General’s remarks came after a recent spat between Global Times and Singapore Ambassador Loh. On 21 Sep, Global Times carried an article saying that Singapore had raised the issue of the disputed South China Sea at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit held in Venezuela on 18 Sep. It added that Singapore had “insisted” to include an international tribunal’s ruling on the waterway, which was in favour of the Philippines, in the summit’s final document.

Singapore’s ambassador to China, Stanley Loh, rejected this and wrote an open letter stating that the news report was “false and unfounded”. Mr Loh said the move to include the international ruling in NAM’s final document was a collective act by the members of the ASEAN. But the editor-in-chief of Global Times came out to stand by his paper’s report.

Then, the Chinese government also came out in support of Global Times, not buying Ambassador Loh’s arguments. When a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman was asked about the tiff between Global Times and Singapore, he blamed an unspecified “individual nation” for insisting on including South China Sea issues in the NAM document.

Xu Liping, senior researcher on Southeast Asia studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said China expected Singapore to be a neutral mediator between China and the countries of Asean, and did not want to see disputes over the South China Sea raised in a multilateral platform like the NAM Summit. And that was why China was so angry over Singapore’s active moves in broaching such a sensitive topic, he said.
“If Singapore does not adjust its policies, I am afraid the bilateral relations will deteriorate,” Xu added. “Singapore should think twice about its security cooperation especially with the United States, and strike a better balance between China and US.”

“2-Headed Snake”

On Thursday, the overseas edition of People’s Daily also published an online commentary, saying Singapore “has obviously taken sides over South China Sea issues, while emphasising it does not”. In other words, China is accusing the Singapore government of saying one thing but doing another – a hypocrite.
Online, the Chinese netizens condemned Singapore as a “2-headed snake”. One of them wrote:


(Translation: China should quickly embark on the Kra Canal project and turn Singapore back into a third world country. This is the best present to give to a “2-headed snake”.)

If the Kra Canal truly becomes a 
reality, ships would certainly 
consider by-passing the Strait of 
Malacca and Singapore altogether, 
making the Singapore’s all-
important geographical location 
redundant. We may truly become a 
third world country after all.



Kra Canal is dead says Thai Ambassador to Kuala Lumpur


REF TO:

http://www.theindependent.sg/kra-canal-is-dead-says-thai-ambassador-to-kuala-lumpur/