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Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects
September 14, 2022
Introduction
Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to respond to the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures, including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the war are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to Congress.
This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to the invasion, the performance and conduct of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, possible Russian intentions, and recent developments on the ground. For other CRS products related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report R47054, Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Related CRS Products.
Prelude to Invasion: Military Buildup and Force Posture
In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and within Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region. The buildup came after a sustained increase in Russia’s permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.1 Since 2014, Russia has created two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western Military District (20th CAA, headquartered in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District (8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-onDon and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate, and manage command and control of units transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly commands the separatist units in two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR).
Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine, 2 in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates. 3
During this buildup, analysts and observers documented the movement of Russian units from across Russia toward Ukraine.4 The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6 th CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s southeast border with Russia, and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29 th and 5th CAAs) moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus. 5 In addition, Russia deployed elite units— such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and spetsnaz (elite light infantry units used for reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.6
These forces included the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic warfare, support, and logistics units.7 Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighters, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which some observers believed would play a key role in the initial invasion.8
On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize the independence of the DNR and LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), most of which had remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and not just territory controlled by DNR/LNR.
Shortly after February 21, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the DNR/LNR, claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage attempts. These Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around Ukraine. 9
On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration, European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia invaded Ukraine.10 Russia claimed its invasion was to conduct a “special military operation” to protect the civilian population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine; many observers understood the latter term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government.11
Initial Invasion
On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin’s televised address announcing a “special military operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision-guided munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure.12 In the opening stages of the attack, the Pentagon assessed that Russia launched over 100 SRBMs, including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. 13
Some observers believe Russia’s initial strategy was (or was intended) to achieve air superiority, degrade Ukrainian air defenses, and undermine the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate defenses and counterattacks. This initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration and scale than some analysts expected. 14 In particular, analysts noted that the Russian air forces (VKS) failed to conduct effective suppression of enemy air defense missions, either because of an unwillingness to act or because of a lack of capability. Russia’s failure to degrade the Ukrainian air force and air defenses, as well as Ukrainian command and control capabilities, allowed the Ukrainian military to respond more successfully to Russia’s invasion than most observers expected, both at the outset and subsequently. 15
After the air assault, Russian ground forces attacked from multiple directions: north from occupied Crimea in the direction of Kherson; limited incursions west from DNR/LNR; from Russia’s Belgorod and Kursk toward Ukraine’s cities of Kharkiv and Sumy; and a strong twopronged thrust toward the capital of Kyiv from Belarus. 16 The first phase of the war was subsequently defined by rapid maneuver operations to outflank and seize key objectives.
Kyiv was an initial key Russian military target. 17 Led by elite, but comparatively lightly equipped, VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units, Russian forces advanced along the western side of Kyiv and reached the outskirts of the city within days. 18 In the early hours of the invasion, Russian VDV units conducted a risky air assault to seize the Antonov International Airport in Hostmel, on the outskirts of Kyiv.19 Analysts have argued that the Russian attack to seize the airport was intended to allow the rapid introduction of follow-on VDV units to surround and seize the Ukrainian capital.20 Ukrainian forces, however, responded and repulsed the attack, reportedly causing heavy Russian casualties and shooting down several helicopters.21
Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance.22 Russia made the most progress in the south from occupied Crimea, reportedly imposing significant casualties on Ukrainian forces in the region. Russian forces advanced quickly toward Kherson (which they captured on March 2, 2022) and eventually turned toward the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol.23 Analysts argue that Russian advances in the south were successful in part because they involved some of Russia’s most modern and professional units from the Southern Military District and had better logistical support than other units, due to rail access from Crimea.24 In other regions, Russia made slow but initially steady progress, seeking to encircle rather than capture major urban centers such as Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv.25 Logistics issues and other factors soon stalled most Russian advances.26
Russian forces ran into effective Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset.27 Despite not announcing a general mobilization until February 25, after the invasion began, the Ukrainian military immediately hindered, deflected, and imposed costs on Russian forces in personnel and equipment. The Ukrainian military appeared to exploit numerous tactical and operational deficiencies of Russian forces (which were overextended in many cases), allowing the Ukrainian military to conduct ambushes and counterattacks.
Russian units operated with little tactical sophistication and not as combined arms formations, leaving units exposed and unprepared for Ukrainian resistance, according to observers and analysts.28 Overall, training and professionalism of Russian units appeared much lower than expected, even among supposedly “elite” units. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.29
Additionally, armored units advanced without infantry support in numerous instances.30 In another example, Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) units reportedly advanced alongside, and sometimes in front of, Russian military forces, apparently with little coordination.31 Contributing to the confusion, observers documented Russian units operating without encrypted communications, often using civilian equipment to communicate.32
Despite having significant artillery, rocket artillery, and air capabilities, Russian forces appeared restrained in their use of these systems and capabilities during the initial invasion.33 Some analysts speculated this occurred because the Russian military underestimated the level of Ukrainian resistance and that it may have indicated an initial hesitation to inflict collateral damage on civilian targets that would be crucial for supporting a Russian occupation. 34
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12 Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “As West Unleashes Sanctions, Russian Military Pushes Toward Kyiv,” Washington Post, February 24, 2022; Alex Kokcharov and John Raines, “Russia Begins ‘Blitzkrieg’ Invasion of Ukraine with Objective of Quick Victory; Intensive Fighting Likely Across Country,” Janes IHS, February 25, 2022.
13 RFE/RL, “Zelenskiy Says Ukraine Has Suffered ‘Serious Losses’ After Russian Air Strikes Pound Dozens of Targets,” February 24, 2022; Thomas Newdick, “These Are the Standoff Missiles Russia Used to Open Its War Against Ukraine,” The Drive, February 24, 2022.
14 Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow’s Use of Overwhelming Force Against Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, February 22, 2022.
15 Some analysts speculate that this result was due to Ukraine’s decision, possibly influenced by U.S. and Western intelligence, to activate and disperse most of its units from their permanent bases in preparation for a possible Russian invasion. Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, “Biden Administration Altered Rules for Sharing Intelligence with Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2022.
16 Nicholas Fiorenza, Huw Williams, and Thomas Bullock, “Ukraine Conflict: Russia Launches Multipronged Attack on Ukraine,” Janes IHS, February 24, 2022.
17 Yuliya Talmazan et al., “Russian Troops Advance Within 20 Miles of Ukraine Capital, Pentagon Says,” NBC News, February 24, 2022; Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand, and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Officials Fear the Worst Is Yet to Come for Kyiv,” CNN, March 1, 2022.
18 Mark Galeotti, “Russian Airborne Forces Retool for an Expanded Role,” Janes IHS, October 25, 2021.
19 Haley Williams, Ainara Tiefenthaler, and Masha Froliak, “Russian Helicopters Attack an Airport Near Kyiv,” New York Times, February 24, 2022.
20 Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” Institute for the Study of War, February 25, 2022.
21 James Marson, “Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2022.
22 CRS Insight IN11872, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects, by Andrew S. Bowen.
23 Michael Schwirtz and Richard Perez-Pena, “First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes More Civilian Targets,” New York Times, March 2, 2022.
24 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Into the Third Week: Will Russian Forces Need to Pause?,” War on the Rocks, March 14, 2022.
25 Richard Perez-Pena, “Russia Batters and Encircles Ukrainian Cities, as Diplomacy Falters,” New York Times, March 10, 2022.
26 Bonnie Berkowitz and Artur Galocha, “Why Russia’s Military Is Bogged Down by Logistics in Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022.
27 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Forces Repel Russian Attack on Kyiv, Prepare for Next Assault,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2022.
28 Liz Sly and Dan Lamothe, “The War in Ukraine Isn’t Working Out the Way Russia Intended,” Washington Post, February 27, 2022; Jack Watling, “Just How Tall Are Russian Soldiers?” RUSI, March 11, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “Echoes of Afghanistan in Russian Soldiers’ Poor Discipline in Ukraine,” Moscow Times, April 1, 2022.
29 Observers noted these units suffered particularly high casualties, which undermined Russian military effectiveness due to their perceived high professionalism and ratio of contract/professional servicemen. James Beardsworth and Irina Shcherbakova, “Are There Even Any Left? 100 Days of War in Ukraine for an Elite Russian Unit,” Moscow Times, June 4, 2022.
30 Serguy Bobok and Frankie Taggart, “Russian Airborne Troops Land in Ukraine’s Second City Kharkiv,” Moscow Times, March 2, 2022; James Marson and Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine’s Troops Fight War of Ambush and Skirmish Against Russian Invaders,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2022; Mark Urban, “The Heavy Losses of an Elite Russian Regiment in Ukraine,” BBC, April 2, 2022.
31 Rosgvardiya units are key internal security troops, neither equipped nor trained for conventional combat and likely sent into Ukraine early in the invasion to prevent protests against any new pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership. See CRS In Focus IF11647, Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies, by Andrew S. Bowen; Vladimir Sevrinovsky, “Refusing to Kill People Isn’t a Crime:’ The Russian National Guard Is Firing Officers Who Refuse to Join the War in Ukraine,” Meduza, March 29, 2022; Tim Ripley, “Russian National Guard Deployed Across Ukraine,” Janes IHS, April 4, 2022.
32 Sergei Dobrynin and Mark Krutov, “Communication Breakdown: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Bogged Down,” RFE/RL, March 19, 2022; Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “‘The Ukrainians Are Listening’: Russia’s Military Radios Are Getting Owned,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022; Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022; James Rands, “Doctrine, Tactics, and Technical Issues Underpin Russian Forces’ Communication Woes,” Janes IHS, March 29, 2022.
33 Thomas Newdick, “A Rundown of Russia’s Arsenal of Artillery That Could Wreak Havoc on Ukraine’s Cities,” The Drive, March 4, 2022.
34 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Assault in Ukraine Slows After an Aggressive Start,” New York Times, February 25, 2022.
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Analysis of Russia and Ukraine’s Initial Military Performance
Russian Performance
Despite Russian forces launching heavy attacks and advancing across Ukraine, the Russian military overall performed poorly during the initial phases of the invasion, surprising most observers and analysts (including Ukrainian military and political officials). 35 Reports indicated that Russia’s military and political leadership appeared surprised by the military’s lack of progress and the level of resistance from Ukrainian forces.36 Some Russian forces invaded with apparently little preparation. Captured Russian soldiers and intercepted communications revealed that many units were unaware they were to invade Ukraine until shortly beforehand.37 As Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated to Congress in early March 2022, “We assess Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of internal military challenges we are observing, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale issues, and considerable logistical issues.” 38
In particular, many analysts were surprised at the apparently limited role the VKS played at the outset of the invasion, beyond the initial bombardment.39 Russian ground forces appeared to have limited air cover, with Russia primarily relying on Iskander-M SRBMs or air-launched cruise missiles launched from VKS bombers inside Belarus and Russia, especially to target Ukrainian infrastructure and other targets in western Ukraine (see Figure 2). 40 The Ukrainian air force continued to operate over western Ukraine, and its air defenses shot down Russian aircraft and challenged Russian air superiority.41
Figure 2. Ukraine Airfields and Key Infrastructure
Sources: Congressional Research Service, Janes IHS
The Russian military’s logistics issues limited its offensives in almost all sectors.42 Russian units appeared poorly supplied (for example, some captured Russian food reportedly was expired and inedible) and seemed to advance past available logistics support. 43 Available logistics appeared too limited to sustain multiple simultaneous offensives.44 Moreover, the Ukrainian military appeared to prioritize ambushing Russian supply columns, exacerbating Russian logistics issues.45 In addition, the Russian military appears to have challenges with command and control, both at the tactical and operational levels. First, reports indicate there was no overall Russian operational commander.46 As a result, it appears each CAA and axis of advance was operating independently, with questionable levels of coordination.47 Second, Russian commanders appeared unprepared for many aspects of the invasion, as evidenced by a lack of coordination among branches (such as VKS and Rosgvardiya) and between units.48 Reporting indicates that communication problems compounded these command and control issues, contributing to higher-ranking officers moving closer to the frontlines and contributing to casualties among these officers. 4935 Robert Dalsjo, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War,” Survival 64, no. 3 (2022), pp. 7-28; Sam Jones, John Paul Rathbone, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “A Serious Failure’: Scale of Russian Military Blunders Becomes Clear,” Financial Times, March 12, 2022; Paul Sonne et al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital,” Washington Post, August 24, 2022.
36 Department of Defense, “Ukrainian Resistance, Logistics Nightmares Plague Russian Invaders,” press release, March 1, 2022; Michael Schwirtz, “Proud Band of Ukrainian Troops Holds Russian Assault at Bay—for Now,” New York Times, March 6, 2022.
37 Luke Harding, “Demoralized Russian Soldiers Tell of Anger at Being ‘Duped’ into War,” Guardian, March 4, 2022; Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and Julian E. Barnes, “As Russia’s Military Stumbles, Its Adversaries Take Note,” New York Times, March 7, 2022
38 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.
39 Justin Bronk, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force,” RUSI, February 28, 2022; Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “What Happened to Russia’s Air Force? U.S. Officials, Experts Stumped,” Reuters, March 1, 2022.
40 Reuters, “Ukrainian Official Says Missiles Launched from Belarus to Ukraine,” February 27, 2022; Reuters, “Ukraine Says It Downed Missile Launched by Russian Bomber Flying over Belarus,” February 27, 2022; Kyrylo Ovsyaniy, “A Source of Death:’ Air Bases in Russia, Belarus, and Crimea Used in Moscow’s Assault on Ukraine,” RFE/RL, March 24, 2022.
41 Media reports have documented the loss of Su-25 (SM/SM3), Su-30SM, and Su-34 fighters and fighter-bombers, as well as numerous Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-35, Mi-28N, and Ka-52 helicopters. Jack Siminski, “What the Air Campaign in Ukraine Tells Us About the Current State of the Russian Air Force,” Aviationist, March 4, 2022.
42 Alex Vershinin, “Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli,” War on the Rocks, November 23, 2021; Ryan Baker, “The Russian Invasion Has Some Logistical Problems. That Doesn’t Mean It’s Doomed,” Washington Post, February 28, 2022.
43 Emily Ferris, “Russia’s Military Has a Railroad Problem,” Foreign Policy, April 21, 2022
44 Polina Beliakova, “Russian Military’s Corruption Quagmire,” Politico.eu, March 8, 2022; Bill Chappell, “Russia’s 40-Mile Convoy Has Stalled on Its Way to Kyiv, a U.S. Official Says,” NPR, March 1, 2022.
45 Julian Borger, “The Drone Operators Who Halted Russian Convoy Headed for Kyiv,” Guardian, March 28, 2022.
46 Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, “Who Is Russia’s Top Field Commander in Ukraine? The U.S. Isn’t Sure.” CNN, March 22, 2022; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, March 31, 2022.
47 Reportedly, each CAA brought and set up its own headquarters structure rather than integrating under the command of the Western or Southern Military Districts, as most analysts expected. Tim Ripley, “Russian Military Adapts Command and Control for Ukraine Operations,” Janes IHS, March 7, 2022.
48 Sam Cranny-Evans and Thomas Withington, “Russian Comms in Ukraine: A World of Hertz,” RUSI, March 9, 2022.
49 Compared with Western militaries, Russian commanders have smaller staffs to assist command and generally are closer to the frontlines, which makes casualties among Russian officers more likely. Many analysts, however, have been surprised by the number and ranks of officers killed. The high number likely indicates that problems forced Russian commanders to accept greater levels of exposure. Jack Deutsch, “‘Winging It’: Russia Is Getting Its Generals Killed on the Front Lines,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2022; Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022
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Ukrainian Performance
Many observers and analysts have been surprised and impressed by Ukraine’s military resistance. Despite having a smaller military than Russia, and a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in equipment and resources, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have proven resilient and adaptive.50 The UAF has demonstrated greater flexibility than the Russian military and a willingness to adapt to changing conditions to exploit Russian missteps and weaknesses.51 The UAF also has benefited from high levels of motivation and recruitment, as well as significant Western security assistance and training. 52
Initially, the UAF traded space to draw Russian forces in, as Russian units advanced without sufficient convoy protection and logistical support. As Russian units advanced, Ukraine emphasized guerrilla strategies, such as hit and run or ambushes, to attack supply lines. 53 Ukraine also isolated Russian units in an effort to tire and deplete Russian forces. Ukraine leveraged key capabilities (such as the TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle for strikes and targeting), security assistance, and artillery to stymie Russian advances and undermine Russian advantages, such as air power. 54 Easily deployable weapons systems (including foreign and domestic anti-tank and anti-air systems) were effective at imposing losses on Russian personnel and equipment.55 The UAF also appears to have adopted a diffuse command structure, allowing each operational command to coordinate and initiate operations according to local conditions.
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50 CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces, by Andrew S. Bowen; CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen.
51 Nabih Bulos, “Ukraine’s Army, Vastly Outgunned, Inflicts Losses on More Powerful Russian Forces,” Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2022; Tim Judah, “How Kyiv was Saved by Ukrainian Ingenuity as Well as Russian Blunders,” Financial Times, April 10, 2022.
52 52 Brett Forrest and Alan Cullison, “How Ukraine Blunted the Russian Advance,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2022; CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt. In addition to the significant levels of security assistance, Western training for the Ukrainian military, specifically Ukrainian special operations forces, has played a key role in defending against Russia’s invasion. For more, see Andrew White, “Ukraine Conflict: Ukrainian Special Operations Forces in Focus,” Janes IHS, March 4, 2022.
53 John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Henry Foy, “Ukraine Uses Guerrilla Counter-Attacks to Take Fight to Russia,” Financial Times, April 1, 2022.
54 Dave Phillips and Eric Schmitt, “Over Ukraine, Lumbering Turkish-Made Drones Are an Ominous Sign for Russia,” New York Times, March 11, 2022.
55 Henry Foy and Ian Bott, “How Is Ukraine Using Western Weapons to Exploit Russian Weaknesses?” Financial Times, March 16, 2022.
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Possible Russian Intentions and Expectations
Observers continue to speculate about Russia’s initial objectives and plans in launching its offensive against Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia’s expectations were based on faulty assumptions that undermined Russia’s conduct during the invasion.56 If this is the case, these incorrect political assumptions possibly determined and imposed unrealistic objectives and timetables onto the Russian military. This in turn may partially, but not entirely, explain the Russian military’s unpreparedness and poor performance.57
On February 25, 2022, the Pentagon assessed that Russia had committed one-third of its available troops to Ukraine. U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to “decapitate” the Ukrainian government and rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key junctures, similar to Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014.58 Some analysts speculate that Russia may have based such a strategy on assumptions that the Ukrainian military would be ineffective and the Ukrainian political leadership could be easily replaced.59 As Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns testified before the House Intelligence Committee in March 2022, Putin “was confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable of a quick, decisive victory at a minimal cost. He’s been proven wrong on every count. Those assumptions have proven to be profoundly flawed over the last 12 days of the conflict.” 60
Analysts speculate that Putin and other Russian policymakers may have held these faulty assumptions in part due to poor intelligence and a willingness by subordinates to convey only positive information to Russian decision-makers.61 Recent media reporting indicates the FSB overstated its influence and agent networks inside Ukraine, possibly contributing to a false expectation of a quick regime change.62 Additionally, many observers speculate a relatively small circle of advisers may have outsized influence on Putin and may have contributed to potentially unrealistic assumptions.63 Observers believe this circle includes Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, who may have overstated the Russian military’s capabilities. 64
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56 Zach Beauchamp, “Why the First Few Days of War in Ukraine Went Badly for Russia,” Vox, February 28, 2022; Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “How Putin Bungled His Invasion of Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2022; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion,” RUSI, April 22, 202; Mark Galeotti, “The Interfering Tsar: Why Putin Is Ukraine’s Best Hope of Victory,” The Times, April 23, 2022.
57 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “11 Days In: Russia’s Invasion Stumbles Forward,” War on the Rocks, March 7, 2022; Isaac Chotiner, “The Russian Military’s Debacle in Ukraine,” New Yorker, March 11, 2022.
58 Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Gives a Grim Assessment of the First Stages of the Russian Invasion,” New York Times, February 24, 2022.
59 Nick Reynolds and Jack Whatling, “The Plot to Destroy Ukraine,” RUSI, February 15, 2022; Economist, “Russia’s Army Is In a Woeful State,” April 20, 2022.
60 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.
61 See Mark Galeotti, “The West Thinks Putin Is Russia’s Spymaster. But Are the Spies Controlling Him?” Guardian, June 20, 2019; Todd Prince, “Eyeing Ukraine, Putin Huddles in a Tight, Hawkish Circle,” RFE/RL, February 15, 2022; Henry Foy and John Paul Rathbone, “Intelligence Failures Hamper Russia’s Ukraine Mission,” Financial Times, March 1, 2022; David V. Gioe and Huw Dylan, “Putin’s KGB Past Didn’t Help Him with Intelligence on Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 17, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, Lara Jakes, and John Ismay, “U.S. Intelligence Suggests That Putin’s Advisors Misinformed Him on Ukraine,” New York Times, March 30, 2022; Steve Holland and Andrea Shalal, “Putin Misled by ‘Yes Men’ in Military Afraid to Tell Him the Truth, White House and EU Officials Say,” Reuters, March 31, 2022; Philip H. Davies and Toby Steward, “No War for Old Spies: Putin, the Kremlin and Intelligence,”
62 Mari Saito and Maria Tsvetkova, “The Enemy Within,” Reuters, July 28, 2022; Greg Miller and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed,” Washington Post, August 19, 2022.
63 Analysts have debated the balance between advisers providing false or misleading information to Putin and the leadership itself imposing unrealistic objectives and limitations onto the Russian government and military. See Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bully in the Bubble,” Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “The Personal Politics of Putin’s Security Council Meeting,” Moscow Times, February 22, 2022; Amanda Taub, “Putin Seems to Sideline Advisers on Ukraine, Taking a Political Risk,” New York Times, March 1, 2022.
64 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Man Behind Putin’s Military,” Foreign Affairs, February 26, 2022; Thomas Grove, “Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, But Now Faces a Potential Quagmire,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2022; Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “The Intellectual Failures Behind Russia’s Bungled Invasion,” RUSI, April 1, 2022.
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March-May 2022
Since early March 2022, Russian forces attempted to adapt to the reality of effective Ukrainian resistance. Russia made some changes to its military operations, including more coordination between units and a greater attempt to operate as combined arms formations, increased air support, and significantly higher levels of artillery and rocket artillery fire.65 Russian forces made slow incremental advances but continued to suffer heavy losses in both personnel and equipment.66 By March 7, 2022, U.S. officials believed Russia had committed “nearly 100 percent” of its available forces into Ukraine.67 The Russian VKS increased its number of sorties and operations, although most missions appeared to employ unguided weaponry rather than PGMs.68 The increased sortie rate also meant heavier losses for the VKS, including some of its most advanced helicopter, fighter, and fighter-bombers.69
At this stage of the conflict, instead of concentrating on one area of operations, the Russian military appeared to continue multiple lines of advance.70 In the north, Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses around Kyiv, from both the northwest and the east. In the east, Russian forces surrounded Kharkiv and attacked Izyum. In the south, Russian forces conducted an offensive to seize Mykolaiv in the southwest and Mariupol in the southeast. 71 Each advance appeared to compete against the others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics, and air support. Gradually, most Russian offensives began to stall due to a number of factors, including continued logistics issues, mounting casualties and a lack of available reinforcements, and increasing Ukrainian counterattacks.72
Throughout mid-March 2022, the Ukrainian military conducted effective counterattacks across most axes of advance, defeating repeated Russian offensives outside of Kyiv, outside of Kharkiv and Sumy, and in Mykolaiv.73 Ukraine also attacked captured infrastructures, such as an airbase in Kherson and the port of Berdyansk, and destroyed key Russian assets.74
Toward the end of March 2022, Russian offensives around Kyiv stalled. Ukrainian forces launched multiple sustained counteroffensives and pushed back Russian forces.75 Observers noted that, after failing to achieve a decisive victory quickly, Russia was reevaluating its objectives and strategy toward achieving territorial gains in the south and east of Ukraine.76 On March 25, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a press conference alleging that Russia had mostly met its initial objectives and would move on to the second phase of the operation, focusing on eastern Ukraine, including the Donbas.77 Russia soon announced it was withdrawing forces from around Kyiv and Chernihiv; analysts speculated that this was aimed at allowing the redeployment of units for further offensives in the east. 78 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on April 4, 2022, “Russia is repositioning its forces to concentrate its offensive operations in eastern and parts of southern Ukraine.... All indications are that Russia will seek to surround and overwhelm Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine.” 79
Subsequently, Russia redirected forces to support operations in the east to cut off Ukrainian military units in the Donbas.80 On April 12, President Putin stated that Russia’s “military operation will continue until its full completion” but said, “Our goal is to help the people in the Donbas, who feel their unbreakable bond with Russia.” 81 The terrain in the Donbas favored Russian forces, with its advantages in artillery units, and made it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct guerrilla-style attacks.82
Despite the apparent focus on the Donbas, some observers remained concerned about larger Russian objectives. On April 22, 2022, Major General Rustam Minnekayev, the deputy commander of the Central Military District, said in an interview that Russia wanted to take full control of eastern and southern Ukraine, including a possible land bridge to Transnistria, a Russia-supported breakaway territory in Moldova.83 Many observers believe this statement reflects larger Russian political objectives over the medium to long term since Russian military force constraints prevent a serious offensive to capture Odessa and link up with Transnistria
Russian forces ran into determined and effective UAF resistance and were unable to make significant progress.87 Russian forces could not break through Ukrainian defenses around Izyum, partially resulting from too few units and a gradual deployment, even with reinforcements from the abandoned effort to take Kyiv.88 Additionally, UAF forces reinforced and conducted counterattacks outside of Kharkiv, pushing Russian forces in some positions back toward the border and potentially placing the Russian city of Belgorod within striking distance of long-range Ukrainian rocket and missile artillery.89 Throughout the war, numerous unexplained explosions have occurred at various industrial sites in Russia, some of which are likely the result of Ukrainian air, missile, or sabotage attacks.90 UAF forces also conducted counterattacks toward Izyum, reportedly advancing against Russian units (such as those from the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army), which had suffered significant casualties.91
Russia’s redeployment of forces away from Kyiv and toward eastern Ukraine indicated the Russian military’s need to rest and resupply after using most of its combat-effective units. During this time, analysts noted the need for Russian personnel reinforcements, not only to replace losses but also to support further Russian offensives.92 Conditions forced Russia to pull units from foreign bases to help replace and rotate out units.93 Russia reportedly also has deployed private military companies (including heavy use of Wagner Private Military Company) to support operations, primarily to oversee and support Russian-led forces from the DNR/LNR.94 Many observers speculated that Putin would announce a state of war and national mobilization during Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebration, allowing Russia to call up reserves and use conscripts in combat.95 The celebration passed with no such announcement. Despite the slow pace of the Russian progress and need for reinforcements, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 20, 2022, “We assess President Putin is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas.” 96
A key Russian military objective was the coastal city of Mariupol, in the Donetsk region.97 Russian forces gradually surrounded and advanced into Mariupol against stiff Ukrainian resistance.98 The effort to seize the city benefited from Russia shifting operations away from seizing further territory in the Kherson region (which includes Mykolaiv).99 After weeks of bombardment and fighting, Ukrainian military forces and large numbers of civilians were isolated in the Azovstal iron and steel plant.100 On April 21, Putin announced that Russia had seized Mariupol and that Russian forces would not assault the Azovstal plant but would surround and seal it off, despite Ukrainian forces’ continued resistance. 101 Ukraine announced on May 16 that it had instructed its remaining troops at Azovstal to cease combat missions.102 Shortly thereafter, Ukrainian troops began surrendering and were evacuated to Russian-controlled areas.103 The status of these prisoners remains unclear, with potential options ranging from “trials” for Russian propaganda purposes to some form of a prisoner exchange.104 On July 29, a massive explosion ripped through a prisoner-of-war camp housing many of the prisoners from Mariupol, killing an estimated 50 prisoners.105 Russia alleged the explosion was the result of a Ukrainian missile strike, but many observers believe it was some other cause.106
Russia also continued its use of long-range PGMs against targets in western Ukraine, but the VKS did not seek further air superiority beyond eastern Ukraine. Russia conducted long-range PGM strikes against what Russian officials say are the Ukrainian defense industry and infrastructure targets in an attempt to cripple and undermine the Ukrainian military’s long-term capability. However, observers began to note the questionable precision, capability, and quantity of PGMs still available to Russian forces.107 U.S. officials have stated most PGMs appear to be air-launched cruise missiles from bombers inside Russia.108
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May-September 2022
After the capture of Mariupol, Russia refocused efforts on seizing key urban and infrastructure areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.109 Due to losses, Russia appeared unable to focus and concentrate combat power on multiple advances, forcing it to refocus efforts on a single objective while consolidating its hold on captured territory (such as in Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia).110 By mid-May 2022, Russia appeared unable to capture the key cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, a likely target of Russia’s refocused offensives. Instead, Russia focused on on seizing the towns of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which would give Russia almost total control over Luhansk Oblast. 111
Figure 3. Donbas Region of Ukraine
Source: Congressional Research Service
In contrast to the early days of the invasion, the fighting in the Donbas resembled a more traditional conventional conflict of slow but intense fighting, and Russia reverted to its traditional reliance on the massed used of artillery and rocket artillery.112 Russian forces appeared to conduct a pincer movement to cut off Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.113 In the north, Russian forces pushed southeast from Izyum, capturing Lyman and attempting to make several crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River near Bilohorivka, but came under Ukrainian artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties.114 In the Donbas, Russia relied heavily on Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) and local DNR/LNR units.115 These forces sustained heavy casualties but gradually pushed the UAF back and captured key towns such as Popasna.116
The UAF continued to staunchly defend territory instead of conducting an organized withdrawal, leading some analysts to speculate that Ukraine’s strategy was to impose as much attrition on Russian forces as possible.117 Nevertheless, Russian forces, including Chechen Rosgvardiya and DNR/LNR troops, continued their offensive into Severodonetsk and gradually seized control of the city after Ukraine ordered its forces to retreat to Lysychansk.118 Russian forces continued to advance north from Popasna toward Bakhmut, threatening to cut off UAF units and envelope Lysychansk.119 Subsequently, the UAF withdrew from Lysychansk to prepared defensive lines between Bakhmut and Siversk.120
Beginning in mid-May 2022, the UAF began receiving significant shipments of U.S. and Western artillery systems, specifically the U.S. M777 155mm howitzer and ammunition.125 Security assistance has been critical to sustaining UAF operations and countering the Russian advantage in artillery and rocket artillery, since the UAF reports it is running low on ammunition and parts for its Soviet/Russian artillery systems.126 Nevertheless, training time and the high need for systems have resulted in most UAF units still relying on older Soviet/Russian systems while waiting for new Western weaponry.127 By July, Ukraine began receiving U.S.-supplied M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), providing the UAF with significantly improved targeting ability, including increased range and precision accuracy.128 Early assessments by U.S. officials and other observers indicate the UAF is using these systems effectively, including to target key Russian command and control, logistics, and transport infrastructure.129 One significant challenge, however, is maintaining and repairing the vast number of Western systems the UAF has received, all with different standards and requirements for operating.
Over the rest of July, Russian forces attempted to regroup and take an “operational pause” after suffering heavy casualties capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.130 Most observers believed Russia had exhausted most of its forces and required time to refit, resupply, and reorganize. Russian forces did not achieve any significant territorial progress over the next weeks, other than small gains between Siversk and Bakhmut, and appeared to focus on solidifying their control over existing territory.131 Russia increasingly relied on Wagner PMC and DNR/LNR forces to probe UAF lines and then direct artillery and rocket artillery upon making contact.132 Open-source reporting continued to document instances of low Russian morale and increasing reports of Russian soldiers refusing to fight, resigning from their contracts before deployment, or refusing orders from their superiors.133
On August 29, 2022, Ukraine launched a long-awaited offensive into the Kherson region in the south, reportedly making some initial advances.146 The extent of UAF success may depend on the capability of Russian forces, which have increased in number in recent weeks; sufficient equipment for UAF units; and sufficient reserves to replace casualties and exploit breakthroughs. 147 Some observers and U.S. officials believe the latest offensive may still be part of a “shaping” strategy to improve the UAF position for future counteroffensives.148 Some reports indicate Ukrainian forces, advised by U.S. officials, determined a smaller offensive would give the UAF flexibility to deploy resources to other fronts and conduct multiple counteroffensives against exposed Russian lines. 149
By early September 2022, UAF offensives had made small but sustained progress across three fronts in Kherson, pushing back some Russian forces.150 UAF forces ran into significant and determined opposition, including the heavy use of artillery and air support.151 At the same time, the UAF began an offensive on another front, in the northeastern region of Kharkiv. Some observers thus speculated the Kherson offensive was intended as a distraction.152 While possible, the level and scale of UAF resources suggested the Kherson offensive was not simply a feint.
Kharkiv Offensive
In the Kharkiv region, the UAF appeared to exploit a weak point in Russian defenses and captured several towns (such as Balakliya) in early September 2022, potentially opening the possibility of targeting a key resupply city of Kupyansk. Some initial reports indicated that Russian defense was manned by Rosgvardiya troops not trained or equipped for frontline combat as well as by lower-quality LNR troops. 153 The UAF appeared to consolidate an estimated core of five brigades to launch a counteroffensive.154The UAF benefited from Russia pulling its most combat-effective troops south toward Kherson and from apparent Russian intelligence and command failures, as Russia failed to detect the UAF buildup and organize a coordinated response. 155 Spearheaded by tanks, the UAF quickly exploited its breakthrough with high mobile units that advanced behind Russian forces, conducting ambushes and cutting off Russian reinforcements. By September 8, the UAF had broken through Russian lines and liberated almost 400 square miles, with Russia appearing unable to coordinate effective resistance or reestablish defensive lines despite rushing in reinforcements.156 The UAF also launched offensives south of Izyum and Lyman to put pressure on Russian forces, threatening to cut off Russian forces in the area.
By September 10, Russian forces had announced a withdrawal from Izyum, a symbolic statement after a near-total rout of Russian forces in the area.157 The collapse of Russian forces meant the UAF advanced so quickly that UAF command had trouble keeping track of its units.158 Many observers believe the UAF will focus on defending its recaptured territory to prevent becoming overextended. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated the offensive had gone “better than expected” and that Ukraine’s focus was on consolidating and defending the recaptured territory.159 By September 11, Russia announced it had withdrawn all forces west of the Oskil River, with Ukraine retaking more than 1,000 square miles of territory and almost all previously occupied territory in the Kharkiv region. 160
Russian Personnel and Manpower Challenges Since the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, analysts have noted that one of the Russian military’s greatest weaknesses is its lack of personnel. The Russian military includes two types of enlisted personnel: conscripts drafted twice a year and contract (professional) soldiers who volunteer for a fixed term of service. Since 2008, Russia has focused with limited success on recruiting contract soldiers, resulting in a mix of conscripts and contract soldiers. Russian law prohibits conscripts from combat unless a national emergency and mobilization are declared. As a result, contract soldiers are prioritized for combat units (and elite units such as VDV, Spetsnaz, and reconnaissance) and to fulfill technical positions requiring higher levels of training and knowledge. Additionally, conscripts receive most training in their home units by contract personnel and officers, making contract personnel crucial to the overall readiness of the Russian military. The Russian military is a tiered readiness force, with personnel levels ranging from 70% to 90% of their authorized strength. Additionally, since 2012-2014, Russia has expanded its ground forces structure by creating new units without increasing the available personnel. Michael Kofman and Rob Lee note, “Russia regressed to a partialmobilization force, hoping to have the best of both worlds: more forces and equipment, reduced staffing and cost, plus the ability to generate substantial combat power on short notice.” However, as new units were created, the actual staffing level was reduced further due to insufficient personnel. Each Russian brigade or regiment is intended to field and deploy two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) of 700-900 contract soldiers (a third would consist of conscripts), but it became clear that the BTGs varied in staffing levels. Some BTGs deployed with 400-600 contract personnel. The result was that the Russian military had a relatively limited core of deployable maneuver combat formations of contract personnel relative to the total size of the military. Heavy Russian casualties have exacerbated the personnel situation. In the initial invasion, Russia mobilized an estimated 80% of its deployable units. Since Russia states its war is a “Special Military Operation,” which prohibits the use of conscripts, it has limited contract personnel and staffed units available to reinforce, rotate, and replace Russian casualties. Force quality has continued to deteriorate as units (especially elite forces) poach the best available officers and men from the lower-tiered units, which in turn do the same to the units below them (including pulling officer cadets from training schools and into command positions). This cycle undermines the quality of the unit, as those pulled up are not of the same quality and do not have sufficient training. As a result, Russia has turned to a variety of “shadow mobilization” strategies to recruit and mobilize forces to sustain offensive operations. These strategies include the following: Pressuring conscripts to sign as contract soldiers Offering high salary levels and signing bonuses for new contract soldiers (estimates range from 3-5 times the average Russian salary) and on a short-term basis (six months) Recruiting at least one volunteer battalion per Russian federal district, with most of these battalions reportedly forming the core of the newly established 3rd Army Corps in Mulino, Russia Forcing conscription of local residents in DNR/LNR (Since these territories are not Russian territory and the inhabitants not Russian citizens, they do not have the protections afforded to Russian conscripts and likely are viewed as more expendable by the Russian leadership.) Increasing reliance on Private Military Companies (PMCs), including the Wagner Group, to conduct offensive operations, especially in the Donetsk and Luhansk region. (PMCs reportedly have been recruiting from Russian prisons in return for a reduced sentence.) Most observers believe these strategies are short-term solutions to avoid a politically costly decision to declare national mobilization. However, it is unclear how long these solutions will suffice and to what extent they can compensate for casualties among Russia’s professional contract soldiers. Many of these recruitment strategies compete over the same recruits, and analysts note these recruitment drives are likely coming up short of proposed goals. The strategies are further complicated by retention issues, as many volunteers reach the end of their short-term contracts. On August 29, 2022, a Pentagon official stated, “This effort is unlikely to succeed, as Russia has historically not met personnel and strength targets.... In fact, if you look at the Russian armed forces, prior to the invasion, they may have already been 150,000 personnel short of their million personnel goal.” Observers also note these recruitment drives have lifted previous age and health restrictions, likely resulting in lower-quality candidates and recruits (in addition to large regional and ethnic disparities among new volunteers). Additionally, the extent and level of training for many of these new units is unclear. Since contract soldiers and junior officers conduct most training at the unit level, including for new conscripts, casualties to these troops likely will negatively affect the Russian military’s ability to train and prepare incoming conscript cycles and will undermine readiness in the future. However, in the event of a national mobilization, conscripts with the most recent service and personnel who served in motor rifle or elite units (VDV, Naval Infantry, Spetsnaz) likely would be among the first targeted and thereby have decreased the training requirements before deployment. On August 25, 2022, Russian President Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the active military to 1.15 million, an increase of 137,000. Although the decree by itself does not resolve Russia’s personnel issues and does not meaningfully allow for greater recruitment, it likely reflects the Russian government planning for a protracted conflict and could provide a legal instrument to coordinate the integration and consolidation of volunteer and DNR/LNR units into the Russian military. Sources: Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Planned a Major Military Overhaul. Ukraine Shows the Result,” New York Times, May 16, 2022; Dara Massicot, “The Russian Military’s People Problem,” Foreign Affairs, May 18, 2022; Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022; Neil MacFarquhar, “Desperate for Recruits, Russia Launches a ‘Stealth Mobilization,’” New York Times, July 10, 2022; Mike Eckel, “The Orchestra Needs Musicians: Behind the Covert Mobilization to Reinforce Russian Troops in Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 14, 2022; Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Russian Volunteer Units and Battalions,” Institute for the Study of War, July 16, 2022; Anastasia Tenisheva, “Russia Sends Army Recruits to Fight in Ukraine After Just Days of Training,” Moscow Times, July 22, 2022; Moscow Times, “Russia Regions Form 40 Volunteer Battalions,” August 8, 2022; Economist, “Russia is Forcing Ukrainian Conscripts into Battle,” August 11, 2022; Novaya Gazeta, “To War or to Prison?” August 12, 2022; Mary Ilyushina, “In Ukraine, a Russian Mercenary Group Steps Out of the Shadows,” Washington Post, August 18, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Wagner Mercenaries Enter the Spotlight as Russian Troops Struggle in Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2022; Olga Ivshina, “Lost Battalions: Calculating Russia’s Casualties in Six Months of War in Ukraine,” BBC, August 22, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine and Russia Both Need More Soldiers,” August 25, 2022; Ann M. Simmons, “Russia’s Dwindling Manpower in Ukraine Spurs Recruitment Drive,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2022; Yuliya Talmazan, “Putin Orders Russian Military to Increase Its Forces as Ukraine War Passes the Six-Month Mark,” NBC News, August 25, 2022; Department of Defense, “Russian Efforts to Raise Numbers of Troops ‘Unlikely to Succeed,’ U.S. Official Says,” press release, August 29, 2022.
War Crimes
Numerous countries, the International Criminal Court, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), think tanks, and human rights organizations have identified instances of potential Russian war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine.161 On April 12, 2022, an OSCE report on possible human rights violations and war crimes in Ukraine found that, “while in the circumstances a detailed assessment of most allegations of IHL (International Humanitarian Law) violations and war crimes concerning particular incidents has not been possible, the Mission found clear patterns of such violations by the Russian forces on most of the issues investigated.” 162With the war past its six-month mark, most observers believe there is little likelihood of political settlement or cessation of hostilities.167 Few observers expect Russia to agree to a political settlement or cease-fire unless it believes it has realized enough territorial gains to achieve its revised objectives and present a victorious narrative to domestic audiences.168 Observers continue to speculate whether Russia has the military capabilities to achieve a decisive outcome or if the UAF can sustain operations through the winter. 169 For both sides, observers believe one of the most critical issues will be raising, supporting, and deploying limited resources of personnel and equipment most effectively.170
Russia likely believes it retains advantages heading into the winter that will allow it to regain the initiative. On September 8, CIA Director William Burns stated, “Putin’s bet right now is that he is going to be tougher than the Ukrainians, the Europeans, the Americans.” 171 Russia also is betting that its economy will weather international sanctions, and that international support for Ukraine will dwindle as rising energy costs take hold in Europe. 172 It is unclear whether Russia’s recent battlefield failures have influenced these views.173
Russia has suffered significant equipment losses, including tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery systems.174 These losses have forced Russia to pull older systems out of storage and deploy them to the battlefield.175 Additionally, some reports indicate Russia is mobilizing its defense industry to retool to produce and repair a variety of modern and older systems, including new legislation giving the government “special economic measures” to control and compel the work of the defense industry.176 However, even with these measures and considering the losses suffered, it will take several months before production can be mobilized to full production capacity. Even at full production, it is unclear how long and to what extent Russia can replace equipment losses.
Observers are more skeptical regarding Russia’s ability to procure key components for advanced weaponry (including microchips) and if countries (such as China or India) are willing to bear the risks to assist Russia in avoiding export controls.177 Captured and destroyed Russian weaponry have demonstrated the extent to which Russia has circumvented export controls and sanctions, as well as the extent to which it has adapted civilian technology for military use.178 It is unclear if Russia has sufficient stockpiles of critical components to continue producing advanced weaponry or if its ability to replenish stockpiles is limited.179
Some have speculated about the potential for Russia to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons if Russian policymakers perceive inadequate military advances or to demonstrate capability. Most analysts, however, believe the likelihood of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons remains low. CIA Director Burns said the United States has not “seen a lot of practical evidence of the kind of deployments or military dispositions that would reinforce that concern.” 180
For Ukraine, there is optimism, as some observers believe momentum has swung in its favor as the UAF retakes territory across the country, and the Russian military continues to retreat. 181 Ukraine’s Commander in Chief Valery Zaluhzny stated on September 7, “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation will be a complex mix of the actual location of the line of contact, the available resources, the pool of combat-ready forces, and, obviously, the strategic initiative that will remain in the enemy’s hands.” 182 Despite being underequipped, UAF forces continue to demonstrate high levels of operational and tactical flexibility to sustain operations.183
As the conflict shifts away from the Donbas to southern Ukraine, the UAF likely needs continued support to replace lost equipment and support transitioning toward NATO-style weaponry. 184 Ukraine’s recent Kharkiv offensive saw the UAF capture large quantities of Russian weaponry and ammunition that can be used to replenish UAF stocks.185 The conflict has consumed significant amounts of ammunition, and the UAF likely needs replenishment of ammunition, assistance and advice in equipment maintenance and repair, and continued training of personnel. Additionally, Ukraine continues to benefit from high levels of volunteers, and foreign support for training will likely give Ukraine a personnel advantage as Russia continues to exhibit recruitment problems. 186
Congress is poised to continue to track developments in the war in Ukraine closely, especially as it considers U.S. and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on the ground.
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146 James Marson, “Ukraine Launches Counteroffensive in South, Leading with Artillery Bombardment,” Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine Starts a Push to Recapture Kherson, a Crucial Russian Occupied City,” August 29, 2022; and Dan Parsons, “U.S. Says Some Russian Units Are ‘Falling Back’ In Kherson,” The Drive, August 31, 2022; Thomas Bullock, “Kyiv Begins Offensive in South of Country,” Janes IHS, September 2, 2022.
147 Matthew Luxmoore, “Ukrainian Soldiers Say They Are Advancing in the South, But at a Cost,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2022.
148 Jim Sciutto, “Ukrainian Forces Begin ‘Shaping’ Battlefield for Counteroffensive, Senior U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, August 29, 2022.
149 Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, “U.S. War Gamed with Ukraine Ahead of Counteroffensive and Encouraged More Limited Mission,” CNN, September 1, 2022; Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.
150 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Against Fierce Resistance, Ukraine Makes Small Gains in the South,” New York Times, September 2, 2022; John Hudson, “Wounded Soldiers Reveal Steep Toll of Kherson Offensive,” Washington Post, September 7, 2022.
151 Andrew E. Kramer, “For Ukraine, the Fight Is Often a Game of Bridges,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.
152 Isobel Koshiw, Lorenzo Tondo and Artem Mazhulin, “Ukraine’s Southern Offensive ‘Was Designed to Trick Russia,” Guardian, September 10, 2022.
153 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, September 6, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, September 7, 2022
154 President Zelensky praised the 25th Airborne Brigade, 80th Air Assault Brigade, and 92nd Mechanized Brigade in a televised speech, but observers noted other units present in the initial offensive. BBC, “Zelensky Hails ‘Good News’ as Settlements Recaptured from Russia,” September 7, 2022; Marc Santora, “How Ukraine Gained Momentum Against Russia and Took a Critical Hub,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.
155 John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Gains Momentum with Kharkiv Offensive,” Financial Times, September 9, 2022.
156 Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8,” Institute for the Study of War, September 8, 2022; Jack Detsch, “They Are Pushing Everywhere:’ Kyiv Goes on the Offensive,” Foreign Policy, September 8, 2022; Isabel Coles, “Ukraine’s Rapid Advance in East Puts Russian Forces on Defensive,” Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine Seizes the Initiative in the East,” September 9, 2022.
157 John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Lightning Ukraine Offensive Pushes Russia Back 70km in a Week,” Financial Times, September 10, 2022; Thomas Grove and Evan Gershkovich, “In Major Advance, Ukraine Drives Russians Out of Key Front-Line Cities,” Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2022.
158 Economist, “Is Russia on the Run?,” September 11, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Turning the Tide? Ukraine Stuns Russia with Counteroffensive but Can’t Claim Victory Yet,” RFE/RL, September 11, 2022.
159 Jack Watling, “Ukraine Can Now Exploit Russia’s Confusion, But Must Plan Carefully,” Guardian, September 10, 2022; John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine’s Reznikov Warns on Russian Counter-attack,” Financial Times, September 11, 2022.
160 James Marson, “Ukraine Claims Fresh Gains Against Russian Forces in Country’s East,” Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, 5-11 September 2022,” Rochan Consulting, September 12, 2022; Illia Ponomarenko, “With Successful Kharkiv Operation, Ukraine Turns the War in Its Favor,” Kyiv Independent, September 13, 2022.
161 See, for example, Amnesty International, “Russian Military Commits Indiscriminate Attacks During the Invasion of Ukraine,” February 25, 2022; International Criminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation, March 2, 2022; Steve Holland, “U.S. Begins Collecting Material For Russia War Crimes Inquiry,” Reuters, March 7, 2022; Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Russian Assault Kills Fleeing Civilians,” March 8, 2022; Jamie Dettmer, “Judgement Day: European Nations Start Probing Alleged Russian War Crimes in Ukraine,” VOA, March 9, 2022; Eliot Higgins, “These Are the Cluster Munitions Documented by Ukrainian Civilians,” Bellingcat, March 11, 2022; Valerie Hopkins, “Investigators of War Crimes in Ukraine Face Formidable Challenges,” New York Times, July 3, 2022.
162 OSCE, Report on Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in Ukraine Since 24 February 2022, April 12, 2022.
163 Malachy Browne, David Botti, and Haley Willis, “Satellite Images Show Bodies Lay in Bucha for Weeks, Despite Russian Claims,” New York Times, April 4, 2022; Cara Anna, “War Crimes Watch: A Devastating Walk Through Bucha’s Horror,” AP, April 10, 2022; Anthony Deutsch, “Ukraine Prepares War Crimes Charges Against Russian Military Personnel, Including Pilots,” Reuters, April 26, 2022; Ivana Kottasova and Oleksandra Ochman, “Ukrainians Must Endure a Brutal ‘Filtration’ Process to Escape Russian-Held Territory: Here’s What That Means,” CNN, May 23, 2022; National Intelligence Council, “Russian Forces Conducting Detentions and Forced Deportations Through Systematic Filtration Operations,” unclassified press release, June 15, 2022.
164 U.S. State Department, “Russia’s ‘Filtration’ Operations, Forced Disappearances, and Mass Deportations of Ukrainian Citizens,” press release, July 13, 2022.
165 Tim Lister et al., “Civilians Killed as Russian Military Strike Hits Evacuation Route in Kyiv Suburb,” CNN, March 7, 2022; Amy Cheng, and Annabelle Timsit, “At Least Six Killed in Kharkiv Strikes; Chasiv Yar Death Toll Hits 34,” New York Times, July 12, 2022.
166 The U.S. State Department has identified Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division, its subordinate 234th Guards Air Assault Regiment, and the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade as involved in possible war crimes in Bucha. U.S. State Department, “Targeting Russia’s War Machine, Sanctions Evaders, Military Units Credibly Implicated in Human Rights Abuses, and Russian Federation Officials Involved in Suppression of Dissent,” fact sheet, June 28, 2022; See also Bryan Pietsch, “Putin Honors Brigade Accused of War Crimes in Bucha,” Washington Post, April 19, 2022; and Jade McGlynn, “Russia’s War Crime Denials Are Fuel for More Atrocities,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2022.
167 Anton Troianovski, Andrew E. Kramer and Steven Erlanger, “Six Months into War, Ukraine and Russia Are Both Reshaped,” New York Times, August 24, 2022; Mehul Srivastava et al., “Six Months of War in Ukraine: ‘The Enemy Learned Fast,’” Financial Times, August 24, 2022.
168 Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab Strategy,” Financial Times, April 24, 2022.
169 Lilia Yapparova, “The Fog of War: Military Analyst Rob Lee on Ukraine’s Push to Liberate Kherson and Russia’s Manpower Problem,’ Meduza, September 1, 2022; Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Into the Breach: Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive Begins,” War on the Rocks, September 2, 2022.
170 Economist, “Ukraine and Russia Both Need More Soldiers: Who Can Train Them Faster?,” August 25, 2022; Jack Watling, “The Ukrainian Offensive Must Come in Stages,” RUSI, September 2, 2022.
171 Julian E. Barnes, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Looks Like a ‘Failure,’ C.I.A Director Says,” New York Times, September 8, 2022.
172 Liz Alderman, “As Russia Threatens Europe’s Energy, Ukraine Braces for a Hard Winter,” New York Times, August 2, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “Organized Labour in Neoliberal and Authoritarian Russia,” In Moscow’s Shadows, September 5, 2022.
173 The need to replace losses could force Putin to make a decision to declare national mobilization, which he has previously resisted. Anton Troianovski, “As Russians Retreat, Putin Is Criticized by Hawks Who Trumpeted His War,” New York Times, September 10, 2022; John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Polina Ivanova, “Russia to Press on ‘Until All the Goals’ Achieved in Ukraine, Says Kremlin,” Financial Times, September 12, 2022; Robyn Dixon, “Putin, Tone Deaf and Isolated, Pursues War ‘Goals’ and Refuses to Lose,” Washington Post, September 13, 2022.
174 Oryx (blog), “Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” February 24, 2022; James Beardsworth, “Tank Losses in Ukraine Raise Strategic Questions for Russia,” Moscow Times, July 18, 2022.
175 Alberto Nardelli, “Russia Turns to Old Tanks as It Burns Through Weapons in Ukraine,” Bloomberg, June 14, 2022.
176 Mark Trevelyan, “Russian Parliament Passes First Vote on War Economy Measures,” Reuters, July 5, 2022; Polina Ivanova, “Russia Prepares to Mobilize Economy for Longer Way in Ukraine,” Financial Times, July 7, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “Russia Is Militarizing Its Economy,” Spectator, July 9, 2022; Sebastien Roblin, “Russia Mulls Restarting Production of Older Vehicles to Replace Ukraine Losses,” Forbes, August 31, 2022.
177 Sidharth Kaushal, “Can Russia Continue to Fight a Long War?,” RUSI, August 23, 2022; John Ismay, “How Russia Uses Low Tech in Its High Tech Weapons,” New York Times, September 4, 2022.
178 James Byrne et al., “Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine,” RUSI, August 8, 2022.
179 Maria Shagina, “Technology Controls Can Strangle Russia—Just Like the Soviet Union,” Foreign Policy, August 22, 2022; Zoya Sheftalovitch and Laurens Cerulus, “The Chips Are Down: Putin Scrambles for High-Tech Parts as His Arsenal Goes Up in Smoke,” Politico.eu, September 5, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence,” New York Times, September 5, 2022.
180 Central Intelligence Agency, “Director Burns’ Remarks at Georgia Tech,” press release, April 14, 2022; Kate O’Keeffe, “Zelensky Warns That Russia Could Use Nuclear, Chemical Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2022; CRS Report R45861, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, by Amy F. Woolf.
181 Marcus Walker and Gordon Lubold, “After Six Months in Ukraine, Momentum Tilts Against Russia,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2022; Jack Detsch, “Ukraine’s Lightning Counteroffensive Approaches the Russian Border,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2022.
182 General Valery Zaluhzny and Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodsky, “Prospects for Running a Military Campaign in 2023: Ukraine’ Perspective,” Ukrinform.net, September 7, 2022.
183 John Hudson, “Ukraine Lures Russian Missiles with Decoys of U.S. Rocket System,” Washington Post, August 30, 2022; and Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “A Frontline Shadow Economy: Ukrainian Units Swap Tanks and Artillery,” New York Times, August 30, 2022.
184 Such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, medium-range air defenses, and mobile artillery. CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.
185 Jack Deutsch, “Russia Is Supplying Ukraine with Lightly Used Tanks,” Foreign Policy, September 13, 2022.
186 Jill Lawless, “Urban Combat and Beyond: Ukrainian Recruits Get UK Training,” AP, August 15, 2022; Vivienne Machi, “Europeans Mull New Training Mission for Ukrainian Army,” Defense News, August 30, 2022.
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