Vasundhra: RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 10, 2022 .

( ) 1/ Operational situation update/ #russian_invasion in #Ukraine on November 11, 2022

Special day today. Special map, as i usually do. #KhersonisUkraine #Kerson is Free at last.

#UkraineMap

https://twitter.com/HeliosRunner/status/1591120367531089920/photo/1

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ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , NOVEMBER 10, 2022.

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Katherine Lawlor, and Mason Clark

November 10, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces steadily advanced in Kherson Oblast on November 10 as Russian forces conduct a withdrawal to the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian military officials and geolocated social media footage confirm that Ukrainian troops have made gains northwest, west, and northeast of Kherson City in the past 24 hours and advanced up to 7km in some areas.[1] Russian forces so far appear to be withdrawing in relatively good order, and Ukrainian forces are making expected gains without routing Russian forces, as they did in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. Ukrainian strikes since August have successfully degraded Russian supply lines on the west (right) bank to force Russian forces to withdraw and will liberate Kherson Oblast to the Dnipro River in the coming days or weeks. The Russian withdrawal will take some time to complete, and fighting will continue throughout Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian troops advance and come up against pre-prepared Russian defensive lines, especially around Kherson City.

ISW does not assess the fighting in Ukraine will halt or enter a stalemate due to winter weather, despite faulty Western assumptions. NBC News reported on November 9 that some US and Western defense officials are eyeing an “expected winter slowdown in fighting as an opportunity for diplomacy to begin between Russia and Ukraine.”[2] Autumn and springtime mud can slow or halt military advances, as can faulty or insufficient wintertime equipment. Some military equipment may need to be adapted for colder weather, and shortages of equipment or ammunition could slow advances due to logistical difficulties — not winter weather.[3] Winter weather could disproportionately harm poorly-equipped Russian forces in Ukraine, but well-supplied Ukrainian forces are unlikely to halt their counteroffensives due to the arrival of winter weather and may be able to take advantage of frozen terrain to move more easily than they could in the muddy autumn months. If fighting does halt this winter, it will be due to logistical challenges and the culmination of several campaigns on both sides. The Russian campaigns to capture all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts all culminated months ago (despite the repeated insistence of Russian forces on launching ineffective attacks), and Russian forces are firmly on the defensive across most of the frontline.

Ukraine holds the initiative and is in the process of securing a major victory in Kherson. A ceasefire would provide the Kremlin with the pause it desperately needs to reconstitute Russian forces. The major Ukrainian victory underway in Kherson Oblast will not be Ukraine’s last. Fighting will continue on the southern axis; in Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast (the only place Russian forces are still attempting meaningful offensives); and in northern Luhansk Oblast as Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations. Russian officials are busy attempting to train 120,000 conscripts to deploy to the frontlines in the spring.[4] Ukrainian forces likely aim to liberate as much occupied territory as possible before those Russian reinforcements arrive. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on November 7 that Ukraine is unwilling to negotiate with Russian forces until certain conditions are met, including the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the prosecution of Russian war criminals, payment for war damages, and promises that Russia will not again invade Ukraine.[5] A wintertime ceasefire would only benefit Russian forces, who would use that opportunity to bolster their faltering defenses and continue their genocidal campaign to eradicate Ukrainian identity in occupied parts of Ukraine.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is increasingly wrestling with St. Petersburg officials over expanding Wagner Group operations in the city. Prigozhin’s press service stated that St. Petersburg officials refused to provide a permit for the newly opened Wagner Center in St. Petersburg on a technicality.[6] The press service noted that St. Petersburg officials are deliberately refusing to issue the permit based on their "ideological” differences, given that Wagner received the permission to construct the center in July.[7] The press service added that Wagner had petitioned the court and will take the issue further if the court recognizes St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov and his government have committed any “crimes.”[8] Prigozhin also accused Beglov and other St. Petersburg “liberal” businessmen of financially supporting Ukrainian “nationalists” and betraying Russia in response to the situation.[9] Prigozhin has previously accused Beglov of failing to support the Russian war effort and demanded his resignation, likely as a result of resistance from Beglov on expanding Wagner’s presence in St. Petersburg.[10] ISW also reported that a Russian nationalist outlet Pravda.Ru, which consistently reports on Prigozhin-related news, published a defamatory piece on Beglov’s uninterest in creating volunteer battalions in August.[11] Prigozhin is increasingly weaponizing his role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine to push his business aspirations.

Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that Russian forces will likely further reduce the pace of their campaign to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure, likely enabling Ukrainian authorities to address most of the damage to infrastructure. Ignat announced on November 10 that on the night of November 9 to 10 Russian forces did not conduct any air or cruise missile strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure facilities.[12] Ignat stated that Russian forces have begun to stockpile high-precision weapons systems to launch a future massive campaign reminiscent of the October 10 strikes, because small numbers of daily cruise missile and drone strikes are now generating few results.[13] Ignat stated Russian forces spent months accumulating the high-precision weapons systems they used in the October campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.[14] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have greatly depleted their arsenal of high-precision weapons systems and have suffered significant aviation losses and therefore would struggle to maintain the pace of their campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.[15] It will likely take Russian forces months to accumulate the number of high-precision weapons systems needed to return to the pace of strikes it conducted in mid-October despite Ignat’s reporting that Russian factories are drastically increasing the manufacturing of cruise missiles.[16] Ukrainian officials have previously stated that they could restore energy supplies to communities in Ukraine within a matter of a few weeks if the pace of the Russian campaign dramatically slowed.[17] ISW also assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have ordered the campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure to curry favor with the Russian pro-war nationalist camp that has been consistently demanding escalation in Ukraine.[18] A reduced pace in the campaign will likely contribute to renewed criticisms from the pro-war nationalist camp. Russian forces likely retain the capability to damage Ukrainian critical infrastructure and impose costs on Ukrainian civilians in the winter but are unlikely to be able to inflict decisive — and lasting — damage.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces steadily advanced in Kherson Oblast on November 10 as Russian forces conduct a withdrawal to the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.

The Russian withdrawal will take some time to complete, and fighting will continue throughout Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian troops advance and come up against pre-prepared Russian defensive lines, especially around Kherson City.

ISW does not assess the fighting in Ukraine will halt or enter a stalemate due to winter weather, despite faulty Western assumptions.

Ukraine holds the initiative and is in the process of securing a major victory in Kherson. A ceasefire would provide the Kremlin with the pause it desperately needs to reconstitute Russian forces.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is increasingly wrestling with St. Petersburg officials over expanding Wagner Group recruitment in the city.

Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that Russian force will likely slow the pace of their campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and in western Donetsk.

Russian forces began constructing second-line fortifications in Crimea and southern Ukraine.

Russian citizens continue to oppose Russia’s war in Ukraine through protest, social media dissent, and desertions from the military.

Russian mobilization efforts are channeling personnel to the Wagner group.

Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to erode Ukrainian national identity while mobilizing residents in Russian-occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 10. Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Oleksiy Hromov announced that Ukrainian forces advanced by two kilometers in an unspecified area of Luhansk Oblast.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Novoselivske and Makiivka, about 19km northwest and 21km southwest of Svatove, respectively.[20] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Operation characterized Russian assaults in Luhansk Oblast as unsuccessful small-arms battles.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made over a dozen unsuccessful assaults along the Svatove-Kreminna line, including an assault on Kuzemivka, about 15km northwest of Svatove.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed to have repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and Ploshchanka (about 16km northwest of Kreminna).[23] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces suppressed Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force attempts on Orlianka and Kyslivka, about 32km northwest of Svatove.[24] A Russian source also claimed that Ukrainian forces carried out a reconnaissance-in-force in the direction of Chervonopopivka, northwest of Kreminna.[25]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian logistics in Luhansk Oblast on November 9 and November 10. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are moving large quantities of supplies and many reserves in the direction of Svatove-Kreminna but noted that Ukrainian forces continue to shell Russian main supply routes.[26] Social media footage also showed ruined asphalt and muddy roads in Svatove due to the Russian transfer of heavy equipment on poor roads, which may also complicate Russian equipment transfers.[27] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed on November 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Svatove with two HIMARS missiles.[28] Geolocated images posted on November 10 show the aftermath of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes on Stakhanov and a mine near Krynychne on the night of November 9 to 10.[29]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian forces made substantial gains throughout Kherson Oblast on November 10. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny stated that in the past day, Ukrainian forces have advanced 7km and liberated six settlements in the Petropavlivka-Novoraysk direction (towards Beryslav) and advanced 7km and liberated six settlements in the Pervomaiske–Kherson City direction (towards Kherson City).[30] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces have advanced the frontline by 7km and liberated 12 settlements, amounting to over 260 square kilometers of territory in the past day.[31] Zaluzhny stated that since October 1, Ukrainian forces have taken back 41 settlements in the Kherson direction.[32] Ukrainian military sources also reported that Russian troops continue efforts to partially withdraw troops from the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River but emphasized that Russian forces are conducting continued maneuvers on the west bank, statements in line with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces will conduct a fighting withdrawal.[33]

Social media footage and imagery confirmed Ukrainian gains in several sectors. Footage posted to social media shows Ukrainian troops in Kyselivka, a critical settlement along the M14 highway about 14km northwest of Kherson City.[34] Footage also shows Ukrainian soldiers in Pravdyne and Myroliubivka, both within 25km northwest of Kherson City.[35] Social media imagery additionally shows Ukrainian forces have advanced into Oleksandrivka and Stanislav, both about 33km west of Kherson City.[36] Ukrainian forces also made advances north of Beryslav, and social media footage confirms the presence of Ukrainian troops in Kachkarivka (36km northeast of Beryslav), Kucherske (33km north of Beryslav), Borozenske (36km north of Beryslav), Bruskynske (38km northwest of Beryslav), Yehenivka (47km northwest of Beryslav), Bobrovyi Kut (45km northwest of Beryslav), Chkalove (29km northwest of Beryslav), Starystya (34km northwest of Beryslav), and Ishchenka (39km northwest of Beryslav).[37] Geolocated imagery confirms Ukrainian forces liberated Snihurivka, Mykolaiv Oblast (about 43km northeast of Kherson City) and the surrounding settlements of Vasylivka, Pavlivka, and Tamryne.[38]

Russian sources discussed Ukrainian ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on November 10, with some confirming that Ukrainian troops have taken control of several settlements northwest, west, and northeast of Kherson City.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to emphasize claimed strikes on Ukrainian concentration areas through Kherson Oblast, likely to detract focus on Russian territorial losses.[40]

Ukrainian forces continued their successful interdiction campaign against Russian concentration areas and military assets to support ongoing counteroffensive actions in Kherson Oblast on November 10. Advisor to the Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Head, Serhiy Khlan, stated that a Ukrainian strike hit Russian equipment in Oleshky, 7km southeast of Kherson City.[41] Local residents and Ukrainian officials also reported strikes in the Beryslav–Nova Kahkovka area between November 9 and 10.[42]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults around Bakhmut near Soledar (10km northeast), Klishchiiivka (6km southwest), Mayorsk (20km south), Yakovlivka (15km northeast), Andriivka (9km southwest), and Bilohorivka (20km northeast).[43] Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Russian forces continued to suffer significant losses in the Bakhmut direction and National Guard of Ukraine representative Mykola Urshalovych stated that Russian forces continue to make suicidal attempts to launch assaults on Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut with “maniacal persistence.”[44] Urshalovych noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting reconnaissance-in-force, which he said indicates that Russian forces have a low level of equipment within intelligence units. A Russian source stated that the Wagner Group is trying to advance to the city limits of Bakhmut on the eastern outskirts of the city, and that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions northeast of Bakhmut near Yakovlivka.[45] Ukrainian and Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 6th Cossack Regiment, continued fighting northeast of Bakhmut in Soledar.[46] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces fully captured Bakhmutske and that Russian forces and the Wagner Group control 40–50% of Bilohorivka.[47] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in the Bakhmut area.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area on November 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vesele, Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Novomykhailivka, all along an arc of the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[49] The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) militia claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian transports, ammunition depots, and strongholds in the vicinity of Pervomaiske.[50] A Russian source reported that Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Novomykhailivka to reach Konstantinivka and cut off the road to Marinka from the south.[51] Russian sources claimed that tense battles are ongoing towards Opytne and Marinka.[52] Russian forces conducted routine shelling in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on November 10. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) and claimed that Ukrainian forces retreated to the northern outskirts of the settlement, where they retain control.[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet operating in southern Donetsk and reported that Russian forces struck down a portion of nine Ukrainian UAVs near Yehorivka.[55] As ISW has previously observed, the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade recently sustained substantial losses in this area and is likely fighting severely understrength.[56] Ukrainian Eastern Joint Forces Operation reported that Russian forces carried out a missile attack on Vuhledar.[57] Russian forces otherwise continued routine shelling along the line of contact in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[58]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces have begun constructing second-line defensive fortifications in Crimea and southern Ukraine, standard military practices that do not necessarily indicate an imminent Russian expectation of defending Crimea. American satellite imagery company Planet Labs published satellite photos on November 10 showing new trenches and restored defensive fortifications near Armiansk in Russian-occupied Crimea and near Chonhar, Kherson Oblast.[59] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on November 10 that Russian forces have also begun strengthening fortifications near Melitopol to protect the land corridor to Crimea.[60] The construction of defensive fortifications on secondary lines of defense is standard military procedure, one that Russian forces have not previously conducted at scale in northern Crimea and elsewhere in southern Ukraine. The construction of these new defensive fortifications is not an indicator that Russian forces expect to defend Crimea from a Ukrainian offensive in the near future.

Russian forces continued routine air, missile, and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts.[61] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Vilniansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[62]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Mobilized men and their relatives continue to oppose the war through protests, social media dissent, and attempted desertions. Poor treatment and provisioning of mobilized Russian personnel are likely driving surrenders and desertions, as well as protests by the families of mobilized personnel within Russia. Russian forces are reportedly detaining those who refuse to fight (refuseniks) in a network of inhumane prisons in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, according to a November 10 report by the Ukrainian Telegram channel ASTRA.[63] Russian authorities reportedly beat, starve, and pressure the refuseniks until they agree to return to the frontlines. A group of imprisoned men in Zaitseve, Luhansk Oblast told the outlet that they were sent to the frontlines around October 20 after very little training, whereupon their officers abandoned them without communications or logistics capabilities for eight days. The men walked about 60km to Starobilsk, where their relatives rented a bus to bring them home. Russian forces detained the men at the border and imprisoned them in a Zaitseve basement instead. Relatives of forcibly mobilized Russian men in Vologda Oblast shared a video on November 10 demanding that their mobilized family members be returned from Svatove, Luhansk Oblast due to poor training and leadership on the front.[64]

Russian mobilization efforts are channeling mobilized Russian personnel to the Wagner Group, indicating the increasing importance of Wagner to Russian combat capabilities. Russian-language opposition outlet Agency News reported on November 10 that mobilized men from Omsk Oblast received military IDs that did not identify them as mobilized personnel, which then allowed Russian authorities to send the mobilized men to fight alongside the prisoners recruited by Wagner.[65] Private military companies are unconstitutional in Russia, and mobilized personnel cannot legally be deployed to fight with any armed group other than the Russian military. Wagner forces reportedly use the prisoners as cannon fodder to draw Ukrainian fire and keep actual Wagner personnel out of harm’s way, as ISW has previously reported.[66] Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych noted on November 10 that Wagner prisoner recruits are the most likely demographic of all Russian forces to surrender to the Ukrainian National Guard, likely due to their poor treatment and dangerous deployments.[67]

Pro-Russian milbloggers and military units continue to call for economic mobilization to support the war effort. A Telegram channel affiliated with the BARS-13 reservist militia argued on November 10 that Russian authorities need to begin mobilizing the Russian economy and engaging in economic activities that will support Russian forces at the front.[68] A Russian milblogger wrote on November 10 that Russia’s reliance on Iranian-made drones and other systems humiliates the Russian military industry and deprives Russia of the chance to develop and produce suitable Russian-made modern weapons systems.[69] The milblogger called for better funding to the Russian military-industrial complex and warned that the West will likely eventually cut Russia’s access to Iranian-made equipment like drones and missiles by overthrowing the Iranian regime.

Russian occupation authorities are likely facing economic repercussions stemming from their policy of forcibly mobilizing men in Russian-occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that local businesses in Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast are suffering major labor shortages because most men are either hiding from mobilization summonses or in the process of being mobilized.[70] The Center reported that Russian forces regularly conduct raids on homes and businesses to find men who are evading mobilization and that several businesses in Makiivka have shut down due to labor shortages. The Center also claimed that Russian officials send mobilized personnel from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine to the front lines with insufficient training and ammunition because deaths among those forcibly mobilized personnel may result in their families hating Ukraine longer-term, driving a wedge between the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied areas.

Some Russian citizens are likely continuing to oppose the war through planned or executed attacks on Russian military locations. The Deputy Interior Minister of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), Vitaly Kiselev, claimed on November 10 that FSB agents detained an unnamed Russian citizen in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast and uncovered five incendiary devices which they claimed the person planned to use to attack unspecified “administrative facilities” in Yekaterinburg.[71] Kiselev claimed that the Russian citizen was affiliated with “terrorist” and “extremist” organizations.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are reportedly continuing their efforts to identify pro-Ukraine residents in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine but are less invested in creating pro-Russian sentiments among occupied populations. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that Russian occupation officials have reduced payments to “socially vulnerable” populations in occupied parts of Zaporizhia Oblast since the September 30 pseudo-referenda.[72] The Center reported that those payments were used to acquire passport data to rig the referendum vote and that Russian authorities are stepping up filtration measures and other “terror tactics” because they no longer need to buy the goodwill of the occupied population. The Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration reported on November 10 that occupation officials installed cameras and microphones in a Novopskov hospital and ordered hospital staff to “conduct casual conversations with visitors to identify untrustworthy individuals.”

Russian occupation officials are continuing their attempts to erode Ukrainian national identity among residents of occupied territories while setting conditions to mobilize additional forces from the occupied Ukrainian civilian population years from now. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that Russian occupation officials opened branches of the Young Army Cadets National Movement in Henichesk, Kherson Oblast and in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[73] The Center reported that “Yunarmia” is a militaristic association of schoolchildren under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Defense that is responsible for the “militarization” of children. The Center reported that participation is supposedly voluntary, but that Russian officials forcibly enroll schoolchildren in Yunarmia in many Russian oblasts. Yunarmia recruits cadets between the ages of 8 and 18.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

References:

[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/z-1-zhovtnya-vidnovleno-kontrol-nad-41-naselenym-punktom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-valerij-zaluzhnyj/; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/20040; https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1... https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1590711291576217610

[2] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/ukraine-russia-war-wi...

[3] https://www.voanews.com/amp/both-sides-in-ukraine-war-face-ammunition-sq...

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[5] https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1589736825634988033?s=20&t=g2...

[6] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/18

[7] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/18

[8] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/18

[9] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/16;

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[14] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110722

[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[17] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hV3W3gkGsXU ; https://www.youtube.com/...

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[19] https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2022/11/10/mynuloyi-doby-nashi-vijska-prosunulys-na-luganshhyni-na-vidstan-do-2-kilometriv/

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09YyDruMCQiKPEXWt5Zq...

[21] https://www.facebook.com/easternforces/posts/pfbid0tXUMcPfWatKFChyNDEpnY...

[22] https://t.me/rybar/41032; https://t.me/mod_russia/21645

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/21645

[24] https://t.me/rybar/41032

[25] https://t.me/rybar/41032

[26] https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/8597 ; https://t.me/stranaua/74403

[27] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1590442419798953985

[28] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9532

[29] https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1590713163716399109; https://twit...

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/z-1-zhovtnya-vidnovleno-kontrol-nad-41-naselenym-punktom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-valerij-zaluzhnyj/

[31] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/1327682387994417/

[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/z-1-zhovtnya-vidnovleno-kontrol-nad-41-naselenym-punktom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-valerij-zaluzhnyj/

[33] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/1327682387994417/; https://arm... dot com.ua/2022/11/10/vijska-rf-shhe-zalyshayutsya-na-pravoberezhzhi-dnipra-u-hersonskij-oblasti/

[34] https://t.me/hueviyherson/28626; https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status...

[35] https://t.me/Tsaplienko/20040; https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1... https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1590756417304416258

[36] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1590717061441130496?s=20&t=7w... https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1590711291576217610

[37] https://t.me/stranaua/74542; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status... https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1590758390158229504

[38] https://twitter.com/AlbertoOlivie13/status/1590683441854832640; https:/... https://twitter.com/vedhiytip/status/1590710563013005313

[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/42575; https://t.me/milinfolive/93153

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/21645

[41] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02jJfnYhpzvmdBeQhf9ediF...

[42] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02jJfnYhpzvmdBeQhf9ediF... https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/22333

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09YyDruMCQiKPEXWt5Zq...

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09YyDruMCQiKPEXWt5Zq... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/protyvnyh-zaznaye-suttyevyh-vtrat-brygadnyj-general-oleksij-gromov/