Showing posts with label AFS INDIA- CHINA - PAKISTAN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AFS INDIA- CHINA - PAKISTAN. Show all posts

Sunday, June 11, 2017

MODERNIZATION PLA : The Southern Theater Command and China’s Maritime Strategy

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/southern-theater-command-chinas-maritime-strategy/?mc_cid=0e916a5940&mc_eid=2aedc83db6



                                 111 - I N D E X - 111

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/111-index.html  ]


MARITIME - GEOPOLITICS - CHINA 

 NEW  [ 1 ]  MODERNIZATION PLA : The Southern Theater Command and China’s Maritime  Strategy

 http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/06/modernization-pla-southern-theater.html


            

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            China’s Maritime Strategy




        
                         ANIMATION  
                        -   USA vs China (2016) 

                                  [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3VqF2dXje0  ]






USA & Japan & South Korea VS Russia & China & North Korea Military Power Comparison 2017 - 2018

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4EF3LwJbvk ]






    

In January 2017, a long-anticipated reshuffle of the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) took place. The PLAN and its three fleets each received new commanders. Less noticed, but more significant, was the replacement of General Wang Jiaocheng with Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai (袁誉柏), former commander of the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet, as commander of the Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Global Times, January 22; Global Times, January 22). This is the first time in PLA history that a naval officer has been appointed to command the multi-service forces of one of its regional combatant headquarters (China Brief, March 31). Most importantly, his appointment is indicative of the shift in China’s military posture from continental defense to maritime security, and the importance of the Southern Theater as a predominantly maritime arena for PLA operations (China Brief, July 22, 2016).
Evolving Maritime Strategy
A major rationale for appointing a naval officer to command the PLA’s Southern Theater has to do with the evolution of China’s maritime strategy. From the late 1960s to mid-1980s, the PLA was required to prepare for an “early, total, and nuclear war” against a possible Soviet invasion from the North (China Brief, May 15). In this continental defense-centered military strategy, the role of the PLAN, with its limited capabilities, was relegated to supporting a land-based war through coastal defense operations to slow down a Soviet invasion.

In 1985, as China’s relations with the Soviet Union began to improve, Deng Xiaoping tasked the PLA with making the “strategic transition” from preparing for a major war against Soviet invasion to preparing for a “local war” over contingencies on the China’s borders. As a result, the notion of “near-coast defense” (“近岸防御”) was replaced by a “near-seas active defense” (“近海积极防御”) strategy. Rather than primarily supporting land operations, the PLAN is required by the new strategy to build itself into a “strategic service” that can operate independently and effectively in its own maritime space, the three seas near China, namely, the South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. [1]
Since the early 2000s, China’s maritime strategy has integrated the concept of “far seas protection” (“远海护卫”) that requires the PLAN to develop capabilities that can safeguard the security of expanding Chinese interests overseas, including “security of overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lanes, overseas Chinese investment, and overseas Chinese citizens and legal entities.” While “near-seas active defense” and “far-seas protection” underlie the expansion of China’s naval capabilities, near-seas security is considered the priority in the near term largely because of their proximity and centrality to the physical security of China. [2]
The reorganization of the PLA that began in late 2015 is largely an attempt to change the army-centric nature of the PLA, the result of the dominance of a military strategy centered on continental defense. The changes accommodate the expanding PLA naval and air capabilities to provide security to China’s newly defined maritime domain and interests, particularly in the near seas. A PLA Army (PLAA) headquarters, for instance, was established to take over the responsibility of running army units from the PLA’s regional combatant headquarters, so that the latter can become genuinely joint by integrating more officers from the non-army services. [3]
Unlike the abolished military region (MR) system which was dominated by army officers, the commanding officers of the three newly established PLA theaters with a maritime strategic orientation (the Southern, Eastern and Northern Theaters), are more balanced in service backgrounds, with PLAA, PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) each occupying one third of these positions. As the pool for selecting future PLA senior officers becomes more mixed in service backgrounds, so will the senior officer corps of the PLA, to the extent that positions for theater chiefs may be held by non-army service officers. [4] The appointment of Yuan to command the Southern Theater has cemented this trend.
Why the Southern Theater Command?
A major objective of reorganizing the PLA regional combatant headquarters from seven MRs to five theater commands is to reduce the overlap of missions among these headquarters. With this reorganization, “safeguarding sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea has become the most important mission that the Southern Theater shoulders” (“维护南海权益是战区肩负的最重要使命”) (People’s Daily , February 28, 2016).
There are several major reasons why the Southern Theater became the first PLA regional combatant headquarters with a naval officer appointed to be its commander. 
Frist, the South China Sea straddles the vital sea lanes that connect East Asia with the Indian Ocean, on which major East Asian economies, including China’s, depend heavily on shipping energy, raw materials, and traded products. The security and control of these sea lanes are not only indispensable for the normal functioning of these economies in times of peace, but also of great importance to “gaining initiative” in times of crisis and war. [5] Although the Yellow and East China Seas constitute the maritime operational space of the PLA’s Northern and Eastern Theaters respectively and have important sea lanes, they are not comparable to those of the South China Sea in strategic vitality.

Second, Chinese analysts also regard the South China Sea as the ideal site to deploy China’s strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). In comparison with the land-based nuclear deterrent, its sea-based counterpart is believed to be more credible because it is more concealed and more likely to survive the first nuclear strike. The deeper these “boomers” dive in the ocean within their safe limit, the more concealed they are against the opponent’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

The average depth of the Yellow Sea is only 40 meters—too shallow to conceal China’s SSBNs. The average depth of the East China Sea is 350 meters, and it can be as deep as 2,000 meters near the Okinawa Trough. Such a depth is quite appropriate for SSBN deployment. The numerous shore-based air and naval bases of the PLA’s Eastern Theater can also offer protection for SSBNs. However, the Yellow Sea’s proximity to Japanese and U.S. bases and their effective ASW capabilities make the area unsuitable for SSBN patrols. These capabilities, for instance, can diminish the credibility of China’s SSBNs by keeping them exposed and vulnerable. In comparison, the average depth of the South China Sea is 1,200 meters. The countries that form the first island chain are relatively weak and do not possess highly capable ASW platforms against Chinese submarines. In comparison with the Yellow and East China Seas, South China Sea is clearly a more secure site to deploy China’s sea-based, retaliatory nuclear capabilities (The Paper, July 21, 2016).

Chinese analysts also believe that South China Sea is deep, wide and open enough to accommodate PLAN’s heavy surface warships. Besides its relative depth, South China Sea encompasses an area of around 3.56 million square kilometers. The sea is also quite open to transit into and out of the Western Pacific because the countries that constitute the first island chain lack effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and naval blockade capabilities over the transit straits. [6] In comparison, the Yellow and East China Seas are much smaller in scope, covering 380,000 square kilometers and 770,000 square kilometers respectively. These seas are generally narrow and partially enclosed. The transit straits to the Western Pacific, for instance, are closely monitored by the robust ISR capabilities of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in peace time and can be effectively blocked by JMSDF in times of crisis and war.

New thinking in the PLA about how to conduct operations may also shed light on why the PLAN regards South China Sea as an ideal site for its operations. PLA operations, for instance, are now guided by the new concept of “information system-based system of systems operations” (“基于信息系统的体系作战”), which highlights the integration of various service forces into a PLA “system of systems” capable of multi-spatial and variable distance deployment and presence. [7] Latterly networked and enhanced by a common information system or C4ISR architecture, this operations system should achieve battlefield transparency-based “information superiority,” which allows for synchronized, parallel operations by multi-service forces, thus enabling “battlefield initiative” against the opponent. [8]

Reflected in the maritime domain, this concept may explain the PLA’s ambitious effort to develop its maritime operations system of systems (海上作战体系) by constructing and deploying a large number of major surface ships, including aircraft carriers. PLA analysts believe that a carrier-based battle group is an ideal maritime operations system of systems. With escorts such as guided missile destroyers, frigates, and nuclear attack submarines, this system of systems is capable of air operations, surface strikes, submarine and ASW warfare, air and missile defense, and electronic and cyber warfare. If well integrated by a common information system, all individual weapons platforms together can not only constitute operational synergy against the opponent but also offer support and protection to reduce each other’s vulnerabilities. [9]

An isolated surface ship or submarine, for instance, may be vulnerable to air, missile and submarine attacks. However, if integrated into a carrier-based system of systems, this vulnerability may be reduced. An aircraft carrier, for instance, provides air capabilities that can compete for air superiority and provide air cover for surface operations. These air capabilities can also be deployed against the opponent’s air ASW capabilities, thus protecting one’s own submarine operations. Moreover, a carrier’s air ASW capabilities can be deployed against the opponent’s submarines, thus providing protection for one’s own surface ships and submarines. In the meantime, the surface and subsurface escorts of the battle group can work to reduce the vulnerability of the carrier itself. The deep, wide and open South China Sea, with its vast strategic depth, is a desirable location for conducting such “maritime system of systems operations.”

Finally, for the past few years, China has undertaken extensive dredging and building of artificial islands on the reefs that China controls in the Spratlys, and construction and upgrading of airfields, helipads, ports, radar and communications facilities in the Spratlys and Paracels. At the same time, China’s claims in the South China Sea remain opaque. The seeming change of status quo due to these activities has already triggered countermeasures from the U.S. Navy such as freedom of navigation and overflight operations near China-controlled islands and reefs in the South China Sea. The Spratlys are about 1,000 km away from the southern tip of Hainan Island, and Paracels are about 340 km. To provide security for these so far-flung maritime frontier outposts and facilities that face major challenges from the U.S. Navy clearly requires substantial naval and air power projection and sustainability capabilities. The long distance, U.S. challenges and lack of clarity of Chinese claims have made the South China Sea situation unpredictable and volatile. In comparison, the Yellow and East China Seas are relatively close to China’s mainland. When there are tensions over Taiwan and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, the “red lines” against major escalations also remain relatively clear, making these tensions more predictable and manageable.

These reasons may explain why when meeting U.S. Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson in July 2016, then PLAN commander ADM Wu Shengli stated that “we will never sacrifice our sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea. It is China’s ‘core interest’ and concerns the foundation of the party’s governance, the country’s security and stability, and the Chinese nation’s basic interests … We will never stop our construction on the Nansha Islands halfway” (Xinhuanet, July 18, 2016).

Similar reasons may explain why ADM Yuan Yubai, a nuclear submariner who also has extensive experience in commanding PLAN’s surface combatant flotillas, replaced an army officer to command the PLA’s Southern Theater, a strategic and operational arena that is predominantly maritime in nature and has become more contentious with maritime issues. [10]

Major Challenges
Appointing a naval officer to command the Southern Theater has also presented major challenges. The appointment is clearly based on the institutional lens of the PLA, which regards South China Sea as a maritime arena of strategic and military competition for “gaining control and initiative,” particularly in the worst case scenarios of crisis and war. Such a narrow institutional lens may be a major driver for activities such as the building of artificial islands in Spratlys and construction and upgrading of facilities in Spratlys and Paracels. These activities have already caused alarm among China’s maritime neighbors in Southeast Asia and triggered U.S. countermeasures such as freedom of navigation operations. The increased tension clearly contradicts China’s foreign policy goal of creating a benign external environment for the continued development of China’s economy. Mitigating the narrow institutional perspective of the military by strengthening civilian control of foreign policy has apparently become a major challenge for China’s leadership.

Finally, the dominance of a theater command by naval officers is unprecedented in PLA history (The Paper, March 27). In addition to ADM Yuan, other senior theater commands from the navy include South Sea Fleet Commander Wang Hai who also serves as deputy commander of the Theater, and Rear Admiral Dong Jun, deputy commander who possibly acts as chief of staff of the Southern Theater Command. This may cause discontent among PLAAF and PLAA officers, and heighten inter-service rivalry. There is, therefore, a need to integrate these services into the primary missions of the Theater Command to alleviate the prospect of such a rivalry.

PLAAF has already been conducting long-range patrols of Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal with H-6K bombers, Su-30 fighter-bombers, air-refueling tankers and early-warning and reconnaissance aircraft (Xinhuanet, August 6, 2016). However, integrating PLAA into primary missions of the Southern Theater may be more difficult. Southern Theater Army headquarters is located in Nanning, the capital of Guangxi province, indicating that the theater’s army forces are primarily deployed to handle contingencies on the land borders with Vietnam and Burma. [11] At the strategic level, this deployment can generate pressure or diversion from the land flank if China’s dispute with Vietnam over reefs in the South China Sea escalates. Integrating the theater army forces at the operational level may prove to be a major challenge for the Theater Command’s commanding officers.

Conclusion
Appointing a naval officer to command a theater in unprecedented in PLA history, further confirming the shift of China’s military posture from continental defense to maritime security. Moreover, ADM Yuan’s position as commander of the Southern Theater Command indicates the relative importance of South China Sea in the eyes of the PLA, particularly as a suitable bastion for its growing SSBN force and as an ideal operational space for its expanding surface fleet.
Nan Li is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.
Notes
  1. See Nan Li “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas,” Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2009).
  2. See Nan Li, “China’s Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era,” in Roy Kamphausen, et al., eds., Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014).
  3. See Nan Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring,” East Asian Policy, 8, No. 4 (October & December 2016).
  4. Ibid
  5. Conversations with Chinese naval analysts in Beijing in August 2016
  6. Ibid
  7. For an in-depth study of “System of Systems,” see Kevin N. McCauley, “PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations,” The Jamestown Foundation, January 2017, available here: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/System-of-Systems-Enabling-Joint-Operations.pdf
  8. See Li, “China’s Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era.”
  9. Chinese analysts cited in Li, “China’s Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era.”
  10. For Yuan’s nuclear submarine background, see citation of Yuan in “Chinese Nuclear Submarines Sets Sail from Here” (“中国核潜艇从这里起航”), Xinhuanet, October 27, 2013.
  11. For an exercise by Southern Theater’s army forces on Sino-Burmese border, see “PLA Conducts Live Fire Exercise on Sino-Burmese Border” (“解放军在中缅边境实弹演习”), Global Times, March 29, 2017.

PLA MODERNIZATION : Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/recent-developments-chinese-armys-helicopter-force/?mc_cid=0e916a5940&mc_eid=2aedc83db6



                             
                                              111 - I N D E X - 111

                 [ http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/111-index.html  ]





PLA MODERNIZATION


    [ 1 ]    PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA  :China’s CENTRAL Theater   Command = "blank"                                        DATA AWAITED



 
          [  1  A  ]   PLA MODERNIZATION :   PLA  ROCKET  FORCE   :                                                                          http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/rocket-force-pla-  second- artillery-corps.html

     NEW     [ 1B ]     PLA MODERNIZATION : Developments in the Chinese Army’s                                          Helicopter  Force 
                    http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/06/pla-modernization-developments-in.html
                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                     
    
     [ 2 ]    PLA MODERNIZATION : PLA : Strategic Assessment:  China’s Northern Theater                                    Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/05/pla-modernization-pla-strategic.html

     [3]     China’s Southern Theater Command 

              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-southern-theater.html


      [4]    PLA MODERNIZATION :Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command

               http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/pla-modernization-snapshot-chinas.html

      [5]    China’s Western Theater Command
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/03/p-l-snapshot-chinas-western-theater.html

       [6]    PLA SETUP PRIOR TO MODERNIZATION
              http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/04/pla-modernization-pla-setup-prior-to.html

     [7]    PLA Theater Joint Intelligence:Organization and Operations

                http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/search/label/PLA%20%20MODERENIZATION








             PLA  MODERNIZATION



Recent Developments in the Chinese                 

              Army’s Helicopter Force





In November 2016, Chinese internet sources showed photos of a ceremony in the (former) 13th Group Army of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army accepting the 1,000th helicopter into the force (NetEase, May 23). This nice round number demonstrates the growth of the Army Aviation Corps over the past decade. Along with Special Operations Forces (SOF), Army Aviation is one of the “new-type combat forces” given priority for development. The increase in the number of Army helicopters accompanies the expansion of the force in the latest round of reforms. [1] In roughly a month’s time, half of all Army Aviation units have experienced some sort of organizational change. However, even as the numbers of helicopters rise, the size of the Army Aviation force is still small for a ground force that will probably number around a million personnel by 2020. [2] The recent changes are an attempt to improve and expand a force that underpins a number of important capabilities from tactical mobility and special operations to logistics support.
Background
The PLA’s Army Aviation Corps was established in 1986 by inheriting helicopters from the Air Force (ChinaMil, September 8, 2016). It began with a single regiment and by the middle of the following decade had expanded to seven operational regiments (and a few training units), composed of about 135 helicopters and some Y-5 biplanes. [3] By early 2017 (prior to changes in the structure of PLA operational units), operational helicopter units had grown to 12 operational units, including five regiments and seven brigades, and a few training units.
The first Army Aviation brigade was formed in the former Lanzhou Military Region in 2009 by expanding an existing regiment (Sina, May 19, 2009). This trend continues into the current round of reform with one exception. Over the past eight years, along with expanding regiments into brigades, a new regiment was formed in the former 41st Group Army in mid-2016 (ChinaMil, July 26, 2016).
According to an unofficial source, an Army Aviation regiment has four to six flight groups (大队), with 12 helicopters in each group; a brigade has six to eight groups (Sina, August 12, 2016). The variation in size among both regiments and brigades allows for the units to expand as new aircraft and pilots become available. Each unit is composed of a variety of helicopters types.
According to The Military Balance 2017, the entire force is composed of nine varieties of light, medium, heavy, and attack helicopters, with some produced in China and others imported from, or jointly developed with, foreign sources. Approximately 300 Russian-produced Mi17-series and Mi-8s comprise the largest proportion of the force, followed by some 255 Chinese-produced Z-9s (armed and transport versions), 85 locally manufactured Z-8s, plus 53 AS350 Ecureuil and 8 SA342L Gazelles from France, 15 Eurocopter H120 Colibri (jointly developed with China), and less than 20 S-70C Blackhawks purchased from the U.S. in the early 1980s. Two types of dedicated attack helicopters are new to the force, with the first WZ-10 being introduced in 2011, followed by the WZ-19; currently, there are approximately 120 of each type.
Prior to current structural changes when the PLA had 18 group armies and 12 Army Aviation units, only nine group armies had an Army Aviation unit assigned. One Army Aviation brigade was subordinate to the former General Staff Department (GSD) and a brigade was assigned to the Xinjiang Military District and a regiment to the Tibet Military District. However, only six group armies and the two Military Districts mentioned had both an Army Aviation unit and a SOF unit.
Army Aviation units support both conventional and SOF units, probably spending more time training with the SOF than with conventional units, with one exception: the 3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade in the former 1st Group Army appears to receive more training with helicopters than other infantry units and eventually may be designated the                                                            Army’s first airmobile brigade. 
It is noteworthy that the 1st Group Army did not have an organic SOF unit, which may explain the 3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade’s experimentation in helicopter operations. An operational airmobile unit, operating from forward bases near the coast, would be extremely useful in any operation against Taiwan (China Brief, March 6, 2015). However, the Army Aviation Corps has only begun experimenting with using forward operating bases for arming and refueling.

Despite the growth in the number and size of units and in the total number of helicopters, the lack sufficient aircraft to perform all the tasks necessary to conduct modern campaigns is a known shortcoming. As a result, continued growth in the Army Aviation Corps is necessary and expected.

Recent Developments
In the month since the April 2017 announcement of changes to the PLA’s “84 corps-level units,” Army Aviation units have undergone some of the most visible observed changes. Of the 18 former group armies that were reduced to 13, significantly none of the five disbanded group armies were assigned either an Army Aviation or SOF unit (China Brief, May 11). In the few weeks since the reduction of group armies was announced, multiple changes in Army Aviation units have been publicized.
Prior to April, there were seven Army Aviation brigades and five regiments. In late May, the count of Army Aviation units is 11 brigades and one regiment. The before and after numbers of Army Aviation and SOF units (so far unchanged) is summarized in the table below.











All four of the former Army Aviation regiments in group armies have been reported as expanded to brigades and it appears that the former GSD Army Aviation brigade and the brigade assigned to the Xinjiang Military District have been transferred to group armies.
Specifically, in mid-May 2017, the former regiment in the 26th Group Army has been described as an “army aviation brigade under the PLA 80th Group Army” and a week later the former regiment in the 54th Group Army was described as an “army aviation brigade under the PLA 83rd Group Army” (ChinaMil, May 18; CCTV, May 26).
The former GSD Army Aviation brigade now appears to be “an army aviation brigade of the PLA 81st Group Army in Beijing” (ChinaMil, May 19). At the same time, the Army Aviation regiment in the former 31st Group Army/current 73rd Group Army was reported to be an “army aviation brigade under the PLA Eastern Theater Command” (ChinaMil, May 19).
Additionally, Chinese television reported the former regiment in the old 41st Group Army (the regiment most recently created) is now a brigade in the 74th Group Army (CCTV, May 27). The same news broadcast reported on an Army Aviation brigade of the 76th Group Army in the Western Theater Command. The 76th is the former 21st Group Army, which previously did not have an Army Aviation unit. This change could be the result of either the transfer of the complete Army Aviation brigade in the Xinjiang Military District to 76th Group Army command or elements of that brigade have been transferred to the 76th to become a seed organization eventually to grow into a full brigade.
The Near Future by 2020
It seems likely that the new reforms will seek to assign both an Army Aviation brigade and a SOF brigade to each of the 13 Group Armies at the very least. With the exception of two group armies, this has already been accomplished by expanding four regiments to brigades and the reassignment of units (such as appears to have occurred with the former GSD Army Aviation brigade and the Xinjiang Military District Army Aviation brigade).
New units will need to be established for the 71st and 78th Group Armies. This process might entail transferring elements from existing units to establish “starter” brigades in the group armies (or other organizations) that currently do not have helicopter assets, unless the civilian defense industries and foreign helicopter purchases can come up with relatively large numbers of airframes to outfit a complete unit at one time.
But developing mature, experienced pilots and crews, especially in complex night and low-level operations, takes longer than building a helicopter. If existing Army Aviation brigades do not have the full complement of the reported eight subordinate groups, it is likely the smaller brigades will add additional aircraft as they (and pilots and aircrew) become available. For SOF units, existing regiments likely will be expanded to brigades and the two group armies without SOF units likely will convert conventional infantry units to SOF brigades (some of which might come from existing infantry units in disbanded group armies). Like helicopter pilots, developing proficient SOF personnel and units also takes years. Both Army Aviation and Special Operations Forces Academies (or Colleges) have been established to meet increasing demands for properly trained and educated officers and NCOs in these specialties.
Thus, in the near future we are likely to see reports of Army Aviation brigades in the 71st and 78th Group Armies. The Army Aviation regiment in Tibet could also be expanded, though geographic conditions make air operations at that altitude more difficult than in lower regions (so it may remain a regiment). If the Army Aviation brigade in Xinjiang has not been transferred in full to the 76th Group Army, it will likely be restored to full strength, or a new unit created, since the size of the Western Theater Command is so large additional helicopter assets would be logical. Likewise, new SOF brigades are likely to be found in the 72nd, 74th, 79th (an expansion from the current regiment), 81st, and 83rd Group Armies and smaller SOF battalions or companies added to divisions and brigades. [4] These new SOF units are likely to be converted from former infantry units and personnel.
Since Army Aviation assets are increasingly important to modern joint and combined arms operations, the PLA could augment additional organizations with helicopters of all types. For example, the five joint Theater Commands and the five Theater Command Army headquarters each could probably use organic helicopter units, perhaps smaller in size than a full brigade (such as a regiment or group) for a variety of purposes, including command and control, attack, transport, electronic warfare, medical evacuation, logistics, and reconnaissance tasks. The three major garrison cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai and other important cities also could probably use smaller helicopter units for similar purposes, as well as during disaster relief missions. Border and coastal defense units would likely find helicopter units very useful in monitoring their border regions as well as for logistics. The newly formed Joint Logistics Support Force would benefit from having helicopters available to directly support the Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base and five Joint Logistics Support Centers.
Though it has been suggested for years, the current round of reform could also establish one or more airmobile units that integrate infantry and helicopter units, with the necessary support, into one (or more) organic unit, perhaps at the group army or corps-organizational level.
Conclusions
The more the PLA Army trains and operates using helicopter and SOF units, the more it will understand how vital they are to modern operations. They will constantly be reminded of the lesson from the 2008 Sichuan earthquake relief effort of the need for even more helicopters for effective and efficient operations. The Army, however, is constrained by the ability of the civilian Chinese aviation industry to produce enough aircraft and develop new models to rectify shortcomings in medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. The addition of attack helicopters in recent years greatly increases the lethality of the force but also complicates tactics and logistics. The distances and speed at which Army Aviation and SOF units can move adds new capabilities to the PLA.
On the other hand, more and larger Army Aviation and SOF units will be much more expensive to man, organize, equip, and maintain than former infantry units. Realistic training for these units will also demand a larger slice of the defense budget at the same time the other services are training more and further from China’s borders. So as the PLA draws down to 2 million people and its responsibilities extend to distances farther from China, we should not expect to see decreases in future defense budgets.
Properly organized, trained, and equipped Army Aviation and SOF units will be able to contribute to joint maritime or land campaigns beyond China’s borders. While doctrine allows for such operations, additional modifications based on new capabilities and technologies likely will be required. However, exercises over the past few years have determined that many tactical and operational commanders are not yet properly trained and ready to employ the helicopter and SOF assets assigned to them. For example, the PLA media routinely reports that some commanders do not know how to employ “new-type combat forces” or do not dare or are unwilling to do so (81.cn, July 31, 2016). Part of the reason for this problem likely is, that in the past there were so few Army Aviation and SOF units available, commanders up to battalion level, who were trained almost exclusively in their own branch functions, had little opportunity to interact with Army Aviation and SOF personnel or units. As the PLA Army grows smaller, “new-type combat forces” will become a larger percentage of the force and more commonly seen in training. Nonetheless, changing commanders’ mindsets on the integration of Army Aviation and SOF into traditional operations will not magically occur overnight.
It has taken roughly 20 years for the Army Aviation Corps to expand from seven units with 135 mostly transport helicopters to 12 operational units with over 1,000 helicopters of all types including dedicated attack helicopters. It seems likely that the force will grow faster in the coming years than over the first two decades of the Army Aviation Corps’ existence. Because they are among the “new-type combat forces,” Army Aviation and Special Operations Forces units will be in the news frequently as they train and operate together. However, by the time this article is published, there will probably be new developments announced, which will require constant attention by foreign analysts.


Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is a former U.S. army attaché to Beijing and Hong Kong and author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006).


Notes
  1. The PLA Navy and Air Force also have helicopter units; The Military Balance 2017, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 283–285, estimates the total Navy helicopter force to be about 94, with about 79 in total Air Force. PLA Navy Marine units reportedly will also receive helicopters in the current batch of reforms. An aviation transport brigade has been added to the Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps, probably increasing the number of helicopters in the force. See “Paratroopers jump out of Y-8 transport aircraft,” http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-05/25/content_7617895.htm.
  2. For comparison, the approximately 475,000-strong U.S. Army, according to The Military Balance 2017, p. 48, has approximately 4,000 helicopters.
  3. The Military Balance 1996/97, p. 179.
  4. Some infantry and armored divisions and brigades already have small SOF units.