SOURCE:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/doklam-row-india-reasonably-sure-china-does-not-want-war-despite-angry-rhetoric/articleshow/59945037.cms



FOR  REFERENCE

Doklam row: India reasonably sure China does not want war despite angry rhetoric

Rajat Pandit

A "face-saving" workable option is for both India and China to simultaneously withdraw their troops from the Bhutanese territory of Doklam (called Dong Lang by China) near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction, said sources in the security establishment.

| Aug 6, 2017.








NEW DELHI: Far away from the actual faceoff  site at Doklam, where rival soldiers are close enough to literally smell each other in the rarefied air of the high-altitude region, the Indian security establishment is reasonably sure China will not risk a war or even "a small-scale military operation" despite all its belligerent rhetoric. 


A "face-saving" workable option is for both India and China to simultaneously withdraw their troops from the Bhutanese territory of Doklam (called Dong Lang by China) near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction, said sources in the security establishment.  


But, added the sources, if it does come down to a skirmish or battle, the Indian Army is well-poised with "fully acclimatised troops" and "an enhanced border management posture" to prevent "any misadventure" by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 


India has repeatedly stressed war is not a solution to the on-going over 50-day standoff, with foreign minister Sushma Swaraj last week telling Parliament that bilateral dialogue, patience and "bhasha saiyam" (language restraint) was the way forward to diffuse tensions. 


"Both countries do not want a conflict. A tactical operation by the Chinese border guards and PLA to construct a motorable road at Doklam (physically blocked by Indian soldiers on June 18) went awry, with the consequent strategic fall-out. Mutual troop pull-back or re-adjustment is the face-saver," said a source. 


But China is yet to sound conciliatory, at least in its public stance. The 7th edition of the annual "Hand-in-Hand" exercise between the Indian Army and PLA, which was to be held in China in October, is likely to be among the "casualties" of the faceoff. "Even the exercise's initial planning conference, leave alone the final one, has not been held despite reminders to China," said another source. 


At the over 11,000-feet site in Doklam, the roughly 300-350 troops from the two sides continue to be ranged against each other as of now. Concertina wire coils around 150 metres long separate them there, with both having also built makeshift defences after earlier pitching tents and establishing logistical supply lines. 


"The Chinese troops at the faceoff site are backed by around 1,500 PLA soldiers in three layers towards the rear. There are some verbal and loudspeaker exchanges but in a non-aggressive manner," said the source. 


Accidental escalation, however, remains a big worry. Indian Army formations in the region, including the 17 (Gangtok), 20 (Binnaguri) and 27 (Kalimpong) Mountain Divisions (each with over 10,000 soldiers), continue to be in a high state of operational readiness.   



As was first reported by TOI, over 2,500 soldiers from the 164 Brigade were moved forward to Zuluk and Nathang Valley in Sikkim in June-July to add to the 6,000 soldiers under the 63 (Nathu La) and 112 (Chungthang) Brigades already deployed in eastern and north-eastern parts of the state. 


As was first reported by TOI, over 2,500 soldiers from the 164 Brigade were moved forward to Zuluk and Nathang Valley in Sikkim in June-July to add to the 6,000 soldiers under the 63 (Nathu La) and 112 (Chungthang) Brigades already deployed in eastern and north-eastern parts of the state. 



As a military thumb rule, an attacker has to deploy three soldiers for every one of the defender in the plains. As the altitude increases, the ratio increases to 9:1 for mountain warfare. "Our troops are better placed and prepared for the long haul," he added.

Sources say India remains steadfast about not allowing China to "bully" Bhutan into ceding ground in the Doklam region, which is "strategically crucial" because the Zomplri (Jampheri) Ridge there overlooks the Siliguri corridor or the "Chicken's Neck" area. But it has maintained restraint in face of escalating rhetoric from Beijing.   

SOURCE:
http://defenceupdate.in/doklam-border-standoff-will-india-china-war/

http://idrw.org/doklam-border-standoff-will-there-be-an-india-china-war/#more-143026

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/doklam-border-standoff-will-there-be-an-india-china-war.509764/

DOKLAM BORDER STANDOFF : WILL THERE BE AN INDIA-CHINA WAR ?

A week ahead of August 1, when China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) marks its 90th anniversary, Xi Jinping's Red Army had a stern message for India. A PLA major-general, flanked by three senior colonels, held a rare meet-the-press in Beijing. "Our willingness and resolve to defend our sovereignty," Senior Colonel Wu Qian thundered, "is indomitable. We will do so whatever the cost." India, he continued, should "not harbour illusions". "The history of the PLA of past 90 years," he said, "has proven our resolve."

COMPLETE COVERAGE: India-China stand-off

China's sabre-rattling, ever since the June 16 standoff with India came to light, has been relentless. One reason, insiders suspect, is that for the PLA and for Xi, the face-off at Doklam couldn't have come at a more sensitive time. On August 1, President Xi, who also heads the PLA's Central Military Commission (CMC) and is the commander-in-chief, will supervise the army's largest-ever annual war games in Zhurihe, Inner Mongolia, a show of strength that is meant to test the military a year after Xi kicked off its most far-reaching reforms. Not only that, in November, Xi will preside over a once-in-five-years party congress that will be key to his second term, as rival factions jostle for the top slots. Any sign of weakness will be seized upon.

Beijing's bluster has been met with quiet resolve from New Delhi. Nearly 300 Indian soldiers have pitched their tents on Doklam blocking the PLA from building a contentious road into territory Bhutan claims. Army officials says the troops will stay for as long as New Delhi wants them to, even through the 10 below zero winter temperatures of the plateau.

Doklam comes at a time when China is pitching its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) even as it aggressively asserts territorial claims around its periphery. "It hurts China's self-image as an emerging global power and Asian hegemon that India should turn its back on BRI and thwart its South Asian plans," says former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal.

Doklam is now in the domain of the PMO which steers foreign policy. The MEA has been silent after its June 30 statement where it noted India's "deep concern at the recent Chinese actions" and "conveyed to the Chinese government that such construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India".

A senior MEA official rejects China's stand that the issue is between China and Bhutan and explains why India is on firm ground, legally and logically. "China's physical movement towards Bhutan automatically pushes the trijunction towards the Indian side thus bringing it closer to the 'chicken's neck' that connects India's Northeast to the rest of India. It's not a unilateral issue but a tripartite one. China alone or even China and Bhutan can't resolve it. The solution has to be tripartite," he says.

As China ramps up the rhetoric, New Delhi is soft-pedalling the standoff. Instructions have apparently gone out to politicians, bureaucrats and the military to not publicly comment on the stalemate. Hectic parleys are under way to defuse the crisis without any perceived loss of face. In a nudge that Beijing is unlikely to take kindly to, a US department of defence spokesperson on July 22 encouraged "India and China to engage in direct dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and free of any coercive aspects". New Delhi is looking at National Security Advisor Ajit Doval's visit to Beijing for the BRICS' NSA meeting on July 27-28 as one channel for dialogue.

The Military Imbalance

The PLA's war rhetoric has so far not translated into additional boots on the ground. Even a month after the standoff, there has been no mobilisation on the Tibetan plateau, a prerequisite for carrying out its threats. Footage of recent 'live firing drills' released on Chinese media were from a PLA exercise last month.

The Indian and Chinese armies last fired in anger 50 years ago, in 1967. The Indian army hit back at the PLA's attempt to disturb the status quo in Sikkim, with a ferocious artillery bombardment at Nathu La on September 11 and Cho La on October 1 where over 300 PLA soldiers were reportedly killed. The incident came exactly five years after the 1962 war loss.

Since 1967, every aggressive move the two sides have made along the 4,057-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) has essentially been posturing, each side manoeuvring to prevent the other from altering the status quo on the ground. The closest India and China came to another war was in June 1986 when General K. Sundarji heli-lifted a mountain brigade to face off against a PLA incursion which had built a road into Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping conveyed, through visiting US defence secretary Caspar Weinberger, his intent to "teach India a lesson" if the crisis was not resolved. The Chinese troops did not withdraw until 1993 when Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Beijing.

Peace and tranquility have prevailed on the border ever since, and the two words formed the underlying text of a landmark 'Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement' signed by PM Rao in 1993. More recently, China's thrust on border infrastructure and the PLA's transformation have made the peace an uneasy one.

Xi's reforms of the PLA are without doubt the most sweeping in its 90-year history. The focus is on modernising and enabling greater integration through a newly set-up joint operations command system, something which India itself has long sought-and failed-to implement. The army's various departments are now under the direct control of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which Xi heads. Now, a single western theatre command handles the border with India, integrating the earlier Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions. The focus is on mobility and nimbleness, leveraging the road and rail infrastructure China has in place, and on integrating the army and air force more closely.

************************************************

IF WAR BREAKs OUT NOW"

 " " INDIAN ARMY IS DOOMED" 

**************************************************8

On the face of it, the odds seem to overwhelmingly favour the PLA. Weak infrastructure and a stalled military modernisation have hobbled the Indian armed forces attempts to ramp up their posture from deterrence to credible deterrence. This year's defence budget, at 1.5 per cent of the GDP, was the lowest allocation since 1950-51. The army's attempts to replace its ageing helicopters, missiles and infantry equipment after the 1999 Kargil War are yet to bear fruit. Its first howitzer buys in three decades, the 146 ultralight howitzers from the US, will trickle in only next year. Its Mountain Strike Corps, an offensive high altitude warfighting force comprising over 90,000 soldiers, will only be combat-ready by 2021. The armed forces lack strategic reconnaissance to peer at least 300 kilometres deep into China and Pakistan and detect mobilisations. The army has been embarrassed by revelations in a July 21 CAG report of its tank and howitzer ammunition being adequate for only 10 days of intense war fighting against the prescribed 40 days.

THANKS BORDER ROADS COMMUNICATIONS IS DOWN THE DRAIN

But of greater concern is the tardy pace of adding border infrastructure. Only 22 of the 73 all-weather roads along the LAC have been completed a decade after they were sanctioned, the 14 strategic railway lines to rush troops and supplies to the border remain paperbound. The IAF's dip in combat aircraft, 32 instead of the sanctioned 39 fighter squadrons, is so perilous that Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa, in a recent interview, compared it to playing cricket with seven instead of 11 players. The navy is short on both submarines and anti-submarine warfare helicopters, key capabilities in tracking Chinese submarines that are now routinely deployed in the Indian Ocean.

The government is yet to move on the recommendations of the Lt General D.B. Shekatkar committee, submitted to the MoD in December 2016. Key proposals include appointing a chief of defence staff, a single-point military advisor to accelerate the integration of the armed forces, creating integrated theatre commands to synergise the three services and cutting back on non-fighting formations to enhance the military's combat potential while saving Rs 25,000 crore over five years. A classified part of the report mentions that the focus of warfare for both the army and the air force are likely to be the mountains since this is where the disputed areas with China and Pakistan lie.

China's Firepower Boost

In Beijing, the view is that the timing of China's muscle-flexing over the Doklam incident is no coincidence amid an overhaul of the PLA. The military's massive transformation has created its own stresses and uncertainties. In the past too, PLA observers say, such circumstances have driven the military to adopt a hardline posture, driven both by domestic political considerations and the need to rally public support for the military. In the lead-up to August 1 and the 90th anniversary, for instance, the PLA's officers have been publicly pledging their allegiance to Xi and showering praise on his reforms. Former PLA officers have even used the Doklam incident to attack the army's critics and demand total support for the army.

"It's advantage India in terms of the army's training and professionalism, and advantage China in terms of infrastructure, logistics, supplies, firepower quantity and their second artillery," says Srikanth Kondapalli, an expert on the Chinese military at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi.         

               

[MISPLACED COMMENT:MILITARY FACT IS 

"NEVER UNDER ESTIMATE YOUR  ADVERSARY"  --  

VASUNDHRA ]

    

 Since China's 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), Beijing had embarked on an ambitious push to build a road and rail network across Xinjiang and Tibet. A decade-and-a-half later, it is almost complete, in stark contrast with India's stalled border road-building. Beijing, no doubt, enjoys the topographical advantage of the Tibetan plateau in both western and eastern sectors, it is only bordering Sikkim in the Chumbi Valley where it faces a major disadvantage. But that too is no impediment, for this year the last two towns in Tibet-Gyalasa and Gandeng in Medog county that borders Arunachal will be connected to the massive highway network, which is now over 82,000 kilometres in length.

In all three sectors, western, middle and eastern, motorable Chinese roads now reach right up to the Indian border. In the middle and eastern sectors, in the Chumbi Valley bordering Sikkim and in Nyingchi across the border from Arunachal, the Chinese railway network will reach the border by 2019.                  [  RAILWAY HAS ALREADY  CROSSED TSANG PO & REACHED  ACROSS  - VASUNDHRA ] In the current five-year plan (2016-2020), the Yanga-Nyingchi railway to the Arunachal border, the Shigatse-Yadong railway to the Chumbi Valley and the Sikkim border, and the Shigatse-Gyirong railway to the Nepal border will be completed. As local officials in Yadong county told India Today in 2015, a 500-km rail track has already entered the Chumbi Valley and tests will begin next year. The line to Nyingchi near Arunachal is now being constructed and will be ready in two years' time. This allows China to rapidly mobilise divisions from not only the western theatre command, but also from the central, southern and eastern theatre commands to the Indian border in a matter of days.

The PLA air force also operates around a dozen airfields along the Indian border, with five big airports in Tibet, from Ngari Gunsa in Shiquanhe, which borders Aksai Chin, to Nyingchi airport near Arunachal. The other big logistical advantage for China, Kondapalli notes, is its indigenous military industrial complex that ensures independence of supplies. "They have a 30-day backup which means they don't have to depend on supplies. Our record is relatively bleak on this front," he notes.

 Most Chinese analyses of the border with India have highlighted Beijing's artillery and missile units as its biggest advantage.

A detailed study published on July 7 in the Sina military portal, China's most widely-read defence website, assessed how the country would handle a conflict with India. It noted that the PLA had made big strides in mobilisation, and revealed that in 2014, during the Chumar standoff, China was able to rapidly mobilise its 54th group army, which was involved in both the India and Vietnam wars, from Henan to Tibet to undertake a drill, while long-range rocket artilleries and J-10 fighters were also sent to border airports as deterrence. "After decades of preparation for war, the PLA has experienced a kind of metamorphosis... Weapons, drills, logistics, and military tactics have improved to a large extent. Troop deployments at the western frontier have been strengthened, as also field artilleries in Tibet. 

There is serious deterrence towards India," it concluded, suggesting China's aim was to win the war without fighting.

Will China go to War?

If China does go to war, analysts say, it will be only after carefully weighing the benefits of getting into a full-scale conventional war where it cannot score a decisive victory. To initiate a conflict will mean tearing up multiple peace and tranquility border agreements with India and disabusing its own proclamation of "peaceful development".

"It would be absurd for China to start a war over its own actions, and over disputed territory with a small country that has a security relationship with India under which India has acted," says Sibal. "China's credibility on territorial issues is very low internationally because of its actions in the South China Sea and repudiation of the UNCLOS award. It will suffer heavy casualties if it triggered a border conflict as would India with minor gains, which would puncture its balloon of military superiority."

In the event of the most plausible conflict scenario, a limited war involving only the army and air force, an advancing PLA will first have to reckon with over 250 of the IAF's Su-30MKI air dominance fighters (the IAF's fighter jets sat out the 1962 war). The IAF jets can take off from their bases on the plains with a full payload of fuel and weapons as opposed to the PLAAF fighters operating off the exposed airfields on the Tibetan plateau with reduced combat loads and fuel (due to the rarefied air). "The IAF's unlikely to wait for PLA to make the first move, our fighters will target their concentration areas," says Air Marshal P.S. Ahluwalia, former C-in-C of the Western Air Command.

INDIA's  RHETORIC

The PLA will have to break through heavily defended passes and valleys protected by over a dozen Indian mountain divisions with 16,000 soldiers each, protected by artillery, Brahmos missile regiments and, in certain places like Ladakh and north Sikkim, pre-positioned armoured brigades with T-72 tanks. "This is not the Indian army of 1962 which fought with bolt action rifles and PT shoes," says a senior army official. "We have three army corps or nearly three lakh soldiers in the Northeast. Today, we have brigades (3,000 soldiers) where we once had companies (100 men)."

The army's emphasis on manpower is not out of place. Mountains swallow troops. If an attack on the plains would need a ratio of 1:3 or three attackers for one defender, it swells to 1:12 in the mountains. The PLA will need over 50,000 soldiers to mount a successful thrust down the Chumbi Valley and towards India's 'chicken's neck' which the Doklam plateau overlooks.

Both sides are so evenly matched that neither can advance without incurring heavy casualties which is why experts believe Doklam might not trigger a conventional war. "China prefers to coerce," says defence analyst Ravi Rikhye. "It will be very, very reluctant to actually start a war." G. Parthasarathy, India's former high commissioner to Islamabad, terms Beijing's response to Doklam as "jingoistic and afflicted by hubris" and draws a parallel to the Sumdurong Chu standoff. "This one could last for months, if not years," he says.

There is, though, a view that the standoff marks a watershed moment in South Asia. "What we have done (in Doklam) is absolutely right and in accordance with the existing India-Bhutan bilateral arrangement," says ex-army chief General Bikram Singh. "However, a strategic fallout is that taking it as a precedent, China may, in the future, support Pakistan outright in border disputes. It is, therefore, axiomatic that we expeditiously create a two-front capability to safeguard our national interests."

Collusive Threat

Over a fortnight before the Doklam face-off, army chief General Bipin Rawat met his five army commanders in Srinagar. The commanders' huddle in Srinagar's Badami Bagh cantonment on June 1 came just two months after the twice-a-year army commanders' conference. The five army commanders, whose area of responsibility-northern, western, southwestern, southern and eastern covers all the zones of future conflict, reviewed war contingencies with Pakistan, particularly its 'proactive strategy', colloquially called 'cold start'. Conceived in 2004, it cuts down on the two-week-long mobilisation time by swiftly mobilising the army to carry out lightning multi-front shallow thrusts across the border with Pakistan within 72 hours. The option of thinning troops from the China border to address the Pakistan front, as the army has done in the past, is no longer viable. 

"We cannot redeploy troops from our eastern borders now. The risk of losing territory to probes by the PLA is too great," says an Indian army general.

Earlier this year, the government lifted a 2015 MoD freeze on the army's mountain strike corps which had slashed its manpower and budgets by half-Rs 38,000 crore and 35,000 soldiers. The army is working out a revised version of 'cold start' to fight an intensive battle of 10-15 days.

An upcoming tri-services military exercise is to be held at an undecided date to work out new strategies to address a multi-front war. On July 8, army chief General Rawat told ANI that "the army is fully ready for a two-and-a-half front war" (the 'half' is for terrorists being used by either China or Pakistan to carry out acts of sabotage).

Shadow Boxing 

"It may be difficult to shake a mountain, but it is even more difficult to shake the PLA." Senior Colonel Wu Qian had said at the meet-the-press. The Doklam standoff is serving some other uses too. One of the PLA's most hawkish generals, the now retired Luo Yuan, called on the public to rally behind the army because of it. "The public should be confident about our soldiers," he said in a widely circulated article. "Do not trust the words of those who would condemn us for being too aggressive or for being too weak when we protect peace. Our army would never engage in a war without the full grasp of victory. Frankly speaking, India is truly different from the India of 1962... We really don't want to engage in a war against India. But if so, India would lose again."

Yet, despite the shrill rhetoric, Beijing is well aware that a war would be disastrous on many fronts. "This is a very difficult situation for China," says Bo Zhiyue, a leading expert on elite Chinese politics who heads the Bo Zhiyue China Institute. "There are two sides to Xi 's 'Chinese Dream' slogan. A stronger China and a stronger PLA. These two parts are not necessarily coherent." Key to Xi's ambitions, including his pet One Belt, One Road project, is a peaceful environment and preserving the global image of a responsible, rising China. This is all the more important as Beijing stakes a claim to global leadership at a time when the US is considering a retreat on some fronts.

Bo says the shrill rhetoric and muscle-flexing are more aimed at cowing India down without firing a bullet. "No country today will demonstrate its military prowess with war," he says. "The exercises in Tibet are no different from what North Korea does with its tests or the US and South Korea do with their exercises. Many in China spoke about taking back the Diaoyu Islands [or Senkaku Islands as Japan refers to them] by force, but that was just rhetoric to please the nationalists. They have to say something like that, or they appear weak. Editorials now say they'll kick out the Indian troops. It's loud rhetoric, but doesn't mean action."
(With Uday Mahurkar)

*************************************************

REFERENCES:

Menon: Peace Prevails but the Old Modus Vivendi With China is Under Stress

                   [ https://youtu.be/Zowy-0QXQsE ]

CLICK/ GOOGLE  TO OPEN THE DETAILS

        [A]    https://thewire.in/88189/88189/

          [B]  Current Stand-Off an Attempt by China to                           Change the Status Quo at Tri-Junction:                                Shivshankar Menon

                BY DEVIRUPA MITRA ON 09/07/2017    

[ https://thewire.in/155766/current-stand-off-attempt-china-change-status-quo-tri-junction-shivshankar-menon/ ]

           [ C ]  Six Expert Views on How India Should Look                      at the Latest Border Stand-Off With China

                 BY DEVIRUPA MITRA ON 05/07/2017

   [ https://thewire.in/154449/expert-gyan-india-china-bhutan/]

  ********************************************

WHAT NEXT TO READ

India, China Withdraw Troops, No Clarity on China's Road Building Efforts in Doklam

China Disputes Indian Version of 2012 Understanding on Border Tri-junction

Construction at Bhutanese Tri-Junction Will Harm Our Security Interests, India tells China

Six Expert Views on How India Should Look at the Latest Border Stand-Off With China

Menon: The Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Has Served India's Purpose

Current Stand-Off an Attempt by China to Change the Status Quo at Tri-Junction: Shivshankar Menon

Menon: 'It is Natural that Smaller Neighbours like Lanka Will Play India Against China'

BHUTAN : INDIA-BHUTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY [ R ]

SOURCE:

[A]  file:///C:/Users/VASUNDHRA/Desktop/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf

[B] http://commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1949/14.html






    INDIA-BHUTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY 

The Indian-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, which was signed in New Delhi on February 8, 2007, came into force following the exchange of Instruments of Ratification between the two governments in Thimphu on March 2, 2007.  


  INDIA-BHUTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY 


The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan: 

Reaffirming their respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; 

Recalling the historical relations that have existed between our two countries; 

Recognizing with deep satisfaction the manner in which these relations have evolved and matured over the years into a model of good neighborly relations; 

Being fully committed to further strengthening this enduring and mutually beneficial relationship based on genuine goodwill and friendship, shared interests, and close understanding and cooperation; 

Desiring to clearly reflect this exemplary relationship as it stands today; And having decided, through mutual consent, to update the 1949 Treaty relating to the promotion of, and fostering the relations of friendship and neighbourliness between India and Bhutan; 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between India and Bhutan. 


Article 2 

In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other. 



Article 3 

There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of Bhutan and the Government of India. Both the Governments shall provide full cooperation and assistance to each other in the matter of trade and commerce. 


Article 4 

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores as may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition and materials outside Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals. 



Article 5 

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan. 


Article 6 

The extradition of persons wanted by either state for crimes and for unlawful activities affecting their security shall be in keeping with the extradition agreements between the two countries. 


Article 7 

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree to promote cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two countries. These shall be extended to such areas as education, health, sports, science and technology. 


Article 8 

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree to continue to consolidate and expand their economic cooperation for mutual and long term benefit. 


Article 9 

Any differences and disputes arising in the interpretation and application of this Treaty shall be settled bilaterally by negotiations in a spirit of trust and understanding in consonance with the historically close ties of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation that form the bedrock of Bhutan-India relations. 


Article 10 

This Treaty shall come into force upon the exchange of Instruments of Ratification by the two Governments which shall take place in Thimphu within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

The Treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent. 


In witness whereof, the undersigned being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Treaty. 

Done at New Delhi on the Eighth Day of February Two Thousand and Seven, in two originals each in Hindi, Dzongkha and English languages, each text being equally authentic. 

However, in case of difference, the English text shall prevail. 

For the Government of For the Government of 
The Republic of India the Kingdom of Bhutan 


                         Sd/-                                                                          

(Pranab Mukherjee)     Minister of External Affairs   
   

                          Sd/-       
                            
 (H.R.H.Trongsa Penlop   Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck)                                                                                                 
The Crown Prince of Bhutan 


  ****************************************



                                                       APPENDIX  "A "
SOURCE:
http://commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1949/14.html

TREATY OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN [1949]

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TREATY OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN [1949] INTSer 14

TREATY OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN Darjeeling, 8 August 1949 The Government of India on the one part, and His Highness The Druk Gyalpo's Government on the other part, equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of affairs caused by the termination of the British Government's authority in India, and to promote and foster the relations of friendship and neighbourliness so necessary for the well-being of their peoples, have resolved to conclude the following treaty, and have, for this purpose named their representatives, that is to say Sri Harishwar Dayal representing the Government of India, who has full powers to agree to the said treaty on behalf of the Government of India, and Deb Zimpon Sonam, Tobgye Dorji, Yang-Lop Sonam, Chho-Zim Thondup, Rin-Zim Tandin and Ha Drung Jigmie Palden Dorji, representing the Government of His Highness the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, who have full powers to agree to the same on behalf of the Government of Bhutan. Article I There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan. Article II The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations. Article III In place of the compensation granted to the Government of Bhutan under Article 4 of the Treaty of Sinchula and enhanced by the treaty of the eighth day of January 1910 and the temporary subsidy of Rupees one lakh per annum granted in 1942, the Government of India agrees to make an annual payment of Rupees five lakhs to the Government of Bhutan. And it is further hereby agreed that the said annual payment shall be made on the tenth day of January every year, the first payment being made on the tenth day of January 1950. This payment shall continue so long as this treaty remains in force and its terms are duly observed. Article IV Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing between the said Governments, the Government of India shall, within one year from the date of signature of this treaty, return to the Government of Bhutan about thirty-two square miles of territory in the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India shall appoint a competent officer or officers to mark out the area so returned to the Government of Bhutan. Article V There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of India and of the Government of Bhutan; and the Government of India agrees to grant the Government of Bhutan every facility for the carriage, by land and water, of its produce throughout the territory of the Government of India, including the right to use such forest roads as may be specified by mutual agreement from time to time. Article VI The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of India, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan, on the other hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition, etc., across the frontier of Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals. Article VII The Government of India and the Government of Bhutan agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan. Article VIII (1) The Government of India shall, on demand being duly made in writing by the Government of Bhutan, take proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 (of which a copy shall be furnished to the Government of Bhutan), for the surrender of all Bhutanese subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the first schedule of the said Act who may take refuge in Indian territory. (2) The Government of Bhutan shall, on requisition being duly made by the Government of India, or by any officer authorised by the Government of India in this behalf, surrender any Indian subjects, or subjects of a foreign power, whose extradition may be required in pursuance of any agreement or arrangements made by.the Government of India with the said power, accused of any of the crimes, specified in the first schedule of Act XV of 1903, who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government of Bhutan, and also any Bhutanese subjects who, after committing any of the crimes referred to in Indian territory, shall flee into Bhutan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the local court of the district in which the offence may have been committed. Article IX Any differences and disputes arising in the application or interpretation of this treaty shall in the first instance be settled by negotiation. If within three months of the start of negotiations no settlement is arrived at, then the matter shall be referred to the Arbitration of three arbitrators, who shall be nationals of either India or Bhutan, chosen in the following manner: (1) One person nominated by the Government of India; (2) One person nominated by the Government of Bhutan; (3) A Judge of the Federal Court, or of a High Court in India, to be chosen by the Government of Bhutan, who shall be Chairman. The judgernent of this Tribunal shall be final and executed without delay by either party. Article X This treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent. DONE in duplicate at Darjeeling this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, corresponding with the Bhutanese date the fifteenth day of the sixth month of the Earth-Bull year. HARISHWAR DAYAE Political Officer in Sikkim. DEB ZIMPON SONAM  TOBGYE DORJI  YANG-LOP SONAM  CHHO-ZIM THONDUP  RIN-ZIM TANDIN HA DRUNG JIGMIE PALDEN DORJI Instruments of Ratification WHEREAS a Treaty relating to the promotion of, and fostering the relations of friendship and neighbourliness was signed at Darjeeling on the 8th day of August 1949 by representatives of the Government of India and of the Government of His Holiness the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, which Treaty is, word for word, as follows: * * * * * * * * * * * * The Government of India, having considered the treaty aforesaid, hereby confirm and ratify the same and undertake faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein contained. IN WITNESS WHEREOF this instrument of ratification is signed and sealed by the Governor-General of India. DONE at New Delhi, the 22nd day of September, 1949. C. RAJAGOPALACHARI, Governor-General of India. WHEREAS a Treaty relating to the promotion of, and fostering, relations of friendship and neighbourliness was signed at Darjeeling on the eighth day of August, 1949 by Representatives of my Government and of the Government of India, which Treaty is, word for word, as follows: * * * * * * * * * * * * My Government, having considered the treaty aforesaid, hereby confirm and ratify the same and undertake faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein contained. IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have signed this instrument of ratification and affixed hereto my seal. DONE at Tongsa the fifteenth day of September, 1949. J. WANGCHUK Druk Gyalpo Seal.

India Bilateral

Ministry of External Affairs, India

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