Showing posts with label LAC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LAC. Show all posts

Monday, December 25, 2023

It took Indian Army to show to world that 'enough is enough': Gen Naravane on Eastern Ladakh


 IS AGNIVEER  SCHEME  A DISASTER ?

 https://youtu.be/4MbYmqAkbbc

It will be interesting to find out WHO framed the AGNIVEER Scheme because such a disgusting  idea can never  occur to a   MAN IN UNIFORM 

To  CRYSTAL-GAZE the mettle of the future AGNIVEER  and with that  also include to cascading   &  go a step further to visualize even  the efficacy of topmost  RANKS in the Armed Forces . One does'nt have to search far,  just study the first fifteen days of the UKRAINE WAR 2022. The Glaring  DRAW BACKS   of  THE RUSSIAN ARMY  is a  smell  like  that of   rotten EGG.  State of the RUSSIAN ARMY glares out like  SOS of very light shots in the sky. AGNIVEER has very strong commonalities with the RUSSIAN SYSTEM of recruitment upto the extent that the first observation has been that it may have  the CHARACTERSTICS OF ITALIAN ARMY IN WORLD WAR -2 

RUSSIAN ARMY IN ON GOING UKRAINE WAR CAN BE                                SUMMARIZED IN ONE SENTENCE

" RUSSIANS CAPTURE A PIECE OF GROUND BEFORE LAST LIGHT & UKRANIANS  THROW  THEM  BACK AFTER LAST LIGHT BACK INTO THEIR TRENCHES "




 

          
 SITE OF CLASH ON  08 AUG 2020


SOURCE :

(   )    https://youtu.be/pv95lcN0eD8



Agniveer Abhinav report -    • Agniveer पर पूर्व सैनिक ने इतनी कड़वी...   Rakhwale: General MM Naravane (R), Indian Army's 28th Chief of Staff has penned down a memoir - Four Stars of Destiny: An Autobiography. As per PTI, he has revealed the decesion making process behind Agnipath scheme, that replaced the recruitment policy in all three services. Now soldiers are recruited for a 4 year term. Only 25 percent are retained after this contract. Other revelations include events of August 2020 when India and China were on the brink of war in Eastern Ladakh.


 (   ) Gen Naravane on Eastern Ladakh :

   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/it-took-indian-army-to-show-to-world-that-enough-is-enough-gen-naravane-on-eastern-ladakh/articleshow/106067214.cms?fbclid=IwAR0h7Rjk3tkvaerTKPyxJCHXc5Y0WdSvu7_K4Nes65TLdVvokj5hkgTDdPk



               Gen Manoj Mukund Naravane


It took Indian Army to show to world that 'enough is enough': Gen Naravane on Eastern Ladakh


Synopsis

Gen Manoj Mukund Naravane, the 28th Chief of Army Staff, one of the foremost Army Generals, provided a gripping account of the India-China confrontation before and after the deadly Galwan Valley incident, India's overall response to the Chinese action and how it served as a catalyst to firm up the Army's combat readiness along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).


Dec 17, 2023,

New Delhi: China followed "wolf-warrior diplomacy" and "salami-slicing" tactics with impunity browbeating smaller neighbours and it took the  Indian Army to show to the world that "enough is enough" and challenge the "neighbourhood bully", says Gen Manoj Mukund Naravane, the 28th Chief of Army Staff, recounting the Indian response to the Chinese aggression in Eastern Ladakh in 2020. In his memoirs 'Four Stars of Destiny', Naravane, providing a rare insight into the deadly Galwan Valley clashes,, says Chinese President Xi Jinping will not forget June 16 any time soon as China's People's Liberation Army suffered "fatal casualties" for the first time in over two decades in the fighting.

Naravane, one of the foremost Army Generals, provided a gripping account of the India-China confrontation before and after the deadly Galwan Valley incident, India's overall response to the Chinese action and how it served as a catalyst to firm up the Army's combat readiness along the Line of Actual Control(LAC)

"It was one of the saddest days of my entire career," says Naravane recalling the death of 20 Army personnel in the Galwan Valley clashes in June 2020.

His tenure as the Army Chief from December 31, 2019 to April 30, 2022 was primarily marked by the Chinese challenges along the contested border as well as the rolling out of long-term reform measures to enhance the combat capabilities of the force.

"June 16 is (Chinese President) Xi Jinping's birthday. This is not a day he will forget any time soon. For the first time in over two decades, the Chinese and the PLA had suffered fatal casualties," Naravane writes.


"They had been following wolf-warrior diplomacy and salami-slicing tactics everywhere with impunity, browbeating smaller neighbours like Nepal and Bhutan, while staking their ever-increasing claims in the South China Sea, without having to pay any costs, especially in terms of human lives."


"It took India and the Indian Army to show to the world that enough is enough and to challenge the neighbourhood bully."


Delving into the overall situation along the frontier, Naravane, at the same time, suggests having a "non-aggression" pact between the two countries pending the settlement of the overall boundary dispute, saying it would go a long way in restoring confidence and pave the way for de-escalation and de-induction of forces.

'Four Stars of Destiny' published by Penguin Random House India will hit the stands next month.

On the Galwan Valley incident, Naravane says it occurred in view of the Chinese PLA refusing to remove two tents that it had erected in Patrolling Point 14 (PP-14), adding following the adversary's refusal, the Indian Army decided to pitch its own tents in the same general area.


The eastern Ladakh border row began in May 2020. Naravane says flag-level meetings had been continuing at other locations then, including at PP-15 and PP-17A, where troops fell back over agreed distances, thereby reducing the chances of violent face-offs.


"At PP-14, however, whenever we asked the PLA to remove their tents, they kept changing their stance. From 'some more time was needed', to 'we will check with our superiors', to it 'being beyond the mandate of the talks'."


"From this stonewalling, it became evident that there had been no intention of removing those tents in the first place. To counter this, we also decided to pitch our own tents in the same general area," he writes.

Naravane says when Indian Army personnel went to pitch the tents, there was a violent reaction from the Chinese side.

"Col Santosh Babu, Commanding Officer of 16 BIHAR, went forward with a small party of troops to attempt to defuse the situation but the PLA were in no mood to relent and attacked the CO's party too," he says.


"Thereafter, it became a free-for-all. With darkness setting in, both sides rushed in additional troops and a see-saw engagement continued throughout the night," he recounts.

Although armed, neither side opened fire, instead using batons or clubs and throwing or rolling down stones on each other's positions, he says.

The former Army Chief says due to better connectivity on their side, the PLA were able to move troops forward in armoured personnel carriers which changed the balance in their favour.

Naravane says he told then Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi during a phone call at 1:30 am on June 16 that the Army must hit back and make the PLA pay the price for their misadventure. "Daylight revealed a not-so-favourable situation."

"Few jawans who could not make it back at night or who had been separated started trickling back. Five jawans had died of injuries in the melee. The next morning, as the head count was taken, we realised many were missing," he says.

"As tense negotiations began, many of our boys, who had either got disoriented or had been briefly detained by the PLA without food or medical aid, returned to base," he says.


"However, 15 of them succumbed to the combined effects of their injuries and hypothermia. It was one of the saddest days of my entire career."

The Galwan Valley clashes on June 15, 2020 marked the most serious military conflicts between India and China in decades and the full extent of the deadliest confrontation was known the next day.

"We are in a profession where death is always lurking around the corner.

"Every patrol or ambush can be your last. As a Company and Battalion Commander, my unit had suffered casualties, and I was always stoic in the face of adversity or bad news. Yet, losing 20 men in a day was hard to bear," he notes.

About the casualties on the Chinese side, Naravane says it was evident that they "too suffered substantially".

"Our men who were in Chinese hands had been kept out in the open and they had seen several bodies being fished out of the river. Whenever that happened, they were subjected to a fresh round of beatings," Naravane writes.

"The sheer savagery of their response was in itself indicative of the losses they had suffered. Initially, they did not admit to any casualties at all; then many months later, admitted to four or five killed, including the CO on their side," he says.

Naravane also mentioned a report by a group of Australian researchers that put the figure of Chinese fatalities to at least 38, A separate Russian (TASS) report put the figure closer to 45 killed, which was consistent with other  intelligence reports, including those from the US, he says.


Naravane says the time is ripe for the resumption of the special-representative level talks to settle the border question between the two sides.

"Pending the settlement of the boundary dispute, which is likely to be time-consuming, articulation of a 'non-aggression' pact between the two countries would go a long way in restoring confidence, paving the way for de-escalation and de-induction of forces from Tibet/Ladakh," he said.

"Such a pact would be somewhat akin to what China and the ASEAN countries are attempting to formalise," he said.

The former Army Chief says the crisis in eastern Ladakh served as a catalyst for the Army's rebalancing to the northern front. The Army moved many key units to the northern front from other parts following the Chinese aggression.

"Though still inadequate, the increase in force ratios on the Northern Front will definitely make the PLA think twice before embarking on any misadventure, especially now that we have the offensive capability to take the battle into Chinese territory," Naravane says.

"In our posture against China, we have moved up from dissuasive deterrence (defensive) to credible deterrence (offensive defence). With these developments, the PLA must have realised that a military solution to the border problem is improbable," he adds.

'Wolf-warrior' diplomacy is a term used for a kind of assertive diplomacy. Salami Slicing is a tactic used to capture territory piece by piece.



Saturday, July 8, 2017

BHUTAN : INDIA-BHUTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY [ R ]

SOURCE:

[A]  file:///C:/Users/VASUNDHRA/Desktop/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf

[B] http://commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1949/14.html






    INDIA-BHUTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY 

The Indian-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, which was signed in New Delhi on February 8, 2007, came into force following the exchange of Instruments of Ratification between the two governments in Thimphu on March 2, 2007.  


  INDIA-BHUTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY 


The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan: 

Reaffirming their respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; 

Recalling the historical relations that have existed between our two countries; 

Recognizing with deep satisfaction the manner in which these relations have evolved and matured over the years into a model of good neighborly relations; 

Being fully committed to further strengthening this enduring and mutually beneficial relationship based on genuine goodwill and friendship, shared interests, and close understanding and cooperation; 

Desiring to clearly reflect this exemplary relationship as it stands today; And having decided, through mutual consent, to update the 1949 Treaty relating to the promotion of, and fostering the relations of friendship and neighbourliness between India and Bhutan; 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between India and Bhutan. 


Article 2 

In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other. 



Article 3 

There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of Bhutan and the Government of India. Both the Governments shall provide full cooperation and assistance to each other in the matter of trade and commerce. 


Article 4 

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores as may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition and materials outside Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals. 



Article 5 

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan. 


Article 6 

The extradition of persons wanted by either state for crimes and for unlawful activities affecting their security shall be in keeping with the extradition agreements between the two countries. 


Article 7 

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree to promote cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two countries. These shall be extended to such areas as education, health, sports, science and technology. 


Article 8 

The Government of Bhutan and the Government of India agree to continue to consolidate and expand their economic cooperation for mutual and long term benefit. 


Article 9 

Any differences and disputes arising in the interpretation and application of this Treaty shall be settled bilaterally by negotiations in a spirit of trust and understanding in consonance with the historically close ties of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation that form the bedrock of Bhutan-India relations. 


Article 10 

This Treaty shall come into force upon the exchange of Instruments of Ratification by the two Governments which shall take place in Thimphu within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

The Treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent. 


In witness whereof, the undersigned being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Treaty. 

Done at New Delhi on the Eighth Day of February Two Thousand and Seven, in two originals each in Hindi, Dzongkha and English languages, each text being equally authentic. 

However, in case of difference, the English text shall prevail. 

For the Government of For the Government of 
The Republic of India the Kingdom of Bhutan 


                         Sd/-                                                                          

(Pranab Mukherjee)     Minister of External Affairs   
   

                          Sd/-       
                            
 (H.R.H.Trongsa Penlop   Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck)                                                                                                 
The Crown Prince of Bhutan 


  ****************************************



                                                       APPENDIX  "A "
SOURCE:
http://commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1949/14.html

TREATY OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN [1949]





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TREATY OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN [1949] INTSer 14


TREATY OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN



Darjeeling,
8 August 1949




The Government of India on the one part, and His Highness The Druk Gyalpo's Government on the other part, equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of affairs caused by the termination of the British Government's authority in India, and to promote and foster the relations of friendship and neighbourliness so necessary for the well-being of their peoples, have resolved to conclude the following treaty, and have, for this purpose named their representatives, that is to say Sri Harishwar Dayal representing the Government of India, who has full powers to agree to the said treaty on behalf of the Government of India, and Deb Zimpon Sonam, Tobgye Dorji, Yang-Lop Sonam, Chho-Zim Thondup, Rin-Zim Tandin and Ha Drung Jigmie Palden Dorji, representing the Government of His Highness the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, who have full powers to agree to the same on behalf of the Government of Bhutan.

Article I

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan.


Article II

The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.


Article III

In place of the compensation granted to the Government of Bhutan under Article 4 of the Treaty of Sinchula and enhanced by the treaty of the eighth day of January 1910 and the temporary subsidy of Rupees one lakh per annum granted in 1942, the Government of India agrees to make an annual payment of Rupees five lakhs to the Government of Bhutan. And it is further hereby agreed that the said annual payment shall be made on the tenth day of January every year, the first payment being made on the tenth day of January 1950. This payment shall continue so long as this treaty remains in force and its terms are duly observed.


Article IV

Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing between the said Governments, the Government of India shall, within one year from the date of signature of this treaty, return to the Government of Bhutan about thirty-two square miles of territory in the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India shall appoint a competent officer or officers to mark out the area so returned to the Government of Bhutan.


Article V

There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of India and of the Government of Bhutan; and the Government of India agrees to grant the Government of Bhutan every facility for the carriage, by land and water, of its produce throughout the territory of the Government of India, including the right to use such forest roads as may be specified by mutual agreement from time to time.


Article VI

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of India, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan, on the other hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition, etc., across the frontier of Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals.


Article VII

The Government of India and the Government of Bhutan agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan.


Article VIII

(1) The Government of India shall, on demand being duly made in writing by the Government of Bhutan, take proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 (of which a copy shall be furnished to the Government of Bhutan), for the surrender of all Bhutanese subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the first schedule of the said Act who may take refuge in Indian territory.

(2) The Government of Bhutan shall, on requisition being duly made by the Government of India, or by any officer authorised by the Government of India in this behalf, surrender any Indian subjects, or subjects of a foreign power, whose extradition may be required in pursuance of any agreement or arrangements made by.the Government of India with the said power, accused of any of the crimes, specified in the first schedule of Act XV of 1903, who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government of Bhutan, and also any Bhutanese subjects who, after committing any of the crimes referred to in Indian territory, shall flee into Bhutan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the local court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.



Article IX

Any differences and disputes arising in the application or interpretation of this treaty shall in the first instance be settled by negotiation. If within three months of the start of negotiations no settlement is arrived at, then the matter shall be referred to the Arbitration of three arbitrators, who shall be nationals of either India or Bhutan, chosen in the following manner:

(1) One person nominated by the Government of India;

(2) One person nominated by the Government of Bhutan;

(3) A Judge of the Federal Court, or of a High Court in India, to be chosen by the Government of Bhutan, who shall be Chairman. The judgernent of this Tribunal shall be final and executed without delay by either party.



Article X


This treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent.
DONE in duplicate at Darjeeling this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, corresponding with the Bhutanese date the fifteenth day of the sixth month of the Earth-Bull year.


HARISHWAR DAYAE Political Officer in Sikkim.

DEB ZIMPON SONAM 

TOBGYE DORJI 

YANG-LOP SONAM 

CHHO-ZIM THONDUP 

RIN-ZIM TANDIN
HA DRUNG JIGMIE PALDEN DORJI


Instruments of Ratification

WHEREAS a Treaty relating to the promotion of, and fostering the relations of friendship and neighbourliness was signed at Darjeeling on the 8th day of August 1949 by representatives of the Government of India and of the Government of His Holiness the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, which Treaty is, word for word, as follows:

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The Government of India, having considered the treaty aforesaid, hereby confirm and ratify the same and undertake faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein contained.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF this instrument of ratification is signed and sealed by the Governor-General of India.

DONE at New Delhi, the 22nd day of September, 1949.

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI,

Governor-General of India.

WHEREAS a Treaty relating to the promotion of, and fostering, relations of friendship and neighbourliness was signed at Darjeeling on the eighth day of August, 1949 by Representatives of my Government and of the Government of India, which Treaty is, word for word, as follows:

* * * * * * * * * * * *
My Government, having considered the treaty aforesaid, hereby confirm and ratify the same and undertake faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have signed this instrument of ratification and affixed hereto my seal.
DONE at Tongsa the fifteenth day of September, 1949.

J. WANGCHUK Druk Gyalpo Seal.

India Bilateral
Ministry of External Affairs, India


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URL: http://www.liiofindia.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1949/14.html














Friday, July 7, 2017

SIKKIM & THE GREAT GAME: The Great Game over Sikkim

SOURCE:
http://claudearpi.blogspot.in/2017/07/the-great-game-over-sikkim.html











Tibetan[INDIAN BRITISH] Army at the beginning of  the 20th century






           The Great Game over Sikkim 


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The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been vociferously trying to convince the Indian correspondents in Beijing about the 1890 Convention(known as Convention of March 17, 1890 between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet).


However, Beijing forgot to mention about the two main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim, who were not even consulted by the 'Great Imperial Powers'.
It is interesting to have the views of Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan politician and famous historian. 

In his 
Tibet: a Political History, he explained:


In 1890 a convention was drawn up in Calcutta by Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India and Sheng-t'ai, the Manchu Amban from Lhasa, without consulting the government of Tibet. The first article of the convention agreement defined the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognized a British protectorate over Sikkim, which gave them exclusive control over the internal administration and the foreign relations of that country.

There was, however, no corresponding acknowledgment on the part of the British of China's authority over Tibet. The remaining six articles related to Tibet, and since she was not represented at the Convention, those articles were not allowed to be put into practice by the Tibetans. The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time; but it suited their interests to deal with the Manchus, because of the advantages they gained from the Convention.

It is also possible that, because of the brief clash between the Tibetans and the British at Lungthur [see note below], the Manchus were afraid that Tibet and Britain might enter into direct negotiations; they therefore agreed to a Convention to forestall such a possibility.

An addition was made to the Convention, known as the Trade Regulations of 1893, in which the question of increasing trade facilities across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier was discussed. Again, the provisions of that agreement could not be enforced because Tibet had not been a party to the negotiations. It is surprising that the British entered into a second agreement with the Manchus, when they knew from the results of the first agreement that there was no way of putting the agreement into effect.

The Manchus had signed on behalf of the Tibetans; yet they were totally unable to persuade or force them to carry out the provisions of the agreement.

A Tibetan, Lachag Paljor Dorje Shatra, was sent to Darjeeling to study the situation. He sent valuable reports to Lhasa; but they did not meet with the favor of the government, which still believed that too close a contact with the British would damage the Tibetan way of life and religion.

About that time, a Japanese monk, Ekai Kawaguchi, under the pretext of being a Ladahki monk, was enrolled for studies at the Sera monastery. He was delivering inaccurate information to the British in India through Sarat Chandra Das. Those inaccurate reports led the British to believe that Tibet was receiving military aid in the form of "small firearms, bullets, and other interesting objects" from Russia.
Moreover, Kawaguchi estimated that there must have been over two hundred Buriat students in the major monasteries of Tibet. The increasing fear of the establishment of Russian influence in Tibet, which would constitute a grave danger to India, led the British to realize that they could no longer deal with Tibet through China; but that they must attempt to establish direct contact with the Lhasa government.
The fact that the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 proved in practice to be of not the slightest use was because Tibet never recognized them.

Francis Younghusband quotes Claude White, the Political Officer of Sikkim, as saying that the Chinese had "no authority whatever" in Tibet and that "China was suzerain over Tibet only in name".

Note on Lungthur: 

In 1887, a fortified post was built by the Tibetans in Lungthur in North Sikkim, which according them, was inside their territory. Unfortunately the British did not agree with the demarcations and demanded their immediate removal.


An ultimatum was sent to the Tibetan commanders to vacate their fortifications before March 15, 1888. At the same time the British sent a formal protest which was forwarded to the Manchus and the Dalai Lama by the Choegyal.


Though not in a position to intervene, the Manchus told the British that “no marked separation existed formerly between Tibet and Sikkim” and that the Tibetans regarded the kingdom of Sikkim as an extension of their own country.


The Kashag (Cabinet of Ministers) replied to the Choegyal that there was no harm if Tibet defended its own borders. This time the British were not in a mood to discuss or even negotiate the exact position of the border.


With the pressure mounting, the British positioned more than 2,000 troops of the Sikkim Field Force. The Tibetans sent 900 men as reinforcement under two generals and a minister, Kalon Lhalu.


Till the last minute the Choegyal tried to mediate, but each party was determined to show the other that they were within their rights. Unfortunately for the Tibetans, their troops were no match for the British, neither in training, equipment nor discipline. The clash which took place at Lungthur was short and the Tibetans were trounced.



Where is Gipmochi?

Article 1 of the 1890 Convention states:

The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing in to the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing in to the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

According to Sikkimese records, Gipmochi is Batang La, 5 km north of Doka La.
It means the territory South of Batang La is Bhutanese, therefore India did not 'trespass' into Tibet.

All this fuss for nothing?