EXCHANGING HATS TO FIX THE MILITARY PART 1: AIR SUPERIORITY AFGSC United States Strategic Command

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 PART  1/3 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2021/07/exchanging-hats-to-fix-military-part-1.html

 PART  2/3:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2021/07/exchanging-hats-to-fix-military-part-2.html

 PART  3/3:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2021/07/exchanging-hats-to-fix-military-part-3.html

SOURCE:

 (a) AIR SUPERIORITY AFGSC :

  https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/exchanging-hats-fix-military-part-1-air-superiority-afgsc 

( b ) Air Force Global Strike Command ( AFGSC ) :

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_Global_Strike_Command  

( c ) Strategic Air Command : 

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Air_Command 

 ( d )  United States Strategic Command : 

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strategic_Command

EXCHANGING HATS TO FIX THE MILITARY PART 1: AIR SUPERIORITY AFGSC

                                    BY

                         Michael Gladius

Air Superiority  Air Force Global Strike Command ( AFGSC ) : Modernizing the Air Force

20 AUG 2019

In the aftermath of WWI, the question of Air Power’s role in the military as an institution arose. Two competing theories arose: The first treated air power as another branch of the Army and Navy, while the second treated Air power as a separate form of war that would be super-dominant. America’s Military has tried both forms, using the former during WWII and the latter post-1947. In recent decades, many critics of an independent Air Force have called for its abolition and a return to the first model, most notably Robert Farley’s 2014 book “Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Forc”. However, total abolition of the Air Force may not be necessary to modernize the institutional role of airpower in the military. A solution to reconcile these opposing theories might be accomplished with a simple exchange of hats.

The main argument brought up by supporters of an independent Air Force is the need for Air Supremac. This could be accomplished by downsizing the Air Force to the Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), which itself is the resurrected Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the Cold War. The SAC was originally formed with air reconnaissance and aerial-delivered nuclear bombs, in addition to the logistical apparatus that enables America to project power across the globe. Today’s AFGSC continues this tradition.

The changes would assign the mission of Air Supremacy to the AFGSC and remove the nuclear element. The other components (strategic logistics & reconnaissance) would remain intact, and the institution would remain under the control of USSTRATCOM. The AFGSC would also acquire high-altitude anti-aircraft artillery (and accompanying RADAR) of its own, in order to seamlessly blend organic air- and ground-based systems to shoot down enemy airplanes and ICBMs.[i] This may entail merging AFGSC and components of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).[ii] All bombers and ground attack aircraft would be reassigned to the other branches of the military. The Air Supremacy Force left behind would thus be lean and mean, benefitting from a single overriding purpose.

The Fate of America’s Nukes

America currently possesses the Nuclear Triad, two of whose components are assigned to the Air Force/AFGSC: ICBMs and those deployed from aircraft. The ICBMs, located primarily in the Northwest, have some of the worst disciplinary and readiness records in the entire military. Their work is stale and idle, which causes problems for morale and effectiveness. On top of these internal problems, the silos can’t shoot-and-scoot to avoid incoming missiles. They were viable in the beginning of the nuclear age, but have since outlived their original purpose. They can be shuttered,[iii] and their personnel reassigned to more active roles, with dignity.

The air-delivered nuclear weapons are another matter. Some, like Farley, argue that long-range missiles have made nuclear bombers irrelevant, while others believe that they grant extra mobility and flexibility in their deployment. With the missile silos closed down, any nuclear bombers kept would be the responsibility of the Army and Navy. If either of these branches desire nuclear bombers, they will want ones which can serve a dual-purpose role. A good example of this is the B-52, which has a commendable record of conventional carpet bombing, despite never launching a single nuclear attack. So far as the Army and Navy are concerned, however, nuclear strikes will always come second after conventional bombing. Aircraft-launched nukes would also most likely play a secondary role to the third leg of the nuclear triad.

The third leg of the nuclear triad, ballistic submarines, ought to become America’s primary nuclear arm. These, like the B-52, are dual-purpose and can shoot and scoot. Furthermore, they are stealthier and harder to hit than the subsonic B-52. Relying on these will simultaneously provide an incentive to maintain a properly sized submarine fleet in peacetime. The Navy, rather than USSTRATCOM, is better-suited for handling America’s nukes for a variety of reasons, some military and some political in nature. Military reasons include the geostrategic nature of the Navy, its long history of using nuclear fuel in capital ships, and its advantages in mobility. Political reasons include the Navy’s pride of place in the armed forces, its alignment with America’s maritime nature, and the political divide between offensive and defensive nuclear warfare. These will be discussed in greater detail in Part 3.

The Unchanged Air Guard

Despite the extensive reorganizing and reassigning within the Air Force/AFGSC, the Air Guard ought to remain unchanged. Since the Air Guard is a reserve service, it has a few options not necessarily available to the active-duty forces. Consolidating all reservist pilots onto a few posts, regardless of their specialization or branch, will cut down on administrative costs and eliminate redundancy/duplication of effort. Furthermore, pilots from multiple branches (but all hailing from the same state) would interact with one another daily. Fraternization will accustom these men and women to working together in joint operations, and allow a free flow of new ideas. These new ideas could readily be tested, and rapidly disseminated due to the intimate, centralized nature of the system. Reservists on land, air, and sea should be more than just a manpower backup supply; they ought to be incubators for innovation and utilized constantly as experimental battalions.

Conclusions

Air Power is integral to the American way of war, and every side of the argument has pertinent strengths. By downsizing, but not abolishing outright, the Air Force a hybrid system can be formed with the strengths of centralization and the flexibility of multiple single-purpose institutions working in parallel. The air supremacy mission fits well in USSTRATCOM’s mission parameters, while air-to-ground attack aircraft do not; thus, a separation relieves both internal and external tension. By orienting the military’s institutions towards missions rather than equipment, streamlining within each organization becomes easier and joint operations become more straightforward.

In part 2, I will discuss the Army, and the Navy in Part 3.

End Notes

---

[i] i.e., THAAD and/or HIMAD

[ii] Alternatively, the AFGSC, MDA, and Space Force could remain as separate components of USSTRATCOM

[iii] Or converted into purely storage facilities

Categories: U.S. Air Force - Department of Defense

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About the Author(s)

Michael Gladius

Michael Gladius is the pseudonym for a budding commentator in the fields of military history and theory. His goal is to blend the lessons of history, principles of human behavior, and practical wisdom in order to draw upon a wide array of factors for optimized solutions and problem-solving. He is currently studying in Europe.

CDS : Eventful First year for CDS, Challenges Remain.(r)

 SOURCE:   https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/eventful-first-year-for-cds-challenges-remain-199981

Bugbears: The three areas of prime concern in the charter of General Rawat (left) relate to jointry, acquisitions and administration. 

Eventful First year for CDS,  Challenges Remain

                                   By 

            Gp Capt Murli Menon (Retd)

                         Defence analyst

Monday, 18 January 2021

Tasked essentially with promoting inter-service jointry and giving much-needed fillip to defence modernisation through timely and optimal defence acquisitions, the first incumbent to the post of CDS hasn’t performed lackadaisically, however contentious his initiatives have turned out to be in one year. His latest desire to win a war for India by employing indigenous weaponry, though laudable, is easier said than done.

Two decades after the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and the consequent Group of Ministers recommended the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and eight years after the Naresh Chandra Committee recommended a permanent chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, the Indian government instituted the first CDS in January 2020.

Tasked essentially with promoting inter-service jointry and giving much-needed fillip to defence modernisation through timely and optimal defence acquisitions, the first incumbent to the post, General Bipin Rawat, has not given a lackadaisical performance, however contentious his initiatives have turned out to be so far. 

His latest desire to win a war for India by employing indigenous weaponry, though laudable, is easier said than done, given the large gap that exists between the state-of-the-art and homegrown capabilities. Serious limitations exist in our indigenous defence capability, more so in the arena of advanced avionics, aerial weaponry and other cutting-edge technologies, such as aircraft carriers and main battle tanks.

The fact that the government chose to have a ‘first among equals’ four-star CDS rather than a five-star one as recommended by the KRC, would in the long term impinge on the effectiveness of the new dispensation.

Be that as it may, perhaps it is premature to judge whether the CDS idea was a good one or not. Three areas of prime concern comprising his charter will be analysed herein: jointry, acquisitions and administration.

Jointry has been a bugbear for most modern militaries, with single service rivalries ruling the roost generally. But this is a difficult tree to bark up, which a mere joint doctrine manual cannot deliver. The career profiles of officers and men have to build in frequent cross attachments to other sister services and mandatory ‘maroon’ tenures for the leadership for career progression.

Understanding the operating culture and peculiarities of other services is one challenge and ‘unified thinking’, more importantly, is the crucial bit.

The CDS needs to initiate policy moves in this respect to gradually build up jointmanship over time. We have a big advantage by way of initial joint training at the National Defence Academy, but a lot needs to be done to enhance tri-service jointry and consequent combat-effectiveness.

Realistic international exercises would help, no doubt, but the ultimate challenge will be to evolve as an Integrated Defence Force, wherein meaningful savings in deployment of combat assets and added combat efficiency could be achieved. Ideas of theaterisation, such as the Air Defence Command and Maritime Theatre Command, mooted by the CDS are perhaps a bit ahead of their time, given the situation in the defence forces as of now.

On defence acquisitions, whilst Make in India is a good guiding principle, practicality in technology exploitation has to be kept in mind. A classic example would be that of the Kaveri engine for the LCA, which the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) has been struggling to indigenise, but to little avail. Hence, the recourse to the US GE 404/414 engines. There are similar handicaps for helicopter, ship and tank engines and other areas, where import becomes inescapable.

The story is the same for most high-tech weaponry for all three services, such as artillery shells, aerial weaponry like the Spice series bombs and naval anti-ship and anti-aircraft weaponry. The recent government decision to grant Rs 48,000 crore for 83 Tejas jets is another doubtful starter in indigenisation, with a proven prototype of the machine not yet being available!

The third contentious policy matter initiated recently by the Department of Military Affairs under the aegis of the CDS is the proposed modification in colour service and pension criteria. Whilst increasing the retirement age to 60 may be attractive to a section of the uniformed fraternity, it may not really assist in bringing down the defence pension Bill, which at 24 per cent of the defence budget — a whopping Rs 1.12 lakh crore — is worrisome, no doubt.

But let us not forget that the defence budget is a mere 1.15 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, and not 3 per cent, as is expected to be, as per the recommendations of a Parliamentary Committee on Defence. Were that to be realised, the pension Bill would be 8.86 per cent of the defence budget.

Also, some of the already instituted measures, such as permanency to the short service commission, OROP already sanctioned etc. would find the DMA struggling to control its inflating pension Bill, a virtual drag on modernisation and general funding.

More innovative measures by way of lateral mobility, compulsory military service and reservists need to be put in place to achieve the desired tooth-to-tail ratio and pyramidical age and career profiles demanded by the military. Getting a handle on the often infructuous Defence Industrial Complex under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and meaningful indigenisation through privatisation are other areas the CDS needs to address to improve the overall combat efficiency and cutting of the flab.

The pension of defence civilians is another substantial loadstone that the CDS needs to do something about. Also, increasing the years of service to earn pension (effectively suggesting a reduction in pension to 50 per cent for service up to 35 years) may not go down well with the new entrants to the defence services, even if applied prospectively.

In any event, the malaise of a bloated manpower situation in the military has been the result of flagrant flouting of norms and uncalled-for beefing up of manpower requirements at the stage of government approval over the years.

To rectify this situation, drastic steps for manpower rationalisation would be called for.

CDS INDIA : Chief of Defence Staff – Game Changer or Damp Squib? (R)

 SOURCE ;  http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/chief-of-defence-staff-game-changer-or-damp-squib/

ALSO  SEE : https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/book-defence-reform-3.pdf

Chief of Defence Staff

 – Game Changer or Damp Squib?

                              By 

          Brig V Jai Kumar (Retd)

12 Jan , 2021

It has been a year since the much-awaited post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was created to provide single point military advice to the national leadership. Almost two decades after a Group of Ministers recommended the creation of the post, General Bipin Rawat took over as the first CDS on 01 Jan 2019. It is perhaps the right time to see whether the manner of its creation and tenancy is a harbinger of enhanced military might and an efficient and cost-effective military machine or just another damp squibs

To put things in perspective, the military is the single source of hard national power, to exert the national will against an adversarial nation, or to prevent aggression by one as seen in Kargil, Doklam and Galwan. While the other sources of national power including economic, political, diplomatic, social and cultural cannot substitute for military power, the hard component, they have a role in enhancing soft power. Eviction of the Pakistani intruders from the icy heights of Kargil or stopping Chinese intrusions in Doklam and Galwan etc would not have been possible without application of military power. The Chinese annexation of Tibet and vast portions of Mongolia as well as extension of its territorial limits well into the South China sea, are all due to exercise of her hard power. It is difficult to imagine these results being achieved through other means.

Military power thus provides the foundation of national power, over which other elements build up. It is not without reason that developed countries with strong economies and highly developed diplomatic and other systems devote a substantial portion of their GDP to sustaining their military might as an essential means of compellence or deterrence

Development and sustenance of military power involves, besides creating well trained military units and formations, for land, sea and air warfare, equipping and training them, providing them with higher direction to synergize their potential, where the whole is greater than the sum of all, and to ensure their development through a continuous cycle of threat assessment, capability gap analysis, capability building, training and testing. Military power must also be supported with timely and comprehensive intelligence inputs, R&D, capital acquisitions and logistics support. There is need of an overarching authority to direct, coordinate, control and take responsibility for all these aspects. In a democracy, this authority must function directly under the political-executive, to enable it to merge the military might of the nation with the other sources of national power. This is the rightful role of the Chief of Defence Staff.

A review of the pre-CDS system and how the nation and its military fared on the parameters of military preparedness, intelligence, R&D, capital acquisitions and logistics would be useful. The pre-CDS Ministry of Defence (MoD), consisted of the Department of Defence (DoD), Department of Defence Production (DoDP), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA), each headed by a Secretary level officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). ..A financial cell of the Finance Ministry was attached to the MoD. There appears to be no one, other than the Defence Minister, who exercises control to ensure that the departments work together or to synergize their energies. Till a few years back the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister also headed the DRDO – an arrangement which was flawed.

The three service headquarters were initially “attached offices” and, post-Kargil, became became “Integrated Offices” of the MoD. Files from the service headquarters were routed through a Joint Secretary in the DoD. Parametric analysis of the four wars that the nation fought under this dispensation would be useful to comment on its appropriateness.

The 1948 Kashmir war, which was fought before the present MoD was in place, saw well trained and equipped army units airlifted to Srinagar airfield to evict the tribal lashkar hordes let loose and actively supported by the Pakistani military in a bid to capture Jammu and Kashmir. Decisive military action executed with grit and valour soon had the marauders on the run. Disaster came in the form of Jawahar Lal Nehru’s decision, without the benefit of cabinet approval to declare a cease fire (on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah) and to refer the matter the UNO, even before the marauders were completely evicted. Refusal to postpone the cease-fire by a fortnight as advised by his Army Chief resulted in a large portion of J&K remaining in the hands of the marauders, which constitutes Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).

The debacle of 1962 was a direct consequence of Nehru’s naivety, inane concepts of statesmanship and obdurate dismissal of expert advice as well as of realities on the ground. The military was relegated to a ceremonial force, its powers severely curtailed in a dispensation created under Nehru’s orders by Defence Secretary HM Patel (Oct ’47 to Jul ’53). { Google :-   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirubhai_M._Patel }  As a consequence, an ill prepared, un-acclimatised and ill-equipped army under an incompetent military leader (Lt Gen BM Kaul, an incompetent and unqualified relative that Nehru imposed upon the Army), was run over by the Chinese PLA, despite raw display of courage, valour and dedication and awe-inspiring junior leadership in the field. Nehru’s refusal to permit use of India’s superior air power, which would yet have resulted in defeating the Chinese aggression, was perhaps his crowning folly that cemented the outcome.

Despite being surprised in ’65, the Indian military, equipped with WW II vintage bolt action rifles, Sherman tanks (the Vijayanta was yet in prototype stage), fighter aircraft fleet of Vampire, Mysteres, Gnats and Hunter aircraft fought the Pakistani aggressors, equipped with superior Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre Jets and F 104 Star Fighters aircraft, to a stand-still. Intelligence failure apart, the political leadership under Lal Bahadur Shastri gave the military its full support and complete freedom of action to grab the initiative by opening a front against Lahore rather than fighting as per Pakistan’s design. This forced Pakistan to divert military resources to protect its hinterland and effectively halted its aggression. Post-war analysts showed a lack of coordination between the Army and the Air Force at the highest levels, with the Army and Air Force not sharing plans.

India created history in 1971 with a brilliant campaign that liberated Bangladesh in under a fortnight (3 to 16 Dec 1971). Backing her Chief’s decision to launch the campaign in December rather than in March, the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi ably complemented General Manekshaw’s efforts through a whirlwind diplomatic initiative and domestic synergy that geared up the entire nation for the effort. One (but not the only) reason to postpone the campaign was deficiency in wherewithal to sustain the military campaign. Unstinting efforts by the defence production agencies and synergizing of all required national energies for the upcoming national effort saw a sharp ramp up of military preparedness. Tri-service synergy was in full display during the entire campaign. Under-whelming performance by the Vijayanta was a        set-back, for which it would be unfair to blame the Heavy Vehicle Factory or the design agency alone.

Surprised again by the surreptitious occupation of heights on our side of the LOC in Kargil by Pakistani forces in May 1999, the army, actively supported by the air force evicted the intruders from virtually invincible positions under harsh environmental conditions. Vajpayee’s directive prohibiting our forces from crossing the LOC, while giving India international brownie points, imposed severe constraints on its military. The Bofors howitzer imported in the 1980s, served the campaign well though India had to resort to emergency procurement of ammunition, normal procurement of which had been derailed due to the corruption scandal.

To summarize, the only instance of close linkage between the political-executive and the military leadership, which happened in 1971, purely due to the personal equations between Mrs Indira Gandhi and General Sam Manekshaw, led to brilliant results. 

The Ministry of Defence, specifically designed by HM Patel, under Nehru’s directives, to debilitate these links and the resultant structure has served the nation ill.

Lack of a single point of accountability for the military being starved of modern of modern weapon systems, munitions and wherewithal to manifest its capabilities also points to inappropriateness of the system by which India conducted her military affairs before institutionalization of the CDS.

So, can the CDS change all this? The answer, sadly, is NO. There has been no meaningful restructuring to address the well-known shortcomings in the conduct of the defence of India. There has been no meaningful restructuring of the MoD. Specifically, the aforementioned lack of an authority, acting under the orders of the Defence Minister, to coordinate, control and take responsibilities for all facets of the MoD is still unchanged.

The much- vaunted CDS is just another department head in the MoD. Further, the newly created “Department of Military Affairs” that he heads is not involved with policy making for the defence of India, preparation for defence or for acts conducive to prosecution of war. These matters continue to remain the preserve of the Department of Defence headed by the Defence Secretary.

Which begs the question – what affairs other than military affairs does the Ministry of Defence engage with. Be it defence policy, defence preparation, defence actions, defence R&D, defence procurements, defence supplies, and defence production all these are part and parcel of Military Affairs. All of them must be controlled, coordinated and directed by a single authority who will then take sole responsibility for any success or failure.

The Chief of Defence Staff, answerable to the Minister of Defence and to the Union Cabinet, must be that single authority. The nation needs that this person has the capability and credentials to shoulder these responsibilities and a sufficiently long tenure, of say five years, to make a difference. Restructuring of the MoD to support him in this endeavour and seating him on the high table of national decision making are also of essence to enable India to maximize her national power through synergy of all its national energies in the fulfilment of her national will.

                                  _________________________

SOURCE:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/19082019-finally-a-cds-for-the-indian-armed-forces-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

Indian Army soldiers. Photo Credit: US DoD, SGT Mike MacLeod, Wikipedia Commons.

 Analysis 

    Finally A CDS For The Indian Armed                            Forces – Analysis 

                                By

                  Maj Gen Alok Deb*

19 August , 2019 

UPDATED 15 JAN 2021

The Prime Minister’s announcement on Independence Day from the ramparts of the Red Fort that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the Indian armed forces would be announced soon, has given rise to elation within the uniformed fraternity. What model should be followed for institutionalising such an appointment and what it entails in terms of reorganisation and operational control has been a matter of heated debate, both within the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy. Some seem to be hailing it as the panacea for all ills afflicting national security, while others are dismissive, predicting that the appointment will be more ceremonial than anything else. 

Given the different models being followed by countries such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) which have trodden this path earlier, as also the reorganisation (on for a couple of years now) in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the existing dispensation in the Pakistan armed forces, such discussions are understandable and, indeed, welcome. 

Jointness is a term that achieved a fresh lease of life after the Kargil War and the subsequent recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee. It has been the focus of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the last few years, based on the directions given by the Prime Minister with great clarity in his address at the Combined Commanders Conference held aboard INS Vikramaditya in December 2015.1 A further fillip to Jointness has been given by the word ‘Integration’. The implications of these two words differ as evinced by all that has been written on the subject in recent years, including the views of the Army and Navy and the perspective of the Air Force. 

Though India has an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), what such integration might actually entail in terms of integrated headquarters (instead of joint), preparing for war in terms of common doctrines, force structures, policies and training objectives, amalgamating logistic resources and other assets and so on is yet to be fully accepted by all stakeholders, and thus not spelt out in detail. Obviously, the way forward is long and challenging. 

At the end of it all, what should finally come about is an India specific model born out of its own peculiarities, current state of individual services, and an overarching long-term perspective of just what the nation requires in the security sphere. While the scope of responsibility of the CDS (in addition to commanding various joint organisations) is being worked out in South Block, as an exercise, it would be instructive to see what changes could be implemented immediately within the current organisational structures through greater jointness, before getting into the gamut of full integration which should be the logical end state. More so, since (for now at least) the Indian armed forces have not been force fed, as their counterparts in the US were with the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act in the last century. 

In the December 2015 speech referred to earlier, two observations made by the Prime Minister deserve greater attention today: “At a time when major powers are reducing their forces and rely more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces. Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal.”2

Given the defence budgeting constraints, a fact accepted by realist defence planners, the necessity for a single point agency to prioritise our weapons procurements based on an accepted joint warfighting doctrine, predicated in turn on national security policy aims and proposed end states, becomes mandatory. A step towards this has been taken with the issue of a joint operational doctrine by HQ IDS in 2018. The CDS would have the authority to bring greater coherence to the doctrine and authorise corresponding amendments if warranted to the Long Term Integrated Procurement Plan (LTIPP), which would automatically acquire greater salience in future. As a corollary, the CDS would be actively involved in formalising newer and modern force structures in consultation with the three services. As the single point of advice to the Government, his recommendations would receive due consideration. He would also provide major inputs for the National Security Strategy and will be responsible for producing the National Military Strategy. 

The above are some of the major responsibilities that the CDS could discharge even today, without any other type of reorganisation, resulting in efficient budgeting and effective warfighting. Needless to say, whatever is proposed must have the appropriate governmental sanction failing which the purpose of setting up such an office would be defeated. There are other tasks which a CDS can perform with minimum restructuring. One is to manage integrated logistics, a concept whose time has come. Some initial steps have been taken in this direction in selected stations, but the matter remains in its infancy. 

Whether it is repairs and recovery, infrastructure development, victualling for all the three services, or procurement of rations, fuels, oils or lubricants, or management of military lands, much can be done by integrating all or some of these functions. Training is another area. While some level of joint training already exists in important staff courses conducted by the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington, it is time to substantially enhance the joint syllabus in such courses. More importantly, while inter service organisations have enough officers from each service, the numbers from one service posted to the headquarters of the other services continue to be miniscule.

As a worldwide phenomenon, militaries being hierarchical societies are known to be averse to major change. The Government has provided an opening to the Services to commence the process of change in a graduated manner. The level of success achieved depends on the sagacity of both the civil and the military brass. The opportunity must be grasped if India’s security aspirations are to be met in full in the near future. A successful beginning by a first time CDS will be a keynote for the same.

                                 ----------------------------------

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

*About the author: Maj Gen Alok Deb, SM, VSM (Retired) is Deputy Director General at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). 

Source: This article was published by IDSA

• 1.“PM chairs Combined Commanders Conference on board INS Vikramaditya at Sea”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, December 15, 2015.
• 2.Ibid.

PART 30 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA : Central Theater Command ( R )

SOURCE:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/tc-central.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Theater_Command

https://sinoinsider.com/2018/02/military-watch-chinas-central-theater-command-gets-a-new-deputy-commander/

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-28-cds-jointness-pla-snapshot.html

Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html


Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
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               Central Theater Command

The five theater commands, which are identified by their strategic locations in east, south, west, north and central China, base their army headquarters in Fuzhou, Fujian Province; Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; Lanzhou, Gansu Province; Jinan, Shandong Province and Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, respectively. The five replaced the former seven military area commands in Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Ji'nan, Shenyang, Lanzhou and Guangzhou as of early 2016. Infrastructure, including communication facilities in the previous seven military area commands, has been taken into consideration for the locations of the headquarters, so that follow-up work on military reform could start as soon as possible.

China's Ministry of National Defense (MND) held a special press conference in Beijing on February 1, 2016, at which the Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun answered journalists' questions about the adjustment and establishment of the theater commands. The new system separates the combat and construction or logistic missions. The theater commands will focus on engagement, while the PLA army, navy and air force will focus on developing their respective forces, said the source. All five commands are expected to have their own army and air force, while naval forces are not likely to be deployed by all five commands. There's no need to build a temporary command system when war erupts, as the joint operations of each theater command will suffice, which is also helpful for troops to successfully fulfill their training and mission, said the source. The five commands will only deploy their own force against security threats, and they need to report to the CMC for additional support.

The Army's subordinate organs within the five theater commands are built on the basis of certain functions and institutions of the former MACs, the Navy's subordinate organs within the five theater commands are built on the basis of relevant naval fleets, and the Air Force's subordinate organs within five theater commands are built on the basis of the air force of former MACs. To date, the adjustment and establishment of the services' organs within five theater commands has been completed.

Central Theater Command is one of the five military regions of People's Liberation Army of China,^[1] and was founded on February 1, 2016.^[2] Its predecessor was the Beijing Military Region.^{[citation needed} Its          jurisdictionincludes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan and Hubei.^[3] Its commander is Gen. Yi Xiaoguang and its political commissar is Gen. Yin Fanglong.^[4][2]                                                                                                             

The International Institute for Strategic Studies attributes to the command of 300,000 personnel, consisting of three group armies (the 27th Army, 38th Army, and the 65th Army), two armoured divisions, one mechanised infantry division, five motorised divisions, one artillery division, three armoured, seven motorised infantry, four artillery, a total of five various anti-aircraft brigades, and one anti-tank regiment.^[5] The command is also augmented by the Beijing Capital Garrison, which consists of the 1st Guards and the 3rd Guards Divisions, and the Beijing Garrison Honor Guard Battalion and Color Guard Company, both of them are charged with public duties, and is also home to the PLA Navy (PLAN) North Sea Fleet and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 10th Air Force Corps.^{[citation needed]}

In addition to guarding the capital, the CTC is also in charge of training key personnel for leadership positions through the numerous military academies in the region.^{[citation needed]}

CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND

Addendum III: PLA Organization of Theater Forces
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%2C%20Section%202%20-%20China%27s%20Military%20Modernization%20in%202017.pdf  See page 220



PLA Army** 

81 Group Army

 Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes
 Artillery Bde 
Air Defense Bde  
Special Operations Bde
 Army Aviation Bde 


82 Group Army

 Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes 
 Artillery Bde
 Air Defense Bde 
 Special Operations Bde
 Army Aviation Bde

83 Group Army 

Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes
 Artillery Bde† 
Air Defense Bde 
 Special Operations Bde 
Army Aviation Bde

PLA Air Force 

Central Theater Air Force Fighter Div 8 

 Fighter/Attack Air Bdes 2
 Bomber Divs Specialized Air Rgt Transport Div
   SAM Div
  4 SAM Bdes
  PLA Air Force Airborne Corps

PLA Rocket Force
    66 Base
     4 Missile Bdes

Note: The order of battle and theater structure presented in addenda I through III reflect Commission assessments based on available open-source information. It is necessarily partial, due to several factors, including: incomplete reporting on China’s military modernization developments; uncertainties surrounding China’s military reform and reorganization, which is only partially complete; and the general opacity surrounding China’s military modernization and reforms. The Commission will continue to track these developments and provide periodic updates.


CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND

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References[edit]

1. ^ Zhen, Liu (January 4, 2018). "Xi Jinping calls for battle readiness as troops stage massive winter drills across China". South China Morning Post. Retrieved January 4, 2018. Dressed in a winter camouflage uniform and flanked by the other members of the supreme Central Military Commission, Xi issued the call from a military base in the Central Theatre Command, one of the country’s five military zones, as troops in 4,000 sites across the country took part in simultaneous drills in the armed forces’ annual new year exercises on Wednesday. Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
2. ^ Jump up to:^a b "President Xi announces establishment of five PLA theater commands". Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. 1 February 2016. Retrieved 14 June 2019. A grand inauguration ceremony was held to mark the founding of the five theater commands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Beijing on Feb. 1, 2016....and Han Weiguo and Yin Fanglong, commander and political commissar of the Central Theater Command....
3. ^ Teo, Cheng Wee (3 Feb 2016). "Military rezoning shows China's focus is on winning wars". The Straits Times. Singapore Press Holdings. Retrieved 14 June 2019. [see map graphic for list of provinces]
4. ^ "Military Watch: China's Central Theater Command Gets a New Deputy Commander". SINOINSIDER. 14 February 2018. Retrieved 14 June 2019. Yi Xiaoguang’s appointment as CTC commander appeared to be confirmed as early as Oct. 18, 2017 when he attended a 19th Party Congress delegate meeting wearing a CTC unit patch and seated beside CTC political commissar Yin Fanglong, a scene aired by China Central Television.
5. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006