ARMED FORCES :India: Crises In Command? – Analysis(R)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13012017-india-crises-in-command-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

ARMED FORCES :India: Crises In Command? – Analysis

                                  By 

                  Murli Menon*

India signed a contract in February 2010 for 12 AgustaWestland AW101 VVIP helicopters. Photo by Brehmemohan, Wikipedia Commons.

BY IPCS 

JANUARY 13, 2017

The controversial nature of the new Indian army chief’s appointment and the corruption scandal involving a former air chief has brought the Indian military leadership in the media spotlight once again.

In India, traditionally, military leadership has got a short shrift. The lack of a strategic culture in India, evident from the lack of understanding of military matters by the civilian hierarchy, is a possible reason for this. The gradual “corporatisation” of the Indian armed forces is another possible contributory factor, where corporate mismanagement [ Read Babugiri] has undermined time-proven military leadership skills. India and its defence establishment need to revisit their own military leadership culture and identify weaknesses. A more copious media debate and agitation by the cognoscenti is required before policy changes could possibly be brought about in this regard.

Military leadership offers different sets of challenges than its civilian variant. Over the years, some civilian leaders have to tried to imbibe certain aspects of military leadership but with very little success. 

Attempts by the military to “civilianise” or “corporatise” its leadership ethos may have more dangerous implications as it could have a direct impact on national security.

A military leader needs to lead men into battle. In the absence of war, the armed forces tend to lose their leadership perspective, and consequently, their fighting edge. This seems to be the case with the Indian armed forces, as these days, they are employed essentially only for counter-insurgency or Low Intensity Conflict Operations. The challenges are even more profound when a military establishment must keep itself battle ready even in times of comparative “peace” or “no peace, no war” situations. This is when basic tenets of military leadership cannot be allowed to be glossed over.

The biggest problem for a peace-time military is what has been described as the “ticket-punching” phenomenon. Every military service lays down norms to enable its officer cadre to have a smooth transition from its tactical to operational and strategic levels of leadership. Nevertheless, some officers choose to “ticket-punch” their way through the established hierarchical shaft, either avoiding the more challenging assignments altogether by opting for “low threat” assignments or by opting for other ornamental staff jobs. These “easier” assignments also tend to offer inflated report statuses numerically, allowing the concerned ticket-punchers to steal a march over their other colleagues who may have exposed themselves to operationally much more challenging and riskier assignments. The promotion criteria in all services, therefore, ought to be based on a military leader’s successful transition across the mandatory field and staff assignments across all levels – tactical, operational and strategic – of war, and not any other extraneous considerations.

Another factor that assists “ticket-punchers” in gaining an unfair advantage is the ill-thought out changes in personnel policies, at times provoked by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Staff/Operations criteria attempt proposed by the Army – and undone by the MoD – and the wanton reduction some years ago of “discretionary weightage” drastically from 25 per cent to 5 per cent (precluding the scope for objectively compensating a deserving candidate during promotion for higher ranks in the Air Force) are two such cases in point.

If the Establishment sends across the message of appointing only an “operationally sound” officer as the chief of any of the services, most travails regarding inept senior level military leadership would be overcome. Even with such merit-imbued promotional criteria in place, it is possible that a senior military functionary, including a chief, could get compromised in some scam. 

Air Chief Marshall (Retd) Shashi Tyagi’s alleged involvement in the AgustaWestland chopper scam is one such example.

 These types of situations need to be addressed through reforms such as Intelligence Bureau vetting, subordinate reportage in confidential reports, and increased transparency in the equipment procurement processes. What is currently playing out with Air Chief Marshall (Retd) Shashi Tyagi is a different matter altogether. He appears to be the fall guy for big political entities. With a proactive judiciary, it is only a matter of time before the truth prevails.

The requirement, therefore, is to ensure that military leadership does not get compromised in terms of dilution of mandatory qualitative criteria for any promotion, particularly the ones to starred ranks. This would remove any possible controversy if a person with better operational credentials supersedes lesser endowed peers. Military leadership has to be nurtured over time. 

Performance in wars may not always be a practical criterion, given that the entire military leadership is now from a “post-war” era as they were commissioned post-1971, the system should look for other norms. It is still possible that these criteria could be ignored leading to the wrong person being elevated to the top job. India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar is quite right when he says that seniority alone cannot be a criterion for promotion. This is where the Indian military needs doctrinal precepts to support its personnel policies, preventing tinkering of norms without objective analyses. India also needs to put in place institutional quadrennial defence reviews like they have in the US – to undertake reformations in the Indian military’s operational, administrative and support infrastructure and procedures.

TOPICS:CorruptionIndiaMilitaryPoliticsSecuritySouth Asia

SOURCE:
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/choosing-an-army-chief-the-perils-of-choice/20161228.htm

Choosing an Army Chief: The Perils of Choice                                               

                                   By

                      Ajai Shukla  

 December 28, 2016

With ambitious generals knowing that political patronage might be rewarded, a worrying era of politicisation of the military looms ahead, observes retired Colonel Ajai Shukla who has known Generals Rawat, Bakshi and Hariz for a long time.

In 1949, when Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was appointing India's first commander-in-chief (downgraded in 1955 to 'chief of army staff'), he faced a choice between three top professionals.

The senior-most was General K M Cariappa, a dead-honest Anglophile with a marked aversion to dhotiwalas, as the army disparagingly referred to Congress leaders.

Next in line was General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji, the princely brother of the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar.

The third was General Nathu Singh, an earthy, Rajput son of the soil.

Rajendrasinhji and Nathu Singh together told Nehru that Cariappa deserved to be appointed, given his seniority and competence.

Nehru, fearful that an over-assertive general might destabilise India's foundling democracy as was happening in several newly independent countries, wondered aloud whether the Indian Army should continue to have a British commander-in-chief, because of the inexperience of Indian generals.

After all, British generals had commanded the army till then, and the navy and air force continued with British chiefs for several more years.

However,  Gen Nathu, with his patriotism offended, told Nehru only half-humorously that, by that token, maybe India should have a British prime minister as well.

Cariappa was appointed without further ado.

It might be unrealistic to expect a similar sense of fair play today.

Indeed, it is more or less accepted now that seniority should not be the single criterion for appointing an army chief, with merit also counting towards the government's eventual choice.

Even so, with the government having named Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat as the next army chief, superseding two lieutenant generals senior to him -- Praveen Bakshi and P M Hariz -- on the grounds that Rawat is better equipped to handle the challenges of the future

 important questions arise over what 

constitutes 'merit.'

I am no dispassionate observer in writing on this supersession drama. I have personally known all three protagonists for four decades, especially Bakshi and Rawat, with whom I shared a squadron in the National Defence Academy.

Later, Bakshi, Hariz and I commanded our regiments together, after which I left service prematurely to become a defence journalist, while the other three went on to high command.

As one who has observed them closely, I can confidently state that all three are superbly equipped to lead the army.

Like Bakshi and Hariz, I was a mechanised forces officer, which meant I spent long years in the deserts of Rajasthan and the plains of Punjab.

Yet, like all armoured corps and mechanised forces officers, I also served tenures in Nagaland, Manipur, Jammu and Kashmir and even Africa.

To argue, as government mouthpieces have done since December 17, that Bakshi's shorter experience (Note: Not absence of experience) of counter-insurgency operations renders him ill-equipped to be army chief is as mischievous and misleading as declaring that Rawat's shorter experience in the plains renders him unfit to command the army in a war with Pakistan, when the bulk of India's offensive power will be applied through its mechanised strike corps.

This criticism of Bakshi and his supersession by Rawat amounts to accepting that the army's prime job is no longer conventional war, but counter-insurgency operations.

And that is tantamount to admitting defeat to Pakistan, whose military strategy has always been to tie down India's military with sub-conventional forces (jihadi militants), while its nuclear arsenal deterred India from retaliating with conventional warfare.

Today, as always, a chief's first preoccupation must remain conventional operations and full-scale war.

Low-intensity operations against separatists must remain a secondary business.

Political decision-makers should also be aware that the side-lining of two mechanised forces officers is being watched with dismay by three quarters of the army, which is deeply divided over the inequitable cornering of promotion vacancies by the infantry and artillery -- the two arms that have monopolised the army chief's office for two decades.

In February, the Supreme Court finally intervened, ordering more vacancies to be distributed to other arms. Yet, there are continuing lawsuits against skewed promotion policies that favour the infantry with disproportionate promotion vacancies.

Now, after two decades, when an armoured corps general was becoming chief in the natural course, an infantry general has superseded him on grounds that would apply, with only minor modifications, to every non-infantry general who is considered for chief in the future.

This is not going unnoticed in the army.

Given the emerging consensus that service chiefs should be selected on the basis of merit, not just seniority, the central question then becomes: 

'Should there be an objective set of 

criteria to evaluate merit?'

There are absolutely none at present.

It could be argued that a general found professionally meritorious enough to be made an army commander (the lieutenant generals one rung below the army chief, who command the Northern, Western Command, etcetera) would also possess the qualities needed to become army chief.

That, however, is only partially true. An army chief has two other important functions.

First, he must be the symbolic and inspirational figurehead for the entire army, a man with the communication skills and media savvy to portray the service in a positive light and create public confidence.

Second, the political leadership must have confidence in the army chief.

Currently, given the leaders' superficial and transactional relationship with the military, the apex political leadership has negligible personal 

interaction with the gaggle of 17 army, navy and 

air force commanders that have sprung up over the years.

While selecting, say, an army chief, the defence minister and prime minister would have only superficially interacted with the generals they are choosing from.

Implementing the long-proposed structures of 'tri-service geographical commands' would narrow down the field to just 5 to 7 geographical commanders, who political leaders might come to know as individuals.

Until then, leaders would be forced to make the 'choice' based on others' inputs, possibly motivated or parochial.

Finally, as evident from Rawat's appointment, a so-called 'merit-based' choice permits the politicisation of the country's most apolitical institution.

Further, it incentivises senior military officers to establish political contacts, which inevitably diminish the military's own channels of authority.

Till now, the military had managed to walk the tight-wire, accepting nominal political authority while resisting political meddling in internal decisions.

This was possible because successive governments were content to allow the military to make its own choices.

Now, with ambitious generals knowing that political patronage might be rewarded, a worrying era of politicisation of the military looms ahead.

Ajai Shukla

Source: 

Related News: 

Bipin Rawat, Praveen Bakshi, General K M Cariappa, M Hariz, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/legacy-of-dignity-for-army-chief/343057.html

            Legacy of Dignity for Army Chief

                                      By

                 Lt Gen Baljit Singh (retd)

When a Chief assumes office through ‘deep selection’ and superseding ‘equals’, he must stand by his better military judgement and follow his conscience to remain prepared to even resign, if need be.

Army Chief-designate Lt General Bipin Rawat paying homage to the martyrs of the 1971 India-Pakistan war. 

George Orwell was born in India in 1903, to British parents. As was the practice in those times, he was banished to spend most of his childhood and adolescent years in England; schooling at the exclusive Eton College, followed by graduation from Christchurch College, in Cambridge University. Again, as was the “done thing” for such well born and aspiring young men, he qualified for entrance to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and was appointed to the Imperial Police cadre, to serve in Burma.

By all counts, George Orwell was a distinguished police officer but he had made a poor choice of profession as he was intellectually inclined, or rather driven, for seeking equitable social opportunities for the teeming economically poorer segments of human society. He espoused his dream brilliantly through the book Animal Farm, which after numerous rejections was ultimately published in early 1945.

As may be imagined, the characters of the book are essentially pigs, horses, et al, who are harnessed to toil at the Manor Farm for their human master, Mr Jones. And one fine day, all animals assemble and in a kind of coup take over the farm to usher in Utopia, and adopt seven commandments, the most important being:
All animals are equal, and whatever goes on two legs is an enemy.

However, George Orwell had witnessed how the principle of equality was soon turned into dictatorial tyranny by Stalin in the USSR. So the utopian philosophy in Animal Farm is modified by the leader of animals to read: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”. Now it may be tad oversimplification of what in the armed forces today goes as the system of “Selection Grade Promotions”, but in essence that is what it is.

There are very well-honed step-by-step merit-evaluation checks applied at multiple levels of the screening process on all aspirants for the next elevation in rank. It would be hard to fault the system per se, particularly as it also provides opportunity for redress by those who may deem it rightful.

Having said all this, let me go back to the mid-1950s for the selection of the successor to General SM Shrinagesh.  As this has been brought to my notice by a friend, retired Maj General PK Mallick, by quoting from the book, Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, by Maj General V K Singh of the Corps of Signals published by SAGE Publications, 2005; I find it most appropriate for all Indian citizens to be better informed:

“In May 1955, Thimayya was appointed GOC-in-C, Southern Command. His tenure was uneventful, except for an attempt by Pakistan to infiltrate in the Chad Bet region of the Rajasthan desert, which was effectively dealt with by a motorised battalion. In September 1956 he moved to the Eastern Command, thus becoming the first officer to command all three field armies in India. In the Eastern Command he had to deal with insurgency by the Naga tribes, in North-East India. At that time, General S.M. Shrinagesh was the Chief of Army Staff. He was due to retire in May 1957, and there were several contenders for the post. Lieut Generals Sant Singh and Kalwant Singh were from the same Sandhurst batch, having passed out on 29 January 1925. The other two were Thimayya and PN Thapar, who had also passed out from Sandhurst together, on 4 February 1926. Thimayya had been placed 15th in order of merit (Sic. at Sandhurst), while Thapar was 18th. Hence, he was technically senior to Thapar. However, the most important factor was Thimayya's impressive war record — he had won the DSO, and was the only Indian to have commanded a brigade in battle. The others did not have any notable achievement to their credit. As expected, Thimayya was selected for the top job in the Army, and on 8 May 1957, he was promoted to General, and took over as Chief of Army Staff. He superseded Lieut General Sant Singh, who resigned, as well as Lieut General Kalwant Singh, who decided to continue....”

What is not stated about General KS Thimayya and what additionally may have singled him out in the “deep selection” process is that he was in command of Siri Division (later 19 Infantry Division), which oversaw practically all operations to include the capture of Zozi La on November 1, 1948, personally led the first Dakota landing at Leh (an improvised landing strip) on May 24, 1948, and the liberation of Ladakh right up to the Karakoram Pass!

Subsequently, after two years of stalemate at the UN General Assembly, when it was finally agreed to set up the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, Maj General Thimayya became its Chairman on July 27, 1953, and his delicate and impartial handling of the acrimony was universally applauded. It was to his credit that North Korea amicably accepted 70,183 of their prisoners of war.

I had less than two years’ service at the time, but I recall that General Thimayya as the Chief was the toast of the entire Army. And with his vast experience of war from up front, he was believed not to favour “showing the flag” posts deployed in Ladakh and along the McMahon Line in the East. In terms of numbers, fire power and logistic access, these posts were a “push over” for the better placed Chinese.

General Thimayya’s war wisdom and political astuteness proved correct. Sometime in August-September 1959, the Chinese in a short and swift move inflicted heavy loses to our isolated post at Longju, in the Siang Valley close to where the Brahmaputra river descends into India. Another post at Machuka was so terribly isolated that our troops chose to abandon it when challenged by the Chinese. Admittedly, that was a disgraceful soldierly conduct but that is how it ended.

These foregone defeats imposed on the military against the better judgement of their Chief, and Defence Minister Krishna Menon’s inability to engage the Army Chief in a meaningful discussion, was the fundamental reason that drove General Thimayya to tender his resignation. Far worse was to follow when Prime Minister Nehru persuaded the Chief to retract his resignation and in the next breath, berated him in the Lok Sabha.

So when a Chief assumes office through deep selection and superseding two “equals”, he must stand by his better military judgement and follow his conscience to even resign, if need be.

And lastly, when General KM Cariappa became the first Indian Chief on January 15, 1949, he had followed the age-old tradition, that is, the incumbent Chief demits office at the stroke of midday and the Chief-designate quietly walking into his office the following morning. And performs his first duty to his Army by way of the “Special Order of the Day”, which basically is a motivational epistle focused on upholding the oath of fidelity, come what may.

 Of late, an unsavoury deviation has crept in, that is, the Chief-designate walks into the office accompanied by his wife, where they are received by the incumbent Chief together with his spouse.

This does not go well with the dignity of that exalted office.

SOURCE:
http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/7780-men-shadows-derailed-bakshi-s-chances-becoming-army-chief

RELATED 

MUST READ

   PART -I  :-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/the-army-chiefs-challenge.html
         
 PART - II:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/arm-in-arm-institutions-like-army-are.html

 PART - III:- 
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/selection-of-army-chief-sensitive-issue.html

PART - IV:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/men-in-shadows-derailed-bakshis-chances.html

PART - V:-
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/india-coas-brewing-storm-in-teacup.html

        Men in shadows derailed Bakshi’s             chances of becoming Army Chief

                               By

                   Shiv Kunal Verma 

NEW DELHI 

25 December, 2016

Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command arrives for a three-day visit to review the operational preparedness and the security situation in Gangtok, on 2 November 2015. IANS

There is evidence to indicate that the move to supersede Lt General Praveen Bakshi, the senior most Army commander who was seen as the natural contender for the post of Army Chief after the retirement of General Dalbir Singh Suhag, started some months ago, with negative stories about the officer being planted through anonymous letters. Four anonymous letters were floated with vague allegations against Bakshi by “men in shadows”, who succeeded in getting a probe ordered into the charges. Nothing emerged from the investigation. But the fact that an investigation was ordered, was used against him for sidelining Lt Gen Bakshi. Eventually, Lt Gen Bipin Rawat was made the Indian Army Chief.

Even Kautilya, the acknowledged master who laid down the guiding principles of statecraft during the era of Chandragupta Maurya, would have been befuddled with what has been happening since the days of the UPA to the Indian state and its relationship with its own armed forces today. The naming of Lt General Bipin Rawat as the next Chief of Army Staff defies convention. The decision, which meant superseding two serving Army Commanders, now is certain to change the very outlook of senior commanders in the armed forces in the future.

From ancient times—going back to the Ramayana and the Mahabharata—the epics assert that “a king’s roots are his treasury and his army”. A careful examination of the Mahabharata in particular, when shorn of its myth and poetic fancy, allows us to glean the foundation on which later Indian military theory and practice evolved. In the beginning, the Army was one of the two prakritis (essential elements), but as time went on, more and more elements were added on and the Army sank lower and lower down in the order of importance.

Nevertheless, despite having senapranetras (later known as senapatis), kings retained their supremacy in matters of defence, being the final and ultimate authority when it came to taking decisions. In his superb book, A Military History of Ancient India, Major General G.S. Sandhu writes: “The king, and the other princes, received their early training in niti (politics) and dhanurveda (military science); they were imparted training in both the theoretical and practical aspects of warfare. They were also given intensive training until they gained proficiency in the use of weapons.”

Today, monarchies are long gone, and the people are governed by the state where power is centred in the hands of elected representatives. However, the fact of the matter is that with the reins of power in their hands, the elected head of a democratic government is in a way a modern-day monarch. The main difference from the days of yore, however, is that our decision making officialdom of today know little about armies and what makes soldiers tick, to say nothing of the use of weapons, their deployment, and their use. Since the early 1950s, ever since the political-bureaucratic began to exercise power in Independent India, most of them and those in their immediate vicinity have had little exposure to the armed forces.

The writing was on the wall for Lieutenant General Praveen Bakshi three to four months ago when an unseen “dirty tricks department” suddenly became hyperactive. Until then, Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi, the Eastern Army Commander, being the senior most among those who had the residual service to make the grade, was seen as the natural contender for the top job when the present COAS would hang up his boots. An Armoured Corps officer, Bakshi had an outstanding record of service, and among the rank and file, the reputation of being a no-nonsense dyed-in-the-wool soldier, who would, it was hoped, ensure self-respect in the armed forces.

               Lt Gen Bipin Rawat        &      Lt Gen P.M. Hariz

Four anonymous letters were floated with vague allegations against Bakshi. The “men in the shadows” succeeded in getting a probe ordered into the charges. Interestingly, through his four-year tenure first as Eastern Army Commander and then the COAS, the present incumbent, General Dalbir Singh Suhag had ensured that only his handpicked officers had replaced him as the Corps Commander in Dimapur, Nagaland. It may be remembered that General Suhag had been the 3 Corps Commander for some time and is conversant with that area and its special characteristics. It may also be recalled that it was during this period that he had a DV-ban slapped on him by General V.K. Singh in connection with the Jorhat raid that was reversed by his successor, General Bikram Singh, the moment he took over. Meanwhile, Bakshi’s squeaky-clean image could not be dented and the agencies apparently reported back saying they had nothing to build a case on.

To make matters tricky for the “shadow men”, the Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, initially decided to stick to the existing norms of seniority and suggested Bakshi’s name to the Prime Minister’s Office. Suddenly, out of the blue, anonymous missives appeared, ghost written by the “men in shadows”. The government thereupon went in for a relook.

Coming to General Suhag, throughout his tenure as the Army Chief, he has surrounded himself with Gorkha Regimental officers. Various key appointments have been lying vacant for months altogether, as was the case with the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun. The outgoing Army Chief is very close to the National Security Adviser. In the aftermath of the Monand Chandel incidents in May and June 2016, where eight Assam Rifles men and then 22 men from the Dogra Regiment were killed, the NSA had himself supervised the nationally acclaimed retaliatory raid that the then DGMI said took place within Myanmar.

With some sections of the government reportedly keen on picking Lt Gen Bipin Rawat for the job, there was a meeting of common interest between them and the COAS, who too had a high opinion of Rawat, who had been one of his chosen few to command 3 Corps. However, to appoint Rawat, the Ministry of Defence had to go over the head of not just Praveen Bakshi, but also Lt Gen P.M. Hariz, who was the Southern Army Commander in Pune. This, it was then claimed, was done “in national interest”.

The writing was on the wall for Lieutenant General Praveen Bakshi three to four months ago when an unseen “dirty tricks department” suddenly became hyperactive. Until then, Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi, the Eastern Army Commander, being the senior most among those who had the residual service to make the grade, was seen as the natural contender for the top job.

In the immediate aftermath of the announcement, the government informally justified Lt General Rawat’s promotion on the grounds that as an infantry officer he had greater experience in handling counter insurgency scenarios. However, this failed to impress critics who pointed out that Bakshi had earlier commanded 9 Corps and served as Chief of Staff, Northern Command, apart from which he also handled Eastern Command, which was as deeply involved with CI Ops as Northern Command. The same could also be said for Lt Gen Hariz, who, like Bakshi, has had a blemish-less record of service and enjoys a first class reputation amongst his peers and his men. On social media and across forums, there was a divide as the Army split into two—those for and those against, mainly on grounds of their service arm.

According to the same ancient texts that hold forth on the role of senapatis and kings, the role of the soldier is clearly defined, stating “The gods send calamities unto those who forsake their comrades in battle and return home with unwounded limbs”. Led by an able administrator, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the government needs to ensure that the “shadow men” are not allowed to prevail with their choices of who will eventually hold the reins of the Army. By manipulating the system for reasons best known to themselves, the “shadow men” may well have prevailed with their choice of who will eventually hold the reins of the Army, but they have also driven a wedge into a system where men at the very top may forsake their comrades in peacetime. For soldiers do not only fight with courage and valour for country and flag, they fight mainly for the man on their left and the man on their right and at the end of the day, they expect fair play from those at the top. It is imperative that the need of the hour is to dispel the influence of these “men in shadows” and their modus operandi of anonymous complaints, which should be treated with the contempt they deserve. It is now up to Prime Minister Modi, whose destiny it is to preside over the various prakritis that hold this country together to ensure that the Army is kept away from these underhand tactics and each soldier is given the respect and honour due to him or her.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of the books 

The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why (Rupa & Co.) and 

1962: The War That Wasn’t (Aleph). 

The latter, hailed by critics to be the most definitive account of the Sino-Indo conflict, examines in detail the role of the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in tampering with the Army’s hierarchy, which directly led to the debacle against China.