In the nearly six years since protestors in Syria first demonstrated against the four-decade rule of the Assad family, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed and some twelve million people—more than half the country’s pre-war population—have been displaced. The country has descended into an ever-more-complex civil war: Jihadis promoting a Sunni theocracy have eclipsed many opposition forces fighting for a democratic and pluralistic Syria. Regional powers have backed various local forces to advance their geopolitical interests on Syrian battlefields. The United States has been at the fore of a coalition conducting air strikes on the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Turkey, a U.S. ally, has invaded in part to prevent Kurdish forces, who are backed by the United States in the fight against the Islamic State, from linking up their autonomous cantons. Russia too has carried out air strikes in Syria; though it claimed to be primarily targeting the Islamic State, analysts say it has more often targeted rebels, including those backed by the United States, who seemed to pose a more immediate threat to the Syrian regime.
After a long stalemate, foreign backers of the regime have turned the tide in Assad’s favor, capturing rebel-held enclaves of east Aleppo, which had once been a hub of the resistance. But Syria likely faces years of instability. Assad has never been willing to negotiate his way out of power, but his continued rule is unacceptable to millions of Syrians, particularly given the barbarity civilians have faced. Meanwhile, the foreign forces on which he relies will continue to wield power. In the north, Kurds will be unlikely to cede their hard-won autonomy, and the Islamic State is yet to be defeated.
Hafez al-Assad is welcomed in Moscow by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1971. Bettmann/Corbis
Assads’ Rule Breeds Discontent
Hafez al-Assad seized power from a Ba’athist military junta in 1970, centralizing power in the presidency. Assad, who came from the Alawi minority, a heterodox Shia sect that had long been persecuted in Syria and was elevated to privileged positions under the post–World War I French mandate, promoted pan-Arab nationalism.
In February 1982, Hafez ordered the military to put down a Muslim Brotherhood uprising in the city of Hama with brute force. Syrian forces killed more than twenty-five thousand there. For the regime’s opponents, Hama would become a rallying cry in 2011. For the regime, it provided Hafez’s son and successor, Bashar, with a template for responding to dissent.
The Assads presided over a system that was not just autocratic but kleptocratic, doling out patronage to bind Syrians to the regime. As the 2011 uprising turned to civil war, many members of minority groups remained loyal to the regime, but so too did some Sunnis, fearing revenge if opposition forces were to take Damascus.
President Bashar al-Assad tours the industrial city of Hessya in 2007. (SANA/AP Photo)
Economic Reforms Upend Syrian Society
Bashar succeeded his father in 2000 pledging reforms. He promised to let markets take the place of the “Arab socialism” touted by the Ba’athist state, upending old patronage networks. He broke up and privatized state monopolies, but the benefits were concentrated among those well-connected with the regime, while the end of subsidies and price ceilings harmed rural peasants and urban laborers. Arecord-setting drought from 2006 to 2010 exacerbated socioeconomic problems. Mismanaged farmland was rendered fallow and farmers migrated to cities in ever-larger numbers, causing the unemployment rate to surge.
Syrians gather outside Deraa's main courthouse, which was set on fire by demonstrators demanding freedom and an end to corruption, in March 2011. Khaled al-Hariri/Reuters
Arab Uprisings Echo Across Repressed Region
The Arab Spring began in December 2010 with the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor decrying corruption. His desperate act inspired protests in Tunisia, and then across the Middle East and North Africa, which forced longtime strongmen in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt to step down. Inspired by these previously unthinkable events, fifteen boys in the southwestern city of Deraa spray painted on a school wall: “The people want the fall of the regime.” They were arrested and tortured. Demonstrators who rallied behind them clashed with police, and protests spread. Many were calling for something more modest than regime change: the release of political prisoners, an end to the half-century-old state of emergency, greater freedoms, and an end to corruption. Unlike Tunisia's Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Assad responded to protestors immediately, offering just token reforms while directing security services toput down the protests with force.
People demonstrate against the Assad regime in the besieged town of Al Qsair, near Homs, in January 2012. Alessio Romenzi/Corbis
From Protest Movement to Civil War
Anti-regime protests soon spread from Deraa to major cities like Damascus, Homs, and Hama. Events in Deraa offered a preview of what was to come elsewhere: The Syrian army fired on unarmed protestors and carried out mass arrests, both targeting dissidents and indiscriminately sweeping up men and boys,rights monitors reported. Torture and extrajudicial executions were frequently reported at detention centers. Then, in late April, the Syrian army brought in tanks, laying siege to Deraa. The civilian death toll mounted and residents were cut off from food, water, medicine, telephones, and electricity for eleven days. Amid international condemnation, the regime offered some concessions, but also repeated the Deraa method elsewhere where there were protests, at far greater length and cost, leading some regime opponents to take up arms. Local coordinating committees sprang up in villages and urban neighborhoods. Originally established to organize resistance to the regime, many of these committees would take on the role of public administration and service provision.
Members of the Free Syrian Army in January 2012. Alessio Romenzi/Corbis
A Disorganized Opposition Splinters
In July 2011, defectors from Assad’s army announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army, and soon after they began to receive shelter in Turkey. Yet the FSA, outgunned by the regime, struggled to bring its loose coalition under centralized command and control. FSA militias often didn’t coordinate their operations and sometimes had competing interests, reflecting their varied regional backers. With resources scarce, they preyed at times on the very populations they were charged with protecting. Its civilian counterpart was also established in summer 2011, in Istanbul. The Syrian National Coalition claimed to be the government-in-exile of Syria, and the United States, Turkey, and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, among others, soon recognized it as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.” But the SNC and its successor, the National Coalition, were unable to deliver significant diplomatic or material support to the opposition, and many of the regime’s opponents within Syria accorded it little legitimacy. Rival coalitions began to proliferate, and FSA fighters drifted to Islamist brigades which, with funding and arms from Gulf donors, scored greater battlefield successes against the regime.
Islamic State militants pose for a photo posted online in the Yarmouk refugee camp, in the Damascus suburbs. Balkis Press/Sipa via AP Images
Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Emerge
The regime’s torture and killing was exploited by al-Qaeda militants eager to capitalize on Syria's chaos. In January 2012, a group called Jabhat al-Nusra announced itself as al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise, and the following month al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri called for Sunnis from around the region to join a jihad against the regime. Jabhat al-Nusra gained Syrian and foreign recruits as it scored greater battlefield successes than rival opposition groups.
In April 2013, a group formed from the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq that called itself the Islamic State of Iraq emerged and exceeded even Jabhat al-Nusra in its brutality. In several months, its forces established control over territory spanning western Syria and eastern Iraq. The ascendance of the Islamic State and other extremists groups fed an increasingly sectarian, zero-sum conflict, and civilians living in the fiefs—as with those of the FSA and pro-regime militias—suffered abuse.
The rise of extremist groups in Syria was, in part, the regime’s own doing, as Assad wanted to present to the world a stark choice between his secular rule and a jihadi alternative. In mid-2011, the regimereleased hundreds of Islamist militants from prisons to discredit the rebellion. They would form extremist groups like Ahrar al-Sham, which espoused a sectarian agenda.
A father holds his dead child in Aleppo, which has been contested for months, in October 2012. MAYSUN/epa/Corbis
Civilians as Targets
Both Assad’s forces and rebel groups have regularly targeted civilians in areas beyond their control. The deaths of some 1,400 civilians fromchemical weapons deployed by the Assad regime in the summer of 2013 mobilized world powers to dismantle the regime’s chemical arsenal. However, in the years since, the Syrian government has employed devastating conventional arms that have also caused massive civilian casualties.
The regime has made regular use of sieges and aerial bombardment. These collective-punishment tactics serve dual purposes, analysts say: They raise the costs of resistance to civilians so that they will pressure rebels to acquiesce, and they also prevent local committees from offering a viable alternative to the regime’s governance. In 2016 the UN humanitarian agency saidfive million peoplelived in areas that were besieged or otherwise beyond the reach of aid.
The toll has mounted despite a UN Security Council resolution in 2014 aimed at securing humanitarian aid routes. Humanitarian aid became politicized as Assad would grant UN convoys permission to distribute food and medicine in government-held areas while denying them access to rebel-held areas, and rights advocates charged the regime with targeting medical facilities and personnel.
At a Hezbollah rally in the Beirut suburbs, the militant group's supporters wave flags featuring the faces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Bilal Hussein/AP Photo
From Domestic Rebellion to Internationalized Civil War
The deepening of Syria’s civil war made both pro- and anti-regime forces dependent on external sponsors. As major powers deepened their involvement, Syria has become a battlefield on which the region’s geopolitical rivalries have been fought.
As mounting casualties and desertions weakened Assad’s army, the regime came to rely increasingly on Iran and Russia. Iran, a longtime ally interested in protecting a vital land route to its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, has invested billions in propping up the regime. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps advises Assad’s army and has sustained thousands of casualties. Its volunteer Basij paramilitary force and the foreign Shia militias it has rallied have sustained even more casualties.
Russia, traditionally averse to regime change, has provided Assad with critical diplomatic support. Moscow has cited what it calls an illegal intervention in Libya and the ensuing chaos there as justification for vetoing measures in the UN Security Council that would have punished the regime. Russia then entered the conflict directly in September 2015 with the deployment of its air force. Though Moscow claimed its air strikes would primarily target the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, analysts said it more often targeted other rebel groups, some backed by the United States and many intermingled with al-Qaeda’s affiliate near the front lines with the regime. This helped Assad strengthen his control of population centers along the country’s western spine. Opposition forces, too, depend on foreign support. A rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar enabled the formation in March 2015 of the Army of Conquest, which was designed to overcome the lack of coordination among rebel groups in the north and comprises an array of opposition and extremist groups. The United States, too, has provided covert training and arms to opposition forces. But official foreign support for opposition forces has been unsteady and uncoordinated.
A YPG base in northern Syria bears signs of rocket fire from a Turkish attack. Soran Qurbani/Demotix/Corbis
The Kurdish Bid for Autonomy
Kurds have fought to consolidate a de facto autonomous territory in northern Syria, which has made them alternately friends and foes of Arab opposition groups. The Islamic State’s siege of Kobani in the fall of 2014 was a turning point; the battle to oust the militant group highlighted the effectiveness of the Kurds’ People’s Protection Units (YPG) against the Islamic State. U.S. forces aided in ousting Islamic State fighters from Kobani and continue to provide arms and air support to the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces. But the YPG’s priority has turned to consolidating autonomous Kurdish cantons in the country’s north, a region the Kurds refer to as Western Kurdistan. YPG fighters, interested in protecting fellow Kurds, have been accused of ethnic cleansing in mixed Arab-Kurd areas. The YPG is tied to the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Washington has designated a terrorist organization. In August 2016, Turkey deployed its military along the Syrian border to both roll back Islamic State forces and, in tandem with Syrian Arab and Turkmen fighters, block Kurds from linking up their two cantons in a contiguous territory. The United States considers Turkey, a NATO ally, a vital partner in the war against the Islamic State, and it faces the dilemma of trying not to alienate either partner.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry hold a news conference in Vienna in October 2015 amid frustrated efforts to find a political solution to Syria's civil war. Brendan Smialowski/Pool/Reuters
The Diplomatic Thicket
UN-backed attempts to mediate a conflict-ending political transition in Syria have been stymied by differences among veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council and other powers. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey aligned with the United States against the Assad regime, while Iran joined Russia in backing it. Russia and China have cast multiple vetoes on Syria-related Security Council resolutions, and the threat of veto has deterred or watered down humanitarian and human rights measures, reinforcing a view of the body as toothless. A June 2012 multilateral document known as the Geneva Communique has become the basis for negotiations. It calls for “a Syrian-led political process,” beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body “formed on the basis of mutual consent.” But multiple rounds of peace talks to implement these principles have yielded little. A core issue is Assad himself: He has no interest in negotiating his own political demise and retains Russia's and Iran's backing, while the possibility of Assad staying on in a transition is anathema to the opposition.
With dim prospects for a negotiated settlement, the United States has instead focused on counterterrorism activities while calling for de-escalation. Some analysts say a number of rebels have come to question U.S. commitments and even joined extremist groups due to factors such as the apparent U.S. resignation to Assad remaining in power, its halting support for vetted armed groups, and air strikes in Idlib and Aleppo provinces that at times have been indistinguishable from those by Syrian and Russian forces.
Volunteers help a Syrian refugee on the southeastern Greek island of Lesbos. Manu Brabo/AP Photo
Refugee Crisis Brings EU to a Breaking Point
More than half of Syria’s pre-war population of twenty-two million has been displaced by the violence, with more than six million displaced internally and another six million fleeing abroad. Neighboring countries have borne the heaviest burden: Lebanon, a country of only 4.5 million people, is hosting more than one million Syrians, and Jordan, with more than half a million, has begun blocking would-be refugees from crossing the border. Turkey is host to nearly three million Syrians, straining government resources. With limited work and educational opportunities, and little hope that they will soon be able to return safely home, more than one million refugees havejourneyed to Europe, contributing to what the UN has called the largest migrant and refugee crisis since World War II. Disputes over how to settle refugees across the EU have thrown the bloc into disarray, threatening to bring an end to the Schengen system of open borders on the continent and contributing to the rise of anti-immigrant, far-right parties. The EU struck an agreement with Turkey to block their northward migration, but it is jeopardized after an attempted coup attempt. As Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan purged his political opponents and sought to curry nationalists’ support for consolidating executive power in the presidency, the EU suspended accession talks, leading Erdogan to threaten to once again “open the gates.”
Residents flee the al-Salihin nieghborhood in east Aleppo after regime troops retook the area in December 2016. (George Ourfalian/AFP/Getty Images)
East Aleppo Falls to Pro-Regime Forces
The regime captured the last rebel-held enclave of east Aleppo in December 2016 after a prolonged siege and bombardment. The city, Syria’s economic powerhouse, had been contested since 2012, and its capture marked a stark reversal of fortune for the opposition; in 2013, rebels had nearly encircled the regime-controlled western part of the city. But the campaign also demonstrates how dependent Assad has become on his foreign backers, both the Russian air force and Shiite militias, as his own forces have weakened.
Scores of civilians were massacred in the battle’s last days in what a UN spokesman called “a complete meltdown of humanity.” With their defeat in Aleppo, rebels were isolated to northern Idlib province, parts of the south, and small enclaves around Damascus and Homs. But even with control of major population centers, Assad will have trouble re-establishing authority over a country that has been fragmented by warlords and overrun by foreign forces, and is likely to face a persistent insurgency, analysts say.
(The National Museum, Damascus) — It’s a god-awful situation in Palmyra. How much of our priceless cultural heritage will be destroyed during the expanding re-occupation by Islamic State (IS)?
This observer has received more than two dozen emails in the past 72 hours asking for details of what is happening in Palmyra. Many scholars and citizens interested in Palmyra and our cultural heritage here is Syria, who I have had the honor to communicate with these past three years while doing research for the volume, Syria’s Endangered Heritage: An International Responsibly to Preserve and Protect are, like most of us, abjectly horrified by Palmyra’s recapture by IS last weekend.
I spoke this morning with my friend W.N. who works with Syria’s Directorate of Antiquities and Museums (DGAM) in Homs and who accompanied me during my last visit to Palmyra when we were given detailed briefings from Syrian Military Intelligence. W was last working in the Palmyra National Museum on Thursday 12/8/2016 two days before the first units of what soon became approximately 4000-5000 IS fighters started invading. He reports that none of his colleagues had any idea that ISIS was in the area and apparently neither did the Syrian and Russian army who were caught by surprise, abandoned their base and heavy weapons stores and moved to the West toward Homs. Like all of us, officials and citizens here hope that ISIS will be expelled before they can do serious damage.
The fears of this observer and many archeologists globally, are many and distressing. One is that we will once again see televised executions in the ancient city to strengthen IS positions and create more publicity. Russian, Syrian and Iranian soldiers, taken prisoners, may become the first victims. On 12/15.2016 the government of Iran reported that two of its IRGC officers were killed a couple of days earlier fighting IS near the key Syrian military base, T4. The IRGC armed and funded Afghan Fatemiyoun Division was rushed back to Palmyra once IS re-entered the area on Saturday, 12/10/2016.
The retaking of Palmyra by IS has strategic implications. Palmyra was a much-touted political asset for Moscow. Russia is worried that the international community will see the Kremlin as a loser in Palmyra rather than as a “great power” that Vladimir Putin has been trying to achieve via Crimea, Ukraine as well as Syria and elsewhere. Previously, many ordinary Syrians welcomed Russian troops with admiration and enthusiasm, hoping that Russia’s participation in the Syrian conflict would end the war. Yet today many of them are disappointed. Some are inclined to believe that Russia is just another stakeholder in the conflict with its own interests – just like the Americans, Turks, Kurds, Hezbollah, ISIS and other military forces.
But a more major immediate concern of officials here relates to information this observer was given last May in Palmyra concerning details of what Daesh had planned to do using the nearly 3,500 explosives they had planted among the ruins. The plan was to completely obliterate Palmyra’s ancient sites. (link) but Russian and Syrian forces, with a little bit of luck and technology, plus Russian explosive sniffing dogs, were able to block them at the last minute as Daesh forces fled into the surrounding desert and mountains.
It is widely feared that IS will now decide to carry out its earlier plan which they dubbed “Erase” and substantially pulverize Palmyra’s antiquities. Unless they can be stopped.
As much of the world will recall, the last time IS controlled Palmyra it blew up several ruins, including historic treasures such as the temples of Bel and Baalshamin and the Arch of Victory among others.
The group also staged several mass public executions in the ancient Roman amphitheater.
Two days ago, Tuesday, 12/13/2013 mass executions were reported in Palmyra of more the 200 residents including a school principal and his family. One of the people in Palmyra who was providing information about recent developments was among those reported executed. Most were shot but a least two were beheaded with IS fighters showing residents photos of what happens to “regime agents.” It is predictable that supporters of the Islamic State will again broadcast televised executions in the ancient city in order strengthen their positions and create more publicity. Russian and Syrian soldiers, taken prisoners, will become the first victims.
“The catastrophe has happened, I am in absolute shock!, ” My much valued friend Dr.Maamoun Abdulkarim, Syria’s Director of Antiquities, told the UK Guardian on Sunday 12/11/2016 in a phone interview. “I am losing hope; it looks like we have lost the city.”
During my meeting with Dr. Maamoun this afternoon in his DGAM office at the National Museum in Damascus, where he offered the most recent, yet sketchy, information from Palmyra, the International Patriot revered for his indefatigable work protecting our global cultural heritage, lamented that he will soon be 50 years of age but in reality he feels more than 80, given unfolding events in his cherished Palmyra.
It was reported here today that IS has again taken over the National Museum of Palmyra, re-established its Sharia Court in the basement, and is expected to construct another “Justice Cage” outside the Museum similar to the one shown below when this observer spent three days last May with the Syrian army who briefed him extensively on how Palmyra was liberated on March 28, 2016 by 64 Russian bombing sorties over 45 days along with 2000 Russian, Syrian army and Shia militia fighters.
The “Islamic State” is expected to once again set up, just 30 yards to the left as one exits the main entrance to Palmyra’s museum, a new execution and slave women auction chamber to decapitate nonbelievers and other miscreants as well as sell women for as little as $ 100—the former price as of February 2015 according to IS documents found in its abandoned Sharia Court. The price for virgins less than 16 years of age was at the time set at $ 150.
Last May the army officers, mentioned above, offered assurances to this observer that “Daesh will never come to Tadmor (Palmyra) again!” I believed them given all the details they presented about defenses being set up by Russian and Syrian forces.
So what happened to these defenses and what went so very wrong? This observer has heard speculation that the Syrian military simply didn’t have the manpower to defend Palmyra while it was closing in on eastern Aleppo so the loss of Palmyra for the second time is really nobody’s fault. A spurious argument in my view.
The ISIS re-occupation of Palmyra
Pulling together information from a variety of sources including Palmyra Museum employees who normally work five days a week in Palmyra as well as two ‘citizen journalists’ still living in Palmyra and other sources, the following events appear to have occurred to date.
Three weeks ago foreign Shia militia and Russian forces left Palmyra and were deployed elsewhere, mainly in Aleppo. At about the same time witnesses in Palmyra said 500 fighters reached Syria and were sent to different front lines, the bulk joining ISIS forces near Palmyra. Shortly they were joined by as many as 4,500 more.
On 10/8/2016 ISIS had begun an assault on government positions in Homs province, where Palmyra is located. It quickly overran government army checkpoints and seized oil and gas fields until it reached the city’s edge. The jihadists briefly entered the Palmyra on Saturday 10/10/2016 before appearing to partially withdraw after Russia launched intense air strikes during Saturday afternoon on the advancing units of the IS, According to some reports, the air power forced the IS units to suspend the offensive but despite the raids and the arrival of Syrian army reinforcements, IS seized control of the city hours later. The activist-run Palmyra Co-ordination Collective said IS militants then seized the city’s military warehouse and its northern and western districts after taking government positions, oilfields wheat silos, the city’s hospital and strategic heights in the surrounding countryside over a period of 72 hours. ISIS also attacked two gas fields, al-Mahr and Jazal, which are important for Syria’s electricity generation and some residents in Damascus are reporting that they have been suffering increased electricity shortages since IS took Palmyra for the second time.
Video released by Isis showed abandoned tanks and other vehicles and empty streets, with buildings still emblazoned with paintings of the Syrian flag and Mr Assad.
The T4 military airport, located 50km west of Palmyra in the east Homs countryside, which is a main strategic goal of IS is one of the Syrian regime’s largest and most important airbases, being near a strategic crossroad that lead to Deir Ezzour, Raqqa, Damascus, and other key cities,. On 12/12/2016 the day after they captured Palmyra, IS fighters declared their intent to capture T4 and reportedly battled to within two kilometers of it amidst their ongoing ground offensive in eastern Homs.
One Palmyra resident reported yesterday that days before the surprise attack government forces and their allies redeployed to Aleppo to join the fighting there. Another resident who was able to escape shortly after IS invaded, reported that “Days before the battle began, we noticed regime forces move a large number of fighters and military equipment towards Aleppo city,” as he added on 12/12/2016 that just before the Islamic State attacked, the number of Syrian, Russian and militia personnel had decreased “from around 40,000 to 10,000.” This observer does not particularly credit these large numbers having been given information that there were never that many government fighters still based in Palmyra since its liberation this past May.
What appears to have aided the ISIS recapture of the city is Palmyra’s isolated location in the eastern desert of Homs province, where the group was able to overrun territory quickly and the geography of the city, being surrounded by mountains, makes it very difficult to defend.
On Monday, 12/12/2016, after four days of fighting, IS took control of the eastern part of Palmyra. On Tuesday, 12/13/2013 mass executions were reported in Palmyra of more the 200 residents including a school principal and his family. One of the people near Palmyra who was providing information about recent developments was among those reported executed. Most were shot but a least two were beheaded with IS fighters showing residents photos of what happens to “regime agents.”
As of today IS controls the whole area and its loss is raising questions and much second-guessing from Monday morning armchair Generals. And some real Generals from countries now fighting here.
Most agree that the quick retaking of Palmyra was possible because was not properly defended militarily; and, thus, it was very vulnerable so IS focused their forces in this direction. The breakthrough and rapid advancement of IS was possible due to fundamental mistakes of commanders of units of the Russian and Syrian Armies, deployed in the Palmyra area, who let their guard down and apparently ignored local reports by remaining townspeople that “Daseh” was returning. The Russians did not pay due attention to fortification activities, processes of equipping positions with engineering and combat hardware, and there was carelessness during tactical reconnaissance and assessment of the forces and means of attackers. As a result, commanders did not report the all necessary information to the higher command in Damascus on time, thereby, deluding it.
There are several reasons offered by Syrian military analysts to explain why Russian and Syrian commanders are being accused of making so many mistakes simultaneously.
On 10/8/2016 ISIS began an assault on government positions in Homs province, where Palmyra is located, It quickly overran army checkpoints and seized oil and gas fields until it reached the city’s edge. The jihadists briefly entered the city on Saturday 10/10/2016 before partially seeming to withdraw after Russia launched intense air strikes. Despite the Russian bombing and the arrival of Syrian army reinforcements, IS seized controlled of the city hours later. The activist-run Palmyra Co-ordination Collective said IS militants quickly seized the city’s military warehouse and its northern and western districts after taking government positions, oilfields wheat silos, the city’s hospital and strategic heights in the surrounding countryside over a period of 72 hours.
Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, who commands the US-led coalition bombing IS in Syria, said jihadists seized a large trove of gear including air-defense weapons when they retook the desert city from Russia and Syrian regime troops on Sunday, 12/10/2016. “We believe that includes some armored vehicles and various guns and other heavy weapons, possibly some air-defense equipment,” Townsend said in a video briefing from Baghdad. Townsend said the coalition would, at least initially, defer to the Russians to try to retake Palmyra but his lack of confidence in Russian ground forces was plain. Another U.S. defense official told Fox News IS was in control of an SA-3 missile system taken from the Syrian regime outside Palmyra, a development first reported by the Washington Post.
LT. Townsend and members of the US led Coalition is said to blame the Russians for the debacle and that the breakthrough and rapid advancement of the IS took was due to fundamental mistakes of commanders of units of the Russian and Syrian Armies, deployed in the Palmyra area, who he claims let their guard down and ignored local reports from remaining citizens that Daseh was returning. They did not pay due attention to fortification activities, ISIS processes of equipping positions with engineering and combat hardware, and they were careless during tactical reconnaissance. Russian commanders failed to anticipate a surprise ISIS attack which is one of their well-known tactics over the past two years. Russian commanders are also being accused of misjudging the availability of rebel forces and the capabilities of likely attackers.
As a result, commanders responsible for safeguarding our globally shared cultural heritage in Palmyra did not report the necessary information to the higher command in Damascus thereby deluding it with respect to clear evidence over the past few weeks that IS was nearby.
Russia is also being accused by the US led Coalition of making many mistakes simultaneously. Specifically not having intelligence sources in Palmyra city, adjacent to the acres of ruins now once again in grave danger, gross negligence in reconnaissance, being preoccupied with their bombing campaign in Aleppo, not observing or ignoring the redeployment of new units of the IS group from Iraq to Syria, as well as involvement of the most experienced IS commanders of the senior and middle levels in the offensive and failure to anticipate the likelihood of large numbers of suicide bombers, involved in the operation. A common IS tactic.
In Russia’s defense, what also appears to have aided the IS recapture of Palmyra is its isolated location in the eastern desert of Homs province, where the group was able to overrun territory quickly and the geography of the city, being surrounded by mountains, rendering it difficult to defend. A source in Homs, 200 km west of Palmyra commented to this observer, “We know that Russia can bomb our hospitals, schools, public gathering and markets. But we have no confidence that their ground forces can defeat Daesh and save Palmyra.”
Adding to doubts about Russia’s performance in Palmyra are reports citing local sources near the site of the attack in eastern Homs province, northwest of Palmyra, reported that there were cases of the use of Sarin gas and suffocation and that dozens had been wounded during heavy rocket fire on 12/12/2016 of the area. Local sources had reported seeing dead bodies with no visible injuries, claims the UK Observatory. The reported gas attack came from the air and took place near the town of Uqairabat, which lies on a main road leading south into Palmyra from government-held territory. Amaq, a news service linked to ISIS, said in an online statement that 20 people had died and around 200 were injured from breathing problems “as a result of a Russian air attack with sarin gas.” These allegations have not been proven.
The Syrian and Russian commands are well aware that IS cannot be defeated this time in Palmyra by just airstrikes. For this reason, combat-ready units of the Syrian Armed Forces-rumored to be from the reputedly competent ‘Tiger Force” is urgently being dispatched to Palmyra on orders of President Assad. As of 12/15/2016 there is no reported sign of their arrival as IS forces work to secure their new supply of weapons and set up positions among the ruins of Palmyra and nearby locations.
A government Minister I met with this morning (12/16/2016) was with President Assad last night when he met with his cabinet and discussed Syria’s plans to retake Palmyra. This afternoon there are reports that he has commanded the elite “Tiger Force” to lead the attack to re-take Palmyra. Russia’s air force and some of its elite fighters are reported, according to the same source, to be at this hour preparing to invade Palmyra. Perhaps as early at the next 48 hours since time is of the essence. On orders from President Putin currently in Japan.
The Syrian people’s past and are globally shared endangered heritage in this cradle of civilization may hang in the balance.
