In the nearly six years since protestors in Syria first demonstrated against the four-decade rule of the Assad family, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed and some twelve million people—more than half the country’s pre-war population—have been displaced. The country has descended into an ever-more-complex civil war: Jihadis promoting a Sunni theocracy have eclipsed many opposition forces fighting for a democratic and pluralistic Syria. Regional powers have backed various local forces to advance their geopolitical interests on Syrian battlefields. The United States has been at the fore of a coalition conducting air strikes on the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Turkey, a U.S. ally, has invaded in part to prevent Kurdish forces, who are backed by the United States in the fight against the Islamic State, from linking up their autonomous cantons. Russia too has carried out air strikes in Syria; though it claimed to be primarily targeting the Islamic State, analysts say it has more often targeted rebels, including those backed by the United States, who seemed to pose a more immediate threat to the Syrian regime.
After a long stalemate, foreign backers of the regime have turned the tide in Assad’s favor, capturing rebel-held enclaves of east Aleppo, which had once been a hub of the resistance. But Syria likely faces years of instability. Assad has never been willing to negotiate his way out of power, but his continued rule is unacceptable to millions of Syrians, particularly given the barbarity civilians have faced. Meanwhile, the foreign forces on which he relies will continue to wield power. In the north, Kurds will be unlikely to cede their hard-won autonomy, and the Islamic State is yet to be defeated.
Hafez al-Assad is welcomed in Moscow by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1971. Bettmann/Corbis
Assads’ Rule Breeds Discontent
Hafez al-Assad seized power from a Ba’athist military junta in 1970, centralizing power in the presidency. Assad, who came from the Alawi minority, a heterodox Shia sect that had long been persecuted in Syria and was elevated to privileged positions under the post–World War I French mandate, promoted pan-Arab nationalism.
In February 1982, Hafez ordered the military to put down a Muslim Brotherhood uprising in the city of Hama with brute force. Syrian forces killed more than twenty-five thousand there. For the regime’s opponents, Hama would become a rallying cry in 2011. For the regime, it provided Hafez’s son and successor, Bashar, with a template for responding to dissent.
The Assads presided over a system that was not just autocratic but kleptocratic, doling out patronage to bind Syrians to the regime. As the 2011 uprising turned to civil war, many members of minority groups remained loyal to the regime, but so too did some Sunnis, fearing revenge if opposition forces were to take Damascus.
President Bashar al-Assad tours the industrial city of Hessya in 2007. (SANA/AP Photo)
Economic Reforms Upend Syrian Society
Bashar succeeded his father in 2000 pledging reforms. He promised to let markets take the place of the “Arab socialism” touted by the Ba’athist state, upending old patronage networks. He broke up and privatized state monopolies, but the benefits were concentrated among those well-connected with the regime, while the end of subsidies and price ceilings harmed rural peasants and urban laborers. Arecord-setting drought from 2006 to 2010 exacerbated socioeconomic problems. Mismanaged farmland was rendered fallow and farmers migrated to cities in ever-larger numbers, causing the unemployment rate to surge.
Syrians gather outside Deraa's main courthouse, which was set on fire by demonstrators demanding freedom and an end to corruption, in March 2011. Khaled al-Hariri/Reuters
Arab Uprisings Echo Across Repressed Region
The Arab Spring began in December 2010 with the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor decrying corruption. His desperate act inspired protests in Tunisia, and then across the Middle East and North Africa, which forced longtime strongmen in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt to step down. Inspired by these previously unthinkable events, fifteen boys in the southwestern city of Deraa spray painted on a school wall: “The people want the fall of the regime.” They were arrested and tortured. Demonstrators who rallied behind them clashed with police, and protests spread. Many were calling for something more modest than regime change: the release of political prisoners, an end to the half-century-old state of emergency, greater freedoms, and an end to corruption. Unlike Tunisia's Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Assad responded to protestors immediately, offering just token reforms while directing security services toput down the protests with force.
People demonstrate against the Assad regime in the besieged town of Al Qsair, near Homs, in January 2012. Alessio Romenzi/Corbis
From Protest Movement to Civil War
Anti-regime protests soon spread from Deraa to major cities like Damascus, Homs, and Hama. Events in Deraa offered a preview of what was to come elsewhere: The Syrian army fired on unarmed protestors and carried out mass arrests, both targeting dissidents and indiscriminately sweeping up men and boys,rights monitors reported. Torture and extrajudicial executions were frequently reported at detention centers. Then, in late April, the Syrian army brought in tanks, laying siege to Deraa. The civilian death toll mounted and residents were cut off from food, water, medicine, telephones, and electricity for eleven days. Amid international condemnation, the regime offered some concessions, but also repeated the Deraa method elsewhere where there were protests, at far greater length and cost, leading some regime opponents to take up arms. Local coordinating committees sprang up in villages and urban neighborhoods. Originally established to organize resistance to the regime, many of these committees would take on the role of public administration and service provision.
Members of the Free Syrian Army in January 2012. Alessio Romenzi/Corbis
A Disorganized Opposition Splinters
In July 2011, defectors from Assad’s army announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army, and soon after they began to receive shelter in Turkey. Yet the FSA, outgunned by the regime, struggled to bring its loose coalition under centralized command and control. FSA militias often didn’t coordinate their operations and sometimes had competing interests, reflecting their varied regional backers. With resources scarce, they preyed at times on the very populations they were charged with protecting. Its civilian counterpart was also established in summer 2011, in Istanbul. The Syrian National Coalition claimed to be the government-in-exile of Syria, and the United States, Turkey, and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, among others, soon recognized it as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.” But the SNC and its successor, the National Coalition, were unable to deliver significant diplomatic or material support to the opposition, and many of the regime’s opponents within Syria accorded it little legitimacy. Rival coalitions began to proliferate, and FSA fighters drifted to Islamist brigades which, with funding and arms from Gulf donors, scored greater battlefield successes against the regime.
Islamic State militants pose for a photo posted online in the Yarmouk refugee camp, in the Damascus suburbs. Balkis Press/Sipa via AP Images
Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Emerge
The regime’s torture and killing was exploited by al-Qaeda militants eager to capitalize on Syria's chaos. In January 2012, a group called Jabhat al-Nusra announced itself as al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise, and the following month al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri called for Sunnis from around the region to join a jihad against the regime. Jabhat al-Nusra gained Syrian and foreign recruits as it scored greater battlefield successes than rival opposition groups.
In April 2013, a group formed from the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq that called itself the Islamic State of Iraq emerged and exceeded even Jabhat al-Nusra in its brutality. In several months, its forces established control over territory spanning western Syria and eastern Iraq. The ascendance of the Islamic State and other extremists groups fed an increasingly sectarian, zero-sum conflict, and civilians living in the fiefs—as with those of the FSA and pro-regime militias—suffered abuse.
The rise of extremist groups in Syria was, in part, the regime’s own doing, as Assad wanted to present to the world a stark choice between his secular rule and a jihadi alternative. In mid-2011, the regimereleased hundreds of Islamist militants from prisons to discredit the rebellion. They would form extremist groups like Ahrar al-Sham, which espoused a sectarian agenda.
A father holds his dead child in Aleppo, which has been contested for months, in October 2012. MAYSUN/epa/Corbis
Civilians as Targets
Both Assad’s forces and rebel groups have regularly targeted civilians in areas beyond their control. The deaths of some 1,400 civilians fromchemical weapons deployed by the Assad regime in the summer of 2013 mobilized world powers to dismantle the regime’s chemical arsenal. However, in the years since, the Syrian government has employed devastating conventional arms that have also caused massive civilian casualties.
The regime has made regular use of sieges and aerial bombardment. These collective-punishment tactics serve dual purposes, analysts say: They raise the costs of resistance to civilians so that they will pressure rebels to acquiesce, and they also prevent local committees from offering a viable alternative to the regime’s governance. In 2016 the UN humanitarian agency saidfive million peoplelived in areas that were besieged or otherwise beyond the reach of aid.
The toll has mounted despite a UN Security Council resolution in 2014 aimed at securing humanitarian aid routes. Humanitarian aid became politicized as Assad would grant UN convoys permission to distribute food and medicine in government-held areas while denying them access to rebel-held areas, and rights advocates charged the regime with targeting medical facilities and personnel.
At a Hezbollah rally in the Beirut suburbs, the militant group's supporters wave flags featuring the faces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Bilal Hussein/AP Photo
From Domestic Rebellion to Internationalized Civil War
The deepening of Syria’s civil war made both pro- and anti-regime forces dependent on external sponsors. As major powers deepened their involvement, Syria has become a battlefield on which the region’s geopolitical rivalries have been fought.
As mounting casualties and desertions weakened Assad’s army, the regime came to rely increasingly on Iran and Russia. Iran, a longtime ally interested in protecting a vital land route to its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, has invested billions in propping up the regime. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps advises Assad’s army and has sustained thousands of casualties. Its volunteer Basij paramilitary force and the foreign Shia militias it has rallied have sustained even more casualties.
Russia, traditionally averse to regime change, has provided Assad with critical diplomatic support. Moscow has cited what it calls an illegal intervention in Libya and the ensuing chaos there as justification for vetoing measures in the UN Security Council that would have punished the regime. Russia then entered the conflict directly in September 2015 with the deployment of its air force. Though Moscow claimed its air strikes would primarily target the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, analysts said it more often targeted other rebel groups, some backed by the United States and many intermingled with al-Qaeda’s affiliate near the front lines with the regime. This helped Assad strengthen his control of population centers along the country’s western spine. Opposition forces, too, depend on foreign support. A rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar enabled the formation in March 2015 of the Army of Conquest, which was designed to overcome the lack of coordination among rebel groups in the north and comprises an array of opposition and extremist groups. The United States, too, has provided covert training and arms to opposition forces. But official foreign support for opposition forces has been unsteady and uncoordinated.
A YPG base in northern Syria bears signs of rocket fire from a Turkish attack. Soran Qurbani/Demotix/Corbis
The Kurdish Bid for Autonomy
Kurds have fought to consolidate a de facto autonomous territory in northern Syria, which has made them alternately friends and foes of Arab opposition groups. The Islamic State’s siege of Kobani in the fall of 2014 was a turning point; the battle to oust the militant group highlighted the effectiveness of the Kurds’ People’s Protection Units (YPG) against the Islamic State. U.S. forces aided in ousting Islamic State fighters from Kobani and continue to provide arms and air support to the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces. But the YPG’s priority has turned to consolidating autonomous Kurdish cantons in the country’s north, a region the Kurds refer to as Western Kurdistan. YPG fighters, interested in protecting fellow Kurds, have been accused of ethnic cleansing in mixed Arab-Kurd areas. The YPG is tied to the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Washington has designated a terrorist organization. In August 2016, Turkey deployed its military along the Syrian border to both roll back Islamic State forces and, in tandem with Syrian Arab and Turkmen fighters, block Kurds from linking up their two cantons in a contiguous territory. The United States considers Turkey, a NATO ally, a vital partner in the war against the Islamic State, and it faces the dilemma of trying not to alienate either partner.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry hold a news conference in Vienna in October 2015 amid frustrated efforts to find a political solution to Syria's civil war. Brendan Smialowski/Pool/Reuters
The Diplomatic Thicket
UN-backed attempts to mediate a conflict-ending political transition in Syria have been stymied by differences among veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council and other powers. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey aligned with the United States against the Assad regime, while Iran joined Russia in backing it. Russia and China have cast multiple vetoes on Syria-related Security Council resolutions, and the threat of veto has deterred or watered down humanitarian and human rights measures, reinforcing a view of the body as toothless. A June 2012 multilateral document known as the Geneva Communique has become the basis for negotiations. It calls for “a Syrian-led political process,” beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body “formed on the basis of mutual consent.” But multiple rounds of peace talks to implement these principles have yielded little. A core issue is Assad himself: He has no interest in negotiating his own political demise and retains Russia's and Iran's backing, while the possibility of Assad staying on in a transition is anathema to the opposition.
With dim prospects for a negotiated settlement, the United States has instead focused on counterterrorism activities while calling for de-escalation. Some analysts say a number of rebels have come to question U.S. commitments and even joined extremist groups due to factors such as the apparent U.S. resignation to Assad remaining in power, its halting support for vetted armed groups, and air strikes in Idlib and Aleppo provinces that at times have been indistinguishable from those by Syrian and Russian forces.
Volunteers help a Syrian refugee on the southeastern Greek island of Lesbos. Manu Brabo/AP Photo
Refugee Crisis Brings EU to a Breaking Point
More than half of Syria’s pre-war population of twenty-two million has been displaced by the violence, with more than six million displaced internally and another six million fleeing abroad. Neighboring countries have borne the heaviest burden: Lebanon, a country of only 4.5 million people, is hosting more than one million Syrians, and Jordan, with more than half a million, has begun blocking would-be refugees from crossing the border. Turkey is host to nearly three million Syrians, straining government resources. With limited work and educational opportunities, and little hope that they will soon be able to return safely home, more than one million refugees havejourneyed to Europe, contributing to what the UN has called the largest migrant and refugee crisis since World War II. Disputes over how to settle refugees across the EU have thrown the bloc into disarray, threatening to bring an end to the Schengen system of open borders on the continent and contributing to the rise of anti-immigrant, far-right parties. The EU struck an agreement with Turkey to block their northward migration, but it is jeopardized after an attempted coup attempt. As Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan purged his political opponents and sought to curry nationalists’ support for consolidating executive power in the presidency, the EU suspended accession talks, leading Erdogan to threaten to once again “open the gates.”
Residents flee the al-Salihin nieghborhood in east Aleppo after regime troops retook the area in December 2016. (George Ourfalian/AFP/Getty Images)
East Aleppo Falls to Pro-Regime Forces
The regime captured the last rebel-held enclave of east Aleppo in December 2016 after a prolonged siege and bombardment. The city, Syria’s economic powerhouse, had been contested since 2012, and its capture marked a stark reversal of fortune for the opposition; in 2013, rebels had nearly encircled the regime-controlled western part of the city. But the campaign also demonstrates how dependent Assad has become on his foreign backers, both the Russian air force and Shiite militias, as his own forces have weakened.
Scores of civilians were massacred in the battle’s last days in what a UN spokesman called “a complete meltdown of humanity.” With their defeat in Aleppo, rebels were isolated to northern Idlib province, parts of the south, and small enclaves around Damascus and Homs. But even with control of major population centers, Assad will have trouble re-establishing authority over a country that has been fragmented by warlords and overrun by foreign forces, and is likely to face a persistent insurgency, analysts say.
In a rapidoffensivelasting less than a month, forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have recaptured the last opposition enclave in east Aleppo. On Monday evening, the army cleared street after street as artillery and air strikes pounded rebel positions northeast of Ramouseh district. By midnight, only a tiny speck of territory remained in opposition hands and celebratory gunfire lit the darkened skies over west Aleppo. On Tuesday evening, finally, news came of a dealbrokered by Russia and Turkey that would see the remaining rebel fighters evacuate to opposition-held territory outside Aleppo, while civilians were to remain in the city under government control.
To al-Assad loyalists, this is a great victory. In an email interview, a source close to the government in Damascus spoke of Aleppo’s “liberation from terror groups”, saying that the restoration of army control would “allow the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons to return to east Aleppo”.
There is clearly a sense of relief among government loyalists in Aleppo, who feel that their city may finally be on the path back to normality. On Monday night, the state broadcaster al-Ekhbariya ran loops of footage from street celebrations in pouring rain, where young men fired in the air and honked their car horns as television anchors handed out chocolates.
But to the Syrian opposition, the fall of east Aleppo is apolitical disasterthat threatens to sap morale and undermine international support for the uprising. Yet opposition representatives struck a defiant tone.
“We can’t ignore the fact that the revolutionaries in Syria have been left alone to face a large group of enemies, including the regime, Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, the militias, and Iraq,” Omar Mushaweh, a Turkey-based leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, told IRIN in an online interview.
But, like other opposition sympathisers interviewed, Mushaweh gave no hint of wanting to surrender. Indeed, with the al-Assad government’s own weaknesses demonstrated by its recent loss of Palmyra to the self-declared Islamic State, no one is under any illusions: the war will go on.
Civilians at Risk
Beyond the political consequences, however, recent events in Aleppo mark the brutal conclusion to four years of human suffering. To Syrians with friends and family in the collapsing rebel enclave, the past weeks have been a nightmare. All through Monday and Tuesday,desperate messages and pleas for help trickled outfrom east Aleppo through private contacts and social media. Though many civilians had already managed to flee into government-held western Aleppo, the last days of the enclave saw tens of thousands of people thronging the streets.
“People are moving around and fleeing as they can in a very volatile situation, as front lines continue to shift on a daily basis,” Linda Tom, a spokeswoman for the UN’s emergency aid coordination body, OCHA, told IRIN in an emailed comment on Saturday. Tom estimated that more than 40,000 civilians had already been displaced at that point, with a further 100,000 still in rebel-held territory, though she stressed that all figures were uncertain.*
Though the Syrian government claims to welcome and protect civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo, many pro-regime militias are poorly organised and undisciplined, and they have a history of looting and destroying abandoned property. Even thegovernor of Aleppo, Brigadier-GeneralHussein Diab, recently complained about the waves of lootingthat tend to follow every successful army offensive in Aleppo.
Though the UN has reported allegations that rebel groups forcibly prevented civilians from leaving in an attempt to use them as human shields, UN officials have also received reports that military-age men are being arrested after crossing into west Aleppo. Indeed, many civilians in the rebel zone seem to have held off fleeing to government territory until they simply had no other choice. “They have been killing us for so long, why would they have mercy?” one resident told theWashington Post.
The Syrian government is eager to deny any such abuses.
“Men of military age leaving the east are being checked and having their details taken down as part of the amnesty and reconciliation process,” a Syrian colonel working for the man running military operations in Aleppo, Lieutenant-General Ziad al-Saleh, said in a statement provided to IRIN by an intermediary. The colonel stated that those guilty of “severe criminality” will be tried and judged, but insisted that “the state is open to these people returning to their normal lives”.
Indeed, as much as they may want to completely crush the opposition and avenge themselves on rebel fighters, al-Assad’s men seem to realise that a softer touch is in their interest. Aleppo will be seen as a major test case for the government’s strategy of imposing local trucesand forcing the evacuation of rebel fighters to peripheral regions like Idlib, as al-Assad shores up control over central Syria and major cities elsewhere.
Nevertheless, as the rebel pocket finally collapsed on Monday and Tuesday, opposition media filled up with references to Srebrenica 1995 and Rwanda 1994, even to the Holocaust. These claims were not backed up by reporting and even overtly pro-rebel media channels had, at the time of writing, produced no evidence of anything remotely similar to these atrocities. According to a spokesperson, the UN had received reports about the killing of82 civiliansat the hands of pro-al-Assad forces on Tuesday. As horrifying as that is, it isno genocide.
That said, the fears of opposition sympathisers in the city are real. Other deaths may have gone unreported and at this point no one is quite sure whether the evacuation deal will hold or what the future will bring. With no outside monitoring of the situation or of the conduct of al-Assad’s forces, there are great and legitimate concerns about the mistreatment of prisoners and vulnerable civilian populations. This gruesome chapter in Syria’s history is still being written.
* A note on the population statistics : Throughout the conflict, the number of civilians in rebel-held eastern Aleppo has been hotly disputed. Until the rebel stronghold finally collapsed, the United Nations had put the number of people in the east city at 250,000-275,000. After the attack began, most UN estimates seemed to add up to around 140,000 civilians. On 9 December, I was told by UN OCHA spokesperson Russell Geekie that in the absence of definite information it would be premature to conclude that the UN number had been too high, though Geekie acknowledged that preliminary figures did seem to point in that direction. During my most recent visit to Damascus in October and November, Syrian officials provided wildly varying estimates that ranged from 97,000 people (according to Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem) to 200,000 people (according to al-Assad). On December 11, a Damascus-based source close to the Syrian government insisted, in an email interview, that the UN has allowed itself to be misled by opposition activists and told me that in a final count the total number of civilians in eastern Aleppo “will not exceed 100,000.”
IRIN is an independent, non-profit media organization. IRIN delivers unique, authoritative and independent reporting from the frontlines of crises to inspire and mobilise a more effective humanitarian response.
