Showing posts with label MAN MANAGEMENT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MAN MANAGEMENT. Show all posts

Friday, April 7, 2017

‘Brown Bag Lunches’ Whet Appetite For Leadership Ideas (R)

SOURCE:
https://swarajyamag.com/ideas/how-brown-bag-lunches-whet-appetite-for-leadership-ideas




How ‘Brown Bag Lunches’ Whet Appetite For Leadership Ideas

                   BY

                    Lt gen Syed Ata Hasnain(Retd)





 









SNAPSHOT

Try ideation wherever you are and try Brown Bag Lunches. I have not found a better management practice for effective leadership and creation of a congenial environment for functioning and thinking.


I first came across the term ‘Brown Bag Lunch’ while attending the executive programme of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii in August 2000. It was a three-month programme designed to introduce middle level government officers (not necessarily uniformed) of countries within the US’ strategic circle to various vistas of comprehensive security of the Asia Pacific Region.
This was the pre-9/11 period and I was serving in Kashmir. The Americans did not have much of an idea of Jammu and Kashmir, nor of irregular warfare, had never heard of 
Improvised Explosive Devices and felt that 
Islamic fundamentalism (the term radicalism 
was introduced much later) was but a passing 
phase. 

There were four Pakistanis who were attending the programme with me; one each from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Army, an academic and a joint secretary from Pakistan's Ministry of Defence (MoD).
The PAF and Army officers always received preferential treatment from the American servicemen. Whenever I warned the various participants (there were 80 people from 35 countries) about the impending dangers of Islamic fundamentalism, I was never taken seriously by the US establishment; even during one large international seminar on transnational terror. The only man who thought I was talking sense was the president (virtually the Commandant) of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Lieutenant General (retired) Hank Stackpole, an outstanding Marine Corps General.
One good day, as good as any in sunny Hawaii, I was called up by the president’s staff officer to convey the General's invitation for Brown Bag Lunch during the lunch hour the next day to discuss Jammu and Kashmir and Islamic fundamentalism. It was to be a one-on-one discussion, but in the excitement of having been invited for the lunch, I forgot to ask the staff officer what was meant by Brown Bag Lunch.
I arrived at the appointed hour carrying my little plastic bag containing the usual paraphernalia of stationery so the staff officer did not ask me any questions. He ushered me into the president's office, where the lean and very intellectual General was already sitting on the sofa, awaiting my arrival. Lunch was open before him; a sandwich and an apple. I wondered what I would be eating. After some small talk the General asked me whether I would like to open my lunch packet before we got down to discussing the subjects he was interested in. I was not sure I heard correctly, but gathering my wits, I said I had carried no lunch with me because I thought he had invited me for lunch.
The General was more than amused. "Didn't they tell you, it was to be Brown Bag Lunch”, he said.
"They did, but I am not sure I understood what that means, neither do I understand what it means even now", I replied.
The General burst out laughing. "Oh, that is American for having a shared lunch; you bring yours and I bring mine", he blurted between his laughs.
"I am sorry, in my country an invitation for a meal means only the host brings the meal,” was my forthright reply.
That afternoon both General Stackpole and I went hungry having eaten half a sandwich and half an apple each but the tone and content of the discussion made up for all the loss. I told him that I was writing my dissertation on Islamic fundamentalism and my research told me that the Americans were getting it all wrong by kowtowing to the Pakistan Army, and not ensuring that the fundamentalist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan were isolated and weeded out.
He was a little surprised hearing this from me, a Muslim, and said so in so many words. I had to explain that I was a soldier and attached nothing to my personal faith; it was only my professional orientation I was bringing to my analysis, but exploiting also my knowledge of the faith. He thanked me and asked me to submit a separate copy of my dissertation to his office, for him to read.
The programme was to end on 15 September 2000 and I was traveling to San Francisco and then the Mid-West on mainland US to be with family. I ensured that a copy of my badly typed dissertation was formatted by a local computer instructor (I was yet a novice at handling computers), refined for presentation and then submitted to General Stackpole's office. The date of submission which can never leave my memory, was a date now etched in the world's memory. 
                               It was 9/11,
 only the year was different. It was 11 September 2000, exactly 365 days before the world changed after the Twin Tower attack.
But that is not the end. It started with Brown Bag Lunches and must end with that. As the Military Secretary (MS) of the Indian Army in 2012-13, I was on the lookout for new practices for taking my branch to a much higher level of efficiency and functioning. I was one of the world’s largest human resource managers, managing a cadre of 40,000 officers.
Many new ideas were being tried, mostly based on thoughts of middle level officers. To keep the adrenaline flowing and allowing open ended intake of ideas, I introduced the Brown Bag Lunch system. One Colonel, Lt Col or Major of the branch would join me for lunch from 1pm to 1.30pm at my office. He brought his lunch, I brought mine; I benefited from the culinary skills of the MS branch wives, who ensured their husbands always carried some novelties; mine was a simpler lunch.
Meals apart, I have never had richer and more fruitful discussion on professional matters than during these sessions. We discussed affairs of the MS branch and of the Indian Army in general. The last five minutes were spent on generic issues. A notebook and pen was within easy reach for me to take down the wealth of thoughts I received.
These were my able subordinates, who I would perhaps meet only collectively and never one on one; Brown Bag Lunch had created the opportunity. Five ideas from the discussion were noted and later compiled for our conferences where all could analyse them. Some ideas were taken to conclusion and some others taken up for deeper study.
This is the world of ideation; if you do not practise it in one form or the other you really may be a deficient leader because one brain can never think of the range of ideas which are required for problem solving. The entire Army could do with many more ideas. I have seen ideation dinners being conducted in institutions in London and held a few in my command of formations too.
Try ideation wherever you are and try Brown Bag Lunches. I have not found a better management practice for effective leadership and creation of a congenial environment for functioning and thinking.
I have to thank General Hank Stackpole and that wonderful American institution, APCSS, for having taught me this. But in hindsight I wish the very fine General had passed on my dissertation to the American President.












The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.












Monday, June 6, 2016

MAN MANAGEMENT::Reducing Flab in Armed Forces

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/reducing-flab-in-armed-forces/247339.html




 Related :

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/06/blog-post.html




            Reducing Flab in Armed Forces

                                     By

                 Gen V P MALIK( retd)





                     MODERNISATION
                                      &
    EXPANSION CAN'T GO TOGETHER



Jun 6, 2016.



The Indian army today is the third largest in the world with over 38,000 officers and 11.38 lakh soldiers

Jun 6, 2016



Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has set up a 12-member committee headed by Lieut-Gen DB Shekatkar (retd) to suggest structural changes in the Army, the IAF and the Navy on cutting down flab and reducing revenue (maintenance) expenditure. Its recommendations will entail doing away with posts that may have become redundant due to technology, and to ensure that addition of new equipment (modernisation) does not mean a corresponding rise in the personnel strength of the forces.

Parrikar has two important reasons for ordering this study. One is the ever-increasing revenue expenditure on manpower which leaves less than 20 per cent of the defence budget for weapons and equipment modernisation. The other is the advice from Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In his address at the Combined Commanders' Conference in December 2015, Modi had said, “At a time when major powers are reducing their forces and rely more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces. Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal.” Articulating global, regional and national strategic environment and politico-military concerns, the Prime Minister exhorted the Defence Minister and the military commanders to promote "jointness" across every level, shorten the tooth-to-tail ratio, and re-examine assumptions that keep massive funds locked up in inventories. 

There is no doubt that budgetary constraint is the primary reason for this decision. As a percentage of the GDP, the defence budget has been decreasing over the last decade. This year there was an increase of 1.16 per cent on the basis of the budget estimate of FY 2015-16. Calculated against the revised estimates (Rs 18,295 crore was surrendered by the Ministry of Defence), it works to an increase of 9 per cent.



This allocation does not cover the rate of inflation, fall in the value of the rupee against the dollar, and the sharply increasing cost of weapons and equipment all over the world. 

Due to the “One Rank, One Pension” scheme, the pension bill will increase substantially. With implementation of the Seventh Pay Commission recommendations, salaries, allowances and establishment charges of all civil and military personnel, paid from the defence budget, will shoot up. Recently, Defence Secretary G. Mohan Kumar admitted to the Standing Committee on Defence that “India’s military spending for FY 2016-17 is not as per the requirements of the services.” Unless the government hikes the defence budget, which is very unlikely, the Ministry of Defence would face a serious resource crunch to make up huge deficiencies of weapons, equipment and ammunition. Any force modernisation will remain a dream. 

We faced a similar situation in the late 1990s. As Army Chief, I decided to suppress 50,000 manpower (mostly from non-field force) over a period of three years, provided the money saved would be given to the army for capital purchases. D B Shekatkar, then a Major-General, heading Perspective Planning Directorate, worked on details in consultation with the heads of arms and services, principal staff officers and army commanders. There was considerable opposition within the army and outside. After obtaining approval and a written commitment on the savings from the Cabinet Committee on Security, we implemented the scheme for two years.

 The Kargil war put an end to that scheme in its third year. 

The Indian army today is the third largest in the world with over 38,000 officers (sanctioned strength is 49,631 officers) and 11.38 lakh soldiers. Cadre reviews and implementation of the Ajai Vikram Singh report has made it top-heavy with bloated headquarters. This is definitely not in line with modern defence management to win short and swift wars.

Incidentally, India is not alone in its attempt to trim its armed forces and improve the teeth-to-tail ratio. In the last decade, all major armed forces of the world have attempted such exercises and made deep cuts in manpower — the most important and costliest military resource. In 2012, the UK announced a 20 per cent cut, reducing the strength of its army to 82,000 combatants by the end of this decade. The Russian army has done away with large size divisional headquarters to make itself a quick-strike, lean force. The US army has announced a reduction of strength by a whopping 80,000 by 2017 to “reduce the overall number of headquarters, while sustaining as much combat capabilities as possible.” China’s recently announced military reforms envisage a cut of 300,000 personnel in its 2.3 million PLA forces by 2020. The idea is to “remake the PLA from a manpower intensive force to a smaller, technologically able and mobile force capable of combat beyond its geographical borders.”

Over the last decade, India's armed forces have absorbed a fair amount of technological developments, including communications and digitisation. Manpower intake is better educated, savvy on computers and smart phones. Most of them have driving licences. But the resultant organisational changes, shedding of redundant establishments and manpower savings have seldom been attempted by the army. On many of these issues, there is a lot to be learnt from the best practices of the private sector. 

In the past, many units were raised to meet special operational circumstances of that period e.g. Rashtriya Rifles for Punjab. A review to examine the need or quantum of such forces is overdue.  

Meanwhile, there is considerable scope for downsizing forces in areas which are not of operational importance, and to reduce the flab. Some suggestions which require further study are:


  • By further improving jointness amongst the forces, there is scope to cut down duplication (sometime triplication) of logistic (medical, supplies, station duties) and security resources.
  • Reducing size of headquarters, particularly of field formations, training establishments and shedding redundant establishments.
  • Merger and pruning of logistic units and training facilities of the army like the EME, Ordnance, Army Service Corps, Army Education Corps, and so on. 
  • Clubbing of non-essential unit functions such as Military Farms and Army Postal Service, or outsourcing their functions.
  • A review of all peace establishments.  
  • Multiple use of lands/facilities wherever units and formations are in close proximity to each other.
With the development of the automobile sector and availability of civilian repair and maintenance infrastructure in forward areas, this requirement of the armed forces fleet can be outsourced, or even better, contracted with vehicle manufacturers.

The flab is not only within the military. Civilian organisations like the ordnance factories, defence PSUs, DRDO, the MES, the Defence Estate, and the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Services, paid from the defence budget, also need to be trimmed. With the Indian private sector coming of age and contributing more for the defence, and greater opportunity to outsource services, these organisations should be included in the flab reduction exercise.




















 

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

पारेकर जी ज़रा धीरे चलना बड़े धोके हैं यह बाबू बिछाई माइन फील्ड में

SOURCE:
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/cutting-nose-to-spite-face.html





Related :

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/06/man-managementreducing-flab-in-armed.html






                      पारेकर जी  à¥›à¤°ा  à¤§ीरे  à¤šà¤²à¤¨ा 

                                      बड़े  à¤§ोके  à¤¹ैं 

                   यह  à¤¬ाबू  à¤¬िछाई  à¤®ाइन फील्ड  में 








                                Babuji Dheere Chalna .
                   Bare Dhoke hain 
 ees BABU mine field mein

                 Cutting Nose to Spite Face

                                         By

                             Deepak Sinha



Friday, 27 May 2016
 
 
 To reduce revenue expenditure, look at civilians paid from Defence Estimates, not Services’s non-combat manpower
 
 
The Minister for Defence has recently announced the formation of an 11-member committee, led by Lieutenant General DB Shekatkar (Retd), to look into areas of overlap and convergence within the three Forces — the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. The committee will also identify areas to “rationalise manpower”, examine possible areas of multi-tasking by troops and suggest ways to “optimise” combat potential by bringing in more technology instead of more boots.
 
 

This is to ensure that the burgeoning revenue expenditure, the monies spent on pay, allowances and pensions among other things, is brought under control so that more funds are available for capital expenditure, especially acquisition of modern weapon systems. As  Bhartendu  Kumar Singh of the Indian Defence Accounts Service points out,  “The Accounts Branch of the Indian Air Force, for example, has 492 commissioned officers and 7,000 men catering to the pay matters of 1,60,000 officers and men in the Air Force. On a competitive note, the same can be provided by 300 people on the civilian side very easily.”

 

[ PLEASE RECHECK- The veterans of IAF are not dependant  on  CDA(PENSIONS) & are catered by the Accounts Branch of the Indian Air Force with the same existing strength.  The strength  of veterans when taken into consideration will make a qualitative difference. THIS IS A RUSE BY THE  " CROOKED MANDARINS"  for  BUREAUCRATIC EMPIRE EMPIRE BUILDING.Remember that left to its own devices, the bureaucracy has no reason to cut back on its own reach or powers of arbitration, and this comes through very strongly in the functioning of the defence ministry, in particular.  - Vasundhra ]

 

 

There can be no two opinions that such a detailed examination is necessary and must be undertaken periodically, except to suggest that the period of three months given to the Committee to complete its task seems grossly insufficient, if it is to do justice to this critical issue.

In fact, one may even suggest that by restricting this examination only to the military, the Defence Minister has not gone far enough.

The reasons for this are not far to seek. The MOD, for example, has sanctioned posts of               5,85,000 civilians, which is more than the active strength of the Pakistan Army.

The MOD spends more than Rs1,000 crore annually on pay, allowances and establishment of the Ministry of Finance personnel who are attached to it.

The civilian-manned Military Engineering Services spends nearly double the amount of the work it does on its own establishment costs.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation only utilizes 39 per cent of its budget on research and development while the remainder is spent on establishment costs.

 
 
The burgeoning pension bill, which is expected to touch Rs60,000 crore this year after taking into account the sanctioning of One-Rank-One-Pension, is another problem. While reduction of manpower will certainly go some way in controlling this issue, the fact is that the per capita expenditure on 25 lakh military veterans and their kin amounts to approximately Rs1.5 lakh annually, while the four lakh civilians paid from the defence pension budget receive an average of Rs5.38 lakh a year, which will shoot up astronomically as and when the Seventh Pay Commission report is implemented.
 
These examples show that priority needs to be given to reducing civilian manpower paid from Defence Estimates, before reducing non-combat manpower of the Services. The fact is that civilian pensions, despite catering to one-fifth the number of military pensioners, make for approximately 36 per cent of defence pensions — and given our difficulties in ensuring employment, even populism suggests it is better to reduce civilians who cost five times more than to reduce the military.

 
On the question capital expenditure being given pride of place in our defence budget to ensure our Forces are adequately equipped, the fact is that this issue is much more than just adequate budgeting. Between eight to 13 per cent of the funds marked for capital expenditure remains unutilised. For 2015-16, this was as high as 13.4 per cent, amounting to returning Rs11,505 crore. This should count as criminal negligence, given the poor state of our weapons and equipment, on the part of those within the military [ read MOD ] responsible for procurement.

 
And this is where the issue gets complicated. The Government always shows its ‘firm commitment’ to national security by allotting adequate funds to the MoD but then manipulates the budget to cater to unforeseen situations. The Finance Minister cannot touch revenue allotments as those are fully committed but, with the active connivance of the MoD (Finance), he takes full advantage of the capital allotment to meet unexpected expenses. All bureaucratic measures are put to good use to delay or derail the procurement process, resulting in vast amounts remaining unspent.
 
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar is known for his intelligence and clarity of thought but like one of his earlier predecessors, Krishna Menon, he too may find his reputation dented somewhat, if he looks at issues through blinkers and acts in haste. It makes little sense to cut off your nose to spite your face. To start with, instead of setting up new committees, he will do well to implement the report of the Naresh Chandra Committee and the recommendations of the Group of Ministers of AB Vajpayee Government. [ read KARGIL report by Dr Subramanayam ]
 
(The writer is a military veteran and consultant with the Observer Research