PART III : India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy

SOURCE  :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html

                                                        PART : III






MARITIME DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE 

                       “Shano Varuna”

           (Be auspicious unto us, O Varuna) - Rig Veda
                         


                    Ensuring Secure Seas

  : Indian Maritime Security Strategy-2015 

Click/ google URL below to open & read

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf



 https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf 




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THE PULSE

SOURCE:
https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy/

         India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy

                                 By

              Darshana M. Baruah

December 03, 2015

India shifts its focus from ‘using’ to ‘securing’ 

maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

On October 26, 2015, the Indian Navy released its latest maritime strategy, titled “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy.” This edition is a revised and updated version of the previous outlined strategy “Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy,” published in 2007. The title itself is indicative of the changing tone of the Indian navy’s interests and intentions from the 2007 strategy. The previous strategy did not take into consideration the changing geopolitical environment and its strategic implications on India’s maritime interests. The 2015 maritime security strategy addresses this gap by complementing the evolving security dynamics in the Indian Ocean region and reflecting a bold Indian navy with a renewed outlook on India’s maritime security needs.

The security architecture in maritime Asia along with the rise of China is compelling India to define its strategic interests and review its maritime policy. The maritime security strategy precisely does the same. It carries a larger strategic angle than its predecessors and attempts to embody an Indian naval vision for the region.

There are three key points that underpin the shift in India’s naval strategy as per this document.

One, this is the first time that an Indian government document is formally acknowledging the implications of the evolving and increasingly accepted concept of the “Indo-Pacific” on India’s maritime security. The geographic extent of this concept has multiple variations but in the contemporary world, the notion essentially brings the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific — theaters of geo-political competition — into one strategic arc. 


The concept has been formally endorsed by Australia, and Canberra outlines the strategic implications of this region in its 2013 Defense White paper. Regional countries such as the United States, Japan, India, and Indonesia prefer to use the term Asia-Pacific in their official documents but different sections of the leadership from these countries have used the term Indo-Pacific in their speeches and remarks.

Indian Chief of Naval Staff RK Dhowan, underpinning the need to revise the 2007 maritime strategy, writes,

“The shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean Region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways.”

India has been adamantly focused on the Indian Ocean and the security changes along its maritime boundaries. As developments beyond this region began to shape the maritime security framework in the Indian Ocean Region, there was a sense of uncertainty among regional navies as to whether India is taking note of these changes and, more importantly, if New Delhi will re-align its policies based on these developments. Nations such as the United States, Japan, and Australia had realized the role India could play in the evolving security architecture, but there was no clarity on New Delhi’s intentions. This edition of the Maritime Security Strategy is putting those concerns to rest, to a certain extent.

Two, the navy’s areas of interest (both primary and secondary) are expanding, reflecting New Delhi’s willingness to play a larger role in the region. The Red Sea, previously a secondary area of interest (as per the revised Maritime Doctrine of 2009), is now an area of primary interest for the Indian navy. Additionally, “the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden and their littoral regions, the Southwest Indian Ocean, including IOR island nations therein and East Coast of Africa littoral regions” now all are of primary interest to India’s maritime security. While Africa and its littoral regions previously were only of secondary importance, the Gulf of Oman, Aden and the South-West Indian Ocean did not feature specifically in either of the areas of interest in the Maritime Doctrine.

The secondary area too has expanded to include the “Southeast Indian Ocean, including sea routes to the Pacific Ocean and littoral regions in the vicinity, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Coast of Africa, and their littoral regions.” The South China Sea continues to remain of secondary importance, but adding to this interest is the specific region of the “East China Sea, Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral regions.”

In defining the areas of interest, the navy’s intention is to outline the geographic extension of its strategic influence and give an indication of its involvement in those areas. Over the years, India’s ASEAN friends have voiced their disappointment in New Delhi’s lack of naval and political presence in the South China Sea, against the backdrop of a rising China. This Maritime Strategy re-affirms India’s resolve to not get directly engaged in the affairs of the Western Pacific and get caught in the U.S.-China power politics dynamic. 

While ASEAN nations have shown a preference for a larger Indian presence in the Western Pacific, regional navies such as Australia and the United States have encouraged India to play a larger security role and be a “net security provider” in the region.

This brings us to the third and a critical development in India’s shifting naval strategy – the role of a net security provider. The Indian Navy in this document has attempted to define what it means to be a net security provider. The strategy outlines: “The term net security describes the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing against the ability to monitor, contain, and counter all of these.” While the navy has not indicated the geographic extent of the region where it aspires to be a net security provider, it has however acknowledged the steps required to be a net security provider. The document does not state whether the navy will be a net security provider and how, but rather outlines the environment conducive to be one. In the backdrop of the region’s expectation for the Indian navy to be a net security provider, the step taken to spell out what the term means is a positive approach. The ‘objective’ for the moment is to “shape a favorable and positive maritime environment, for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.”

This links us back to the first point, which is India’s move to acknowledge the changes happening around India’s area of maritime interest — regardless of whether the navy ascribes to them or not — and renew its own strategy keeping in line with India’s strategic interests.

The fact that there has been a shift in India’s maritime strategy and policies was made clear through the navy’s engagement under the Modi government. There was, however, no document per se spelling out this shift. The 2015 maritime strategy not only formalizes the intent of the Indian navy, it also takes a bold tone in narrating the same. Given the emphasis on collaborating with other navies, it is clear that part of the narrative is to build a network of regional cooperation to ensure peace and stability in India’s areas of interest. The document also recognizes the increasing importance of HADR operations for the Indian navy, given the expansion of India’s maritime outlook as well as capabilities.

Be it through the Joint Strategic Vision with the United States, Japan’s inclusion into the MALABAR exercises, new bilateral exercises with Japan, Indonesia, and Australia, or re-engaging with the island nations of the IOR and South Pacific, there is a clear message that India is willing to play a larger role in the unfolding security architecture in the region.

It was only a matter of time before New Delhi acknowledged the changing dynamics within its area of maritime interests. The initiatives taken under the Modi government to re-engage with the navies of the region are much appreciated and this document is a step forward in voicing India’s intentions and concerns regarding maritime security. If New Delhi can sustain the momentum that it has created in the Asian maritime domain, India will emerge as a credible leader and critical player in the evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific

Darshana M. Baruah is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

RELATED

[A] Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009

INDIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE Indian Navy  Naval Strategic Publication 1.1 

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf

 [B] Chapter 4 m India’s Aspirational Naval Doctrine1 Iskander Rehman

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Indias_Aspirational_Naval_Doctrine.pdf

[C] Indian Navy Updates Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009

https://www.academia.edu/23733565/Indian_Navy_Updates_Indian_Maritime_Doctrine_2009

[ D ]  CHAPTER IV INDIAN NAVY’S MARITIME DOCTRINE

http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/22017/14/14_chapter_4.pdf

PART II : DEFENCE & MARITIME BACKGROUNDER TO DISMISSIVE TARDY INDIAN DEFENCE & PREPAREDNESS OBSTACLES

SOURCE :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html






                                  PART II



        BACKGROUNDER  TO  DISMISSIVE 
                                    
            TARDY INDIAN  DEFENCE 
                                    & 
             PREPAREDNESS OBSTACLES

                    The Elephant at Sea:

                  India's Maritime Strategy

[   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

WoodrowWilsonCenter

Published on Jul 30, 2013

Asia Program

In the next decade, India plans to introduce 40 new warships and 400 new aircraft to its naval forces. Such efforts reflect a dramatic maritime transformation now underway in India—one meant to improve India's power projection capabilities at sea and to produce a blue-water navy. On March 9, the Asia Program, with co-sponsorship from International Security Studies, hosted an event on India's maritime strategy and growing maritime power.

______________________________________________________

PART I : What Good Are the Indian Navy's Aircraft Carriers Against Pakistan?(R)

SOURCE:

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/what-good-are-the-indian-navys-aircraft-carriers-against-pakistan/

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html

                                                                  PART  I

What Good Are the Indian Navy's Aircraft Carriers Against Pakistan?

                                    By

                             Robert Farley

December 12, 2017

Just how useful will India’s carriers be in a potential future war with Pakistan?

The Indian Navy is devoting enormous resources to the development of an effective, multi-ship carrier force. It remains unclear, however, precisely how the Indian Navy would use that force in the event of a rekindled war with Pakistan. A recent Naval War College Review article by Ben Wan Beng Ho sheds some light on the problems that India’s carrier force might have in taking the fight to Pakistan. Long story short, India’s carriers would face enormous risks in undertaking offensive operations, with very uncertain benefits.

Ho argues that the need for self-defense, combined with limited deck space, make it very difficult for INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya, either separately or in tandem, to threaten Pakistani land installations. Pakistan’s A2/AD network, including submarines, aircraft, and surface ships, poses a credible threat to the carriers, making their use in offensive operations very risky. Conceivably, Pakistan could even attack Indian carriers with tactical nuclear weapons, if the war developed in that direction. The Indian carriers would struggle to execute a close blockade of Pakistani ports, destroy the Pakistani surface fleet, or do much damage to Pakistani military targets on land.

Ho suggests that the carrier fleet would be better employed as a decisive late-war weapon, after Indian Air Force assets had worn down Pakistani defenses. This would have the benefit of enabling India to bring its entire carrier force to bear. Ho also argues that the carriers could play a productive role in sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, which might also allow them to threaten Pakistani lines of communication.

Ho details the problems associated with small-deck carriers, especially the limited number of aircraft to share offensive and defensive missions.

The need for self-protection is not entirely problematic; Indian carriers will undoubtedly receive a great deal of attention from potential opponents, drawing resources away from other military operations.

Other Indian naval forces could either use this misdirection to conduct offensive operations, or could rely on the defensive umbrella provided by the carriers.

But some core problems remain. Indian naval strategy envisions three operational carrier battle groups undertaking more or less the same tasks. 

But Indian naval procurement has produced a plan to acquire three carriers with radically different capabilities, 

meaning that the actual utility of the 

carrier battle group in crisis

conditions will depend upon which 

carrier is operational at a given time.

We also have no clear idea regarding the reliability of the two existing ships. Vikramaditya is an old Russian hull that underwent controversial late-life transformation into a STOBAR carrier; Vikrant is a purpose-built STOBAR carrier, but will be the largest warship ever constructed in India, with all of the potential reliability issues that this entails. The two ships are similar but not identical, meaning that maintenance and flight procedures will vary in potentially consequential ways. 

This makes sharing aircraft and pilots a dicey proposition.

Moreover, as Ho notes, the reports we have regarding readiness in the naval aviation program are not great. The MiG-29K has been a carrier aircraft for less than a decade, and has never been subjected to a demanding, up tempo set of combat operations. Anecdotes from the Russian experience do not suggest optimism.

While Vikrant and Vikramaditya will provide important opportunities for learning, the Indian Navy may need to wait for the commissioning of INS Vishal, projected in the 2030s, to have a real offensive capability against Pakistan. By that time, however, the lethality of Pakistan’s A2/AD umbrella may have significantly increased.

Topics

Flashpoints

Tags

India-Pakistan War

Indian carrier aviation

Indian Navy

INS Vikramaditya

INS Vikrant

INS Vishal

STOBAR

From String Of Pearls To Head Vice: Is China Squeezing A Strategic Advantage Over India? (R)

SOURCE: https://swarajyamag.com/world/from-string-of-pearls-to-head-vice-is-china-squeezing-a-strategic-advantage-over-india

From String Of Pearls To Head Vice: Is China Squeezing A Strategic Advantage Over India?

                    BY

     Syed Ata Hasnain

- 

SNAPSHOT

The Chinese Defence Minsiter General Chang Wanquan recently visited Sri Lanka and Nepal even as the state-owned media in China issued veiled warnings to India.

Is China’s wariness of India’s relationship with the US forcing it to move beyond the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.

Asia Pacific is quiet at present awaiting President Donald Trump’s true strategic emergence; uncertainty about rebalancing and pivot reinforce the belief that the US is yet unprepared to seriously address the issues concerning China. West Asia still steals the march in terms of glamour news such as the ongoing battle for Mosul and discussions on the future strategy of Islamic State (IS or Daesh).

However, a reading of 2017 thus far gives indicators of a bolder China, preparing itself for all options that the US strategy may adopt to address the future needs of its interests in the Asia Pacific. Although South Asia classically remains a peripheral zone for the Asia Pacific it is an important area of the Indo-Pacific region. For China, the Pacific Rim and waters are within reach with potential for greater control due to direct accessibility from the mainland. It is the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) of South Asia where China’s access is not from the mainland but through belts and corridors. That zone is crucial because through it are aligned the sea lines of communication (SLsOC), China’s commercial and economic lifeline.

It is not usual to commence analyses with deductions but here it may be necessary. A flurry of reportage and commentary in Chinese media, especially the print, considered virtual official mouthpieces, appears to indicate that Beijing perceives an emboldened New Delhi due to the emerging US-India strategic partnership. The coming of Trump doesn’t appear to have diluted that even as details are being resolved. China’s original strategy the ‘String of Pearls’, hotly denied by it, was obviously a form of psychological encirclement of India through more active diplomatic outreach to the smaller states of South Asia. That, in the new dispensation, is being progressed to the next level which is obviously less benign and taking the shape of a ‘Head Vice’. Here is why such a deduction seems more plausible; with activities from Myanmar to Gwadar under the scanner.

Fourteenth November 2016 is an important date; on that day the operationalisation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) appears to have commenced with movement of ships from Gwadar to other ports. The deepening of Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China goes up several notches and as the $50 billion project progresses the notches will convert to rungs. This will be notwithstanding the supposedly blood sucking 11 per cent interest on Chinese loans amounting to $35 billion. It may see transfer of land and assets of choice from Pakistan to China in a later timeframe. Gwadar also allows China to monitor US and Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and Pakistan to dominate the energy routes to which it is a gateway. CPEC has done more for Pakistan’s strategic confidence than any other arrangement in 50 years. The same if not already evident in Pakistan’s diplomatic and military stance will manifest very noticeably as we proceed to the future.

Even more than the Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship it is China’s surge towards Sri Lanka that should draw attention. It had already established a hold during the later stages of the Eelam wars through supply of weapons worth almost $1 billion to the Sri Lankan armed forces. China had also won favour by securing the project for construction of a modern port at Hambantota and an ultra-modern international airport at Mattala in 2006. It was a project initially offered to India but not taken up by us due to questionable commercial viability. China grabbed it and after completion realises its commercial non-viability but immense strategic value for its own maritime presence in the Indian Ocean to oversee the security of its SLsOC.

Sri Lanka, beholden to Chinese support during the final stages of the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and financially in no position to pay for the project has apparently bartered 80 per cent holding in the project and the nearby modern airport at Mattala. Till the time Mahinda Rajapaksa was in power the Chinese confidence was evident but with the arrival of President Maithripala Srisena the urgency that Sri Lanka felt towards making up with the West increased; this was primarily due to the human rights investigations that were being sought in relation to the final stages of the war against the LTTE. To regain some strategic space China has sent its defence minister on a recent visit with offers on renegotiating Hambantota, supply of military hardware to give Sri Lanka a more proactive role in patrolling the oceans and self-confidence to preserve its integrity. Details of the visit are yet emerging.

Switch to Bangladesh and we have the Chevron gas fields under sale with China’s Zhenhua Oil bidding for these. Zhenhua raises no eyebrows until it is revealed that it is a subsidiary of Norinco, the Chinese defence manufacturing company. The brow would raise even more once it was known that the gas fields in question are not in Southern Bangladesh but in the North Eastern part bordering Meghalaya, lower Assam and Tripura. India is not paranoid but surely land based presence of an adversary’s assets bordering your rear areas is not a position of comfort. Strategic literature emanating from Dhaka expresses deep interest in the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor which has not received a very enthusiastic response from India. China’s involvement in development of port infrastructure in Bangladesh is but a matter of time as the latter cannot afford to drag its feet on this due to its own economic compulsions.

Maldives is more complex in complete contrast to the size of its geography. A Chinese firm has acquired "Feydhoo Finolhu" island on a 50 year lease for $4 million for developing a resort near capital city Male. This has now been supplemented by a Saudi Arabian initiative of investing $10 billion for wholesale acquisition of Faafu, 19 low-lying islands 120km south of Male. It would involve building seaports, airports, high-end housing and resorts and the creation of special economic zones. No doubt Chinese-Saudi Arabian cooperation is not something which has been contemplated as a security threat.

Yet, when viewed in the context of the increasing footprint of radical Islam in the islands, increasing visibility of Chinese Saudi defence cooperation becomes worrying for India’s strategic watchers. As per an interesting paper written by James Dorsey of the RSIS – “Riyadh sees its soft power in the Maldives as a way of convincing China it is Saudi Arabia – and not its regional rival, Iran – that is the key link in Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative to link Eurasia to the Middle East kingdom through Chinese-funded infrastructure”. That explains the concern for India.

Nepal’s relationship with India has been tentative for some time and even the goodwill re-established by the relief work after the disastrous earthquake of 2015 has not translated into any major strategic advantage. At the same time the deterioration of Indo-Nepalese relations over the new constitution and the rights of people of Indian origin has also not been fully exploited by China. There are pin-prick events such as a low-level military training exercise and continuing negotiations on project feasibility of a trans-national (Tibet to Nepal) railway project and power lines. The Belt-Road concept of President Xi Jing Ping has yet to emerge here but interest in the same has been expressed by Nepal; its future inclusion is a given.

Prime Minister Prachanda is likely to visit Beijing in the near future but China’s Defence Minister Chang Wanquan is already visiting Kathmandu after his visit to Sri Lanka. Prachanda’s visit may set the stage for the Chinese President’s visit to Kathmandu which was postponed last year following some unconfirmed reports of Beijing’s unhappiness over a lack of seriousness to push bilateral projects. That moment seems to have passed. China has recently pledged $8.3 billion in investment to Nepal – equivalent to nearly 40 per cent of its entire GDP. That staggering commitment dwarfed India's offer of $317 million.

China’s Global Times wrote on 26 December 2016 – “It is neither realistic nor possible for India to always regard Nepal as its backyard and put pressure on Sino-Nepalese cooperation.” The deepening of Sino-Nepalese ties can therefore be taken for granted although the speed of the same may be a little slower.

On Bhutan the Global Times recently stated – “New Delhi is one of the crucial reasons why China and Bhutan, which is controlled by India economically and diplomatically, have not yet established diplomatic relations”. Summing up the discomfort of India it said – “If such tendencies in India continue, China will have to fight back, because its core interests will have been violated. This is not what we hope for, but the ball is in India’s court”.

It is obvious that China is concerned about India’s efforts to secure its neighbourhood and keep it within its realm of influence. There is an element of realpolitik in this. Its ambitious designs to achieve its interests mainly extend to securing SLsOC and the Belt and Road linkages and facilities. It has invested just too much time, energy and money into this and its sensitivity to all this will increase progressively. That is the reason why it is trying to send aggressive messages and enhancing the psychological squeeze on India. India’s stance has been correct and balanced. It has objected to issues such as the construction of the CPEC through the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan over which India lays claim. Norms of international conduct do not permit this but just as in the case of the South China Sea dispute China is beyond adherence to legal procedures.

The cold war between India and China with respect to influence in the South Asian region is already taking the shape of a New Great Game. This is likely to intensify. Maturity demands that rhetoric be reduced and engagement increased so that economic and diplomatic activities continue which perhaps will bring some compulsion to view each other’s interests with sensitivity. India cannot be pressurised regarding its partnerships with other countries which are based upon mutual and shared strategic interests. The New Great Game in the IOR of South Asia is likely to continue with increasing attempts at securing spheres of influence. There is a set of old military tactics which states that when surrounded hit at the enemy from outside the area of encirclement.

India must develop Chahbahar at the earliest and convince the US to support the India-Afghanistan-Iran initiative as it makes ample sense. In Sri Lanka, it must seek ways of enhancing its presence and supporting the Sri Lankan government with more economic initiatives. Handling Maldives has been a challenge but control over its strategic decisions must be exercised with consultation. Our relationship with Bangladesh is strong and progressing; Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is visiting India in April 2017. Her visit is one of the most strategically important visits in recent months and must help in developing long-term trust and faith between countries which are considered natural partners. With Nepal an exercise of a degree of strategic independence by it is inevitable. The question is how that can be managed to advantage. Lastly, the BCIM Economic Corridor needs to be analysed more deeply for hidden agenda. The overall benefit to the North East may assist in stabilising the region through the economics route.

What India has to fully ensure is that the String of Pearls do not convert to a Head Vice which will squeeze it out of options.

Tags

• Sri Lanka
 
• Chinese String of Pearls
 
• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
 
• China Defence Spending

Syed Ata Hasnain

The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.