STATUS INDIA -TIBET BOUNDARY ISSUE AS ON NOV ( 2013)

SOURCE:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2515187/India-ready-let-China-Aksai-Chin-neighbour-country-drops-claim-Arunachal-Pradesh.html


        STATUS  INDIA -TIBET BOUNDARY                      ( ISSUE  AS ON NOV 2013 )

         India 'ready to let China keep Aksai Chin' if neighbour country drops claim to Arunachal Pradesh

                                    By

                          Saurabh Shukla

 28 November 2013 

UPDATED 22 JUL 2017

The bhai-bhai days may soon be reborn in bye-bye avatar along the India-China border.

Foreign ministry documents on border negotiations accessed by Mail Today reveal that India has signalled its readiness to let its Aksai Chin region remain in Chinese hands in exchange for recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as part of its territory.

In other words, India is willing to give up its claims to Aksai Chin if China does the same for Arunachal.

China continues to push for territorial concessions in Arunachal Pradesh, which it has been eyeing for a long time, before moving forward on the long-standing border issue between the two countries.

Publicly, India has been holding to its stated position that there can't be any territorial concessions. But behind the closed doors of the negotiating room, India has told China that it "may not be averse to status quo position".

Simply put, it means that for China to give up its claim on the 90,000 sq km inside Arunachal, including Tawang, India could agree to give up 38,000 km sq of Jammu and Kashmir. That piece of land, called Aksai Chin in the Ladakh sector, has been in dispute since Pakistan annexed it and then illegally handed 5,180 sq km over to China in 1963.

Bargaining Point

This contentious formula is not the stated position of New Delhi, but it is being considered a bargaining point, officials privy to the discussions have told Mail Today.

Any such proposal can only be implemented if a new government in New Delhi has enormous political will, because there is an unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament of 1962 that India will ensure that it gets back all territory illegally occupied by China.

Several documents based on the notes made by Indian officials suggest that even after 16 rounds of boundary negotiations, the talks are effectively deadlocked. China insists it needs substantial concessions on Arunachal Pradesh and the entire disputed Eastern sector before a framework or a formula to resolve disputes in all sectors can be agreed to.

The boundary talks are currently in the second leg of a three-stage process. Both sides signed an agreement on political parameters in 2005, and are now negotiating a framework to resolve disputes in all sectors.

First Stage

The first stage was to establish guiding principles, the second included evolving a consensus on a framework for the boundary, and the last step comprised carrying out its delineation and demarcation. This final stage involves delineating the border in maps and on the ground.

The 16th round of boundary negotiations earlier this year between National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon and Chinese Special Interlocutor Yang Jeichi, a former Chinese foreign minister, also ended on a disappointing note, with India contesting the Chinese assertion that the boundary was never demarcated.

Menon has been a tough negotiator, responding strongly to Chinese suggestions of concessions and rejecting its maximalist approach.

The Indian side also says that both sides should, in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding, make meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question so as to arrive at a package settlement.

The Big Deal

A consensus is building where India and China may agree to territorial concessions. It means that for China to give up its claim on the 90,000 sq km inside Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang, India could agree to give up 38,000 sq km of Jammu and Kashmir. 

That piece of land, called Aksai Chin in the Ladakh sector, has been in dispute since Pakistan annexed it and then illegally handed 5,180 sqkm over to China in 1963.

                                                              CHINESE WAR                                     PREPAREDNESS IN AKSAI CHIN

            UPDATED TILL 21 JUL 2017


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                                AKSAI CHIN AS SEEN FROM                                    GOOGLE  EARTH

                                                       ABOVE

CHINESE ROAD COMMUNICATIONS 
                                  &

   DEFENCES AS DETECTED FROM                                  GOOGLE EARTH








 PLA    MISSILE  BASE ( WITH TUNNELS )

    33 Km from  karakoraum pass 

                               AT   

                      18 Deg    Mag 

                                OR   

                 40  Km  22 Deg  Mag  


            FROM DAULAT BEG OLDI  
                              ON

  KARAKORAM   WATER- SHED  NORTH








NOT LISTED   AIR PORT WITH FIVE(05) Km RUNWAY  JUST 485 Km  NORTH  22 Deg NNE FROM NEW DELHI 

       LOC  FROM NGARI TOWN-  
48 Km  SSE 170 DEG ON G-219 HIGHWAY TO SHIGASTE .   NEW DELHI & ALL AIRPORTS OF NW INDIA ARE IN THE RANGE OF SS 11- MISSILES ( (NUKES ? )

These 4 Countries Will Stop China From Ruling A Disputed Sea(R)

SOURCE:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/07/14/these-4-countries-will-resist-chinas-rising-power-in-a-disputed-sea/#14dbd528c714

  India On High Alert After China Moves

        Military Equipments To Tibet

                     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJrVGJ0QuRY

These 4 Countries Will Stop     China From Ruling A Disputed Sea

                   PREVIEW   

                     REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY

THE DAY VIETNAM  FALLS TO CHINKS 
THERE WILL BE NOTHING  TO STOP CHINA CAPTURING MALAYSIA  ARCHIPELAGO. IT WILL BE A REPEAT
                                  OF 
WORLD WAR II BURMA CAMPAIGN .

                 CHINKS HAD BEEN

EYEING  "THIBET" SINCE THE ADVENT                                    OF
                          BIG GAME.

AFTER THE QUICK SUSPECT DEATHS                                        
                              OF 

7th DALAI LAMA  TO 12 th  DALAI  LAMAs

 IN 1886  BEFORE 13th DALAI LAMA 

COULD  CONSOLIDATE  HIS RULE 

 BRITAIN BARTERED AWAY "THIBET" 

TO CHINESE IN EXCHANGE FOR 

 BRTISH  RULE OVER  "BURMA". 

 CHINESE WERE EYEING BURMA IN 1886                                         & 
 AS  A PART OF BIG ASIAN  GAME

 THEY ARE STILL EYEING BURMA . 

       INDIA LOST BURMA IN 1939 
                                     &
    IF INDIANS  DO  NOT  MODERNIZE

                      "ARMED FORCES"

TO FACE CHINA THAN INDIA SHOULD  

              BE PREPARED FOR INDIAN 

                      "BALKANIZATION"

                                       & 
                               
                              BYE BYE  

                                     TO 

"DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF  BHARAT "

       THIS IS CALLED REVENGE OF                                         GEOGRAPHY

                                                        -Vasundhra

                                   --------------------------------------------------------------------------

China Moves Tonnes Of Military Equipments To Tibet

        

   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TB5ZBfLRc2s

CHINKS HAVE TO BE CAUGHT BY  YAK (TIBETAN) HORNS &  IT  SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT TIBET IS AUTONOMOUS  REGION OF INDIA.                               'INDIAN DIPLOMACY' 
IS A TOTAL FAILURE ON ALL FRONTS                                     EXCEPT  IN                             
                             SELF PRAISE

              --------------------------------------------


Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 24th 1886 between the British Government and the Government of China) Extract: 
   

      1876, Zhifu Agreement - Britain

            http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/147

                                                     &

        1886, Burma-Tibet - Britain

                 in 

• British treaties
• 
  
             http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/148

Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 24th 1886 between the British Government and the Government of China) Extract: Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it he practicable, the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider trade regulations: but if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly.


 The remainder of the Convention was concerned with the recognition of British supremacy in Burma and the above clause about Tibet appears to be in the nature of a concession to facilitate the principal object of the Convention. 

These 4 Countries Will Stop                             China 

From Ruling A Disputed Sea

                       BY

               Ralph Jennings

An activist shouts anti-China slogans during a rally marking the 42nd anniversary of the 1974 naval battle between China and then-South Vietnamese troops over the Paracel Islands, in Hanoi on January 19, 2017. (HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/Getty Images)

China claimed to be king of the widely disputed sea off its south coast before a world arbitration court ruled a year ago that it lacked legal grounds for the massive maritime claim. A year after that ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Beijing has become only more dominant over the South China Sea despite competing claims by Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. That’s because China rejected the ruling but to make sure no one squawked, it stepped up economic cooperation with some of the other countries.

China has the world’s third largest military and second biggest GDP, making its maritime control hard to challenge especially if you’re a smaller Southeast Asian state. But not everyone is just standing by. Here are four countries that are able and likely to throw water on China’s increasing control over the 3.5 million-square-kilometer sea that’s rich in fisheries, fuel reserves and shipping lanes:

1. India

India has no claim in the South China Sea but hopes to stop China from consolidating its own. The well-armed Western ally that disputes two border regions with China established an “Act East”policy in 2014 to improve ties with fast growing Southeast Asian nations. Supposedly it would act economically, but maybe there's more.

In May the country was exploring placement of a tsunami warning system in the South China Sea for regional use even though Beijing is working on one, as well. In 2014 the overseas subsidiary of India’s state-run firm ONGC reached a deal with Vietnam to explore under a tract of sea that Beijing covets. China is not opposing India’s tsunami alert system idea but is less thrilled about the oil deals.

2. Japan

Acting as China’s balance-of power counterweight in Asia, Japan gave Vietnam six ships in 2014 and last year agreed to lease five military aircraft to the Philippines. Those are just just two examples of how it has supplied nations with South China Sea claims that overlap those of Beijing.

Some see Japan as an Asian proxy for Western influence against Chinese expansion. From May 1 its Izumo helicopter carrier began escorting a U.S. supply ship. It was probably headed to the South China Sea through August for port calls and drills with India and the United States in the Bay of Bengal.

China has a separate maritime dispute with Japan over Tokyo-controlled islets in the East China Sea. It’s very wary of Japanese military expansion in the future. No wonder a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson told Japan in March via the official Xinhua News Agency not to cause trouble in the region.

3. United States

U.S. President Donald Trump looked the other way at China’s maritime expansion through April as he hoped his Chinese counterpart would help rein in North Korea’s ballistic missile development. But as that cooperation shows signs of thinning, since late May the U.S. Navy has passed two vessels through the South China Sea to refute Beijing's idea that the whole sea is theirs. China objected to both passages.

The United States doesn’t claim any of the sea, but Beijing frets because of the well-armed U.S. government’s ease in forming military alliances with Asian countries that do. The prime example is joint U.S. naval patrols with the Philippines since 2014.

4. Vietnam

This is the only country with a competing South China Sea claim that is likely to go against China’s maritime expansion, which includes land reclamation at some of the sea’s bigger features and infrastructure for military use. Like other states in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese value their trade relationship with China, which totaled $95.8 billion in 2015.

But they fundamentally dislike China and aren’t afraid to risk its wrath despite a smaller military. Consider centuries of land border disputes, a deadly 1974 battle over the sea’s Paracel Islands(China controls them now) and a boat-ramming incident three years ago over a Chinese oil rig. Vietnam can count on India and Japan for support if needed. So it’s OK reclaiming its own isletsand drilling for oil in waters that may fall inside China’s “nine-dash line” that it uses to demarcate its maritime claim. China will bellyache -- a military official cut short a visit to Hanoi last month -- but Vietnam has enough resolve and backing to resist.

APPENDIX FOR  INFO



Legal Materials on Tibet

Treaties & Conventions Relating to Tibet

Numbers in brackets (e.g. [1]) indicate page in print version.

Sino-Tibetan Treaty, 821/823 A.D. [371]

Peace Treaty Between Ladakh and Tibet at Tingmosgang (1684) [372]

Ladakhi Letter of Agreement (1842) [374]

Agreement Between Tibet and Kashmir (1852) [375]

Treaty Between Tibet and Nepal (1856) [376]

Treaty Between Nepal and Tibet (1856) [378]

Chefoo Convention (1876) [380]

Convention Relating to Burmah and Thibet (1886) [381]

Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1890) [382]

Convention Between Great Britain and Thibet (1904) [385]

Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet (1906) [389]

Convention Between Great Britain and Russia (1907) [391]

Agreement Between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending Trade Regulations of 1893 (1908) [393]

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Government of Mongolia and Tibet (1913) [397]

Anglo-Tibetan Declaration (1914) [399]

Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet, Simla (1914) [400]

Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations (1914) [403]

Agreement for the Restoration of Peaceful Relations Between China and Tibet (1918) [406]

Supplementary Agreement Regarding Mutual Withdrawal of Troops and Cessation of Hostilities Between Chinese and Tibetans (1918) [409]

Tibet Justice Center Home | Legal Materials on Tibet

From String Of Pearls To Head Vice: Is China Squeezing A Strategic Advantage Over India? (R)

SOURCE: https://swarajyamag.com/world/from-string-of-pearls-to-head-vice-is-china-squeezing-a-strategic-advantage-over-india

From String Of Pearls To Head Vice: Is China Squeezing A Strategic Advantage Over India?

                    BY

     Syed Ata Hasnain

- 

SNAPSHOT

The Chinese Defence Minsiter General Chang Wanquan recently visited Sri Lanka and Nepal even as the state-owned media in China issued veiled warnings to India.

Is China’s wariness of India’s relationship with the US forcing it to move beyond the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.

Asia Pacific is quiet at present awaiting President Donald Trump’s true strategic emergence; uncertainty about rebalancing and pivot reinforce the belief that the US is yet unprepared to seriously address the issues concerning China. West Asia still steals the march in terms of glamour news such as the ongoing battle for Mosul and discussions on the future strategy of Islamic State (IS or Daesh).

However, a reading of 2017 thus far gives indicators of a bolder China, preparing itself for all options that the US strategy may adopt to address the future needs of its interests in the Asia Pacific. Although South Asia classically remains a peripheral zone for the Asia Pacific it is an important area of the Indo-Pacific region. For China, the Pacific Rim and waters are within reach with potential for greater control due to direct accessibility from the mainland. It is the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) of South Asia where China’s access is not from the mainland but through belts and corridors. That zone is crucial because through it are aligned the sea lines of communication (SLsOC), China’s commercial and economic lifeline.

It is not usual to commence analyses with deductions but here it may be necessary. A flurry of reportage and commentary in Chinese media, especially the print, considered virtual official mouthpieces, appears to indicate that Beijing perceives an emboldened New Delhi due to the emerging US-India strategic partnership. The coming of Trump doesn’t appear to have diluted that even as details are being resolved. China’s original strategy the ‘String of Pearls’, hotly denied by it, was obviously a form of psychological encirclement of India through more active diplomatic outreach to the smaller states of South Asia. That, in the new dispensation, is being progressed to the next level which is obviously less benign and taking the shape of a ‘Head Vice’. Here is why such a deduction seems more plausible; with activities from Myanmar to Gwadar under the scanner.

Fourteenth November 2016 is an important date; on that day the operationalisation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) appears to have commenced with movement of ships from Gwadar to other ports. The deepening of Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China goes up several notches and as the $50 billion project progresses the notches will convert to rungs. This will be notwithstanding the supposedly blood sucking 11 per cent interest on Chinese loans amounting to $35 billion. It may see transfer of land and assets of choice from Pakistan to China in a later timeframe. Gwadar also allows China to monitor US and Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and Pakistan to dominate the energy routes to which it is a gateway. CPEC has done more for Pakistan’s strategic confidence than any other arrangement in 50 years. The same if not already evident in Pakistan’s diplomatic and military stance will manifest very noticeably as we proceed to the future.

Even more than the Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship it is China’s surge towards Sri Lanka that should draw attention. It had already established a hold during the later stages of the Eelam wars through supply of weapons worth almost $1 billion to the Sri Lankan armed forces. China had also won favour by securing the project for construction of a modern port at Hambantota and an ultra-modern international airport at Mattala in 2006. It was a project initially offered to India but not taken up by us due to questionable commercial viability. China grabbed it and after completion realises its commercial non-viability but immense strategic value for its own maritime presence in the Indian Ocean to oversee the security of its SLsOC.

Sri Lanka, beholden to Chinese support during the final stages of the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and financially in no position to pay for the project has apparently bartered 80 per cent holding in the project and the nearby modern airport at Mattala. Till the time Mahinda Rajapaksa was in power the Chinese confidence was evident but with the arrival of President Maithripala Srisena the urgency that Sri Lanka felt towards making up with the West increased; this was primarily due to the human rights investigations that were being sought in relation to the final stages of the war against the LTTE. To regain some strategic space China has sent its defence minister on a recent visit with offers on renegotiating Hambantota, supply of military hardware to give Sri Lanka a more proactive role in patrolling the oceans and self-confidence to preserve its integrity. Details of the visit are yet emerging.

Switch to Bangladesh and we have the Chevron gas fields under sale with China’s Zhenhua Oil bidding for these. Zhenhua raises no eyebrows until it is revealed that it is a subsidiary of Norinco, the Chinese defence manufacturing company. The brow would raise even more once it was known that the gas fields in question are not in Southern Bangladesh but in the North Eastern part bordering Meghalaya, lower Assam and Tripura. India is not paranoid but surely land based presence of an adversary’s assets bordering your rear areas is not a position of comfort. Strategic literature emanating from Dhaka expresses deep interest in the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor which has not received a very enthusiastic response from India. China’s involvement in development of port infrastructure in Bangladesh is but a matter of time as the latter cannot afford to drag its feet on this due to its own economic compulsions.

Maldives is more complex in complete contrast to the size of its geography. A Chinese firm has acquired "Feydhoo Finolhu" island on a 50 year lease for $4 million for developing a resort near capital city Male. This has now been supplemented by a Saudi Arabian initiative of investing $10 billion for wholesale acquisition of Faafu, 19 low-lying islands 120km south of Male. It would involve building seaports, airports, high-end housing and resorts and the creation of special economic zones. No doubt Chinese-Saudi Arabian cooperation is not something which has been contemplated as a security threat.

Yet, when viewed in the context of the increasing footprint of radical Islam in the islands, increasing visibility of Chinese Saudi defence cooperation becomes worrying for India’s strategic watchers. As per an interesting paper written by James Dorsey of the RSIS – “Riyadh sees its soft power in the Maldives as a way of convincing China it is Saudi Arabia – and not its regional rival, Iran – that is the key link in Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative to link Eurasia to the Middle East kingdom through Chinese-funded infrastructure”. That explains the concern for India.

Nepal’s relationship with India has been tentative for some time and even the goodwill re-established by the relief work after the disastrous earthquake of 2015 has not translated into any major strategic advantage. At the same time the deterioration of Indo-Nepalese relations over the new constitution and the rights of people of Indian origin has also not been fully exploited by China. There are pin-prick events such as a low-level military training exercise and continuing negotiations on project feasibility of a trans-national (Tibet to Nepal) railway project and power lines. The Belt-Road concept of President Xi Jing Ping has yet to emerge here but interest in the same has been expressed by Nepal; its future inclusion is a given.

Prime Minister Prachanda is likely to visit Beijing in the near future but China’s Defence Minister Chang Wanquan is already visiting Kathmandu after his visit to Sri Lanka. Prachanda’s visit may set the stage for the Chinese President’s visit to Kathmandu which was postponed last year following some unconfirmed reports of Beijing’s unhappiness over a lack of seriousness to push bilateral projects. That moment seems to have passed. China has recently pledged $8.3 billion in investment to Nepal – equivalent to nearly 40 per cent of its entire GDP. That staggering commitment dwarfed India's offer of $317 million.

China’s Global Times wrote on 26 December 2016 – “It is neither realistic nor possible for India to always regard Nepal as its backyard and put pressure on Sino-Nepalese cooperation.” The deepening of Sino-Nepalese ties can therefore be taken for granted although the speed of the same may be a little slower.

On Bhutan the Global Times recently stated – “New Delhi is one of the crucial reasons why China and Bhutan, which is controlled by India economically and diplomatically, have not yet established diplomatic relations”. Summing up the discomfort of India it said – “If such tendencies in India continue, China will have to fight back, because its core interests will have been violated. This is not what we hope for, but the ball is in India’s court”.

It is obvious that China is concerned about India’s efforts to secure its neighbourhood and keep it within its realm of influence. There is an element of realpolitik in this. Its ambitious designs to achieve its interests mainly extend to securing SLsOC and the Belt and Road linkages and facilities. It has invested just too much time, energy and money into this and its sensitivity to all this will increase progressively. That is the reason why it is trying to send aggressive messages and enhancing the psychological squeeze on India. India’s stance has been correct and balanced. It has objected to issues such as the construction of the CPEC through the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan over which India lays claim. Norms of international conduct do not permit this but just as in the case of the South China Sea dispute China is beyond adherence to legal procedures.

The cold war between India and China with respect to influence in the South Asian region is already taking the shape of a New Great Game. This is likely to intensify. Maturity demands that rhetoric be reduced and engagement increased so that economic and diplomatic activities continue which perhaps will bring some compulsion to view each other’s interests with sensitivity. India cannot be pressurised regarding its partnerships with other countries which are based upon mutual and shared strategic interests. The New Great Game in the IOR of South Asia is likely to continue with increasing attempts at securing spheres of influence. There is a set of old military tactics which states that when surrounded hit at the enemy from outside the area of encirclement.

India must develop Chahbahar at the earliest and convince the US to support the India-Afghanistan-Iran initiative as it makes ample sense. In Sri Lanka, it must seek ways of enhancing its presence and supporting the Sri Lankan government with more economic initiatives. Handling Maldives has been a challenge but control over its strategic decisions must be exercised with consultation. Our relationship with Bangladesh is strong and progressing; Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is visiting India in April 2017. Her visit is one of the most strategically important visits in recent months and must help in developing long-term trust and faith between countries which are considered natural partners. With Nepal an exercise of a degree of strategic independence by it is inevitable. The question is how that can be managed to advantage. Lastly, the BCIM Economic Corridor needs to be analysed more deeply for hidden agenda. The overall benefit to the North East may assist in stabilising the region through the economics route.

What India has to fully ensure is that the String of Pearls do not convert to a Head Vice which will squeeze it out of options.

Tags

• Sri Lanka
 
• Chinese String of Pearls
 
• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
 
• China Defence Spending

Syed Ata Hasnain

The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.