SOURCE:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again
Click/Google to Open the VIDEO [ https://youtu.be/lVwSmc6K5x4 ]
Showing posts with label FOREIGN POLICY INDIA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FOREIGN POLICY INDIA. Show all posts
Monday, November 9, 2020
Wednesday, July 19, 2017
These 4 Countries Will Stop China From Ruling A Disputed Sea(R)
SOURCE:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/07/14/these-4-countries-will-resist-chinas-rising-power-in-a-disputed-sea/#14dbd528c714
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJrVGJ0QuRY
REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY
THE DAY VIETNAM FALLS TO CHINKS
THERE WILL BE NOTHING TO STOP CHINA CAPTURING MALAYSIA ARCHIPELAGO. IT WILL BE A REPEAT
OF
WORLD WAR II BURMA CAMPAIGN .
CHINKS HAD BEEN
EYEING "THIBET" SINCE THE ADVENT OF
BIG GAME.
AFTER THE QUICK SUSPECT DEATHS
OF
7th DALAI LAMA TO 12 th DALAI LAMAs
IN 1886 BEFORE 13th DALAI LAMA
COULD CONSOLIDATE HIS RULE
BRITAIN BARTERED AWAY "THIBET"
TO CHINESE IN EXCHANGE FOR
BRTISH RULE OVER "BURMA".
CHINESE WERE EYEING BURMA IN 1886 &
AS A PART OF BIG ASIAN GAME
THEY ARE STILL EYEING BURMA .
INDIA LOST BURMA IN 1939
&
IF INDIANS DO NOT MODERNIZE
"ARMED FORCES"
TO FACE CHINA THAN INDIA SHOULD
BE PREPARED FOR INDIAN
"BALKANIZATION"
&
BYE BYE
TO
"DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF BHARAT "
THIS IS CALLED REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY
-Vasundhra
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TB5ZBfLRc2s
CHINKS HAVE TO BE CAUGHT BY YAK (TIBETAN) HORNS & IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT TIBET IS AUTONOMOUS REGION OF INDIA. 'INDIAN DIPLOMACY'
IS A TOTAL FAILURE ON ALL FRONTS EXCEPT IN
SELF PRAISE
--------------------------------------------
Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 24th 1886 between the British Government and the Government of China) Extract:
&
Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 24th 1886 between the British Government and the Government of China) Extract: Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it he practicable, the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider trade regulations: but if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly.
The remainder of the Convention was concerned with the recognition of British supremacy in Burma and the above clause about Tibet appears to be in the nature of a concession to facilitate the principal object of the Convention.
An activist shouts anti-China slogans during a rally marking the 42nd anniversary of the 1974 naval battle between China and then-South Vietnamese troops over the Paracel Islands, in Hanoi on January 19, 2017. (HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/Getty Images)
APPENDIX FOR INFO
Legal Materials on Tibet
Treaties & Conventions Relating to Tibet
Numbers in brackets (e.g. [1]) indicate page in print version.
Tibet Justice Center Home | Legal Materials on Tibet
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/07/14/these-4-countries-will-resist-chinas-rising-power-in-a-disputed-sea/#14dbd528c714
India On High Alert After China Moves
Military Equipments To Tibet
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJrVGJ0QuRY
These 4 Countries Will Stop China From Ruling A Disputed Sea
PREVIEW
REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY
THE DAY VIETNAM FALLS TO CHINKS
THERE WILL BE NOTHING TO STOP CHINA CAPTURING MALAYSIA ARCHIPELAGO. IT WILL BE A REPEAT
OF
WORLD WAR II BURMA CAMPAIGN .
CHINKS HAD BEEN
EYEING "THIBET" SINCE THE ADVENT OF
BIG GAME.
AFTER THE QUICK SUSPECT DEATHS
OF
7th DALAI LAMA TO 12 th DALAI LAMAs
IN 1886 BEFORE 13th DALAI LAMA
COULD CONSOLIDATE HIS RULE
BRITAIN BARTERED AWAY "THIBET"
TO CHINESE IN EXCHANGE FOR
BRTISH RULE OVER "BURMA".
CHINESE WERE EYEING BURMA IN 1886 &
AS A PART OF BIG ASIAN GAME
THEY ARE STILL EYEING BURMA .
INDIA LOST BURMA IN 1939
&
IF INDIANS DO NOT MODERNIZE
"ARMED FORCES"
TO FACE CHINA THAN INDIA SHOULD
BE PREPARED FOR INDIAN
"BALKANIZATION"
&
BYE BYE
TO
"DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF BHARAT "
THIS IS CALLED REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY
-Vasundhra
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
China Moves Tonnes Of Military Equipments To Tibet
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TB5ZBfLRc2s
CHINKS HAVE TO BE CAUGHT BY YAK (TIBETAN) HORNS & IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT TIBET IS AUTONOMOUS REGION OF INDIA. 'INDIAN DIPLOMACY'
IS A TOTAL FAILURE ON ALL FRONTS EXCEPT IN
SELF PRAISE
--------------------------------------------
Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 24th 1886 between the British Government and the Government of China) Extract:
1876, Zhifu Agreement - Britain
http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/147&
1886, Burma-Tibet - Britain
Convention relating to Burmah and Thibet, July 24th 1886 between the British Government and the Government of China) Extract: Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances, by the Chinese Government, has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it he practicable, the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider trade regulations: but if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly.
The remainder of the Convention was concerned with the recognition of British supremacy in Burma and the above clause about Tibet appears to be in the nature of a concession to facilitate the principal object of the Convention.
These 4 Countries Will Stop China
From Ruling A Disputed Sea
BY
Ralph Jennings
China claimed to be king of the widely disputed sea off its south coast before a world arbitration court ruled a year ago that it lacked legal grounds for the massive maritime claim. A year after that ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Beijing has become only more dominant over the South China Sea despite competing claims by Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. That’s because China rejected the ruling but to make sure no one squawked, it stepped up economic cooperation with some of the other countries.
China has the world’s third largest military and second biggest GDP, making its maritime control hard to challenge especially if you’re a smaller Southeast Asian state. But not everyone is just standing by. Here are four countries that are able and likely to throw water on China’s increasing control over the 3.5 million-square-kilometer sea that’s rich in fisheries, fuel reserves and shipping lanes:
1. India
India has no claim in the South China Sea but hopes to stop China from consolidating its own. The well-armed Western ally that disputes two border regions with China established an “Act East”policy in 2014 to improve ties with fast growing Southeast Asian nations. Supposedly it would act economically, but maybe there's more.
In May the country was exploring placement of a tsunami warning system in the South China Sea for regional use even though Beijing is working on one, as well. In 2014 the overseas subsidiary of India’s state-run firm ONGC reached a deal with Vietnam to explore under a tract of sea that Beijing covets. China is not opposing India’s tsunami alert system idea but is less thrilled about the oil deals.
2. Japan
Acting as China’s balance-of power counterweight in Asia, Japan gave Vietnam six ships in 2014 and last year agreed to lease five military aircraft to the Philippines. Those are just just two examples of how it has supplied nations with South China Sea claims that overlap those of Beijing.
Some see Japan as an Asian proxy for Western influence against Chinese expansion. From May 1 its Izumo helicopter carrier began escorting a U.S. supply ship. It was probably headed to the South China Sea through August for port calls and drills with India and the United States in the Bay of Bengal.
China has a separate maritime dispute with Japan over Tokyo-controlled islets in the East China Sea. It’s very wary of Japanese military expansion in the future. No wonder a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson told Japan in March via the official Xinhua News Agency not to cause trouble in the region.
3. United States
U.S. President Donald Trump looked the other way at China’s maritime expansion through April as he hoped his Chinese counterpart would help rein in North Korea’s ballistic missile development. But as that cooperation shows signs of thinning, since late May the U.S. Navy has passed two vessels through the South China Sea to refute Beijing's idea that the whole sea is theirs. China objected to both passages.
The United States doesn’t claim any of the sea, but Beijing frets because of the well-armed U.S. government’s ease in forming military alliances with Asian countries that do. The prime example is joint U.S. naval patrols with the Philippines since 2014.
4. Vietnam
This is the only country with a competing South China Sea claim that is likely to go against China’s maritime expansion, which includes land reclamation at some of the sea’s bigger features and infrastructure for military use. Like other states in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese value their trade relationship with China, which totaled $95.8 billion in 2015.
But they fundamentally dislike China and aren’t afraid to risk its wrath despite a smaller military. Consider centuries of land border disputes, a deadly 1974 battle over the sea’s Paracel Islands(China controls them now) and a boat-ramming incident three years ago over a Chinese oil rig. Vietnam can count on India and Japan for support if needed. So it’s OK reclaiming its own isletsand drilling for oil in waters that may fall inside China’s “nine-dash line” that it uses to demarcate its maritime claim. China will bellyache -- a military official cut short a visit to Hanoi last month -- but Vietnam has enough resolve and backing to resist.
APPENDIX FOR INFO
Legal Materials on Tibet
Treaties & Conventions Relating to Tibet
Numbers in brackets (e.g. [1]) indicate page in print version.
Sino-Tibetan Treaty, 821/823 A.D. [371]
Peace Treaty Between Ladakh and Tibet at Tingmosgang (1684) [372]
Ladakhi Letter of Agreement (1842) [374]
Agreement Between Tibet and Kashmir (1852) [375]
Treaty Between Tibet and Nepal (1856) [376]
Treaty Between Nepal and Tibet (1856) [378]
Chefoo Convention (1876) [380]
Convention Relating to Burmah and Thibet (1886) [381]
Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1890) [382]
Convention Between Great Britain and Thibet (1904) [385]
Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet (1906) [389]
Convention Between Great Britain and Russia (1907) [391]
Agreement Between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending Trade Regulations of 1893 (1908) [393]
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Government of Mongolia and Tibet (1913) [397]
Anglo-Tibetan Declaration (1914) [399]
Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet, Simla (1914) [400]
Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations (1914) [403]
Agreement for the Restoration of Peaceful Relations Between China and Tibet (1918) [406]
Supplementary Agreement Regarding Mutual Withdrawal of Troops and Cessation of Hostilities Between Chinese and Tibetans (1918) [409]
Friday, April 14, 2017
INDIAN SECURITY OVERSEAS COMMAND - INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN [[R]
SOURCE:
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/605240/india-must-deploy-troops.html
IT IS TIME TO BALKANIZE PAKISTAN
BALUCHISTAN IS AN INDEPENDANT COUNTRY
CLICK/GOOGLE TO WATCH
https://www.periscope.tv/NewsX/1nAJEVpoOOoxL
Kabul and New Delhi have had a historically friendly relationship. Afghanistan’s location at the strategic cross-roads between South Asia and Central Asia and South Asia and West Asia makes it an important geo-political partner. Afghanistan has vast mineral deposits. When the Chabahar port in Iran becomes operational, India will gain access to the CARs through Afghanistan. Hence, peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests for India.
India supports the installation of a broad-based and stable representative government in consonance with Afghan customs and traditions. The imposition of the Western model of democracy will not be appropriate. India would prefer a government that adopts a stance of neutrality between India and Pakistan, but should be willing to work closely with any government that is truly representative of the Afghan people.
India’s efforts to provide greater assistance are being hampered by the lack of geographical contiguity. India has only limited access to Afghanistan as Pakistan has not given India transit rights. India’s attempts to allay Pakistan’s misapprehensions about New Delhi’s intentions have not been successful as Pakistan has steadfastly refused to discuss this issue. Afghanistan’s problems can’t be resolved unless the trans-Durand Line challenges that it faces from Pakistan and the Haqqani network are addressed simultaneously.
The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership agreement was signed in October 2011. It calls for close political cooperation with a mechanism for regular consultations and joint initiatives on regional and international issues. It stipulates a strategic dialogue to provide a framework for cooperation in the field of national security. Security cooperation is intended to enhance mutual efforts against international terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics and money laundering.
The agreement specifies that India will assist in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes of the ANSF. It commits the two sides to “strengthening trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as cooperation between other bodies of business and industry representatives…” India has committed itself to continue to provide assistance for Afghan-istan’s reconstruction and development programmes and capacity building.
Policy objectives
India’s policy objectives in Afghanistan are in consonance with the strategic partnership agreement. Besides a stable and preferably neutral government, India’s political objectives include the following: ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a base and safe haven for terrorists and radical extremists; counter Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth, acquire access to Afghanistan and through it to the CARs; establish broad-based engagement with all political groups; support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, as visualised by the Afghan High Peace Council; assist Afghanistan to train its administrative and judicial staff to improve governance and delivery of justice; and, further enhance people-to-people contacts.
India’s national security objectives comprise: supporting the capacity building efforts of ANSF by ensuring implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, including the supply of war-like stores; ensuring the safety and protection of Indian assets and infrastructure in Afghanistan; and, cooperating to share intelligence.
India’s economic policy objectives are to increase trade with Afghanistan and through it with the CARs; enhance Indian business investment in Afghanistan; assist Afghanistan to develop its natural resources; further increase India’s reconstruction and capacity building programme; enhance India’s energy security; for example, through the commissioning of the TAPI (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) pipeline; assist Afghanistan to replace narcotics-based agriculture with regular agriculture; and, work towards the implementation of Safta (South Asian Free Trade Area).
Finally, unless the security environment improves substantially, governance and development will continue to take a back seat. The P-5 (UN permanent members: China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States) need to be persuaded to supplement the ANSF with a United Nations or a regional peacekeeping force to eliminate the Taliban.
Though there is no support in India for sending troops to Afghanistan, there is realisation that the fight against the Taliban and the al Qaeda has long-term security implications for the country as peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests. Along with other neighbours, New Delhi should be willing to deploy up to one division (15,000 troops) to join such a force provided Pakistan’s sensibilities about Indian military presence in Afghanistan can be assuaged.
(The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/605240/india-must-deploy-troops.html
IT IS TIME TO BALKANIZE PAKISTAN
BALUCHISTAN IS AN INDEPENDANT COUNTRY
CLICK/GOOGLE TO WATCH
https://www.periscope.tv/NewsX/1nAJEVpoOOoxL
INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOPS
IN
AFGHANISTAN
By
Gurmeet Kanwal,
April 8, 2017
PEACE, STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
The situation in Afghanistan can be described as a
stalemate at both the strategic and tactical levels. The
security environment is precarious, socio-economic
development is stagnating and the reconciliation
process has reached an impasse.
The NATO–ISAF (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation–International Security Assistance Force) strategy to clear-hold-build-transfer-exit has succeeded only partially as the Taliban and the Al Qaeda have not been eliminated and terrorists owing allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) are growing in number.
The fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are not yet capable of managing security after the premature withdrawal of the US-led NATO-ISAF intervention force. The Afghanistan National Security Forces’ (ANSF, ANA plus ANP) numbers are small (3,52,000). The ANA lacks heavy weapons, artillery, air support and helicopters for logistics support.
The standards of junior leadership are low and the troops are inadequately trained and equipped. They do not have the level of motivation necessary to undertake complex counter-insurgency operations on a sustained basis. Cases of fratricide and desertions with weapons are commonplace.
While the ANSF and the remnants of the Nato-ISAF forces control most of the large towns and the airports, the Taliban — together with the al-Qaeda — control large swathes of the countryside. Governance is virtually non-existent outside Kabul. The approximately 13,000 Nato-ISAF troops now remaining in Afghanistan are on a train-advise-assist mission.
Unless Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, the Central Asian
The fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are not yet capable of managing security after the premature withdrawal of the US-led NATO-ISAF intervention force. The Afghanistan National Security Forces’ (ANSF, ANA plus ANP) numbers are small (3,52,000). The ANA lacks heavy weapons, artillery, air support and helicopters for logistics support.
The standards of junior leadership are low and the troops are inadequately trained and equipped. They do not have the level of motivation necessary to undertake complex counter-insurgency operations on a sustained basis. Cases of fratricide and desertions with weapons are commonplace.
While the ANSF and the remnants of the Nato-ISAF forces control most of the large towns and the airports, the Taliban — together with the al-Qaeda — control large swathes of the countryside. Governance is virtually non-existent outside Kabul. The approximately 13,000 Nato-ISAF troops now remaining in Afghanistan are on a train-advise-assist mission.
Unless Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, the Central Asian
Republics (CARs), China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia
join hands with the international community to supplement
the ANSF’s efforts to eliminate the insurgents, the security
environment is likely to deteriorate further and may
degenerate into a civil war.
Kabul and New Delhi have had a historically friendly relationship. Afghanistan’s location at the strategic cross-roads between South Asia and Central Asia and South Asia and West Asia makes it an important geo-political partner. Afghanistan has vast mineral deposits. When the Chabahar port in Iran becomes operational, India will gain access to the CARs through Afghanistan. Hence, peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests for India.
India supports the installation of a broad-based and stable representative government in consonance with Afghan customs and traditions. The imposition of the Western model of democracy will not be appropriate. India would prefer a government that adopts a stance of neutrality between India and Pakistan, but should be willing to work closely with any government that is truly representative of the Afghan people.
India’s efforts to provide greater assistance are being hampered by the lack of geographical contiguity. India has only limited access to Afghanistan as Pakistan has not given India transit rights. India’s attempts to allay Pakistan’s misapprehensions about New Delhi’s intentions have not been successful as Pakistan has steadfastly refused to discuss this issue. Afghanistan’s problems can’t be resolved unless the trans-Durand Line challenges that it faces from Pakistan and the Haqqani network are addressed simultaneously.
The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership agreement was signed in October 2011. It calls for close political cooperation with a mechanism for regular consultations and joint initiatives on regional and international issues. It stipulates a strategic dialogue to provide a framework for cooperation in the field of national security. Security cooperation is intended to enhance mutual efforts against international terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics and money laundering.
The agreement specifies that India will assist in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes of the ANSF. It commits the two sides to “strengthening trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as cooperation between other bodies of business and industry representatives…” India has committed itself to continue to provide assistance for Afghan-istan’s reconstruction and development programmes and capacity building.
Policy objectives
India’s policy objectives in Afghanistan are in consonance with the strategic partnership agreement. Besides a stable and preferably neutral government, India’s political objectives include the following: ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a base and safe haven for terrorists and radical extremists; counter Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth, acquire access to Afghanistan and through it to the CARs; establish broad-based engagement with all political groups; support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, as visualised by the Afghan High Peace Council; assist Afghanistan to train its administrative and judicial staff to improve governance and delivery of justice; and, further enhance people-to-people contacts.
India’s national security objectives comprise: supporting the capacity building efforts of ANSF by ensuring implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, including the supply of war-like stores; ensuring the safety and protection of Indian assets and infrastructure in Afghanistan; and, cooperating to share intelligence.
India’s economic policy objectives are to increase trade with Afghanistan and through it with the CARs; enhance Indian business investment in Afghanistan; assist Afghanistan to develop its natural resources; further increase India’s reconstruction and capacity building programme; enhance India’s energy security; for example, through the commissioning of the TAPI (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) pipeline; assist Afghanistan to replace narcotics-based agriculture with regular agriculture; and, work towards the implementation of Safta (South Asian Free Trade Area).
Finally, unless the security environment improves substantially, governance and development will continue to take a back seat. The P-5 (UN permanent members: China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States) need to be persuaded to supplement the ANSF with a United Nations or a regional peacekeeping force to eliminate the Taliban.
Though there is no support in India for sending troops to Afghanistan, there is realisation that the fight against the Taliban and the al Qaeda has long-term security implications for the country as peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests. Along with other neighbours, New Delhi should be willing to deploy up to one division (15,000 troops) to join such a force provided Pakistan’s sensibilities about Indian military presence in Afghanistan can be assuaged.
(The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)
Tuesday, January 10, 2017
India’s Foreign Policy Challenges For 2017 – Analysis
SOURCE
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Desktop/India%E2%80%99s%20Foreign%20Policy%20Challenges%20For%202017%20%E2%80%93%20Analysis%20%E2%80%93%20Eurasia%20Review.html
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Desktop/India%E2%80%99s%20Foreign%20Policy%20Challenges%20For%202017%20%E2%80%93%20Analysis%20%E2%80%93%20Eurasia%20Review.html
India’s Foreign Policy Challenges For 2017 – Analysis
By
Dr Subhash Kapila*
Fluidity in global geopolitical dynamics on verge of 2017 centring on USA, Russia and China with consequent impact on Indian foreign policy is already evident with the initial posturing of US President-elect Trump.
India’s foreign policy management since May 2014 has notched appreciable and dynamic successes under the leadership and personal diplomacy of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India’s diplomatic profile has gone up and the regrettable ‘strategic deficit’ of the previous ten years of governance in conceptualising Indian foreign policy formulations stands erased. India today figures substantially in the geopolitical calculus of the Major Powers as never before.
In the unfolding geopolitical dynamics as the world heads towards 2017 India has emerged as the ‘Swing State”, something which can be lucratively capitalised by the Indian foreign policy establishment. Yet, attendant on all this is the crucial imperative for Indian foreign policy planners to estimate and predict the responses and reactive strategies of China and Russia to the forthcominglikely aggressiveness and lesser restraint in the foreign policy of the new US President.
India under the above contextual unfolding of global strategies of USA, Russia and China can no longer operate on the trajectory of its existing foreign policy template. In the ensuing melee, the strategic determinants of India’s foreign policy would tend to dominate the economic determinants. As far as the latter is concerned, India is already an established economic power and an attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investments. India would therefore be well advised to concentrate on the strategic content of its foreign policy formulations to meet the challenges unfolding in 2017 and which would go beyond 2017.
Indian foreign policy can never be crafted in a vacuum or delusionary Non-Alignment-ism or the much hackneyed “Strategic Restraint” mantra of yesteryears. Geopolitical dynamics would force India to exercise strategic alignment options with no luxury of hedging strategies or preaching multilateralism like China which while sermonising on the same behaves autocratically with its neighbours including India.
Imperceptibly and incrementally, but surely, India seems to have already exercised its strategic alignment preference in favour of the United States. India being designated as a ‘Major Defence Partner’ by USA and the various logistics access and interoperability agreements agreed upon testify to the enhanced strategic partnership between USA and India.
Both in India and the United States bipartisan strong support exists for the US-India Strategic Partnership. With that is as a given, India should expect that the same would continue even under the Trump Administration. Any contrary rhetoric during the Trump campaign trail needs to be discounted including his recent laudatory reverences in his telephonic conversation with Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif.
The challenge for Indian foreign policy establishment in 2017 as regards the United States will rest more on higher strategic expectations and call that the Trump Administration would have on India as the United States gets tough with China and the resultant strategic fall-out from the same.
India may not be a full military alliance partner of the United States but the attendant circumstances which impelled the evolution of the US-India Strategic Partnership was the ‘China Threat’ factor and there is no point in being in denial on it. As a major ‘Strategic Partner’, the military expectations are the same as those from a military alliance partner. India’s challenge therefore in 2017 is not only to reinforce its strategic links with the United States but also prepare its diplomatic contingency plans to deal with the fall-out of the new ‘China Policy’ of the United States in the offing. Concomitant with the foregoing is the military imperative for India to upgrade its war=preparedness and fill the voids in its military inventories.
There is no point in India pretending that it can continue to be a neutral observer when the chips are down between USA and China. China can be expected to use India as a pressure point against the United States even without any military provocations by India. China has not forgiven India for moving into the American strategic orbit.
China will present the biggest foreign policy challenge in 2017 and the ensuing years basically arising from the more assertive policies of the United States in the Asia Pacific specifically and Indo Pacific Asia in general. China has fumed in various ways at the growing strategic proximity of India with the United States. This will intensify as the Trump Administration is unlikely to exercise strategic restraint with China in face of growing Chinese military brinkmanship in East Asia and on its peripheries, including India.
The China challenge to India’s foreign policy establishment gets magnified additionally with the China - Pakistan Axis getting substantially reinforced as a result of geopolitical changes adverse to China. Pakistan with China’s military encouragement would tend to adopt more provocative and adversarial postures against India. India should expect a surge in terrorist attacks emanating from [ CHINESE PROTECTORATE OF ] Pakistan.
The inescapable conclusion rising from the above is that the propensity of the Indian foreign policy establishment to initiate unilateral political reach out to both China and Pakistan will no longer be valid. India needs to realise that the ‘Pakistan Threat’ to India in recent years is being fuelled more by China. China is the major, potent and long-range threat to India.
No scope exists for Indian diplomacy to dilute the ‘China Threat’ and the now China-added ‘Pakistan Threat’ to India.
The challenge for India’s foreign policy and diplomacy in 2017 and beyond is to sensitise world opinion on the imminence of the ‘China Threat’ both in terms of military capabilities and intentions, not only to India but also to larger parts of Asia. This arises because in Chinese perceptions where the United States figures as the prime threat, China feels it best to first target countries close to USA like Japan and India.
Russia used to be the traditional counterweight to the ‘China Threat’ and ‘Pakistan Threat’ to India. But with Russia not even pretending to be neutral between China and India after having moved into China’s orbit, and under Chinese influence Russia openly allying with Pakistan, India is left with no strategic counterweight to the dual China-Pakistan Axis Threats, but for the United States and its allies.
Russia has in the last two years has openly reversed its strategic preferences in South Asia by openly siding with Pakistan on issues like the Afghan Taliban to furtherance of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
India’s foreign policy challenge is 2017 is to devise diplomatic initiatives to offset Russia’s tilt to Pakistan and creating a complex strategic challenge for India in South Asia. In short Russia’s present moves in South Asia can no longer be viewed as India-friendly. India must forthwith reset its Russia-policy.
One would be glad to accept a cogent rebuttal to the above from the many China-apologists and Russia-apologists that thrive in India. India must not hope and be in a state of denial about Russia’s strategic commitments to India enshrined in the Russia-India Strategic Partnership or that the China-India Strategic Partnership was an insurance against China’s adversarial stances against India or that would ensure peace and tranquillity on the Indian borders with Tibet, presently under Chinese military occupation.
One does not foresee any major complications arising from the advent of Trump Administration in India’s ‘Neighbours First’ foreign policy, barring Pakistan. China however will continues to muscle-in on to India’s turf and the future challenges are to ensure that Indian foreign policy gaze is not lifted from its neighbourhood while it wrestles with the challenges of the geopolitical churning involving the Major Powers.
While dwelling on India’s foreign policy challenges in 2017 the biggest challenge that has surfaced in years is that India’s political Opposition’s failure to present a united bipartisan front on India’s foreign policy and India’s national security challenges. It affects India’s national image which is an important foreign policy input for Major Powers as they devise their Indian policies.
Concluding, one would like to re-emphasise that India is at strategic crossroads where India in the pursuit of its national aspiration to emerge as a global player would be called upon to exercise its strategic preferences in terms of preferred partners with which it enjoys major convergences. On the verge of 2017, the United States, Japan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam should be the major focus of India’s foreign policy in 2017.
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