Showing posts with label GEO - MILITARY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GEO - MILITARY. Show all posts

Friday, April 14, 2017

INDIAN SECURITY OVERSEAS COMMAND - INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN [[R]

SOURCE:
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/605240/india-must-deploy-troops.html


      IT IS TIME TO BALKANIZE PAKISTAN

        BALUCHISTAN IS AN  INDEPENDANT COUNTRY


                                     
  CLICK/GOOGLE TO WATCH 




 https://www.periscope.tv/NewsX/1nAJEVpoOOoxL







         INDIA MUST DEPLOY TROOP

                                  IN 

                      AFGHANISTAN     

                                 By
                    Gurmeet Kanwal, 

April 8, 2017 


                      PEACE, STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN


The situation in Afghanistan can be described as a 

stalemate at both the strategic and tactical levels. The 

security environment is precarious, socio-economic 

development is stagnating and the reconciliation 

process has reached an impasse.

The NATO–ISAF (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation–International Security Assistance Force) strategy to clear-hold-build-transfer-exit has succeeded only partially as the Taliban and the Al Qaeda have not been eliminated and terrorists owing allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) are growing in number. 

The fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are not yet capable of managing security after the premature withdrawal of the US-led NATO-ISAF intervention force. The Afghanistan National Security Forces’ (ANSF, ANA plus ANP) numbers are small (3,52,000). The ANA lacks heavy weapons, artillery, air support and helicopters for logistics support. 

The standards of junior leadership are low and the troops are inadequately trained and equipped. They do not have the level of motivation necessary to undertake complex counter-insurgency operations on a sustained basis. Cases of fratricide and desertions with weapons are commonplace. 


While the ANSF and the remnants of the Nato-ISAF forces control most of the large towns and the airports, the Taliban — together with the al-Qaeda — control large swathes of the countryside. Governance is virtually non-existent outside Kabul. The approximately 13,000 Nato-ISAF troops now remaining in Afghan­istan are on a train-advise-assist mission. 

Unless Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, the Central Asian

 Republics (CARs), China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia

 join hands with the international community to supplement

 the ANSF’s efforts to eliminate the insurgents, the security

 environment is likely to deteriorate further and may

 degenerate into a civil war. 

Kabul and New Delhi have had a historically friendly relationship. Afghan­istan’s location at the strategic cross-roads between South Asia and Central Asia and South Asia and West Asia makes it an important geo-political partner. Afghanistan has vast mineral deposits. When the Chabahar port in Iran becomes operational, India will gain access to the CARs through Afghanistan. Hence, peace and stability in Afghanis­tan are vital national interests for India.

India supports the installation of a broad-based and stable representative government in consonance with Afghan customs and traditions. The imposition of the Western model of democracy will not be appropriate. India would prefer a government that adopts a stance of neutrality between India and Pakistan, but should be willing to work closely with any government that is truly representative of the Afghan people. 

India’s efforts to provide greater assistance are being hampered by the lack of geographical contiguity. India has only limited access to Afghanistan as Pakistan has not given India transit rights. India’s attempts to allay Pakistan’s misapprehensions about New Delhi’s intentions have not been successful as Pakistan has steadfastly refused to discuss this issue. Afghan­istan’s problems can’t be resolved unless the trans-Durand Line challenges that it faces from Pakistan and the Haqqani network are addressed simultaneously. 

The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership agreement was signed in October 2011. It calls for close political cooperation with a mechanism for regular consultations and joint initiatives on regional and international issues. It stipulates a strategic dialogue to provide a framework for cooperation in the field of national security. Security cooperation is intended to enhance mutual efforts against international terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics and money laundering. 

The agreement specifies that India will assist in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes of the ANSF. It commits the two sides to “strengthening trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as cooperation between other bodies of business and industry representatives…” India has committed itself to continue to provide assistance for Afghan-istan’s reconstruction and development programmes and capacity building.


Policy objectives

India’s policy objectives in Afghanistan are in consonance with the strategic partnership agreement. Besides a stable and preferably neutral government, India’s political objectives include the following: ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a base and safe haven for terro­rists and radical extremists; counter Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth, acquire access to Afghanistan and through it to the CARs; establish broad-based engagement with all political groups; support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, as vis­ualised by the Afghan High Peace Council; assist Afghanistan to train its administrative and judicial staff to improve governance and delivery of justice; and, further enhance people-to-people contacts. 

India’s national security objectives comprise:
supporting the capacity building efforts of ANSF by ensuring implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, including the supply of war-like stores; ensuring the safety and protection of Indian assets and infrastructure in Afghanistan; and, cooperating to share intelligence. 

India’s economic policy objectives are to increase trade with Afghanistan and through it with the CARs; enhance Indian business investment in Afghanistan; assist Afghanistan to develop its natural resources; further increase India’s reconstruction and capacity building programme; enhance India’s energy security; for example, through the commissioning of the TAPI (Turkmenistan–Afg­hanistan–Pakistan–India) pipeline; assist Afghanistan to replace narcotics-based agriculture with regular agriculture; and, work towards the implementation of Safta (South Asian Free Trade Area).

Finally,
unless the security environment improves substantially, governance and development will continue to take a back seat. The P-5 (UN permanent members: China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States) need to be persuaded to supplement the ANSF with a United Nations or a regional peacekeeping force to eliminate the Taliban. 

Though there is no support in India for sending troops to Afghanistan, there is realisation that the fight against the Taliban and the al Qaeda has long-term security implications for the country as peace and stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests. Along with other neighbours, New Delhi should be willing to deploy up to one division (15,000 troops) to join such a force provided Pakistan’s sensibilities about Indian military presence in Afghanistan can be assuaged. 

(The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)

Wednesday, January 18, 2017

DELHI PAKRO : IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN DO WHY NOT CHINKS

SOURCE
https://www.thequint.com/world/2017/01/16/can-china-army-reach-new-delhi-in-2-days-cold-start-doctrine-chinese-state-tv-war-with-india



DELHI PAKRO : IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN DO  WHY NOT CHINKS


















This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy against India, but it comes as probably the first one which is as specific. (Photo: iStock)






DELHI PAKRO
DO NOT LAUGH IT OFF. YES IT CAN BE DONE - VASUNDHRA

[ THE ANSWER LIES IN THE CONCEPT OF CENTRE  OF GRAVITY OF BATTLE FIELD.[COG] FIELD MARSHAL ROMEL HAS DISCUSSED & TOUCHED UPON IT DURING NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN & SO HAVE THE NUMEROUS MILITARY THINKERS. NOW CHINESE ARE ON IT. YES DELHI CAN BE CAPTURED IN 48 Hrs, BUT AFTER CAPTURE HOW WILL THEY WITHDRAW or WILL THEY WITHDRAW ? ]

 IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get  DELHI CAPTURED   WITH A  COY GROUP  of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH  THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!!


Can China’s Army Really Reach Delhi in 2 Days? Nope, Say Experts






YEP, SAYS VASUNDHRA




“It would take China's motorised troops 48 hours and its paratroops 10 hours to reach India's capital if war broke out,” a Chinese State television channel boldly proclaimed.

This is not the first time China has tried to use rhetoric as a deterrence strategy but it comes as probably the first one that is so specific. 

Interestingly, this also comes on the back of Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat’s pointed comment on honing India’s Cold Start strategy for Pakistan.


Does the Chinese state TV’s statement come as nothing more than a deterrence tool, or are the claims viable?


‘A Ridiculous Remark Made Without Any Practicality’



Experts and retired army officers were quick to rubbish this as illogical rhetoric, and questioned the logistics of the provocative claim. The ill-thought-out remark shows the level of understanding of the people who’ve made it, said retired colonel Rohit Agarwal. Speaking to The Quint, he broke the comment down and analysed its impracticality.
For motorised troops to infiltrate the mountainous terrain of the north-eastern border of India and advance further inside is not possible, he said.








Soldiers of Indian Army and Chinese Army undertaking endurance exercises during Indo-China Joint Military exercise in November 2016. (Photo Courtesy: Twitter/@adgpi)
Soldiers of Indian Army and Chinese Army undertaking endurance exercises during Indo-China Joint Military exercise in November 2016. (Photo Courtesy: Twitter/@adgpi)


If you’re talking about motorised troops, you need to first look at the terrain. Where will those troops come from? All of our north-eastern border is mountainous, so, even if they plan on using that route for their troops, how far can they advance?
 Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army



As far as the paratroops are concerned, anyone can drop paratroops anywhere, said a former Indian army commander to The Quint. Putting the situation in perspective, he said:
If it takes their paratroops 10 hours to reach Delhi then theoretically it will take even our paratroops the same time to reach Beijing.
Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army
Agarwal explained that depending on the flying time and the time taken to prepare, why just 10 hours? One can drop paratroopers anywhere anytime, but what thereafter? What possibilities will they have after landing in foreign territory? Will it be a clandestine operation? If so, what will it lead to? It would then be a full-scale escalation, he added.
You can drop paratroopers in Delhi as and when you like, but what will they do once they reach the ground? So, I think it’s just rhetoric.
 Rohit Agarwal, Retired Colonel, Indian Army

Agarwal says it’s difficult to discern what might have prompted the state channel to issue the remark. But China is always looking to send messages and threats to India or even United States, said Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d).
This claim is beyond ridiculous. It’s saying their motorised troops will reach Delhi in 48 hours – how will they cross the Himalayas?
 Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (ret’d)



Further, a former Army commander explained that notwithstanding all the disputes India has with China and Pakistan, the chances of a war are extremely low.
This is nothing but a figment of imagination of the television channel and a matter of who they’re quoting and how. It’s just imaginations running wild and typical punchline reporting by the state channel.
Former Army Commander

The Chinese state TV’s comment was issued without context and, seeing the experts’ views, is being interpreted as mere rhetoric – thus negating any deterrence effect it may have sought to achieve.

PS 

  CHINKS  WOULD OPEN A   OPERATION MAINTENANCE  AXIS FROM SHILPA PASS TO  SIMLA TO CHANDIGARH TO DELHI IN 48 HRS  & WILL DO SO ON OTHER MAIN & SUBSIDARY AXIS AS PER THEIR OPERATION PLANS





DELHI PAKRO
Do not laugh it off. Yes it can be done 

The answer lies in the concept of Centre Of Gravity of Battle Field (COG)  Field Marshal Rommel  has discussed and touched upon it during North African campaign & so have   the numerous military thinkers.. Now the chinese are on it(COG). Yes Delhi can be captured in  in H plus 48 Hrs  but after capture how will they withdraw or will they withdraw at all ? 


IF SHEKAR GUPTA CAN get  DELHI CAPTURED   WITH A  COY GROUP  of ARMY, WHY CHINKS CANNOT DO WITH  THE THIRD LARGEST ARMY!!!!!!!!


Coming to hard facts

After Sumdrung chu incident Chinese have developed the capability to induct one air borne division in 24 hrs, one Airborne corps in 72 hours & they have practically demonstrated by launching a para division within two to four hours in the earth quake zone of 2009( ?year)

With the advent of Railway line they can induct 25 to 30 divisons to Lhasa in thirty days with micro induction management. Their road communication in Tibet is almost first class. Chinese have a full fledged Airfield/port with SIX KILOMETER runway    Sixty kilometers as the crow flies off CHUSUL south of NGARI in tibet,  including at Shigaste & Lhasa. From Ngari flying of heavy weight crafts  time to Chandigarh is one hour & to Delhi 2   minus hours (minus). Chinese do have a capability till 2009 to airlift a division & para drop. Which they must have improved probably to a Corps.

 It is fact that they can capture Arunachal  & Aksai chin in 48 hours & Indians response time is estimated to be 7 days.  In Ladhak they will link with PAKIS at Siachen for which they do have a large sand model at pass HAJI ALI What ever I say here is all available  on the net and much more. Cutting it short Chinese have the capability to capture Chandigarh & Palam  in H pls 8 hrs and link up with motorised divisons  combo with airlift in D plus   48hrs . It is possible.& be assured Indians will not know what has hit them .

THIS IS A FACT. I AM NOT JOKING -                                                                          Vasundhra
  

  









Thursday, January 5, 2017

Beijing To Help Pakistan Make more Long-Range ICBMs - IS IT TO NUKE USA !!??

SOURCE:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/if-india-makes-more-long-range-icbms-beijing-may-help-pakistan-do-the-same-says-chinese-state-media/articleshow/56347332.cms



                                                       REJOINDER

    If Chinks want to equate PAKIS with India it is  time for India to reclaim Pakistan as an integral part of India & TIBET along with OUTER TIBET as part of autonomous region of Greater India. India should also diplomatically recognize TAIWAN & establish diplomatic relations. India should also lay claim to complete  South East Asia as an extension of Indian cultural heritage.










If India Makes more Long-Range ICBMs, Beijing may help Pakistan do the same, says Chinese State Media




HIGHLIGHTS

  • Chinese media said Pakistan should get the same nuclear privileges as India

  • It also hinted it will help Pakistan build long-range nuclear missiles

  • It said India has 'broken limits' on how many missiles it can make

Jan 5, 2017

Beijing wants to communicate the message that if India increases the number of its long-range missiles, it will help "all-weather friend" Pakistan do the same, Chinese media said.



The context to this comment was India's final test firing of the Agni-IV+ inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Monday.



"If the UN Security Council has no objection over this (ICBMs), let it be. The range of Pakistan's nuclear missiles will also see an increase," the state-run Global Times said in an editorial, hinting that China will help Pakistan come on par with India.



News outfits in China are often used by the government to convey its opinions or to test the waters or to deliver rebukes it can't through diplomatic channels.

Global Times's editorial further batted for Pakistan saying it should be accorded the same nuclear privileges as India.



"If the Western countries accept India as a nuclear country and are indifferent to the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, China will not stand out and stick rigidly to those nuclear rules as necessary. At this time, Pakistan should have those privileges in nuclear development that India has," the editorial said.

On the one hand, the editorial said China isn't bothered by India's testing of missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, but on the other it did sound like Beijing was perturbed by Agni-IV, especially as it came close on the heels of 
thesuccessful test-firing of Agni-V+ .



"...Chinese don't feel India's development has posed any big threat to it. And India wouldn't be considered as China's main rival in the long run," the editorial first says.


"But it (China) will not sit still if India goes too far...New Delhi understands that it does little good to itself if the Sino-Indian relations are ruined by any geopolitical tricks," the editorial says later.



Aside from these issues, the editorial alleged that India "has broken the UN's limits" on how many nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles it can produce.

 Whats Pak gonna do with ICBMs when its current missiles are sufficient to target cities upto Chennai They want to target Arunachal Pradesh?  

                                OR 

by proxy chinks want USA to get NUKED by PAKIs  India should call out China''s bluff and supply Agni IV to Vietnam.

"The US and some Western countries have also bent the rules on its nuclear plans. New Delhi is no longer satisfied with its nuclear capability and is seeking intercontinental ballistic missiles that can target anywhere in the world and then it can land on an equal footing with the UN Security Council's five permanent members," the editorial said.



On Monday, India successfully tested - for the final time - its long-range ballistic missile, Agni-IV, which can travel 4,000 kilometres. No long before that, it successfully test-fired Agni-V that has a range of more than 5,000 kilometres and can reach Europe and the northernmost parts of China.















Friday, June 3, 2016

Competition In the Indian Ocean

SOURCE:http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/competition-indian-ocean/p37201



Competition In the Indian Ocean

Author: Eleanor Albert, Online Writer/Editor
Updated: May 19, 2016
Asif Hassan/AFP/Getty Images
Introduction
The Indian Ocean is the world's third largest body of water and has become a growing area of competition between China and India. The two regional powers' moves to exert influence in the ocean include deep-water port development in littoral states and military patrols. Though experts say the probability of military conflict between China and India remains low, escalated activities (such as port development and military exercises) and rhetoric could endanger stability in a critical region for global trade flows. But the diverse nontraditional security challenges in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) also offer areas of potential collaboration for China and India, as well as other regional actors.
What is the importance of the Indian Ocean?
The Indian Ocean covers at least one fifth of the world's total ocean area and is bounded by Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (known as the western Indian Ocean), India's coastal waters (the central Indian Ocean), and the Bay of Bengal near Myanmar and Indonesia (the eastern Indian Ocean). It provides critical sea trade routes that connect the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia with the broader Asian continent to the east and Europe to the west. A number of the world's most important strategic chokepoints, including the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca through which 32.2 millions of barrels of crude oil and petroleum are transported per day—more than 50 percent of the world's maritime oil trade—are found in the Indian Ocean Region, which itself is believed to be rich with energy reserves. Nearly 40 percent (PDF) of the world's offshore petroleum is produced in the Indian Ocean, coastal beach sands and offshore waters host heavy mineral deposits, and fisheries are increasingly important for both exports and domestic consumption.


 
Why is the Indian Ocean a source of competition?
China and India are dependent on energy resources transported via the secure sealanes in the Indian Ocean to fuel their economies. India imports nearly 80 percent of its energy, mostly oil from the Middle East, and is due to overtake Japan as the world's third largest energy consumer (behind China and the United States). According to a U.S. Department of Defense report, 84 percent (PDF) of China's imported energy resources passed through Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean in 2012. As Beijing and New Delhi press to maintain economic growth, their dependency on the safe transport of resources will likely intensify. China's growing global influence and India's rapid economic rise have heightened the ocean's strategic value. Meanwhile, the United States' rebalance to Asia—shifting from a foreign policy dominated by the Middle East to one more centered on Asia—has also been a contributing factor elevating concern over Indian Ocean security. Diverse security challenges affect the region ranging from natural disasters to concerns over energy security, piracy, and military posturing. 
How are China and India competing in the Indian Ocean?
Both countries have developed initiatives to bolster infrastructure and other connections in the region, which the World Bank describes as among the "least economically integrated." Competition between Beijing and New Delhi is not necessarily overt, but each country is seeking to strengthen ties with smaller regional states to secure their respective security and economic interests.

Beijing's regional vision, backed by $40 billion of pledged investment, outlines its One Belt, One Road plan—combining the revitalization of ancient land-based trade routes, the Silk Road Economic Belt, with a Maritime Silk Road. China's ties with regional states have deepened, including the influx of Chinese capital into construction projects in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Since launching counterpiracy operations in 2009, Beijing has become increasingly active in the region. China has also undertaken efforts to modernize its military, particularly its naval deployment capabilities to protect overseas interests like personnel, property, and investments. Experts also argue that Beijing's forays into what is at times described as India's neighborhood are driven by China's excess capacity challenges—incentivizing Chinese firms out of domestic markets to compete in and open new markets abroad.



For its part, India sees itself as the natural preeminent regional power. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has doubled-down on fostering stronger diplomatic, economic, and security ties with IOR maritime states as a means to strengthen India's economy, establish its role a driver of regional growth , and simultaneously diminish China's growing appeal, writes CFR's Alyssa Ayres.


"It is India's neighbourhood that holds the key (PDF) to its emergence as a regional and global power," writes former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran. Though Beijing deflects claims of hegemonic aspirations, it identifies security in the IOR as a primary concern for Chinese "core interests." In 2015, a white paper charting China's military strategy indicated a shift of People's Liberation Army Navy to focus on both offshore water defense and open seas protection. Chinese behavior suggests that Beijing seeks to establish a persistent regional maritime presence. It now boasts a semipermanent naval presence through its counterpiracy activities in the Indian Ocean and has more aggressively asserted itself in the Pacific with extensive patrols and land reclamation projects in disputed waters.

"It is India's neighbourhood that holds the key to its emergence as a regional and global power."—Former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran

China's ambitions in the region have been described by many scholars by the "string of pearls" metaphor, which holds that China is taking on economic and investment projects with Indian Ocean states to secure ports or places where its military forces could set up naval facilities or at the very least, refueling and repair stations. Chinese experts dismiss this, claiming that China seeks access, not bases, for economic gain. C. Raja Mohan, director of Carnegie India, a regional center of the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment think tank, argues that as rising powers, China and India's pursuit of partnerships with smaller regional states is inevitable. "Everyone is playing this game,” he says. “Bases is going to be the name of the game in the Indian Ocean, and that game is going to be pretty attractive in the coming years."


Still, "maritime competition between China and India is still nascent and should not be overblown," cautions CFR's Daniel S. Markey in a Contingency Planning Memorandum. Still, he writes that a "tit-for-tat politico-military escalation" is possible in the larger Indo-Pacific, a region spanning both the Indian and Pacific oceans.
 
What fuels China-India tensions?
China-India relations are fraught, colored by historical disputes and the perceived threat to India of China's rise. Tensions have persisted despite overtures by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Much of the friction stems from a longstanding dispute along a 2,400-mile border in India's Arunachal Pradesh and China's Tibet and the legacy of the 1962 Sino-Indian War along the Himalayan border.


The expansion of a Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean has heightened India's concerns. Beijing says its activities are commercially motivated and intended to better protect its interests and people abroad. However, Brahma Chellaney of the Center for Policy Research (CPR), an independent Indian think tank, argues a ramped up Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere is consistent with Xi Jinping's intention of making maritime power central to achieving Chinese dominance in Asia.


While China's aims are disputed, both sides continue to ramp up military capabilities in the ocean region. China continues to deploy greater numbers of naval forces to support counterpiracy operations in the western Indian Ocean, and invests and sells arms, including tanks, frigates, missiles, and radar, to India's neighbors. Beijing is currently restructuring its military: Xi Jinping announced in September 2015 that the People's Liberation Army would cut 300,000 of its troops to redistribute resources to sea and air capabilities. As China adapts its military force to meet its global ambitions, its posturing has grown bolder. In October 2015, China finalized the sale of eight submarines to Pakistan, and in recent years, Chinese submarines have docked at the Sri Lankan port of Colombo and the Pakistani port of Karachi. More still, Beijing's land reclamation efforts and assertive behavior in the Pacific could bleed into the region, suggest the U.S. Naval War College's Andrew Erickson and Kevin Bond.

"Bases is going to be the name of the game in the Indian Ocean, and that game is going to be pretty attractive in the coming years."—C. Raja Mohan, director, Carnegie India

India is also reinforcing its regional maritime presence. "Activating partnerships and expanding capabilities in the Indian Ocean has been central to our quest for security," said Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar at the launch of Carnegie India in April 2016. The country has vowed to spend billions to build up its navy, including anti-submarine capabilities, has sent vessels to visit the South China Sea, and called for freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes as part of its Act East policy. The construction of military bases, modernized equipment and fleets, new maritime assets, and the expansion of security ties are all part of New Delhi's push to assert itself as the region's leader. Modi initiated the first bilateral India-Australia exercises and India participated in multilateral naval games in the Bay of Bengal with the United States, Australia, and Japan. David Brewster of Australian National University says there is little doubt that despite India's traditional principle of nonalignment, outreach to the United States, Australia, and Japan are calculated moves that could play a significant role in counterbalancing China.
What other countries have strategic interests in the IOR?
Small regional states, such as Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles and Sri Lanka, are recipients of both Chinese and Indian aid and investment, primarily for transport and infrastructure development. The majority of their foreign policy ties are determined by what deals can be made to help them meet their national development goals, says Nilanthi Samaranayake of Virginia-based CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization.


Global powers from outside of the region also have an interest in maintaining the ocean’s security. The United States operates a naval support facility—Diego Garcia—on UK-leased territory in the central Indian Ocean, while France maintains a presence in the region from Reunion, its Indian Ocean island outpost. Australia has a modern naval force operating in the ocean, and the IOR is increasingly featured (PDF) in defense, national security, and maritime strategies developed in Canberra.
What are transnational concerns in the ocean?
Despite the rise in competition, multilateral cooperation involving China, India, and other states, takes place on issues including piracy, disaster relief, and drug smuggling. The following areas show potential for expanded cooperation:

-- Counterpiracy. Piracy has been costly to ocean-faring traders but global and regional responses have shown success. Oceans Beyond Piracy, a Colorado-based non-profit, estimates that the economic cost of piracy off the Somali Coast amounted to $2.3 billion in 2014, a drop from the estimated $5.7-$6.1 billion loss (PDF) two years prior.





Source: UNITAR-UNOSAT

Counterpiracy efforts near the Gulf of Aden have been the most successful manifestation of regional cooperation. More than eighty countries, organizations, and industry groups participate in operations in the IOR under the auspices of the ad hoc, voluntary Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), created in January 2009 in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (PDF) on Somali piracy and armed robbery at sea. Since military cooperation began, the volume of attacks has shrunk. Yet experts warn that pirates have turned to more sophisticated equipment (PDF) and if naval pressure in the western Indian Ocean is reduced, pirate activity would rise again.
China and India carry out anti-piracy activities independently, deploying naval vessels to escort merchant ships, provide protection, conduct rescue operations, and confiscate contraband. In April, China dispatched its twentieth naval escort task force to the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, India has prevented forty piracy attempts and developed an online registration service for merchants to request Indian naval escorts.

-- Search and Rescue. Another recent example of cooperation was the search effort for the Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which disappeared en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing in March 2014. At the height of operations, twenty-six countries, including China and India, contributed to the search mission. Wreckage believed to be from the flight was discovered in July 2015.


-- Disaster Relief. There is room for growth on humanitarian aid and disaster relief cooperation. After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, governments, including Australia, France, India, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the UK, and the United States, participated in extensive relief and rehabilitation efforts (PDF). Separately, China disbursed (PDF) more than $62.2 million in aid, shipped supplies, and dispatched medical and rescue teams. More than a decade later, the IOR's vulnerability to natural disasters and the subsequent effects of climate change could provide impetus for more extensive collaboration.

-- Fisheries. Consumers in Indo-Pacific countries on average obtain 20 to 50 percent (PDF) of their animal protein from fish, and industrial fishing is an important export for smaller countries in the IOR. Regional players identify overfishing and environmental degradation as serious risks to sustainable economic development and food security, but mechanisms to establish sustainable fisheries have not been effective. The Stimson Center's David Michel blames (PDF) challenges to cooperation on the region's existing security architecture: the majority of institutions, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, only operate at a sub-regional level or focus on specific species.
 
What are the prospects for improved regional governance?
Experts say there is a growing need for an effective regional security architecture, similar to extant mechanisms among major powers in the East and South China seas, to address the IOR's diverse challenges. Regional multilateral organizations, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which facilitates the exchange of military views to enhance communication and transparency across the region's naval forces, do exist. However, experts say IOR members must undergo an extensive region-building project for countries to be willing to act together more effectively.


China and India have expressed eagerness to assume greater responsibility (PDF) in policing maritime global commons and to be recognized as major powers. China's activities are likely to expand in conjunction with its One Belt, One Road initiative, but this does not have to come at India's expense, say some experts. "India is going to have to come to terms with China's entry into the Indian Ocean," states CNA's Samaranayake. New Delhi could also benefit from partnering with Beijing to integrate the region. Broader initiatives like the BRICS Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are also pulling India into to a larger leadership role alongside China.


The biggest challenge to creating coordinated effective action across the Indian Ocean is the lack of institutions of governance that cover the whole space, says CFR's Alyssa Ayres. "It may sound mundane, but institutionalized organizations with a regular diplomatic calendar and senior officials meeting to work on an agenda drive processes of consultation and action."
This Backgrounder is part of a CFR project on the New Geopolitics of China, India, and Pakistan, supported in part by a generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation.

Additional Resources

This 2014 report (PDF) by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies explores the looming great game in the Indian Ocean.

The map of Asia is being reimagined, from the framework of the Asia-Pacific region into the larger construct of the Indo-Pacific, writes Rory Metcalf of the Australia-based Lowy Institute.

This Stimson Center report (PDF) entitled "Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region" identifies the region's challenges and opportunities for enhanced cooperation.

This CFR Backgrounder outlines competing visions to revive ancient Silk Road trade routes to connect Asia and Europe.

The Australian National University's David Brewster analyzes New Delhi's ambitions for strategic leadership in the Indian Ocean Region.

Journalist Wade Shapard investigates a major Chinese-led port project in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

More on this topic from CFR

 
 

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