Showing posts with label MIDDLE EAST. Show all posts

Thursday, November 2, 2023

India’s Challenge in Qatar

SOURCE:

( ) India’s Challenge in Qatar : https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-challenge-in-qatar/#:~:text=At%20a%20time%20when%20the,eight%20Indian%20nationals%20to%20death.

( ) Qatar - The World Factbook : https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/qatar/

( ) Qatar The Gas Superpower and Geopolitical Switzerland: https://youtu.be/67cM6MEZCac

COMMENTARIES

India’s Challenge in Qatar

HARSH V. PANT

DEATH SENTENCE

DOHA

INDIAN NAVY

INDIAN TIES

MIDDLE EAST

QATAR

VERDICT

OCT 31 2023

At a time when the Middle East is passing through a delicate phase, India’s challenges in the region grew even more serious last week when the Court of First Instance in Qatar decided to sentence eight Indian nationals to death. These ex-servicemen of the Indian Navy have been in detention in Doha since last year on espionage charges which remain unspecified and opaque. New Delhi expressed its “deep shock” at the verdict and is reportedly exploring all possible legal and diplomatic options, though as of this writing the official copy of the Qatari court’s judgment was not in New Delhi’s possession, making it difficult to articulate a coherent stand.

These former personnel of the Indian Navy were employees of a private company called Al Dahra and were arrested last year in August by Qatar intelligence agency from Doha. What is interesting is that the owner of the company, an ex-serviceman of the Royal Oman Air Force was also arrested but later released in November. However, the eight Indian Navy veterans continued to be tried in an extremely confidential manner and despite New Delhi being granted consular access to them, the challenges have been quite visible from the beginning. Qatar’s refusal to be forthcoming with the details of the case had already cast a shadow on this case and now with a formal declaration of the death sentence, New Delhi has its task cut out.

With more than seven lakh Indians in Qatar and with Qatar meeting almost 40 per cent of India’s LNG requirements, this is a relationship that has been in the best of health in recent years.

For most Indians it has not only been disconcerting to see their retired servicemen being treated like this but it has also raised questions about the very nature of India-Qatar ties which seem to be propelled by energy and people-to-people engagements. With more than seven lakh Indians in Qatar and with Qatar meeting almost 40 per cent of India’s LNG requirements, this is a relationship that has been in the best of health in recent years. There is also a framework agreement on defence and security cooperation singed in 2008 envisages maritime training, joint-exercise and enhancing defence manufacturing bases in the two nations. For Qatar, building robust ties with an emerging economic power like India has been a priority as it seeks diversification in its external relationships, while for New Delhi it has been about strengthening partnership with a Gulf state that punches above its weight in the region and beyond. There is a reason why when Qatar was isolated and feeling the heat of Saudi-led blockade in 2017-2021, India continued with its economic engagement with Doha.

The Middle East has been one of the biggest success stories of Modi government’s foreign policy in the last decade. With some deft diplomatic footwork and a new found nimbleness, New Delhi has managed to build remarkably strong ties with the Arab states in the Gulf. Looking beyond just energy ties and diaspora linkages, Indian approach to the region has assumed a strategic character, making way for a wider regional policy response instead of merely bilaterals as reflected in the emergence of that I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE and the US) minilateral. This converged in the high-profile announcement during last month’s G-20 summit in New Delhi of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor – a multi-modal transport and economic corridor connecting three geographies aimed at boosting economic prosperity and bridging the infrastructure deficit.

With some deft diplomatic footwork and a new found nimbleness, New Delhi has managed to build remarkably strong ties with the Arab states in the Gulf.

The crisis brewing in the Middle East today is likely to keep the pressure on India. The Israel-Hamas conflict and the challenges for all the regional stakeholders that it has thrown up has complicated intra-regional ties. Qatar’s decision to challenge the foundations of an essentially strong relationship will provoke a rethink in India about the future sustainability of this relationship. That this case involves, according to some reports, allegations of spying for Israel adds another layer of complexity at a time when the Arab street is seething at Israel.

New Delhi will have to tread cautiously though India is not without levers when it comes to bilateral ties. From high-level political engagement to moving through the appeals process and even invoking the provisions of the 2015 pact on the transfer of sentenced prisoners, all the options will no doubt have to be explored. But fundamentally, New Delhi will have to remind Doha that the very future of this bilateral relationship now stands at a crossroad. It is not simply a matter between two governments but also involves the sentiments of 1.4 billion Indians. If this crisis is not resolved in an amicable manner, future cooperation will be difficult to envision under public pressure.

The reasons behind the timing and severity of the punishment meted out by the Qatari court are best known to Doha but its implications for India’s ties with Qatar can be far reaching. In the past, Qatar’s lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns about extremist voices could have been brushed aside, but the present predicament pertaining to ex-Indian servicemen has the potential to do some lasting damage to this bilateral relationship despite some significant convergences between Doha and New Delhi.

This commentary originally appeared in NDTV.

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

RUPTURES IN THE YEMEN COALITION

SOURCE:
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/ruptures-in-the-yemen-coalition/?utm_source=A+Short+History+of+Modern+Russia&utm_campaign=e7680dc709-190804_sunday+reads_COPY_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_daf8214408-e7680dc709-264164417

RUPTURES IN THE YEMEN COALITION

By

Xander Snyder

Clashes between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may indicate a deeper strategic divide between the two

August 14, 2019

Infighting among the Arab coalition in Yemen is starting to resemble a civil war within a civil war. Disagreements between Saudi Arabia, the coalition leader, and junior partner the United Arab Emirates in Yemen is nothing new, and in some ways last weekend’s events looked like only the latest in the tussle between them: Two UAE-backed entities, the Southern Transitional Council and its military wing, the Security Belt, attacked Yemeni government forces, which are supported by Saudi Arabia and led from afar by exiled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, in the southern port city of Aden. The militias seized the presidential palace and several military bases

What’s different about this round of infighting is the context. In May, the United Nations brokered a cease-fire that required rebel Houthi troops to withdraw from the key port city of Hodeida, though airstrikes by the Arab coalition on Houthi targets there in June called into question the U.N.’s assertion that the withdrawal had been completed. Four days before these strikes, a Yemeni official claimed that the UAE was plotting a military coup against Hadi. It was a credible claim even at the time, given the STC’s threat to overthrow Hadi last October, and one that was further validated by the STC’s seizure of the presidential palace in Aden last weekend.

(click to enlarge)

Then, beginning in June, the UAE started to slowly leave the country. Emirati forces made what the UAE described as a “strategic” withdrawal from Hodeida – ostensibly as part of the U.N.-led peace process that prompted the Houthis’ partial exit – and “tactical” retreats from other cities, including Aden. By July 2, some sources were reporting as much as an 80 percent drawdown in UAE forces from in and around Hodeida, a full withdrawal from Marib, and an ongoing tactical withdrawal from Aden. Emirati sources also reported that the UAE had scaled back its presence in Assab, Eritrea, by 75 percent. (Assab is where the UAE trains soldiers and launches airstrikes on Yemen.) Around July 6, control over the Emirati forces’ headquarters in Mocha had been transferred to Saudi Arabia.

(click to enlarge)

Throughout these withdrawals, Emirati officials repeatedly issued statements insisting that the military would continue to participate in the Arab coalition and would honor its commitment to countering Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula. Three Western diplomats, speaking to Reuters, said the UAE’s withdrawals were in fact related to escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran that began when four tankers were attacked in an Emirati port in May. That the UAE would want to bring troops home to protect its coasts seemed credible.

But in early July reports surfaced that Emirati forces were redeploying to Yemen. In early August, the Emirati foreign affairs minister confirmed as much. If the UAE is indeed redeploying, it might suggest that the earlier withdrawals were, in fact, tactical. But details on any such redeployment are scant, and other reports suggest the withdrawal is continuing – painting a rather muddled picture of the UAE’s position in Yemen.

A Narrowing Strategy

What is certain, however, is that the UAE’s perception of the war in Yemen – and of its winnability – has changed. The UAE is no longer comfortable expending all the resources it’s contributed to the war, especially as tensions in the Strait of Hormuz threaten the country’s maritime trade. This makes the UAE’s interest in controlling Yemen’s southern coast all the more pressing.

The recent infighting in Aden thus takes on greater significance. The UAE appears willing to scale back its presence across much of the country, including in combating the Houthis, even as it doubles down on its control over southern Yemen.

Hence the meeting, purportedly on maritime issues, between Emirati and Iranian officials in July. Officially, the two countries discussed fishermen’s rights to cross into each other’s waters for commercial purposes. But the timing of the meeting – on the heels of the reports that UAE forces were redeploying and just a week and a half before the STC attack on the Saudi-backed Yemeni government – makes the official version highly suspect.

It’s possible that the UAE and Iran reached a tacit agreement to leave each other alone in Yemen. Their territorial interests are complementary; Iran-backed Houthis are now concentrated north of Hodeida, with their seat of power in Sanaa, while the UAE is interested in securing possessions in the south. If the UAE is to redirect its forces away from hotly contested arenas like Hodeida to the south, it wouldn’t threaten the Houthis; in fact, there would be fewer Emirati forces available to fight them.

The UAE has other reasons to reconsider its commitment to the war in Yemen. Following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the American public became much more interested in Saudi Arabia’s behavior on the world stage, particularly in Riyadh’s role in the Yemen civil war. Both chambers of the U.S. Congress have passed legislation to curtail U.S. support for Saudi Arabia in the war. President Donald Trump has vetoed some of these bills, but the dissension is there. The U.S. is less willing to turn a blind eye to the conflict, making a difficult war much harder for the Saudi-led Arab coalition to fight.

That leaves Saudi Arabia with Houthi forces at its southern doorstep, threatening its airports with Iranian-supplied missiles, and with less Emirati ground support. Throughout the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has relied on the UAE’s ground forces, which it supports from the air – a strategy that limits Saudi casualties and, therefore, the Saudi public’s opposition to the war. If the UAE pulls back to the south, Saudi Arabia will be forced to either commit more ground forces to a quagmire of a war or to reach some kind of accommodation with the Houthis. Iran’s goal in supporting the Houthis all along has been to tie Saudi Arabia down; forcing the Saudis into this position would benefit Tehran, too.

(click to enlarge)

The obvious problem with this theory is that the STC is no friend of Iran. Even after taking Aden, its leader even said the STC was committed to Saudi Arabia. Still, it would be easier for the UAE and its allies to make these kinds of commitments from a position of power – namely, consolidated control of the south. The UAE needs to be playing on its own terms, which at this point probably includes pushing for a political settlement that will relieve the demands on its manpower and resources to a war that seems, at best, to be a stalemate. And what better time to push for a settlement than now, since the UAE has control over Yemen’s southern coast and the surrounding maritime routes.

What Happens Next?

The UAE’s withdrawals and redeployments, its meeting with Tehran, and the infighting in Aden make it more likely that a political resolution to the war in Yemen will divide the country in two. To manage discontent with the war on the home front, it’s more likely Saudi Arabia will need to reach an agreement with the Houthis. But even if they reach a political settlement, Saudi Arabia will not be able to divert its attention from its southern border, constraining what it can do in the rest of the Middle East to counter Iran’s influence. An enduring Houthi presence in northern Yemen is not the most powerful stick in the world, but it’s one that Riyadh knows that Tehran could use to poke it in the eye at inopportune moments. (It also makes it less likely that half of one of our 2019 forecasts – that Iran’s position in Syria and Yemen will weaken – will come true.)

Last, this would portend a deepened rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Going its own way in Yemen is a sign that, where its interests diverge with Saudi Arabia, the UAE will be willing to pursue them regardless of what Riyadh wants. The two are still aligned on some issues – not least their shared fear of Iran – but this will represent another point of tension, and possible division, between the Gulf’s two monarchies.

Wednesday, May 13, 2015

Yemen Crisis: More than Shia-Sunni Battle

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/yemen-crisis-more-than-shia-sunni-battle/79116.html

Yemen Crisis: More than Shia-Sunni Battle

By

K C REDDY

Yemen, which was once acknowledged as the Fortunate Arabia or Happy Arabia by ancient geographer Ptolemy, has now become a cauldron of insurgencies.

May 12 2015

The Conflict Zone

2011: Arab Spring protests spread to the streets of Yemen's capital Sana'a. President Saleh is badly injured in a rocket attack, suffering burns to 40 per cent of his body, and is flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Returns to Yemen, promising to hand over power to his deputy Adbrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

2014: Following the conclusion of the 10-month National Dialogue Conference, Hadi announces that Yemen will become a federation of six regions. Houthi rebels reject the plan. Tribesmen blow up Yemen's largest oil pipeline. Houthi rebels seize control of the capital Sana'a. The UN attempts to broker a political settlement.

2015: Houthis seize government installations and take power. The UN Security Council denounces the move. Hadi resigns, is arrested, then escapes from detention in Sana'a, fleeing to Aden. Islamic State carries out its first attacks in Yemen: two suicide bombings against Shia mosques. Houthi rebels advance south to Aden, prompting Mr Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia. A coalition of Arab states launches airstrikes against the Houthi, with US support.

Also in this section

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Supporters of Yemen''s Southern Separatist Movement man a tank flying the movement''s flag near the International airport in Aden, as battles against Shiite Houthi rebels continue. AFP

The airstrikes can only lead to a prolonged conflict. The international community will have to take diplomatic intiatives to resolve the crisis

FOR the last few weeks, Yemen has been hitting headlines in the global media for the wrong reasons. It has become a cauldron of insurgencies —by the Shias, people of south Yemen and finally the Islamic State. The Shia insurgency in North Yemen, popularly known as “the Houthis” is carried out by Zaydi Muslims (a sub sect of Shia) constituting 35-40 per cent of Yemen's Muslim population.

Oversimplifying the Issue

Attributing the present day Yemeni crisis as a mere Shia-Sunni power struggle amounts to oversimplification of the issue as Yemen is largely a tribal society and around 400 Zaidi tribes are operating mostly in the North Yemen area. Inter- tribal and intra-tribal tensions crop up in the control and distribution of economic resources and power-sharing arrangements as well. The internal struggle for power between long-competing factions remains at the core of the Yemeni crisis. Subsequent support by countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran etc. to the fighting factions either directly or indirectly and emergence of terrorist outfits like Al Qaida and the Islamic State provide a unique and complicated dimension to the Yemeni crisis.

Root Causes

A dispassionate scan of the historical and political developments of Yemen throws ample light on the root causes of the present-day crisis. Till 1990, two states existed in Yemen — one in the North and another in the South. The southern state of Yemen was formed in 1967 and the socialist state was officially known as the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen. After six years of civil war (1968) between Hamiaddin royalists supported by Saudi Arabia, Britain and Jordan on one side and the republicans backed by Egypt on the other side, the republicans came out victorious and formed the Yemini Arab Republic. However, the power struggle between the two states continued with the eruption of fresh fighting. Finally, with the Arab League brokered peace in 1990, both states reached an agreement on the joint governance of Yemen. Both Yemeni Arab Republic and Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen were merged and paved the way for the formation of the present-day Republic of Yemen and Ali Abdullah Saleh became the President. In order to honour the power-sharing agreement, the Vice-President was taken from South Yemen. The fragile peace did not last long and lead to the 1994 civil war. In spite of Saudi Arabia actively backing South Yemen leaders, their armed forces were defeated and many Yemeni socialist leaders and other southern secessionist leaders fled into exile.

Ali Abdullah Saleh became the first directly elected president of Yemen in 1999, winning 96.2 per cent of the vote.

North-South divide

A deep divide persisted between the Shia Muslim-dominated North Yemen and Sunni Muslim-influenced South Yemen. High poverty levels, an oppressive and corrupt government, a large number of weapons in private hands are some of the factors contributing to the present crisis. Sensing the chaotic situation, Al Qaida stepped in and conducted a number of attacks on Yemeni military convoys and mosques despite Ayaman al Zawahiri's guidelines advising against attacks on mosques. Not wanting to lag behind, the Islamic State in March this year, deployed four suicide bombers at two Houthi mosques in the capital Sanna, killing more than 100 worshippers .The Islamic State threatened to carry out more such attacks more in future.

Yemeni Revolution

Earlier, in 2011, encouraged by the popular ouster of the Tunisian government, street protests started in Sanna. The protests were initially against unemployment, adverse economic conditions and governmental corruption. Additionally, the proposed amendment to the Yemini constitution sought to allow then President, Saleh, to remain in office for life. It was strongly believed that his son Ahmed Saleh was being groomed to eventually take over reins from his father. The Houthis participated in the Yemini revolution in 2011 along with other insurgent groups, socialists, Islamists, student bodies, anti-government tribes and opposition parties.

As a result of the peace brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the last part of 2011, Saleh handed over power to his deputy Abdu Rabbo Mansoor Hadi. In 2012 presidential elections, which were also boycotted by the Houthis as well as southern insurgents; Hadi got 99 per cent of the vote.

Another factor which contributed to the Houthis capturing power was the withdrawal of fuel subsidies in July 2014. It was estimated in 2013, the fuel subsidies in Yemen were $ 3 billion — roughly 20 per cent of the state expenditure .The Houthis capitalised on the frustration among diverse segments of the population over the Sunni-dominated government's decision to discontinue the fuel subsidies.

The Houthi insurgency started way back in 2004 when the government accused them of seeking to overthrow it. Houthi leaders denied the allegations by saying that they were only defending themselves from the government attacks. Since then, regular attacks and counter- attacks between government forces and militias backed by them on one side and the Houthis on the other continued, resulting in thousands of casualties .The Houthi insurgency reached its peak in February this year when they installed a Revolutionary committee to administer the country and chased out the internationally recognised President Hadi. The President made an unsuccessful attempt to establish his authority in Aden (South Yemen), before being forced to flee to Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi-led Airstrikes

With a view to destroy military bases and armed depots of the Houthis, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of GCC ( Gulf Cooperation Council) countries in air raids. The US, the UK, France, Turkey and Belgium supported Saudi Arabia's military action on Yemen while Iran, Russia and China opposed it. It is too early to say whether Saudi-led airstrikes will resolve the crisis or prolong and deepen it, particularly due to the historical reality that air power is not enough to win battles. Ground troops remain an indispensible factor to win a war in spite of air superior power. From all accounts, it appears the air strikes may even drag on. The aerial strikes by coalition forces may halt further advance by the Houthis but they are not adequate to dislodge them from their mountain homelands in North Yemen. The air campaigns elsewhere, like the one in Libya, resulted in a chaotic nation with very little hope of improvement in the near future. Similar is the case with coalition air strikes in the areas occupied by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria which did not resolve the crisis.

Another striking feature of Yemeni crisis is the conspicuous absence of United State's active role. For the last two decades, the US was playing an active and leading role in the Middle East but now the lead role remained is with Saudi Arabia.
Is it due to a shift in the US policy in the Middle East?
It is more likely the US has no economic interest in Yemen's energy resources, particularly after the discovery of shale gas deposits. Moreover it's interest in Yemen seems to be more on containing the expansion of Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula.

Initially, Pakistan's participation was contemplated in some quarters but the unanimous resolution passed by Pakistani Parliament killed such a possibility. Pakistan's stand might have been driven by two considerations — its security forces are overstretched in tackling its own insurgencies and with 20 per cent Shia population, it can ill afford to field ground forces for Yemeni conflict.

Pakistan's decision to stay away from Saudi led air strikes on Yemen and its likely impact on its relationship with other Gulf Coordination countries may alter the exiting geopolitical equations in the Middle East.

The current unstable security situation gave a serious blow to Yemen's ailing economy. In spite of having sufficient oil and natural gas resources, the crisis in Yemen has adversely impacted their exploration and transport. Being an oil-based economy, the chaotic security situation has contributed to significant levels of unemployment.

India's Historical Ties

Unlike many Asian countries, India maintained a deep-rooted historical and trade relationship with Yemen leading to the migration of thousands of people of Yemen-origin to Hyderabad. Some reports indicated presence of 300,000 strong Yemeni-origin diaspora in India. Similarly, an estimated 100,000 people of Indian origin are concentrated in South Yemen and they enjoy a fair degree of cultural and religious freedom.

Besides regular people-to-people contacts between India and Yemen, prominent leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose also visited Aden (South Yemen) and Aden remains on the Hajj route for Indian pilgrims.

The intensified coalition air strikes may prolong the struggle and lead to a political vacuum in some parts of Yemen. This will lead to Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State attempting to realise their dream of establishing caliphates in those areas. Thereafter, the crisis may not remain a mere problem between two groups or two countries and it may assume a regional /global dimension. The international community needs to be aware of the potential threat and activate diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis before it is too late.

The Indian Connection

Unlike many Asian countries, India maintained a deep-rooted historical and trade relationship with Yemen, leading to the migration of thousands of people of Yemen-origin to Hyderabad. Some reports indicated the presence of 300,000-strong Yemeni--origin diaspora in India. Similarly, an estimated 100,000 Yemeni-origin people of Indian origin are concentrated in South Yemen.

The writer, a former IPS officer, is former UN Chief Security Adviser.

Tuesday, May 12, 2015

The Sunni-Shia Divide

SOURCE:
http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/

The Sunni-Shia Divide

A CFR InfoGuide Presentation

Sectarian conflict is becoming entrenched in a growing number of Muslim countries and is threatening to fracture Iraq and Syria. Tensions between Sunnis and Shias, exploited by regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran, could reshape the future Middle East.

http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/

An ancient religious divide is helping fuel a resurgence of conflicts in the Middle East and Muslim countries. Struggles between Sunni and Shia forces have fed a Syrian civil war that threatens to transform the map of the Middle East, spurred violence that is fracturing Iraq, and widened fissures in a number of tense Gulf countries. Growing sectarian clashes have also sparked a revival of transnational jihadi networks that poses a threat beyond the region.

Islam’s schism, simmering for fourteen centuries, doesn’t explain all the political, economic, and geostrategic factors involved in these conflicts, but it has become one prism by which to understand the underlying tensions. Two countries that compete for the leadership of Islam, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, have used the sectarian divide to further their ambitions. How their rivalry is settled will likely shape the political balance between Sunnis and Shias and the future of the region, especially in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain.

Alongside the proxy battle is the renewed fervor of armed militants, motivated by the goals of cleansing the faith or preparing the way for the return of the messiah. Today there are tens of thousands of organized sectarian militants throughout the region capable of triggering a broader conflict. And despite the efforts of many Sunni and Shia clerics to reduce tensions through dialogue and counter violence measures, many experts express concern that Islam’s divide will lead to escalating violence and a growing threat to international peace and security.

Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law.

Shia identity is rooted in victimhood over the killing of Husayn, the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, in the seventh century, and a long history of marginalization by the Sunni majority. Islam’s dominant sect, which roughly 85 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims follow, viewed Shia Islam with suspicion, and extremist Sunnis have portrayed Shias as heretics and apostates.

Source: Pew Research, The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 2011

"A Regional War In the Middle East Draws Ever Closer." - UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic

Origins Of The Schism

Mohammed unveiled a new faith to the people of Mecca in 610. Known as Islam, or submission to God, the monotheistic religion incorporated some Jewish and Christian traditions and expanded with a set of laws that governed most aspects of life, including political authority. By the time of his death in 632, Mohammed had consolidated power in Arabia. His followers subsequently built an empire that would stretch from Central Asia to Spain less than a century after his death. But a debate over succession split the community, with some arguing that leadership should be awarded to qualified individuals

and others insisting that the only legitimate ruler must come through Mohammed’s bloodline.

A group of prominent early followers of Islam elected Abu Bakr, a companion of Mohammed, to be the first caliph, or leader of the Islamic community, over the objections of those who favored Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. The opposing camps in the succession debate eventually evolved into Islam’s two main sects. Shias, a term that stems from shi’atu Ali, Arabic for “partisans of Ali,” believe that Ali and his descendants are part of a divine order. Sunnis, meaning followers of the sunna, or “way” in Arabic, of Mohammed, are opposed to political succession based on Mohammed’s bloodline.

Ali became caliph in 656 and ruled only five years before he was assassinated. The caliphate, which was based in the Arabian Peninsula, passed to the Umayyad dynasty in Damascus and later the Abbasids in Baghdad. Shias rejected the authority of these rulers. In 680, soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph killed Ali’s son, Husayn, and many of his companions in Karbala, located in modern-day Iraq. Karbala became a defining moral story for Shias, and Sunni caliphs worried that the Shia Imams—the descendants of Husayn who were seen as the legitimate leaders of Muslims (Sunnis use the term “imam” for the men who lead prayers in mosques)—would use this massacre to capture public imagination and topple monarchs. This fear resulted in the further persecution and marginalization of Shias.

Even as Sunnis triumphed politically in the Muslim world, Shias continued to look to the Imams—the blood descendants of Ali and Husayn—as their legitimate political and religious leaders. Even within the Shia community, however, there arose differences over the proper line of succession. Mainstream Shias believe there were twelve Imams. Zaydi Shias, found mostly in Yemen, broke off from the majority Shia community at the fifth Imam, and sustained imamate rule in parts of Yemen up to the 1960s. Ismaili Shias, centered in South Asia but with important diaspora communities throughout the world, broke off at the seventh Imam. Most Ismailis revere the Aga Khan as the living representative of their Imam. The majority of Shias, particularly those in Iran and the eastern Arab world, believe that the twelfth Imam entered a state of occultation, or hiddenness, in 939 and that he will return at the end of time. Since then, “Twelvers,” or Ithna Ashari Shias, have vested religious authority in their senior clerical leaders, called ayatollahs (Arabic for “sign of God”).

Many Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian converts to Islam chose to become Shia rather than Sunni in the early centuries of the religion as a protest against the ethnic Arab empires that treated non-Arabs as second-class citizens. Their religions influenced the evolution of Shia Islam as distinct from Sunni Islam in rituals and beliefs.

Sunnis dominated the first nine centuries of Islamic rule (excluding the Shia Fatimid dynasty) until the Safavid dynasty was established in Persia in 1501. The Safavids made Shia Islam the state religion, and over the following two centuries they fought with the Ottomans, the seat of the Sunni caliphate. As these empires faded, their battles roughly settled the political borders of modern Iran and Turkey by the seventeenth century, and their legacies resulted in the current demographic distribution of Islam’s sects. Shias comprise a majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, and a plurality in Lebanon, while Sunnis make up the majority of more than forty countries from Morocco to Indonesia

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Timeline

: Origins of the Sunni-Shia Schism

Early Muslims split into two camps following the death of the Prophet Mohammed. This chronology explains how the sects evolved from 632 until the late twentieth century. (Photo: Abbas Al-Musavi/Brooklyn Museum)

632A D

**Combat between Ali ibn Abi Talib and Amr Ben Wad near Medina in Arabia. Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection/Brown Library**

The Death of Mohammed

Early followers of Islam are divided over the succession of the Prophet Mohammed, who founded the religion in Arabia. Prominent members of the community in Mecca elect Abu Bakr, a companion of Mohammed, with objections from those who favor Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. Ali eventually becomes caliph, or ruler of the Islamic community, in 656, and is assassinated in 661 after a power struggle with the governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya. Mu’awiya claims the caliphate and founds the Umayyad dynasty, which rules the Muslim empire from Damascus until 750.

661 – 1258 A. D.

**Map of the Ummayad Caliphate in 750. Courtesy University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin**

Umayyad and Abbasid Dynasties Target Shias

Umayyads, and later Abbasids, who replace the Umayyads and rule from Baghdad after 750, oppress and kill the successors of Husayn, known as Imams, who pose a political threat to Sunni caliphs. The sixth Shia Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq, orders his followers to hide their true beliefs for the survival of the faith. Shia branches such as Ismaili and Zaydi emerge from different interpretations of succession for Imams. The Sunni caliphate becomes hereditary.

661 A. D.

**Painting of Ali being designated as the Prophet Mohammed’s successor. University of Edinburgh**

The Early Shias

The partisans of Ali, or shi’atu Ali, grow discontented after the murder of their leader in 661. They reject the authority of the caliphs during the Umayyad dynasty, which rules over an expanding empire stretching from Pakistan through northern Africa to Spain. Shias argue that the legitimate leaders of Islam must be the sons of Ali and Fatima, Mohammed’s daughter. Husayn, one of Ali’s sons, eventually leads a revolt from Kufa, in modern-day Iraq.

680 A. D.

**Painting commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn. Abbas Al-Musavi/Brooklyn Museum**

The Battle of Karbala

Yazid, the Umayyad ruler, dispatches an army to crush the Kufa revolt. A battle in Karbala, north of Kufa, ends with the massacre of Husayn and many of his companions. Husayn's martyrdom and its moral lessons help shape Shia identity, and the sect grows despite the murder of its leaders. Husayn’s death is commemorated by Shias during the annual ritual of Ashura, which includes practices, such as self-flagellation, that are distinct from Sunni Islam.

939 A. D.

Occultation of the Mahdi

Most Shias today are Twelvers. They believe that the line of Imams continued to the twelfth Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi, or the guided one, who entered a state of occultation, or hiddenness, in 939. Shias expect the Mahdi to return at the end of time. Sunni Islam becomes a broad umbrella term for non-Shia Muslims who are united on the importance of the Quran and practices of Mohammed, though they may differ in legal opinion.

969 A. D.

**Visitors at a shrine in Cairo believed to hold Husayn’s head. Mohammed Aly Sergie**

Fatimids: The First Shia Dynasty

Ismailis, who break off from the Twelver line after the sixth Imam, take control of Egypt and large parts of North Africa and expand to western Arabia and Syria, creating the Fatimid dynasty. The Fatimids, who assume the titles of both imam and caliph, establish al-Azhar Mosque, which centuries later becomes the intellectual center of Sunni Islam. The Shia Fatimid caliphate fades in the twelfth century, and the Ismaili community spreads to Yemen, Syria, Iran, and western India.

1268 A. D.

Ibn Taymiyya in Damascus

By the ninth century, Sunnis adhere to four schools of Islamic jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali. Ibn Taymiyya, a religious scholar, moves to Damascus in 1268 and studies the Hanbali school, which condemns Shias as rafidha, or rejecters of the faith. He preaches a return to the purity of Islam in its early days. Ibn Taymiyya opposes celebrating Mohammed’s birthday and other practices that resemble Christian and pagan rituals. His ideas help shape Wahhabi and Salafi thought centuries later. (Photo: Bernard Gagnon)

1501 A. D.

**The renovated mosque of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Riyadh. Mohammad Nowfal Areekode**

Wahhabi Islam Emerges in Arabia

Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab establishes a religious movement on the Arabian peninsula in the eighteenth century steeped in the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. Wahhabis, as his followers are known, preach a puritanical faith that puts them in conflict with other Sunnis as well as Shias. Wahhabi fighters desecrate the shrine of Husayn in Karbala and destroy Mohammed’s tombstone in Medina. They join Mohammed bin Saud to found the first Saudi kingdom, which is defeated by Ottoman forces in the early nineteenth century.

1703 A. D.

**The Sykes-Picot Agreement. The National Archives, United Kingdom**

Sykes–Picot and the End of the Caliphate

The secret Sykes-Picot agreement is reached between France and the United Kingdom to divide the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which has been in decline and weakens further during World War I. Colonial rulers elevate minorities to powerful positions in Iraq and Syria, a policy which later contributes to sectarian tensions in these countries. Tempering these tensions are new ideas of secularism and nationalism that sweep through the Turkish and Arab province of the former Ottoman Empire. The newly founded secular Republic of Turkey abolishes the caliphate in 1924. In the Arab world, identity politics stressing pan-Arabism and a unity among Muslims helps mute sectarianism, especially during the fight for independence against the European powers.

1916 A. D.

**King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (seated) with his son, crown prince Saud. AP**

Saud Dynasty Establishes a Kingdom

Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud and his army of Wahhabi warriors consolidate control of the Arabian peninsula and form the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. During the founding battles, fighters attack fellow Sunnis in western Arabia and Shias in eastern Arabia and southern Iraq. Wahhabi preachers go on to dominate the kingdom’s judiciary and education system, and their teachings are spread first in Saudi Arabia and then internationally as the country grows wealthy from its large oil resources. The rise of Wahhabi and the related Salafi branches of Islam fuels Sunni-Shia tensions today.

1932 A. D.

**Murad IV, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1623 to 1640. (Public Domain/Wiki Commons)**

Ottomans Conquer Iraq

Safavids briefly gain control of Iraq, an Arab territory, but lose it in 1639 to the Ottomans, who claim the title of the Sunni caliphate in Turkey. The Ottoman–Safavid wars eventually establish the modern contours of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Shia Islam dominates Iran, and Shia Muslims in Turkey are killed or displaced, shifting the demography in favor of Sunnis, a development that makes both these countries far more homogenous than their neighbors.

1501 A. D.

**Painting of an early battle in the Safavid Dynasty by Mu'in Musavvir. Freer and Sackler, Smithsonian Institution**

Safavid Dynasty and the Rise of Shias in Persia

Ismail, leader of the Safavid dynasty, defeats the Mongols and brings the territories of former Persian empires under central authority, including modern-day Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. Shi’ism becomes the official religion of the Safavids and is often spread through force. As the Safavid dynasty declines in the eighteenth century, the power of Shia clergy in civil affairs grows in Iran.

1947 A. D.

**Syrian president Hafez al-Assad in 1973. Getty**

Ba’ath Rule Begins in Syria

Syria’s first years of independence are riddled with coups until Ba’athists in the military seize power in 1963. The Ba’ath Party, popular in Iraq and Syria, promotes a secular, pan-Arab, socialist ideology and is hostile to Islamists. Hafez al-Assad, a Ba’ath leader and member of the heterodox Shia sect known as Alawis, takes power in 1970 and rules until his death in 2000, after more than a thousand years of Sunni dominance in Syria. His son Bashar continues to rule the country amid civil war in 2014.

1963 A. D.

Lebanese Civil War

Lebanon experiences a sectarian civil war that (with important exceptions at various times) pits the Christian minority that has held political power since independence in 1943 against the Muslim majority. Syria intervenes in the fighting in 1976 and Israel intervenes in 1982. After the Israeli intervention, Iran sponsors the establishment of a Shia Lebanese militia, Hezbollah, which over time becomes the most powerful force in Lebanese politics. Under pressure from Hezbollah, Israel withdraws its last forces from Lebanon in 2000. (Photo: AP)

1976 – 1989 A.D.

**Al-Azhar Mosque in the old Islamic area of Cairo. Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Courtesy Reuters**

Sectarian Harmony: The Azhar Fatwa

Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltut, the rector of Cairo's al-Azhar Mosque, which Sunnis view as the preeminent religious institution, issues a religious ruling, or fatwa, that recognizes Shia law as the fifth school of Islamic jurisprudence. After decades of colonialism and then secular nationalism, many Sunni and Shia religious authorities throughout the Muslim world unite to confront these common threats. This harmony is tarnished as secular states weaken.

1947 A. D.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah Getty Images/Time & Life Pictures/Margaret Bourke-White

The Birth of Pakistan

India’s struggle for independence includes an Islamic awakening, resulting in the creation of Pakistan in the partition of India at the end of British rule. The Sunni-majority country is founded by a Shia, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who emphasizes the need for a secular Pakistan where all citizens are equal irrespective of "religion or caste or creed." Pakistanis elect prime ministers from both sects. But the Islamization of the state, promoted by Saudi Wahhabi clerics, accelerates after army chief General Zia ul-Haq, a Sunni, seizes power in 1978. Sectarian violence escalates after the 1980s.

[TIME LINE ENDS]

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Modern Tensions

Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the “guardianship of the jurist” (velayat-e faqih), a controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between political leadership and religious scholarship. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith. Khomeini argued that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams.

Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini’s success, but did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions.
Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia minority of roughly 10 percent, and millions of adherents of a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism (an offshoot of the Sunni Hanbali school) that is antagonistic to Shia Islam. The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism, as both countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam. Many of the groups responsible for sectarian violence that has occurred in the region and across the Muslim world since 1979 can be traced to Saudi and Iranian sources.

Saudi Arabia backed Iraq in the 1980–1988 war with Iran and sponsored militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan who were primarily fighting against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but were also suppressing Shia movements inspired or backed by Iran.

The transformation of Iran into an agitator for Shia movements in Muslim countries seemed to confirm centuries of Sunni suspicions that Shia Arabs answer to Persia. Many experts, however, point out that Shias aren’t monolithic—for many of them, identities and interests are based on more than their confession. Iraqi Shias, for example, made up the bulk of the Iraqi army that fought Iran during the Iran–Iraq War, and Shia militant groups Amal and Hezbollah clashed at times during the Lebanese civil war.

Percent of Sunnis who accept Shias as Muslim Infographic — **Source:** **Pew Research, The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, 2012**

For their part, both mainstream and hard-line Sunnis aren’t singularly focused on oppressing Shias. They have fought against coreligionists throughout history, most recently in the successive crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia’s battles against al-Qaeda and related Sunni militant groups. Sharing a common Sunni identity didn’t eliminate power struggles among Sunni Muslims under secular or religious governments.
But confessional identity has resurfaced wherever sectarian violence has taken root, as in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion removed Saddam Hussein, a dictator from the Sunni minority who ruled over a Shia-majority country. The bombing of a Shia shrine in Samara in 2006 kicked off a cycle of sectarian violence that forced Iraqis to pick sides, stirring tensions that continue today.

In the Arab world, Shia groups supported by Iran have recently won important political victories. The Assad regime, which has ruled Syria since 1970, relies on fellow Alawis, a heterodox Shia sect that makes up about 13 percent of Syria’s population, as a pillar of its rule. Alawis dominate the upper reaches of the military and security services in Syria and are the backbone of the forces fighting to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria’s civil war. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq unseated Saddam Hussein and instituted competitive elections, the Shia majority has dominated the parliament and produced its prime ministers. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia and political movement, is the strongest political actor in Lebanon. Iran’s regional influence has swelled as its allies in these countries have accumulated power.

Sunni governments, especially Saudi Arabia, have increasingly worried about their own grips on power, a concern that was exacerbated with the protest movement that began in Tunisia in late 2010. The Arab Awakening, as the uprisings are known, spread to Bahrain and Syria, countries at the fault lines of Islam’s sectarian divide. In each, political power is held by a sectarian minority—Alawis in Syria, where Sunnis are the majority, and a Sunni ruling family in Bahrain, where Shias are the majority. The civil war in Syria, which is a political conflict at its core, has exposed sectarian tensions and become the staging ground for a vicious proxy war between the region’s major Sunni and Shia powers.

Some analysts view the Syrian conflict as the last chance for Sunnis to limit and reverse the spread of Iranian power and Shia influence in the Arab world.

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Timeline: Modern Sunni-Shia Tensions

Iran’s Islamic revolution, which brought Shias to power in 1979, and the Sunni backlash have fueled a competition for regional dominance. This timeline highlights Sunni-Shia tensions in recent decades. (Photo: Henri Bureau/Corbis)

January 16,1979

**Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Tehran in 1979 after fourteen years of exile. AP Photo**

Iran’s Islamic Revolution

Iran’s ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, flees the country after months of increasingly massive protests. Exiled Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returns and leads an Islamic republic based on a constitution that grants him religious and political authority under the concept of velayat-e faqih (“guardianship of the jurist”). Khomeini is named supreme leader and starts to export the Islamic revolution, which is viewed with suspicion by Sunni rulers in countries with significant Shia populations, such as Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.

December 24, 1979

**Afghan tribal rebel with captured Soviet-made light machine gun. Hiromi Nagakura/AP Photo**

Soviet Army Invades Afghanistan

Soviet forces invade Afghanistan after the communist government in Kabul requests military aid to fight Islamist rebels. The insurgents, known as mujahadeen (“those who fight jihad”), attract mainly Afghan fighters and are augmented by thousands of foreign Sunni fighters, including a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden. Weapons and cash for the mujahadeen are supplied through Pakistan by Saudi Arabia and the United States. The war, which is framed as a resistance to Soviet occupation, raises the profile of fundamentalist Sunni movements.

July 5, 1980

**Muhammad Zia Ul-Haq, Pakistan's sixth president, ruled from 1978 to 1988. Central Press/Getty Images**

Shia Protests in Pakistan Exposes Sectarian Tensions

Tens of thousands of Shias protest in Islamabad against the imposition of some Sunni laws on all Muslims. Pakistan’s president gives Shias an exemption, but the sectarian confrontation becomes an important political issue in the country. Sunni groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba, funded by Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia, kill thousands of Shias over the next three decades. Smaller Shia sectarian militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Jafria also emerge but are responsible for fewer attacks.

September 22, 1980

**An Iraqi soldier watches the Iranian Abadan refinery burn during the Iran-Iraq conflict. Henri Bureau/Corbis**

Iraq Sparks a War with Iran

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, a Sunni ruling over a majority-Shia country who fears the spillover effects of the Iranian Revolution, sends his troops to occupy part of an oil-rich province in Iran. The move sparks an eight-year war, resulting in roughly one million deaths. Iraq is backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States, the latter responding to hostility from Tehran’s new government following the Islamic revolution and taking hostage of U.S. diplomats.

February 28, 1991

**Bodies suspected to be Shias killed by Saddam’s regime are found in a mass grave in 2003. Damir Sagolj/Courtesy Reuters**

Saddam Crushes Shia Insurgency After Gulf War

Riots erupt in the Shia cities of Basra and Najaf after U.S.-led allies drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait and rout them on the battlefield in the first Gulf War. The Shia protestors are in part motivated by a perception that they will receive U.S. backing if they turn against Saddam. U.S. officials say this was never promised. Saddam’s forces

mount a brutal crackdown, killing tens of thousands of Shias, shelling the shrines of Najaf and Karbala, and razing parts of Shia towns.

August 8, 1998

**Afghans flock to the Blue Mosque, also known as the Tomb of Ali, in Mazar-e-Sharif. (Courtesy Reuters)**

Taliban Massacres Shia in Mazar-e-Sharif

Taliban militants, Sunni fundamentalists who seized power after the defeat of Soviet forces, capture the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in northwest Afghanistan. The
Taliban kills at least two thousand Shias in Mazar-e-Sharif
and Bamiyan in 1997 and 1998. The offensive in northwest Afghanistan, backed by Pakistan, helps the Taliban consolidate power in the country. Militants kill eight Iranian diplomats based in Mazar-e-Sharif, prompting Tehran to deploy its troops to the border, but United Nations mediation averts a confrontation

September 11, 2001

Al-Qaeda Strikes the U.S., Killing Thousands

In response to the attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. forces pursue al-Qaeda leaders and militants to their bases in Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban government. U.S.-led international troops help set up a new order in the country. The toppling of the anti-Iranian Taliban government in Afghanistan, followed shortly thereafter by the U.S. invasion of Iraq that brings down another Iranian foe, Saddam Hussein, fans Sunni fears in Jordan and Gulf states of a Shia revival.

March 19, 2003

**U.S. troops pull down a twenty-foot statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad. Goran Tomasevic/Courtesy Reuters**

U.S. Forces Topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq

A coalition led by the United States invades Iraq and ends Saddam’s regime and centuries of Sunni dominance in Iraq. Sectarian violence erupts as remnants of the deposed Ba’ath party and other Sunnis, both secular and Islamist, mount a resistance against coalition forces and their local allies, the ascendant Shia community. Shia militias also emerge, some of which also oppose the U.S. military presence. Foreign Sunni militants, many affiliated with al-Qaeda, flock to Iraq to participate in what evolves into a sectarian war. Iranian influence in Iraq grows dramatically as Tehran backs Shia militants, as well as the Shia political parties that come to dominate the electoral process.

February 14, 2005

**Supporters of Rafik Hariri in protest over his killing. Ali Hashisho/Courtesy Reuters**

Assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri

Former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri is killed in a car bomb after spearheading an effort to raise international pressure on Syria to withdraw its forces, which have been in Lebanon since 1976. His assassination is seen as a Syrian plot supported by Syria’s Lebanese allies, including Hezbollah, and leads to massive demonstrations that convince Syria to withdraw. The assassination and subsequent mobilization pit the Lebanese Sunni community, whom Hariri had come to represent, against Hezbollah and Lebanese Shias, who remain allied with Syria. Lebanese Christians split, with some supporting the Hariri camp and others supporting Hezbollah.

February 22, 2006

**Iraqis walk past the damaged al-Askari mosque following an explosion in Samarra. Hameed Rasheed/AP Photo**

Bombing of Shia Shrine Escalates Iraq Violence

Sectarian killings become normal in Iraq, with both Sunni and Shia militias targeting civilians across the country. The bombing that destroys the golden dome of al-Askari mosque in Samarra, home to the tombs of the tenth and eleventh Shia Imams, triggers a more intense wave of violence that almost doubles the monthly civilian death toll in Iraq to nine hundred

December 30, 2006

**Indian Muslims protest the execution of Saddam Hussein. Ahmad Masood/CourtesyReuters**

Saddam’s Execution Inflames Sunnis

Saddam Hussein, responsible for the deaths of thousands of Shias and Sunnis in Iraq, is executed amid taunts by witnesses who chant the name of Shia cleric and Mahdi army militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. The unruly scene, captured on video, elevates Saddam’s status as a martyr among many Sunnis in the region and underscores the new reality of rising Shia power in Iraq.

February 11, 2011

Protests Erupt in the Middle East, Exposing Sectarian Fault Lines

A wave of pro-democracy protests sweeps across the region, starting with the overthrow of Tunisia’s president, and then Egypt’s on February 11, eventually spreading to other Arab states in what is known as the “Arab Spring” or the “Arab Awakening.” Iranian officials welcome the fall of long-term U.S. allies like Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, and unrest in Bahrain, home to an oppressed Shia majority. As protests reach Syria in March, Tehran backs the government, which is dominated by Alawis, a heterodox Shia sect, while the opposition is dominated by members of the majority Sunni community. Dormant sectarian tensions in Syria are revived and a regional sectarian showdown begins. (Courtesy Reuters)

August 30, 2012

**Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad talks to Egypt's president, Mohammed Morsi, during the sixteenth summit of the Nonaligned Movement in Tehran. Courtesy Reuters**

Egypt’s Morsi Visits Iran

President Mohamed Morsi’s trip to Tehran, the first visit by an Egyptian leader since Cairo’s recognition of Israel in the 1980s, signals the potential for a new relationship between Iran and Sunni Islamists. Iran tries to rebrand the Arab uprisings as an “Islamic Awakening” and an extension of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. But the visit by Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, exposes Islam’s deep cleavage. He praises Islam’s first three caliphs, whom Shias reject, and says opposing the Assad regime is a “moral obligation,” remarks that Iranian officials criticize.

October 1, 2012

**Hezbollah members carry the coffin of commander Ali Bazzi, who was killed in Syria. Ali Hashisho/ Courtesy Reuters**

Hezbollah Commander Killed in Syria

Civil war divides Syrians largely along sectarian lines, with Sunnis supporting rebels, and Alawis, Shias, and other minorities backing the Assad regime. Foreign Sunni fighters trickle and then flood into the country, and signs of increased involvement from Iran and its Lebanese proxy militia, Hezbollah, emerge. The death of Hezbollah founding member Ali Hussein Nassif comes months before the group publicly acknowledges its role in the war. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries fund rebels, turning the fighting in Syria into a regional proxy war.

April 8, 2013

Al-Qaeda’s Iraq Affiliate Expands in Syria

The Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the country, extends its activities into Syria, creating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Known for its brutality against Shias and most Sunnis who oppose it, the group proves to be too extreme for al-Qaeda and is eventually expelled from the network. ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria add an additional layer of sectarian violence to the region, and its control of territory in both states threatens to dissolve borders and fracture countries in the Middle East. (Yaser Al-Khodor/Courtesy Reuters)

April 20, 2014

**Indonesian Shias protest plans to relocate hundreds who had been driven from their village. Ibnu Mardhani/Demotix**

Anti-Shia Sentiments Spread to Indonesia

Asian Muslims, influenced by the sectarian violence in the Middle East and Pakistan, aim to avoid potential tensions by suppressing the growth of their tiny Shia communities. Indonesian clerics and radical Islamists hold an “Anti-Shia Alliance” meeting in the world’s largest Muslim country, which is more than 99 percent Sunni. Malaysia, where Sunnis are also dominant, has implemented laws forbidding the propagation of the Shia faith.

June 10, 2014

**Mahdi Army fighters loyal to Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr march in Najaf. Alaa Al-Marjani/Courtesy Reuters**

Shia Militias Mobilize as ISIS Advances in Iraq

ISIS militants and other armed Sunni groups seize Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, with little resistance from the Iraqi army. The Sunni insurgency, brewing for years in response to what it sees as exclusionary policies of Shia prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, expands toward Baghdad and the borders with Syria and Jordan. ISIS threatens to destroy sacred Shia shrines, prompting a call to arms by Iraq’s top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Shia civilians respond to a mass recruitment drive that swells the ranks of militias and elevates sectarian tensions.

[ TIME LINE ENDS]
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Practicing the Faith

Sunnis and Shias agree on the basic tenets of Islam: declaring faith in a monotheistic God and Mohammed as his messenger, conducting daily prayers, giving money to the poor, fasting during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.

There are divisions even over the precepts of Islam, but the main difference relates to authority, which sparked the political split in the seventh century and evolved into divergent interpretations of sharia, or Islamic law, and distinct sectarian identities.

Shias believe that God always provides a guide, first the Imams and then ayatollahs, or experienced Shia scholars who have wide interpretative authority and are sought as a source of emulation. The term “ayatollah” is associated with the clerical rulers in Tehran, but it’s primarily a title for a distinguished religious leader known as a marja, or source of emulation. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was appointed by an elected body of Iranian clerics, while maraji (plural of marja) are elevated through the religious schools in Qom, Najaf, and Karbala. Shias can choose from dozens of maraji, most of whom are based in holy cities in Iraq and Iran. Many Shias emulate a marja for religious affairs and defer to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran for political guidance.

For Sunnis, authority is based on the Quran and the traditions of Mohammed. Sunni religious scholars, who are constrained by legal precedents, exert far less authority over their followers than their Shia counterparts.

Both sects have subdivisions. The divisions among Shias were discussed above. Four schools comprise Sunni jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali, the latter spawning the Wahhabi and Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia. Sunnism, a broad umbrella term for non-Shia Islam, is united on the importance of the Quran and practice of Mohammed but allows for differences in legal opinion

Terrorist violence in 2013 was fueled by sectarian motivations, marking a worrisome trend, in particular in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

U.S. Department of State

Flash Points

Sunni-Shia tensions contribute to multiple flash points in Muslim countries that are viewed as growing threats to international peace and security. The following arouse the most concern among regional specialists:

Rising Militancy

Notable concern about the role of sectarian violence increased in 2013. Extremists were “fueled by sectarian motivations” in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan, according to the U.S. State Department. After years of steady losses for al-Qaeda–linked groups, Sunni extremist recruitment is rising, aided by private funding networks in the Gulf, particularly in Kuwait, with much of the violence directed at other Muslims rather than Western targets. Shia militants are also gaining strength, in part to confront the threat of Sunni extremism, miring many Muslim communities in a vicious cycle of sectarian violence.

U.S. officials such as FBI director James B. Comey have warned that the war in Syria, which attracted thousands of fighters from Europe and the United States, poses a long-term threat to Western interests. The eventual outflow of these militants, battle-hardened and with Western passports, is viewed as a potential “terrorist diaspora” that could eclipse the global terror networks that emerged after the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Saudi-Iranian Rivalry

Saudi Arabia and Iran have deployed considerable resources to proxy battles, especially in Syria, where the stakes are highest. Riyadh closely monitors potential restlessness in its oil-rich eastern provinces, home to its Shia minority, and has deployed forces along with other Gulf countries to suppress a largely Shia uprising in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia is also providing hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support to the predominantly Sunni rebels in Syria, while simultaneously banning cash flows to al-Qaeda and extremist jihadi groups fighting the Assad regime.

Iran has allocated billions of dollars in aid and loans to prop up Syria’s Alawi-led government, and has trained and equipped Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan to fight with various sectarian militias in Syria. At the same time, the widening proxy battle may also be stirring concern among leaders in Riyadh and Tehran about the consequences of escalation. The two sides were reported to be in talks in May 2014 to establish a dialogue for settling disputes diplomatically.

Humanitarian Crisis

The ongoing civil war in Syria has displaced millions internally, and almost three million civilians, mostly Sunni, are now refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. The influx of more than a million Syrians into Lebanon, a state with a historically combustible religious mix that experienced its own fifteen-year civil war in the 1970s and 1980s, has burdened its cash-strapped government and pressured communities hosting refugees. Jordan and Iraq are still struggling to provide housing and services to an impoverished and traumatized population. Turkey has the greatest capacity to provide humanitarian aid, yet Ankara must increasingly balance “the public’s sympathy for and unease toward refugees,” the International Crisis Group reports.

Fractured States

Syria’s civil war, as well as Iraq’s sectarian conflict, is threatening to redraw the map of the Middle East bequeathed to the region by British and French colonial authorities. The Assad regime in Syria has consolidated control over the Mediterranean coast, the capital of Damascus, and the central city of Homs, which together comprise a rump state that connects with Hezbollah strongholds, threatening the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Other parts of the country are contested or controlled by various rebel and Islamist groups, including ISIS, which seeks to dominate the eastern regions of Syria that link to its territory in Iraq. And Kurdish groups in northern Syria, which, like their Iraqi cousins, have long campaigned for basic rights denied under the Ba'athist government, are on the verge of gaining de facto independence.

The United States spent more than one trillion dollars to stabilize Iraq, but the country remains in a precarious state. Sectarian tensions are mounting in Iraq as the newly ascendant Shia majority struggles to accommodate the Sunni minority and deal with the Kurdish Regional Government in the north of the country while confronting extremist Sunni groups. Most politicians and activists in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon reject attempts to redraw the map of the region, but the vanishing borders and emergence of new areas of influence based on sectarian and ethnic identities are a growing existential challenge.

Sunnis had no other option but to defend themselves and use arms. We reached a point of to be or not to be.

Tariq al-Hashimi, former vice president of Iraq

Experts

Geneive Abdo Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center
Deborah Amos Middle East Correspondent, National Public Radio
Reza Aslan Associate Professor, University of California, Riverside
F. Gregory Gause III Senior Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Bruce Hoffman Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
Ed Husain Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, CFR
Vali R. Nasr Dean, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Thursday, November 2, 2023