ISLAMIC MILITARY ALLIANCE : Pakistan In Hot Seat As General Takes Command Of Saudi-Led Alliance (R)

SOURCE:

http://www.eurasiareview.com/31032017-pakistan-in-hot-seat-as-general-takes-command-of-saudi-led-alliance-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

Pakistan In Hot Seat As General Takes Command Of Saudi-Led Alliance – Analysis

                                   By 

                    James M. Dorsey

Pakistan's Raheel Sharif. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Steven Schneider, Wikipedia Commons. 

March 31, 2017 

With no troops to command and a Riyadh-based skeleton staff, General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan’s recently retired top commander, appeared to slide into a cushy job as commander of a 41-nation, Saudi-led military alliance created to fight terrorism.

In fact, the general’s new job is everything but straightforward. He has taken on a task that is likely to require diplomatic tap dancing if he is to succeed in putting flesh on the alliance’s skeleton and ensure that his native Pakistan is not enmeshed in the bitter dispute between Saudi Arabia, one of Pakistan’s closest allies, and Iran, the South Asian state’s neighbour.

Complicating things for General Sharif is the fact that Pakistan is home to the world’s largest Shiite Muslim minority, who account for up to a quarter of its population. Pakistani critics warned that General Sharif’s appointment risked involving Pakistan not only in the Middle East’s seemingly intractable conflicts, but also in Sunni-Shiite Muslim sectarian strife. 

General Sharif’s appointment of what is officially the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism, dubbed the Muslim world’s NATO, promises to give the group credibility it needs: a non-Arab commander from one of the world’s most populous Muslim countries who commanded not only one of the Muslim world’s largest militaries, but also one that possesses nuclear weapons.

Yet, General Sharif’s problems start with the alliance’s name. The alliance, announced hastily by Saudi Arabia two years ago without prior consultations with all of its alleged members, has yet to adopt a common definition of what constitutes terrorism.

Members also have yet to reach agreement on what the alliance’s priorities are: Iran, viewed by Saudi Arabia as the foremost threat, or jihadist groups like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Many members, including Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia, are moreover weary of being roped into Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen that has allowed Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to emerge stronger than ever.

Pakistan’s parliament rejected in 2015 a Saudi request to contribute troops to the war in Yemen. More recently, on the eve of General Sharif’s appointment, Pakistan agreed to send 10,000 combat troops to the Saudi side of the kingdom’s border with Yemen.

Pakistan has sought to deflect criticism that it was ignoring parliament’s rejection by reaching out to Iran. General Raheel has reportedly told his Saudi counterparts that he would seek to involve Iran in the alliance. Similarly, General Sharif’s successor, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, appeared to be hedging his bets by declaring that “enhanced Pakistan-Iran military-to-military cooperation will have a positive impact on regional peace and stability.”

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir seemed to dispel any notion of cooperation, let alone reconciliation with Iran in a speech in February in which he charged that “Iran remains the biggest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Iran has as part of its constitution the principle of exporting the revolution. Iran does not believe in the principle of citizenship. It believes that the Shiite, the ‘dispossessed’, as Iran calls them, all belong to Iran and not to their countries of origin. And this is unacceptable for us in the kingdom, for our allies in the Gulf and for any country in the world.”

Mr. Al-Jubeir stipulated that “until and unless Iran changes its behaviour, and changes its outlook, and changes the principles upon which the Iranian state is based, it will be very difficult to deal with a country like this.”

However, it may, ironically, be the rise of President Donald J. Trump that will provide substance to Pakistani efforts to capitalize on the appointment of General Sharif and Pakistan’s dispatch of troops to bridge the gap between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has wholeheartedly endorsed Mr. Trump because of his tough stance towards Iran and wants to be seen to be responding to the president’s insistence that US allies shoulder more of the burden of their defence. Iran has long called for talks with Saudi Arabia.

Recent overtures by Kuwait to mediate between the two regional powers have raised hopes that an arrangement may be possible despite the kingdom’s tough stance. Kuwaiti foreign minister Sabah Khalid Al Sabah travelled to Tehran in January to discuss ways of initiating a dialogue between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Iranian president Hassan Rohani responded weeks later with a visit to Kuwait and Oman. Oman has long had close relations with Iran, mediated in various disputes involving the Islamic republic, and facilitated US-Iranian negotiations that resulted two years ago in the nuclear agreement with Iran and the lifting of international sanctions. Mr. Rohani also earlier this month sent a letter to Kuwaiti Emir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah regarding efforts to tone down animosity with Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and Iran recently reached agreement on the participation of Iranian pilgrims in the haj, the Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca. The two countries failed to agree last year, preventing Iranian Muslim from fulfilling what is a key religious obligation.

Mr. Al-Jubeir, moreover, made a surprise visit last month to Iraq, widely seen as a gesture towards Iran. Led by a predominantly Shiite Muslim government, Iraq is closely aligned with Iran. Iran supports the government in its fight against the Islamic State (IS) and sponsors powerful Shiite militias that fight alongside Iraqi troops. As a result, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq have long been strained.

Writing in Al-Monitor, former Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian suggested that a 1988 United Nations Security Council resolution could serve as a basis for a Saudi-Iranian arrangement. The resolution which in ended the Iran-Iraq war in which Saudi Arabia co-funded the Iraqi effort to roll back the Islamic revolution called for regional collective security arrangements. That may be a tall order with Iran unlikely to back off its support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah militia, or the Houthis in Yemen.

“For a new era to dawn in Iranian-GCC relations, the two sides have to be able to express their concerns to each other in a constructive way and translate dialogue into tangible diplomatic gains. They can look to Europe for examples on how to resolve historic rivalries and how the Peace of Westphalia or systems such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union came to be,” Mr. Mousavian said.

James M. Dorsey  0 Comment Foreign Policy, Iran, Middle East, Military, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/yemen-crisis-more-than-shia-sunni-battle/79116.html

Yemen Crisis: More than Shia-Sunni Battle  

                                          By

                                                              K C REDDY       

       

Yemen, which was once acknowledged as the Fortunate Arabia or Happy Arabia by ancient geographer Ptolemy, has now become a cauldron of insurgencies.

 

 

            

May 12 2015

The Conflict Zone

• 2011: Arab Spring protests spread to the streets of Yemen's capital Sana'a. President Saleh is badly injured in a rocket attack, suffering burns to 40 per cent of his body, and is flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Returns to Yemen, promising to hand over power to his deputy Adbrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

• 2014: Following the conclusion of the 10-month National Dialogue Conference, Hadi announces that Yemen will become a federation of six regions. Houthi rebels reject the plan. Tribesmen blow up Yemen's largest oil pipeline. Houthi rebels seize control of the capital Sana'a. The UN attempts to broker a political settlement.

• 2015: Houthis seize government installations and take power. The UN Security Council denounces the move. Hadi resigns, is arrested, then escapes from detention in Sana'a, fleeing to Aden. Islamic State carries out its first attacks in Yemen: two suicide bombings against Shia mosques. Houthi rebels advance south to Aden, prompting Mr Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia. A coalition of Arab states launches airstrikes against the Houthi, with US support.

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Supporters of Yemen''s Southern Separatist Movement man a tank flying the movement''s flag near the International airport in Aden, as battles against Shiite Houthi rebels continue. AFP

The airstrikes can only lead to a prolonged conflict. The international community will have to take diplomatic intiatives to resolve the crisis

FOR the last few weeks, Yemen has been hitting headlines in the global media for the wrong reasons. It has become a cauldron of insurgencies —by the Shias, people of south Yemen and finally the Islamic State. The Shia insurgency in North Yemen, popularly known as “the Houthis” is carried out by Zaydi Muslims (a sub sect of Shia) constituting 35-40 per cent of Yemen's Muslim population.

Oversimplifying the Issue
 

Attributing the present day Yemeni crisis as a mere Shia-Sunni power struggle amounts to oversimplification of the issue as Yemen is largely a tribal society and around 400 Zaidi tribes are operating mostly in the North Yemen area. Inter- tribal and intra-tribal tensions crop up in the control and distribution of economic resources and power-sharing arrangements as well. The internal struggle for power between long-competing factions remains at the core of the Yemeni crisis. Subsequent support by countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran etc. to the fighting factions either directly or indirectly  and emergence of terrorist outfits like Al Qaida and the Islamic State provide a unique and complicated dimension to the Yemeni crisis.


 

Root Causes 

 

A dispassionate scan of the historical and political developments of Yemen throws ample light on the root causes of the present-day crisis. Till 1990, two states existed in Yemen — one in the North and another in the South. The southern state of Yemen was formed in 1967 and the socialist state was officially known as the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen. After six years of civil war (1968) between Hamiaddin royalists supported by Saudi Arabia, Britain and Jordan on one side and the republicans backed by Egypt on the other side, the republicans came out victorious and formed the Yemini Arab Republic. However, the power struggle between the two states continued with the eruption of fresh fighting. Finally, with the Arab League brokered peace in 1990, both states reached an agreement on the joint governance of Yemen. Both Yemeni Arab Republic and Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen were merged and paved the way for the formation of the present-day Republic of Yemen and Ali Abdullah Saleh became the President.  In order to honour the power-sharing agreement, the Vice-President was taken from South Yemen. The fragile peace did not last long and lead to the 1994 civil war. In spite of Saudi Arabia actively backing South Yemen leaders, their armed forces were defeated and many Yemeni socialist leaders and other southern secessionist leaders fled into exile.

 Ali Abdullah Saleh became the first directly elected president of Yemen in 1999, winning 96.2 per cent of the vote.

 

North-South divide
 

A deep divide persisted between the Shia Muslim-dominated North Yemen and Sunni Muslim-influenced South Yemen. High poverty levels, an oppressive and corrupt government, a large number of weapons in private hands are some of the factors contributing to the present crisis. Sensing the chaotic situation, Al Qaida stepped in and conducted a number of attacks on Yemeni military convoys and mosques despite Ayaman al Zawahiri's guidelines advising against attacks on mosques. Not wanting to lag behind, the Islamic State in March this year, deployed four suicide bombers at two Houthi mosques in the capital Sanna, killing more than 100 worshippers .The Islamic State threatened to carry out more such attacks more in future.

 

 Yemeni Revolution

Earlier, in 2011, encouraged by the popular ouster of the Tunisian government, street protests started in Sanna. The protests were initially against unemployment, adverse economic conditions and governmental corruption. Additionally, the proposed amendment to the Yemini constitution sought to allow then President, Saleh, to remain in office for life. It was strongly believed that his son Ahmed Saleh was being groomed to eventually take over reins from his father. The Houthis participated in the Yemini revolution in 2011 along with other insurgent groups, socialists, Islamists, student bodies, anti-government tribes and opposition parties.
 

 

As a result of the peace brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the last part of 2011, Saleh handed over power to his deputy Abdu Rabbo Mansoor Hadi. In 2012 presidential elections, which were also boycotted by the Houthis as well as southern insurgents; Hadi got 99 per cent of the vote.
 

 

Another factor which contributed to the Houthis capturing power was the withdrawal of fuel subsidies in July 2014. It was estimated in 2013, the fuel subsidies in Yemen were $ 3 billion — roughly 20 per cent of the state expenditure .The Houthis capitalised on the frustration among diverse segments of the population over the Sunni-dominated government's decision to discontinue the fuel subsidies.

 

The Houthi insurgency started way back in 2004 when the government accused them of seeking to overthrow it. Houthi leaders denied the allegations by saying that they were only defending themselves from the government attacks. Since then, regular attacks and counter- attacks between government forces and militias backed by them on one side and the Houthis on the other continued, resulting in thousands of casualties .The Houthi insurgency reached its peak in February this year when they installed a Revolutionary committee to administer  the country and chased out the internationally recognised President Hadi. The President made an unsuccessful attempt to establish his authority in Aden (South Yemen), before being forced to flee to Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.
 

Saudi-led Airstrikes
 

With a view to destroy military bases and armed depots of the Houthis, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of GCC ( Gulf Cooperation Council) countries in air raids. The US, the UK, France, Turkey and Belgium supported Saudi Arabia's military action on Yemen while Iran, Russia and China opposed it. It is too early to say whether Saudi-led airstrikes will resolve the crisis or prolong and deepen it, particularly due to the historical reality that air power is not enough to win battles. Ground troops remain an indispensible factor to win a war in spite of air superior power. From all accounts, it appears the air strikes may even drag on. The aerial strikes by coalition forces may halt further advance by the Houthis but they are not adequate to dislodge them from their mountain homelands in North Yemen. The air campaigns elsewhere, like the one in Libya, resulted in a chaotic nation with very little hope of improvement in the near future. Similar is the case with coalition air strikes in the areas occupied by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria which did not resolve the crisis.
 

 

Another striking feature of Yemeni crisis is the conspicuous absence of United State's active role. For the last two decades, the US was playing an active and leading role in the Middle East but now the lead role remained is with Saudi Arabia.
 Is it due to a shift in the US policy in the Middle East?
 It is more likely the US has no economic interest in Yemen's energy resources, particularly after the discovery of shale gas deposits. Moreover it's interest in Yemen seems to be more on containing the expansion of Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula.
 

 

Initially, Pakistan's participation was contemplated in some quarters but the unanimous resolution passed by Pakistani Parliament killed such a possibility. Pakistan's stand might have been driven by two considerations — its security forces are overstretched in tackling its own insurgencies and with 20 per cent Shia population, it can ill afford to field ground forces for Yemeni conflict.
 

 

Pakistan's decision to stay away from Saudi led air strikes on Yemen and its likely impact on its relationship with other Gulf Coordination countries may alter the exiting geopolitical equations in the Middle East.
 

 

The current unstable security situation gave a serious blow to Yemen's ailing economy. In spite of having sufficient oil and natural gas resources, the crisis in Yemen has adversely impacted their exploration and transport. Being an oil-based economy, the chaotic security situation has contributed to significant levels of unemployment.
 

India's  Historical Ties
 

Unlike many Asian countries, India maintained a deep-rooted historical and trade relationship with Yemen leading to the migration of thousands of people of Yemen-origin to Hyderabad. Some reports indicated presence of 300,000 strong Yemeni-origin diaspora in India. Similarly, an estimated 100,000 people of Indian origin are concentrated in South Yemen and they enjoy a fair degree of cultural and religious freedom.
 

 

Besides regular people-to-people contacts between India and Yemen, prominent leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose also visited Aden (South Yemen) and Aden remains on the Hajj route for Indian pilgrims.
 

 

The intensified coalition air strikes may prolong the struggle and lead to a political vacuum in some parts of Yemen. This will lead to Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State attempting to realise their dream of establishing caliphates in those areas. Thereafter, the crisis may not remain a mere problem between two groups or two countries and it may assume a regional /global dimension. The international community needs to be aware of the potential threat and activate diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis before it is too late.
 

 

The Indian Connection
 

Unlike many Asian countries, India maintained a deep-rooted historical and trade relationship with Yemen, leading to the migration of thousands of people of Yemen-origin to Hyderabad. Some reports indicated the presence of 300,000-strong Yemeni--origin diaspora in India. Similarly, an estimated 100,000 Yemeni-origin people of Indian origin are concentrated in South Yemen.





 

 

The writer, a former IPS officer, is former UN Chief Security Adviser.


















 

Source:
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joint-arab-military-force-by-omar-ashour-2015-04

           What Good Is an Arab Military Alliance

                                     By

                             Omar Ashour 

APR 13, 2015

The framework nuclear agreement that Iran and the P-5 (China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States) plus Germany recently reached represents progress on one major security challenge in the Middle East. But, as some Arab countries move to establish a joint military force, another security question is emerging: Will such an alliance leave the region better or worse off, particularly given today’s growing Sunni-Shia divide?

 

 

A nine-country Saudi-led coalition, which includes Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan, is already carrying out airstrikes against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen – an effort that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently declared will end with the Saudis’ “noses [being] rubbed to the soil.” Yet Egypt’s president, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has indicated that the coalition’s mandate may be extended beyond Yemen.

But what is that Mandate?

 

A few objectives can be excluded from the start. For example, post-conflict democratization cannot be the goal, given that Arab regimes lack the credentials or knowhow to craft democracies, and their militaries are neither willing nor able to assist in the process. Similarly, humanitarian intervention can be ruled out, owing not only to most Arab regimes’ lack of experience and inglorious human-rights records, but also because none of the official statements related to the founding of the joint force have remotely suggested that upholding human rights was ever a concern.

 

Stabilization might be an objective, but only if the relevant governments can agree on shared threats and how to address them. They could, for example, take the classic “balance of power/terror” approach, by intervening to undermine the more powerful actor in a conflict, force it to the negotiating table, and dictate the terms of any compromise, thereby ensuring that they benefit from the newly created status quo.

 

But the rise of Arab military coalitions raises serious concerns, not least because the history of Arab-led military interventions – unlike those carried out by the West in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and even Libya – does not contain any promising precedent. Such interventions were usually aimed at empowering a proxy political force over its military and political rivals, instead of averting humanitarian disaster or institutionalizing a non-violent conflict-resolution mechanism following a war.

 

Egypt’s military intervention in Yemen in the 1960s is a case in point. By late 1965, Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser had sent 70,000 troops in Yemen to support a republican coup against royalist forces. Despite using prohibited chemical weapons against Yemeni guerillas from 1963 to 1967 – a first in an intra-Arab conflict

– Egypt failed to achieve its objectives.

 

On top of its military humiliation, Egypt’s international reputation suffered, with the United Nations General Assembly condemning the Egyptian forces’ use of banned chemical weapons against villages that supported the monarchy.
 The adventure also took a heavy economic toll; by 1965, Egypt had run up a foreign debt of nearly $3 billion, forcing it to add a “defense tax” to finance the Yemen war.

 

The Syria-dominated “Arab Deterrent Force” did not fare much better when it intervened in Lebanon’s civil war in the 1980s, failing either to end the brutal fighting or to secure vulnerable Palestinian refugees. After 1982, when the Lebanese government failed to extend the ADF’s mandate, it turned into a purely Syrian military force – one that ended up committing some of the worst atrocities against Palestinian factions and refugees in the so-called “War of the Camps” in 1985.

 

Brief and less complex interventions were also unsuccessful in ending violent crises – and in some cases even exacerbated them. A clear example is the recent Egyptian airstrikes in Libya, which have not only undermined the UN-led peace process in a deeply divided country, but have also empowered the most extreme elements.

 

Of course, history is not a definitive guide to the future; an Arab-led intervention today could turn out very differently. But there is little to indicate that it will; indeed, despite hundreds of Saudi airstrikes on Houthi-controlled military bases and seaports, the rebels continue to advance. If emerging Arab military coalitions are to avoid the mistakes of past interventions, their members must reconsider their approach, including the structural deficiencies that contributed to past failures.

 

Many factors affect the outcome of a military intervention in a civil war, especially if it involves a ground offensive. In particular, Arab leaders should focus on revising the processes by which national-security policy is formulated, improving civil-military relations, providing the relevant training in peacekeeping and peace-building, reforming the political culture, and addressing socio-psychological complexes.

 

If Arab leaders fail to overcome these deficiencies, the latest Arab force could become the Middle East’s newest source of anti-democratic, sectarian-based instability, potentially intensifying the Sunni-Shia conflict. That is the last thing the region needs
 

Omar Ashour

, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies and Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter and an associate fellow at Chatham House, is the author of The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements and Collusion to Collision: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt

 

Source:
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/04/10/yemen-at-war-the-new-shia-sunni-frontline-that-never-was/

Analysis · Middle East

Yemen at War: The New Shia-Sunni Frontline                         That Never Was

                                  By

                  Catherine Shakdam      

 

April 10, 2015

 

This war in Yemen is not a religious one, but world powers are doing a really good job at turning it into one.
 

(Image: Google Maps)

In utter and complete violation of international law, Saudi Arabia, the world’s most violent and repressive theocracy, declared war on its southern neighbor Yemen, on March 25, 2015, calling on a broad military coalition to lend its support.

Behind Saudi Arabia stands

Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Sudan, the UAE, the U.S., the EU, and Pakistan.

As unsuspecting Yemenis slept in their homes, Saudi Arabia and Co. unleashed a deluge of bombs onto the capital, Sana’a, caring little for the millions of civilians below, intent on crushing their designated enemy, the Houthis.

The new object of the kingdom’s disaffection, the Houthis are a Yemeni rebel group hailing from northern Sa’ada organized under the leadership of Abdel-Malek Al Houthi and have been actively depicted in western and pro-KSA media as the source of all evil, a Shia rebel faction in collusion with Iran, the new enemy to hate and, above all, the new target to destroy.

And while such a narrative could be easily construed as politically charged, the mere manifestation of Saudi Arabia’s paranoiac fear that  Iran might one day ambition to dissolve its mighty Arabian empire, labelling the Houthis as Shia and inferring they represent Yemen’s entire Shia community has only served to fuel negative sectarian sentiment while stripping all Shia in Yemen from their inalienable national civil rights.

The equation has been as follows: Houthis are Shia and therefore all Shia in Yemen are Houthis. Since all Houthis are in alliance with Iran and therefore inherently bad, all Shia in Yemen should be treated with suspicion and eventually neutralized.

While this rhetoric serves the kingdom’s reactionary religious stance, appealing to its radical religious leadership, it has put Yemen and of course all Yemenis in the crossfire of a dangerous debate: freedom of religion. More importantly such a reduction of Yemen’s political, social, and religious makeup is as bias as it is profoundly erroneous.

In the words of famous Irish politician, David Trimble,

 “The dark shadow we seem to see in the distance is not really a mountain ahead, but the shadow of the mountain behind—a shadow from the past thrown forward into our future. It is a dark sludge of historical sectarianism. We can leave it behind us if we wish.”

So what happened in Yemen that the world has felt compelled to revert to religious labeling and shaming in order to advance its political agenda on the ground?

The first element here that needs to be understood is that Saudi Arabia, the main instigator of violence and promoter of hate, is itself defined within the parameters of religious radicalism— in essence, reactionary Sunni Wahhabis are prone to reject anything that does not fall in line with their understanding of the divine. This trait has been amply demonstrated by Riyadh in its brutal and often bloody repression campaign against Shia rights activists in the eastern province of  Qatif.

The arrest and subsequent sentencing to death of Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr stands as testimony to Saudi Arabia’s intolerance towards whoever or whatever is perceived to represent a threat to its authority—religious, political or otherwise.

But back to Yemen….

A Lesson in Religion: What is Zaidism?

To better understand what is at play and truly grasp the tragedy that is unfolding in this once joyous nation of southern Arabia, one needs to go back to the social-religious makeup of Yemen.

Yemen is a Muslim nation. And though Islam acts as the axis upon which the constitution has been weaved, it is important to understand that unlike its northern neighbor Saudi Arabia,

Yemen is at heart a tolerant and religiously inclusive country.

Now, Yemen’s Muslim population can be broken down into two main religious groups: the Sunnis to the south and the Zaidis to the north.

Zaidism, the oldest branch of Shia Islam, carries very little difference to Sunnism—at least not in the sense many might think. Just as Sunni Islam is not Saudi Arabia, Zaidism is not Shia Iran.

Now, about 40 percent of Yemen’s total population is Zaidi. Yemen’s Zaidi tradition dates back to eighth century AD, when the Ummah (Muslim community) was experiencing its first great schism.

Inspired by Imam Hussein’s grandson, Zayd, Zaidis are also known as Fivers and are different in their philosophy from the Twelvers—mainstream Shia Islam.

With a religious tradition stretching back across the centuries, Yemeni Zaidis are hardly an oddity or even a new religious phenomenon as some media have attempted to portray them to be. If the world suddenly woke up to Yemen’s Zaidi character, it is mainly because the religious suddenly appeared as a potent political catalyst, a weapon of opportunity.

Came along the Houthis…. As it happens, the Houthis, a tribal faction from northern Sa’ada organized politically under the denomination, Ansarallah, are Zaidi Muslims. And while they never hid this factor from their identity, their affiliation to Zaidi Islam has been of no consequence when it comes to their political demands.

Like any other political groups in Yemen, the Houthis have defined themselves through their demands, not their faith, as the Saudis and the world would do for them!

While all Houthi tribesmen—not to be confused with the group’s political arm, Ansarallah, since the faction now includes within its ranks Sunnis—are Zaidis, not all Zaidis are Houthis. The Houthis are merely a tribal group within Yemen; they do not speak or represent the whole of Yemen’s Zaidi community. And while the Houthis carry immense weight within Ansarallah, not all Ansarallah members are Houthis. Many of Ansarallah leaders—Ali Al Amad, for example—do not belong to the Houthi tribe.

It is this confusion that has fed the wave of abuses that has befallen Yemen Zaidis and to a greater extent Yemen’s broad Shia community.

As noted by Hawra Zakery, a rights activist with Shia Rights Watch, “Considering the increasing anti-Shia movements in Middle East, it is critical that politicians and media outlets differentiate between militant groups and majority of Shia populations in order to present this minority in a more realistic picture.”

She added, “The Houthis themselves say to aim to speak for the Yemeni people and represent the Yemeni people’s aspirations, beyond religious dogma and such differentiation is critical.”

The Shia Boogeyman

Shia Islam stands now the boogeyman, the twisted religious ideology that everyone is so very scared of. Thing is, no one really knows why. And therein lies an interesting question indeed.

Why is it, for example, that the Houthis continue to be labelled as this “Shia rebel group” when other groups do not enjoy the same flurry of adjectives?  Not even Al Qaida. Why not describe Al Qaida as this Sunni radical/Wahhabi terror group? Or would that be upsetting for Saudi Arabia? Would that automatically entails painting off all Wahhabis and Sunnis for that matter, under the terror brush?

Actually yes it would! And of course that would be unfair, prejudice and above all self-defeating.

Playing religion to fuel negative sentiments and somewhat rationalize violence will only lead to more senseless violence and bloodshed.

And while the world remains at war with Yemen, Shia Rights Watch has rung the alarm, calling on world powers to honor their commitments to international law and human rights and change the pervasive narrative which is tearing Yemen apart from the inside out.

“Freedom of religion is an alienable right. Yemen’s Shia community should not be turned into a political target so that to fit foreign powers’ agenda. People should not have to feel threatened in their religious identity and be turned into easy targets of hate, shun by society as they are members of a minority,” said SRW in a statement.

SRW actually argues that groups such as Al Qaida and ISIS have benefited from the rise of anti-Shia sentiments, both in Yemen and the broader region, as reducing the debate to a framework of Sunni versus Shia fits directly into its politico-religious narrative. The rights groups have not been alone in this assessment.

Marwa Osman, a political analyst and commentator with RT stressed earlier this April that Saudi Arabia’s anti-Shia campaign will carry heavy repercussions throughout the Middle East.

(Image: Shia Rights Watch)

“The violence in Yemen began this month on March fourth when a car bomb exploded outside a stadium in Beitha,”  wrote SRW in its March report, “which resulted in the death of 10 Shias and the wounding of 50 more. This was only the beginning of the casualties as 167 Shias were murdered, and 400 were injured. 143 of the deaths and 350 of the injuries took place on March 20^th when the Islamic State terrorists performed four mosque bombings. This is the first month this year that Yemen has had reported anti-Shia incidents, but the invasion by neighboring Gulf States may bring more casualties. The Arab coalition forces have already begun racking up the civilian casualties, which include a refugee camp, and the invasion cannot end well.”

 

 

More troubling yet, Yemeni Zaidis have been turned away from hospitals in the capital, refused care by doctors on account of their Zaidism over the past few months—yet another manifestation of this new rising hatred politicians and media have fueled and fed.

Hossam Al Hamdi, an administrator at one of Sana’a hospitals said he personally witnessed two incidents when Zaidi  patients were told to leave the premises and seek treatment elsewhere. “There’s been a great deal of tensions within the communities as a lot of people have transferred their political antipathy of the Houthis onto all Yemeni Zaidis … This is really a worrying development as Yemen has never experienced such problems before.”

While Yemen suffered many woes over the years, decades and centuries, sectarianism was never part of the equation. Are we to believe that Yemen Zaidi community, which community has been around since the eighth century suddenly became a potent threat to national security? Or is it that politicians would much rather exploit religion to rationalize very worldly ambitions: money and power.

This war in Yemen is not a religious one, but world powers are doing a really good job at turning it into one.

Let us all remember why Saudi Arabia sent the heavy cavalry in Yemen: oil and control over the world oil route.

Related

Catherine Shakdam

Catherine Shakdam is a political analyst for the Middle East with a special focus on Yemen and radical movements. The Associate Director of the Beirut Center for Middle Eastern Studies, she has contributed her analyses to the Middle East Monitor, Foreign Policy Association, Your Middle East, IslamistGate, Majalla, ABNA, Open Democracy, International Policy Digest, Eurasia Review and many more. A regular commentator on NewsMax and Etijah TV she has also worked as a contributing analyst for Wikistrat and helped oversee several rights campaign in both Yemen and Bahrain. 

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