Source:
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joint-arab-military-force-by-omar-ashour-2015-04

           What Good Is an Arab Military Alliance

                                     By

                             Omar Ashour 

APR 13, 2015

The framework nuclear agreement that Iran and the P-5 (China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States) plus Germany recently reached represents progress on one major security challenge in the Middle East. But, as some Arab countries move to establish a joint military force, another security question is emerging: Will such an alliance leave the region better or worse off, particularly given today’s growing Sunni-Shia divide?

 

 

A nine-country Saudi-led coalition, which includes Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan, is already carrying out airstrikes against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen – an effort that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently declared will end with the Saudis’ “noses [being] rubbed to the soil.” Yet Egypt’s president, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has indicated that the coalition’s mandate may be extended beyond Yemen.

But what is that Mandate?

 

A few objectives can be excluded from the start. For example, post-conflict democratization cannot be the goal, given that Arab regimes lack the credentials or knowhow to craft democracies, and their militaries are neither willing nor able to assist in the process. Similarly, humanitarian intervention can be ruled out, owing not only to most Arab regimes’ lack of experience and inglorious human-rights records, but also because none of the official statements related to the founding of the joint force have remotely suggested that upholding human rights was ever a concern.

 

Stabilization might be an objective, but only if the relevant governments can agree on shared threats and how to address them. They could, for example, take the classic “balance of power/terror” approach, by intervening to undermine the more powerful actor in a conflict, force it to the negotiating table, and dictate the terms of any compromise, thereby ensuring that they benefit from the newly created status quo.

 

But the rise of Arab military coalitions raises serious concerns, not least because the history of Arab-led military interventions – unlike those carried out by the West in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and even Libya – does not contain any promising precedent. Such interventions were usually aimed at empowering a proxy political force over its military and political rivals, instead of averting humanitarian disaster or institutionalizing a non-violent conflict-resolution mechanism following a war.

 

Egypt’s military intervention in Yemen in the 1960s is a case in point. By late 1965, Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser had sent 70,000 troops in Yemen to support a republican coup against royalist forces. Despite using prohibited chemical weapons against Yemeni guerillas from 1963 to 1967 – a first in an intra-Arab conflict

– Egypt failed to achieve its objectives.

 

On top of its military humiliation, Egypt’s international reputation suffered, with the United Nations General Assembly condemning the Egyptian forces’ use of banned chemical weapons against villages that supported the monarchy.
 The adventure also took a heavy economic toll; by 1965, Egypt had run up a foreign debt of nearly $3 billion, forcing it to add a “defense tax” to finance the Yemen war.

 

The Syria-dominated “Arab Deterrent Force” did not fare much better when it intervened in Lebanon’s civil war in the 1980s, failing either to end the brutal fighting or to secure vulnerable Palestinian refugees. After 1982, when the Lebanese government failed to extend the ADF’s mandate, it turned into a purely Syrian military force – one that ended up committing some of the worst atrocities against Palestinian factions and refugees in the so-called “War of the Camps” in 1985.

 

Brief and less complex interventions were also unsuccessful in ending violent crises – and in some cases even exacerbated them. A clear example is the recent Egyptian airstrikes in Libya, which have not only undermined the UN-led peace process in a deeply divided country, but have also empowered the most extreme elements.

 

Of course, history is not a definitive guide to the future; an Arab-led intervention today could turn out very differently. But there is little to indicate that it will; indeed, despite hundreds of Saudi airstrikes on Houthi-controlled military bases and seaports, the rebels continue to advance. If emerging Arab military coalitions are to avoid the mistakes of past interventions, their members must reconsider their approach, including the structural deficiencies that contributed to past failures.

 

Many factors affect the outcome of a military intervention in a civil war, especially if it involves a ground offensive. In particular, Arab leaders should focus on revising the processes by which national-security policy is formulated, improving civil-military relations, providing the relevant training in peacekeeping and peace-building, reforming the political culture, and addressing socio-psychological complexes.

 

If Arab leaders fail to overcome these deficiencies, the latest Arab force could become the Middle East’s newest source of anti-democratic, sectarian-based instability, potentially intensifying the Sunni-Shia conflict. That is the last thing the region needs
 

Omar Ashour

, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies and Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter and an associate fellow at Chatham House, is the author of The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements and Collusion to Collision: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt

 

Source:
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/04/10/yemen-at-war-the-new-shia-sunni-frontline-that-never-was/

Analysis · Middle East

Yemen at War: The New Shia-Sunni Frontline                         That Never Was

                                  By

                  Catherine Shakdam      

 

April 10, 2015

 

This war in Yemen is not a religious one, but world powers are doing a really good job at turning it into one.
 

(Image: Google Maps)

In utter and complete violation of international law, Saudi Arabia, the world’s most violent and repressive theocracy, declared war on its southern neighbor Yemen, on March 25, 2015, calling on a broad military coalition to lend its support.

Behind Saudi Arabia stands

Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Sudan, the UAE, the U.S., the EU, and Pakistan.

As unsuspecting Yemenis slept in their homes, Saudi Arabia and Co. unleashed a deluge of bombs onto the capital, Sana’a, caring little for the millions of civilians below, intent on crushing their designated enemy, the Houthis.

The new object of the kingdom’s disaffection, the Houthis are a Yemeni rebel group hailing from northern Sa’ada organized under the leadership of Abdel-Malek Al Houthi and have been actively depicted in western and pro-KSA media as the source of all evil, a Shia rebel faction in collusion with Iran, the new enemy to hate and, above all, the new target to destroy.

And while such a narrative could be easily construed as politically charged, the mere manifestation of Saudi Arabia’s paranoiac fear that  Iran might one day ambition to dissolve its mighty Arabian empire, labelling the Houthis as Shia and inferring they represent Yemen’s entire Shia community has only served to fuel negative sectarian sentiment while stripping all Shia in Yemen from their inalienable national civil rights.

The equation has been as follows: Houthis are Shia and therefore all Shia in Yemen are Houthis. Since all Houthis are in alliance with Iran and therefore inherently bad, all Shia in Yemen should be treated with suspicion and eventually neutralized.

While this rhetoric serves the kingdom’s reactionary religious stance, appealing to its radical religious leadership, it has put Yemen and of course all Yemenis in the crossfire of a dangerous debate: freedom of religion. More importantly such a reduction of Yemen’s political, social, and religious makeup is as bias as it is profoundly erroneous.

In the words of famous Irish politician, David Trimble,

 “The dark shadow we seem to see in the distance is not really a mountain ahead, but the shadow of the mountain behind—a shadow from the past thrown forward into our future. It is a dark sludge of historical sectarianism. We can leave it behind us if we wish.”

So what happened in Yemen that the world has felt compelled to revert to religious labeling and shaming in order to advance its political agenda on the ground?

The first element here that needs to be understood is that Saudi Arabia, the main instigator of violence and promoter of hate, is itself defined within the parameters of religious radicalism— in essence, reactionary Sunni Wahhabis are prone to reject anything that does not fall in line with their understanding of the divine. This trait has been amply demonstrated by Riyadh in its brutal and often bloody repression campaign against Shia rights activists in the eastern province of  Qatif.

The arrest and subsequent sentencing to death of Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr stands as testimony to Saudi Arabia’s intolerance towards whoever or whatever is perceived to represent a threat to its authority—religious, political or otherwise.

But back to Yemen….

A Lesson in Religion: What is Zaidism?

To better understand what is at play and truly grasp the tragedy that is unfolding in this once joyous nation of southern Arabia, one needs to go back to the social-religious makeup of Yemen.

Yemen is a Muslim nation. And though Islam acts as the axis upon which the constitution has been weaved, it is important to understand that unlike its northern neighbor Saudi Arabia,

Yemen is at heart a tolerant and religiously inclusive country.

Now, Yemen’s Muslim population can be broken down into two main religious groups: the Sunnis to the south and the Zaidis to the north.

Zaidism, the oldest branch of Shia Islam, carries very little difference to Sunnism—at least not in the sense many might think. Just as Sunni Islam is not Saudi Arabia, Zaidism is not Shia Iran.

Now, about 40 percent of Yemen’s total population is Zaidi. Yemen’s Zaidi tradition dates back to eighth century AD, when the Ummah (Muslim community) was experiencing its first great schism.

Inspired by Imam Hussein’s grandson, Zayd, Zaidis are also known as Fivers and are different in their philosophy from the Twelvers—mainstream Shia Islam.

With a religious tradition stretching back across the centuries, Yemeni Zaidis are hardly an oddity or even a new religious phenomenon as some media have attempted to portray them to be. If the world suddenly woke up to Yemen’s Zaidi character, it is mainly because the religious suddenly appeared as a potent political catalyst, a weapon of opportunity.

Came along the Houthis…. As it happens, the Houthis, a tribal faction from northern Sa’ada organized politically under the denomination, Ansarallah, are Zaidi Muslims. And while they never hid this factor from their identity, their affiliation to Zaidi Islam has been of no consequence when it comes to their political demands.

Like any other political groups in Yemen, the Houthis have defined themselves through their demands, not their faith, as the Saudis and the world would do for them!

While all Houthi tribesmen—not to be confused with the group’s political arm, Ansarallah, since the faction now includes within its ranks Sunnis—are Zaidis, not all Zaidis are Houthis. The Houthis are merely a tribal group within Yemen; they do not speak or represent the whole of Yemen’s Zaidi community. And while the Houthis carry immense weight within Ansarallah, not all Ansarallah members are Houthis. Many of Ansarallah leaders—Ali Al Amad, for example—do not belong to the Houthi tribe.

It is this confusion that has fed the wave of abuses that has befallen Yemen Zaidis and to a greater extent Yemen’s broad Shia community.

As noted by Hawra Zakery, a rights activist with Shia Rights Watch, “Considering the increasing anti-Shia movements in Middle East, it is critical that politicians and media outlets differentiate between militant groups and majority of Shia populations in order to present this minority in a more realistic picture.”

She added, “The Houthis themselves say to aim to speak for the Yemeni people and represent the Yemeni people’s aspirations, beyond religious dogma and such differentiation is critical.”

The Shia Boogeyman

Shia Islam stands now the boogeyman, the twisted religious ideology that everyone is so very scared of. Thing is, no one really knows why. And therein lies an interesting question indeed.

Why is it, for example, that the Houthis continue to be labelled as this “Shia rebel group” when other groups do not enjoy the same flurry of adjectives?  Not even Al Qaida. Why not describe Al Qaida as this Sunni radical/Wahhabi terror group? Or would that be upsetting for Saudi Arabia? Would that automatically entails painting off all Wahhabis and Sunnis for that matter, under the terror brush?

Actually yes it would! And of course that would be unfair, prejudice and above all self-defeating.

Playing religion to fuel negative sentiments and somewhat rationalize violence will only lead to more senseless violence and bloodshed.

And while the world remains at war with Yemen, Shia Rights Watch has rung the alarm, calling on world powers to honor their commitments to international law and human rights and change the pervasive narrative which is tearing Yemen apart from the inside out.

“Freedom of religion is an alienable right. Yemen’s Shia community should not be turned into a political target so that to fit foreign powers’ agenda. People should not have to feel threatened in their religious identity and be turned into easy targets of hate, shun by society as they are members of a minority,” said SRW in a statement.

SRW actually argues that groups such as Al Qaida and ISIS have benefited from the rise of anti-Shia sentiments, both in Yemen and the broader region, as reducing the debate to a framework of Sunni versus Shia fits directly into its politico-religious narrative. The rights groups have not been alone in this assessment.

Marwa Osman, a political analyst and commentator with RT stressed earlier this April that Saudi Arabia’s anti-Shia campaign will carry heavy repercussions throughout the Middle East.

(Image: Shia Rights Watch)

“The violence in Yemen began this month on March fourth when a car bomb exploded outside a stadium in Beitha,”  wrote SRW in its March report, “which resulted in the death of 10 Shias and the wounding of 50 more. This was only the beginning of the casualties as 167 Shias were murdered, and 400 were injured. 143 of the deaths and 350 of the injuries took place on March 20^th when the Islamic State terrorists performed four mosque bombings. This is the first month this year that Yemen has had reported anti-Shia incidents, but the invasion by neighboring Gulf States may bring more casualties. The Arab coalition forces have already begun racking up the civilian casualties, which include a refugee camp, and the invasion cannot end well.”

 

 

More troubling yet, Yemeni Zaidis have been turned away from hospitals in the capital, refused care by doctors on account of their Zaidism over the past few months—yet another manifestation of this new rising hatred politicians and media have fueled and fed.

Hossam Al Hamdi, an administrator at one of Sana’a hospitals said he personally witnessed two incidents when Zaidi  patients were told to leave the premises and seek treatment elsewhere. “There’s been a great deal of tensions within the communities as a lot of people have transferred their political antipathy of the Houthis onto all Yemeni Zaidis … This is really a worrying development as Yemen has never experienced such problems before.”

While Yemen suffered many woes over the years, decades and centuries, sectarianism was never part of the equation. Are we to believe that Yemen Zaidi community, which community has been around since the eighth century suddenly became a potent threat to national security? Or is it that politicians would much rather exploit religion to rationalize very worldly ambitions: money and power.

This war in Yemen is not a religious one, but world powers are doing a really good job at turning it into one.

Let us all remember why Saudi Arabia sent the heavy cavalry in Yemen: oil and control over the world oil route.

Related

Catherine Shakdam

Catherine Shakdam is a political analyst for the Middle East with a special focus on Yemen and radical movements. The Associate Director of the Beirut Center for Middle Eastern Studies, she has contributed her analyses to the Middle East Monitor, Foreign Policy Association, Your Middle East, IslamistGate, Majalla, ABNA, Open Democracy, International Policy Digest, Eurasia Review and many more. A regular commentator on NewsMax and Etijah TV she has also worked as a contributing analyst for Wikistrat and helped oversee several rights campaign in both Yemen and Bahrain. 

More articles by this author »

Chinese Show of Naval Force: Chinese Navy Rescues Foreigners from Yemen's Aden

Source:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2015/china-150403-sputnik01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1384%2eka0ao00b2h%2e19rb

Chinese Show of Naval Force: Chinese Navy

Rescues Foreigners from Yemen's Aden

Sputnik News

In-Depth Coverage

 

03 Apr 2015

In an unprecedented move, the Chinese military sent a warship to Yemen to evacuate 225 foreign nationals from the conflict-ridden country.


The operation marks the first time the Chinese military has helped other countries evacuate their citizens from a war zone. A statement released by the China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said evacuees were picked up from Aden, Yemen's second city, and transported across the Red Sea to Djibouti, from where they can take flights home. The naval frigate was redirected there from the coast of Somalia, where it had carried out anti-piracy patrols.

The evacuees consisted of nationals from 10 different countries, the majority of whom were Pakistanis, at 176. Chinese State television showed the foreign nationals aboard the naval frigate arrive to Djibouti, with footage showing children stepping off the warship and waving Chinese flags.


Speaking to the Associated Press, foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said 'the Chinese government has taken special action to help with the evacuation of foreign citizens.'

According to the foreign ministry's statement, the operation came after the governments of Pakistan, Ethiopia, Singapore, Italy, Germany, Poland, Ireland, the UK, Canada, and Yemen requested China's help.

China has used its warships once in the past for a similar operation, when in 2011 it evacuated 30,000 people from a war-ravaged Libya. However, at the time, China had only evacuated its own citizens from the conflict zone.

The recent operation is illustrative of the ongoing transition in China's role in the international community, whereby the once-reclusive country is becoming increasingly active in humanitarian aid and relief abroad.

The country drew international praise last year after it sent troops to Liberia to help build a treatment center and transport medical supplies in response to the Ebola outbreak. In 2013, Beijing also sent a hospital ship to the Philippines in the aftermath of the Typhoon Haiyan.

'China has been keen to learn from the experience of other countries on how to evacuate people, especially after Libya,' A senior Western diplomat in Beijing said to Reuters. 'It's good to see China taking more of an interest in this.'

Yemen has become the site of intense conflict since last September, when Iran-back Shiite Houthi fighters seizes the capital city of Sanaa from Saudi and American-backed President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. A Saudi led bombing campaign against Houthi forces has plunged the country into more violence, as UN reports estimate that over 500 people have been killed in the past two weeks and more than 1,700 injured.

People's Liberation Army Navy Navy - Introduction Navy - Ships Navy - Modernization Navy - History Navy - Doctrine Navy - Organization Navy - Personnel Navy - Foreign Policy Navy - Facilities Navy - Glossary

Bernhard Zand wrote in Der Spiegel September 10, 2012: "One country that could give China good advice, a country whose historians are well versed in naval policies and in arms races on the high seas, is Germany. A century ago, Berlin stood where Beijing is now, as an emerging economic power that was admired, envied and feared. At the time, Germany wanted a navy that would broadcast its self-confidence to the world, one that could rival the world’s greatest naval force of the era, the British Navy. That plan almost succeeded. But it didn’t end well."

BRANCHES
Surface Forces			Submarine Force			Naval Air Force
Coastal Defense Force			Marine Corps
Commander, PLAN
North Sea Fleet			East Sea Fleet			South Sea Fleet
	Submarine, NSF			Submarine, ESF			Submarine, SSF
		Conventional Sub Flotilla			Conventional Sub Flotilla			Conventional Sub Flotilla
								1st Nuclear Sub Flotilla
	Surface Force, NSF			Surface Force, ESF			Surface Force, SSF
		Destroyer Flotilla			Destroyer Flotilla			Destroyer Flotilla
		Speedboat Flotilla			Speedboat Flotilla			Speedboat Flotilla
		Suport Vessel Flotilla			Suport Vessel Flotilla			Suport Vessel Flotilla
					Landing Ship Flotilla			Landing Ship Flotilla
								Sub Chaser / Frigate Flotilla
	Naval AF, NSF			Naval AF, ESF			Naval AF, SSF
		U/I Fighter DIV			4th Fighter DIV			8th Fighter DIV
		U/I Fighter/Bomber DIV			6th Fighter DIV			9th Fighter DIV
		U/I Bomber DIV			Radar Brigade			Radar Brigade
		Radar Brigade
		AAA Regiment
	Coastal Defense Force, NSF			Coastal Defense Force, ESF			Coastal Defense Force, SSF
		Shore-to-Ship Missile RGT			Shore-to-Ship Missile BN			Shore-to-Ship Missile BN
					AAA Regiment			AAA Regiment
					Shore-Ship Missile and AAA RGT
							Marine Corps, SSF
								1st Marine BDE
								164th Marine BDE

 

YEMEN - Eye on Sana’a

SOURCE:
http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/eye-on-sana%e2%80%99a/ar-AAamzZN






                                                 YEMEN - Eye on Sana’a

Saudi Arabia has got together with its inner circle of states in the Arab League to set things right in neighbouring Yemen, where a civil war is raging between a deposed president backed by Saudi Arabia and another president who was earlier deposed by it. Yemen’s own president has already run off to Riyadh. But there is a catch here.

 

The rebels include the Houthi tribe. They are called Shia but are actually Zaidi, which means they do not recognise the Twelve Imams of Iran because Imam Zaid was the son of the fourth Imam, which is where they end their confession. Iran is supporting the Houthis, backed by a split Sunni army in Yemen, which is also home to two other anti-Saudi killer outfits: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. This means the Saudis are being squeezed in the south by more or less the same forces squeezing them from the north in Iraq.

 

Put Saudi Arabia together with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which it is a member, and you have a clutch of very rich market states that can afford to spend on the Yemen invasion. They are target-killing the Houthis in Sana’a, Aden and elsewhere, without any “boots on the ground”. The big army of Egypt is on board, but the “biggest Muslim army of Pakistan” is not yet taking part.

 

 In Pakistan, no one supports participation in the invasion, forcing Islamabad to say Pakistan will go in if Saudi Arabia is invaded.

 

 

 

It is a tough decision not to go in and bomb the Iran-supported Houthis. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who is ruling Pakistan, was plucked out of prison in Karachi in 2000 —  where he was to serve a life sentence for having tried to kill his army chief, General Pervez Musharraf —  and given a comfortable life-in-exile in Saudi Arabia. Even earlier, when Nawaz faced sanctions for having tested a nuclear device in 1998, the kingdom had given him free oil for three years at the rate of $12 billion annually, which comes to a lot of money. In exile, Nawaz was able to restart his business in Saudi Arabia.

 

 

Saudi Arabia didn’t like socialist PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who took Pakistan leftward. But it took to General Zia-ul-Haq, who hanged Bhutto and then Islamised Pakistan with a lot of Saudi money. Bhutto had built up Libya’s then President Muammar Gaddafi in opposition to the Saudi king during an Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974, thus taking sides in a polarised Arab world. The kingdom, thereafter, never really took to Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party and fawned on the right-wing Muslim League supported by the Pakistan army.

 

 

Zia rolled back Bhutto’s leftist legacy with hard Islam. Lucky for him, he had America and Saudi Arabia fighting on the same side in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. That meant Iran had to be ignored. The Soviet invasion had coincided with the Islamic Revolution led by the anti-US Imam Khomeini, who had mauled the US embassy in Tehran and started destabilising the small states across the Gulf in 1979. Zia was strapped for cash after the Bhutto interregnum of bad economics. He just couldn’t be neutral.

 

 

In the 1990s, the Muslim League (Nawaz) and the PPP (Benazir) alternated in power, with the army calling the shots, cutting short their tenures and expanding into Afghanistan with American and Saudi money. In 1996, Pakistan put in place the dreaded Taliban government and recognised it. The world stood aside, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE went along with Pakistan. In 1998, the Taliban killed Iranian “diplomats” in Mazar-e-Sharif and invited Tehran’s wrath. Pakistan, thereafter, became the arena of “relocated” sectarian mayhem that has, today, forced the country into a popular stance of neutrality as the Arabs and Iranians take each other on.

 

 

MUST READ: Nearly 400 Indians to be evacuated from Yemen in second phase

 

 

By the time Musharraf was ousted in 2008, he had already upset the Saudis because of the way he had treated Nawaz. The PPP alternative was never to the kingdom’s liking. When the party came to power after Musharraf, it favoured the Iranian pipeline project because America had imposed sanctions on a “nuclearising” Iran and India had ducked out of it earlier. At the fag end of the PPP rule in 2013, its leader, Asif Ali Zardari, went to Tehran as president and signed an impossible deal with his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — Pakistan would build its side of the $7.6 billion pipeline or pay $200 million a month if it failed to buy Iranian gas by December 2014.

 

In 2013, Nawaz returned to power, but wisely didn’t say how hopeless the pipeline project was under the sanctions. Tehran wooed him by proposing to lend him money for his part of the project. It then waived the post-December 2014 fine. But nothing moved. What moved was new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s palm-bearing diplomacy and the newfound “heroic flexibility” of Ayatollah Khamenei, who produced the clinching fatwa that Islam forbade nuclear weapons. Washington and Europe (P5+1) bit the bait and put Saudi Arabia — and Israel — off, landing Pakistan in an awkward locus of two very hard places.

 

 

Pakistan was unstable and broke. Iran has the rial but not much of it, and under sanctions, that too is scarce. Saudi Arabia has the riyal too, but its supply is abundant.

 

The kingdom played its cards better than Iran. Proud Iranians had backed a restless Ahmadinejad, who needled the region with dubious adventure and saw his oil — which he didn’t refine —  come under sanctions. The kingdom, pragmatic and plugged into the global economy, was heavy with dollars and purse-proud. A measure of its power was experienced when it refused to cut production in 2014, during a demand slump and piled more hardship on Iran through tumbling prices. It funded the generals in Egypt and propped up a Pakistan that can’t say no, paralysed by terrorism.

 

 

 

 

© Provided by Indian Express A photo taken by an Indian expat of an airstrike in Sanaa. 



 

Pakistan is going to get into more trouble in Afghanistan unless it gets together with India to fight the post-withdrawal war there, which no one is going to win after the 3,00,000-strong Afghan National Army takes to its heels — and the Taliban, now anti-Pakistan, kills all the “empowered women” in Kabul and pushes millions more refugees into Pakistan.

 

 

India is now a bigger presence in Afghanistan than Pakistan, and the Afghans are clearly not too enamoured of Pakistan. Singly, India and Pakistan will both come to grief. But a mutually agreed upon plan of action against the Taliban can stop the Islamic State — which Afghan President Ashraf Ghani says is already in Afghanistan — from entering Pakistan on its way to India as the “Army of Khorasan”.

 

 

 

Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are equally important for South Asia. The GCC states give employment nearer home and are the only kinds of states that Muslims provisionally seem able to run well, if you can keep democracy away. If India and Pakistan act clever and coordinate their plan of action, they can benefit from the mushrooming manpower of South Asia.

 

 

 

The writer is consulting editor, ‘Newsweek Pakistan’