Showing posts with label RUSSIAN MILITARY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RUSSIAN MILITARY. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 8, 2015

Russian Nclear Submarines

Source
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/949.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2015/russia-150407-presstv01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1387%2eka0ao00b2h%2e19ur





                   Russian Nclear Submarines


Russian nuclear submarine catches fire at shipyard



 
 Apr 7, 2015

A Russian nuclear submarine has caught fire at a shipyard in Russia's northern province of Arkhangelsk, but there are no casualties or threats as the vessel was not carrying any nuclear fuel.
The 155-meter (508-feet) K-266 Orel (Eagle) submarine was being repaired at the Zvyozdochka shipyard in the city of Severodvinsk, located in the delta of the Northern Dvina River, on Tuesday, when the blaze broke out.


The conflagration started as welding works were being carried out, with rubber insulation catching fire, according to a report published by Russian TASS news agency.

The Russian Emergencies Ministry declined to comment on the fire at the Zvyozdochka shipyard.

Russia's United Shipbuilding Company, however, confirmed the incident, adding that nobody was hurt.


The submarine's nuclear reactor had reportedly been shut down before the blaze.

A spokesperson for Zvyozdochka shipyard, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Interfax news agency that there were no casualties, and all crew and workers left the craft in time.

"Nuclear fuel from the submarine was unloaded in 2013 before repair works began, and there is no weaponry on the craft," the spokesperson stated.


By late afternoon, firefighters had reportedly contained the blaze.

"The fire has been localized, there is no threat to the population or the environment," the spokesperson noted.

A similar fire at a nuclear submarine occurred in Russia in December 2011, when the K-84 Yekaterinburg of Delta-IV class caught fire during welding works in dry dock.

The blaze, which lasted for some 20 hours, left nine people injured after inhaling toxic fumes and caused dozens of millions of dollars worth of damage.

The incident nearly led to a nuclear disaster, even though Russian officials insisted the nuclear-powered submarine was not carrying atomic weapons at the time.





Further Reading



Project 949 Granit / Oscar I
Project 949A Antey / Oscar II

The Oscar-class nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarine, which displaces more than 18,000 tons when under water, is one of Russia's largest and most capable submarines. As with earlier cruise-missile submarine, the Oscar was designed primarily to attack American aircraft carrier battle groups. 


As with other Russian submarines, the Oscar features a double hull -- and inner pressure hull and an outer hydrodynamic hull, with eight inches of rubber between them to muffle sounds. American submarines have a single pressure hull, with additional hydrodynamic fairings, such as the cap that encloses the bow sonar dome. The 3.5 meter separation between the inner and outter hulls on the Oscar provides significant reserve buoyancy, and improved survivability against conventional torpedoes.


These large submarines are said to be slow to dive and maneuver, though they are credited with a submerged speed of about 30 knots - sufficient to keep pace with their targets. The improved Oscar II is about 10 meters longer than the Oscar I, possibly making room for a quieter propulsion system, and feature upgraded electronic systems. The Oscar II is also characterized by a substantially enlarged fin, which should improve underwater manueverability, as well as the substitution of the Oscar-I's four-bladed propeller with a [presumably] quiter seven-blade propeller.   The Oscars are rather poorly characterized in the open literature, with substantial discrepancies in reported submerged displacement [the upper estimates are probably closer to the mark] and maximum submerged speed [reportedly classified intelligence estimates have tended upward over time.   The submarine is equipped with two dozen SS-N-19 missiles with a range of 550-kilometers -- three times as many anti-ship cruise missiles as earlier Charlie and Echo II class submarines.  The missiles, which are launched while the submarine is submerged, are fired from tubes fixed at an angle of approximately 40 degrees. The tubes, arranged in two rows of twelve each, are covered by six hatches on each side of the sail, with each hatch covering a pair of tubes. The launchers are placed between the inner pressure hull and the outer hydrodynamic hull. The torpedo tubes fire both torpedoes and shorter range anti-ship missiles, and a combination of some two dozen weapons are carried.   The Project 949A submarines have a total of at least ten separate compartments, which can be sealed off from each other in the event of accidents. The compartments are numbered sequentially from fore to aft, with the two separate reactor compartments numbered V and V-bis [which is accounts for the fact that there are ten compartments, though the numbers only run through nine].  
    I - Torpedo room
    II - Control Room
    III - Combat stations and radio room
    IV - Living Quarters
    V and V-bis - Reactors
    VI - propulsion
    engineering
    VII - main propulsion turbines
    VIII - main propulsion
    turbines
    IX - electric motors

Access hatches are believed to be located in the 4th and 9th compartments. In common with the larger Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarine, the Oscar-class boats are reported to have an emergency crew escape capsule located in the sail. In the 1980s the Rubin Design Bureau was responsible for developing a number of third generation nuclear submarines with cruise missiles, including Projects 949 ("Granit", "Oscar I") and 949A ("Antey", "Oscar II"). The Bureau took the lead in using naval cruise missiles, designing the first cruise missile nuclear submarine -- Project 659 ("Echo I"), then Project 675 ("Echo II") and related modifications.

Operations

In 1994 an Oscar submarine conducted operations off the East Coast of the United States. In July 1997 when the Oscar II submarine K-442 Chelyabinsk [aka Pskov] shadowed several US aircraft carriers off Washington state. The Tomsk transitted to the Pacific under ice after being commissioned on 28 February 1997, and arrived at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy on 24 September 1998. This brought the Pacific Fleet class inventory to seven, with four others in the Northern Fleet. 


On 26 January 1998 a moored nuclear-powered Oscar II submarine suffered a cooling system accident. During routine tests aboard a cooling system pipe broke, releasing ammonia and nitrogen gas into the compartment. A total of 5 crew members were injured, one of whom, a Captain of the 3rd Rank, died two days later. The Oscar II submarine was reportedly the K-512 St.Georgy Pobeditel [formerly named Tomsk]. This eleventh unit of the 'Oscar II' SSGN class had been launched in July 1995 despite irregular materiel and component delivery problems. 


In February 1999 an Oscar-class submarine was observed monitoring a NATO exercise off the coast of Norway. In August 1999 NATO sonar detected the presence in Western Atlantic waters of a Russian Oscar class submarine belonging to the northern fleet, based in the Arctic ports. In the mid-1999 an Oscar II-class submarine sailed from northern Russia to the Mediterranean, the first Russian SSGN patrol in the Mediterranean in a decade. It then sailed on to areas off the eastern United States. In early September 1999 the crew of the Jose Maria Pastor, a fishing trawler registered in Almeria [southeastern Spain] reportedly snagged an Oscar submarine in its nets. The incident occured some 27 miles (50 kilometers) from the Tarifa coast (Cadiz Province), and continued for over half an hour before the submarine broke free. Another Oscar II deployed from the Russian Far East, sailing to the area around Hawaii before arriving in waters off San Diego by October 1999. It reportedly spent a week following the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis and the amphibious landing ship Essex.

















 

Russia's Unseen New Armata Battle Tank Captured on Camera

Source:
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russias-unseen-new-armata-battle-tank-captured-on-camera/518019.html






Published on Dec 13, 2014
 
Experimental Russian tank "Black Eagle" is based on the Soviet T-80 tank, as a result of extensive modernization
 


      [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIUmHTtEJpU]


Published on Jul 31, 2014
 
The film is about the continuity of Russian arms merchants Demidovs to the present day


         Tanks. Ural Character - the Movie Dmitry Rogozin  

        
                     Tanks. Ural character.


              The history of tank development.



                      The film, Dmitry Rogozin.







[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFxOu1aGvE0]

     


Russia's Unseen New Armata Battle Tank                Captured on Camera

                      The Moscow Times


Mar. 25 2015

military-informant.comRussia's brand-new T-14 Armata main battle tanks, covered in tarps and resting on a train carriage, are seen in Alabino.

 
Russia's brand-new T-14 Armata main battle tank, which is set to be officially unveiled to the public at a Victory Day parade on Red Square on May 9, has reportedly been sighted readying for the ceremonies outside Moscow.


Photos of tanks resembling the Armata tank design hit the Russian internet on Monday.

According to Russian military blog                               military-informant.com, which published the photos, the tanks, covered in tarps and resting on a train carriage, were gathering with other military units in Alabino, outside Moscow. There they will rehearse their movements for this year's Victory Day celebration, which marks 70 years since the defeat of Nazi Germany.


The Armata is part of a massive rearmament program costing hundreds of billions of dollars that aims to restore some of the military might Russia lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
A video taken from a cell phone and uploaded to YouTube on Monday shows what appears to be the Armata tank. The video shows a junction near the factory that produced the tank, Uralvagonzavod, and a tank testing range.














 


The tank's seven wheels give it away as an Armata. Russia's current tanks are all based on variations of old Soviet tank chassis designs and have six wheels.


Another recognizable feature is the long and boxy turret that resembles modern Western tank turret designs such as the U.S. M1 Abrahms and German Leopard 2. Older Russian tanks have more bulbous turrets.


The new tanks, officially designated the Armata T-14 main battle tank, is built on a chassis known as the Armata Universal Combat Platform. Armata will serve as a common base for a series of armored combat vehicles, according to manufacturer Uralvagonzavod.


The chassis will be used to develop new armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, and even a fully automated drone tank, the company has said. The common chassis will make production and maintenance easier and cheaper, according to Uralvagonzavod.

 
See also:
Student in Russia Builds 20-Ton Soviet Tank Out of Snow

British Embassy Tweets Diagram to Help Russia Spot Its Tanks in Ukraine

Kiev Says Russian Tanks Have Crossed Into Ukraine

























 

Monday, April 6, 2015

"Armata :- THE WORLD'S FIFTH GENERATION DEADLIEST TANK ?

Source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/putins-new-wunderwaffe-the-worlds-deadliest-tank/





 "Armata  :-

 THE WORLD'S  FIFTH GENERATION DEADLIEST TANK ?



QUANTUM  JUMP FROM SECOND GENERATION TANKS EXISTING IN THE WORLD TO FIFTH GENERATION IS BOUND TO CHANGE THE FUTURE BATTLE FIELDS & HOW THE BATTLES WILL BE FOUGHT

Putin’s New 'Wunderwaffe': The World’s Deadliest Tank?

                                       By

                          

 
 
 
 
 
Putin’s New 'Wunderwaffe': The World’s Deadliest Tank?
Image Credit: You Tube Still Shot

 Why tankers in the West should be worried about Moscow’s new armor.
 


Russia will display its newest tank during the Victory Day Parade in Moscow’s Red Square on May 9 this year. 20 units of the world’s first series-produced third generation main battle tank, designated T-14 and based upon the new “Armata” universal chassis system, have recently been delivered to the Russian Armed Forces for training purposes.


By 2020, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), the largest main battle tank manufacturer in the world, plans to produce 2,300 T-14 Armata models. According to media reports, large deliveries of the tank (around 500 per year) will start in 2017. In total, the Russian Land Forces are scheduled to receive a batch of 32 Armata main battle tanks this year.


The Russian military intends to replace 70 percent of its tank corps with the new tracked vehicle, replacing the older T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks – both of which were also produced by UVZ. The Russian military envisions the universal chassis system as a platform for as many as 13 different tracked vehicles, including a self-propelled artillery platform, an armored military engineering vehicle, and an armored personal carrier.


What are the tank’s technical specifications? According to the Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO) based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
The tank’s main armament is the 2A82 125-mm smoothbore cannon, capable of firing high-powered munitions,including armor-piercing discarding sabot, guided missile, shaped-charge, and other types of munitions. The T-14 is equipped with the Chelyabinsk A-85-3A X-diesel engine capable of producing up to 1500 hp. It also has a tank information control system (TICS) that monitors all assemblies and components, diagnoses malfunctions, and controls onboard systems.


The muzzle energy of the 2A82 123-mm smoothbore cannon is greater than that of the German Leopard-2 Rheinmetall 120 mm gun, according to media reports. The tank also boasts fully automated ammunition loading and completely computerized targeting systems.
The FSMO report continues:
The T-14 tank will be equipped with an adjustable suspension capable of adapting to varying relief, terrain type, and vehicle speed, resulting in increased speed while moving in columns, as well as over rugged terrain. The suspension system will also alleviate crew fatigue, while assisting the fire control system to deliver accurate fire while on the move.

The article also notes that, “[u]nlike previous Soviet/Russian vehicles, crew safety (survivability) and comfort appear to be a concern. The crew is in an armored capsule that is somewhat roomy compared to other Soviet/Russian tanks.”


According to RT, “the tank’s turret will also carry a 30 mm sub-caliber ranging gun to deal with various targets, including low-flying aerial targets, such as attack planes and helicopters. A 12.5 mm turret-mounted heavy machine gun is reportedly capable of taking out incoming projectiles, such as anti-tank missiles. It’s capable of neutralizing shells approaching at speeds of up to 3,000 meters per second.”

What makes Russia’s new main battle tank so special?


First, the active defense system deserves special attention. It is an individual anti-missile and anti-projectile tank defense system, supposedly capable of intercepting any type of anti-tank ammunition.
“It defends the vehicle from strikes, including those from the air. Thus, even the most modern Apache helicopter will not have a 100 percent chance of destroying a T-14 with its missiles. Active defense is situated along the entire perimeter of the turret at various levels, which ensures complete protection of the tank’s most important elements,” according to the FSMO report.


Second, the location of the crew is also quite unique for a Russian tank (as is the vehicles unmanned remotely controlled turret):
The crew of three men is located in an armored capsule in the forward portion of the hull. According to the specialists, the forward projection has multilayered, combined armor protection which can withstand a direct hit of any type of rounds which exist today, [including] sub-caliber and cumulative rounds.
The German weekly Der Stern notes about the T-14 Armata:

An absolutely new main battle tank is certainly not something most of the world’s exiting armies can boast about. The German Leopard-2 tank was developed 35 years ago, just like the American M1 Abrams. The existing versions of the western tanks feature many improvements, but the basic characteristics do not differ much from the original. The Armata is the first genuinely new [tank] construction since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
 
The Foreign Military Studies Office further underlines:

In order to appreciate the real design and technological breakthrough of the Russian tank builders, a rather recent, but classified story should be remembered. It turned out that it is more difficult to design and manufacture a truly new tank than a new aircraft. Fifth-generation fighters are already flying, but only second-generation tanks are in the inventories throughout the entire world. So the Armata will become the first series-produced third-generation tank (although there are those who will dare to list it as fifth generation).
 
Of course, all of these reports have to be taken with a grain of salt, and until the tank has been thoroughly examined in action, we will know very little about its genuine capabilities.

Saturday, March 21, 2015

The Russian Military

SOURCE:
http://www.cfr.org/russian-federation/russian-military/p33758




 

                                
The Russian Military

The Russian Military

Author: Jonathan Masters, Deputy Editor




Updated: March 20, 2015




Introduction
The Russian military suffered years of neglect after the Soviet collapse and no longer casts the shadow of a global superpower. However, the Russian armed forces are in the midst of a historic overhaul with significant consequences for Eurasian politics and security. Russian officials say the reforms are necessary to bring a Cold War-era military into the twenty-first century, but many Western analysts fear they will enable Moscow to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, often relying on force to coerce its weaker neighbors. Some say Russian interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014–2015—both former Soviet republics seeking closer ties to the West—demonstrate that President Vladimir Putin is prepared to use military might to reestablish Russian hegemony in its near abroad.

What are Russian conventional military capabilities?
Both in terms of troops and weapons, Russian conventional forces dwarf those of its Eastern European and Central Asian neighbors (see Table 1), many of which are relatively weak ex-Soviet republics closely allied with Moscow. Russia has a military pact with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, formed in 1992. Moscow also stations troops in the region: Armenia (3,300), Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (7,000), Moldova's separatist Transnistria region (1,500), Kyrgyzstan (500), Tajikistan (5,000), and Crimea (20,000).




Table 1
CSTO Conventional Military Data
 















As part of defense reforms, most Russian ground forces are to be professionalized and reorganized into formations of a few thousand troops for low- and medium-intensity conflicts. But for the foreseeable future many will remain one-year conscripts with limited training (military service is compulsory for Russian men aged eighteen to twenty-seven). The Airborne Assault Forces, which comprises about thirty-five thousand troops and whose commander answers directly to Putin, is Russia's elite crisis-reaction force. A Special Operations Command, also a reserve of Putin, was created in 2013 to manage special operators outside Russian borders.
Moscow is intent on remilitarizing its Arctic territory and is restoring Soviet-era airfields and ports to help protect important hydrocarbon resources and shipping lanes. (Russia has the world's largest fleet of icebreakers, which are regularly required to navigate these waters.) In late 2013, Putin ordered the creation of a new strategic military command in the Russian Arctic.


Figure 1

Russia Military Alliance Map




Meanwhile, rearmament has been slow, and much of the military's equipment remains decades old. The once formidable Soviet navy is now little more than a coastal protection force. All of the navy's large vessels, including its sole aircraft carrier, the non-nuclear Kuznetsov, are holdovers from the Cold War. (By comparison, the United States has ten nuclear carriers and builds several new warships each year.) While Russia plans to reestablish its "blue-water navy," analysts say it won't be able to produce a new fleet of large warships for at least a decade. The navy's immediate focus is building nuclear submarines and smaller surface vessels for coastal defense and sea lane protection.



The Russian air force remains the second-largest in the world, with approximately 2,500 aircraft in service, but most date from the 1980s. New variations of the Sukhoi Flanker, a multi-role fighter, are expected to serve as Russia's main combat aircraft for at least the next the decade. Meanwhile, Sukhoi is developing several more advanced warplanes, including a fifth-generation "stealth" fighter, the T-50. Russia does not yet operate armed drones, but military leaders say that research is underway. The current fleet of strategic bombers, which resumed regular patrols in 2007, is expected to fly for at least another twenty years, allowing designers ample time to develop replacements.

 
What are Russian nuclear capabilities and doctrine?
Russia's vast nuclear arsenal remains on par with the United States and is the country's only residual great power feature, according to military analysts. Moscow keeps about 1,500 strategic warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, and heavy bombers. These numbers comply with the so-called New START treaty, which came into force February 2011. Russia is also believed to have a few thousand nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are lower-yield munitions that can be deployed and used on the battlefield.


Russia leaned on its nuclear deterrent as its conventional force languished in the years after the Soviet collapse. In 2000, Moscow lowered its nuclear threshold, permitting the use of atomic weapons in response to conventional attacks that pose an existential threat. (By comparison, Soviet doctrine had reserved nuclear weapons for use only in retaliation for a nuclear attack.) The most recent military doctrine, approved in December 2014, reaffirmed the post-2000 policy.
Much of the Russian nuclear deterrent is being modernized: A new class of ballistic missile submarine is coming into service; some strategic bombers are being upgraded; and there are plans to replace all Soviet-era ICBMs over the next decade or so.
What is the Russian military budget?
At close to $90 billion for 2013, the Russian military budget has more than doubled over the last decade (see Figure 2), trailing only behind the United States ($640 billion) and China ($188 billion), according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (Data includes funding for armed services, paramilitary forces, military space activities, foreign military aid, and military R&D.)



Figure 2


But analysts say recent spending remains well below Soviet levels. Second, Russia still spends a fraction of what the United States and many of its allies spend per soldier. And third, high inflation rates in the defense industry as well as endemic corruption consume a large portion of newly allocated resources.


In 2015, Russia was about halfway through a ten-year $700 billion weapons modernization program, with priorities given to strategic nuclear weapons, fighter aircraft, ships and submarines, air defenses, communications, and intelligence. But defense spending is closely tied to global energy prices, which can fluctuate significantly. (Oil and gas account for more than half of Russia's federal revenues, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.) A roughly 50 percent plunge in oil prices from mid-2014 to early-2015, coupled with the rising costs of international sanctions, has forced Russia to consider major budget cuts, however Putin has thus far exempted defense spending.    


 
What prompted the reforms?
The five-day conflict with Georgia in August 2008 exposed major deficiencies, particularly in command-and-control systems, hardware, weaponry, and intelligence. Though ultimately successful, the operation confirmed that Russia's mass-mobilization military, where millions of conscripts could marshal to protect the motherland, remained outdated.
In the weeks after the conflict, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, a powerful reformer appointed by Putin, recommitted the military to a lengthy overhaul involving massive personnel cuts, rearmament, and reorganization into a professional force capable of responding quickly to acute crises.
What does Russia consider threats?
Russian leaders acknowledge that there is now little threat of a large-scale NATO land invasion—a top concern during the Cold War—but they repeatedly condemn the bloc's eastward expansion, including its plans to roll out a ballistic missile defense shield across Europe. The United States, which developed the system, says it is only designed to guard against limited missile attacks from "rogue" states like Iran, but Moscow believes the technology could be updated and may tip the strategic nuclear balance in favor of the United States. Furthermore, Putin and his military leaders frequently express concern with conventional precision weapons being developed by rivals.



Figure 3
NATO's Expanding Membership Map




Moscow also fears that Western powers are working covertly to undermine its interests in the region. Russian leaders believe the United States and its allies orchestrated the so-called color revolutions—a series of popular uprisings in former Soviet satellites in the early 2000s. "Russian foreign policy appears to be based on a combination of fears of popular protest and opposition to U.S. world hegemony, both of which are seen as threatening the Putin regime," writes Dmitry Gorenburg, an expert on the Russian military at CNA Corporation, a Virginia-based research institution.



Many Western and Russian analysts say Moscow's concerns with NATO divert attention away from more practical threats like those looming on Russia's southern periphery, including ethnic insurgencies in the North Caucasus region, weapons proliferation, and a potential resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
 
What are Russia's objectives in the region?
Military modernization will enable the world's largest country by far (and one of the most sparsely populated) to better defend its vast territory and national interests. But the conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia have aroused concerns about Putin's willingness to use military force to preserve Russia's traditional sphere of influence.


Shortly before annexing Crimea in March 2014, Putin said he would defend the rights of Russians abroad, and in April he referred to a large swath of Ukrainian territory as Novorossiya or New Russia, a term used by the Russian tsars. Some believe one of Putin's main objectives is to establish control over the entire northern coast of the Black Sea, connecting Russia in the east to Moldova in the west. "Mr. Putin may seek to create Novorossiya one slender slice at a time, thereby reducing his chances of massive confrontation with the West. An intermediate goal would be to connect Crimea by land to Russia," wrote regional specialists Hans Binnendijk and John E. Herbst in the New York Times.


Moscow has provided ethnic Russian insurgencies in eastern Ukraine with training, personnel, and heavy weapons. In November 2014, Russia acknowledged rebel elections in the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, a move that echoed its unilateral recognition of separatist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia after its conflict with Georgia in 2008. (Moscow provoked further international censure in late 2014 and early 2015, signing treaties to formally integrate the two breakaway Georgian regions with Russia.)



But Putin's assertiveness has come with a cost. The Group of Eight (now G7) cut Moscow out of its elite club in March 2014, and top Russian officials, banks, and businesses face an array of Western sanctions that may, along with slumping energy prices, push the economy into recession. The Russian military has also suffered: France has delayed delivery of two warships, and Ukraine has moved to end its extensive defense-industrial cooperation with Moscow.



Looking ahead, states that border Russia are chiefly concerned with its "hybrid warfare" capabilities, which by many accounts were deployed successfully in Crimea and to a lesser extent in Eastern Ukraine. The International Institute for Strategic Studies describes hybrid warfare as "the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure."


In an ominous move, Russia withdrew in March 2015 from the Joint Consultative Group on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The forum, which set national limits for the deployment of major weapons systems and heavy military equipment, was seen as a cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system.

 
What is NATO's strategy toward Russia?
NATO is fundamentally reassessing its defenses in Europe, particularly in the East. In early 2015, allies agreed to establish new command centers in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. The outposts, which are expected to open in 2016, will support a new rapid reaction force of about five thousand troops. In a major crisis, military leaders say that up to two more brigades, for a total NATO force of about thirty thousand, could be marshalled. "This will be the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since the end of the Cold War," Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said in January.


The United States has shored up NATO's air presence over Poland and the Baltic states, and other allies, including the UK, Germany, and Denmark, are providing reinforcements as well. In 2014, allied jets intercepted Russian warplanes more than four hundred times without altercation.


NATO members are also bolstering security collaboration with Ukraine, an alliance partner since 1994. But as a non-member, Ukraine remains outside of NATO's defense perimeter, and there are clear limits on how far it can be brought into institutional structures. The United States plans in April to send an armored brigade to train troops in western Ukraine on route clearance, counter-battery fire, and electronic warfare. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama's administration is considering providing Kiev with lethal, defensive weapons, but some Western European leaders worry this may escalate the conflict.


U.S. General Philip Breedlove, NATO's top commander, has stressed that military force alone will not shift the battle's momentum. "We don't want a war of grand proportions in Ukraine. We must find a diplomatic and political solution," he told Congress in February. "What is clear is that this is not getting better. It is getting worse every day."


In the longer term, some defense analysts believe the alliance should consider advancing membership to Finland and Sweden, two Partnership for Peace countries with a history of avoiding military alignment. (Nordic peers Denmark, Iceland, and Norway are charter NATO members.)

Additional Resources

In a series of blog posts, CNA's Dmitry Gorenburg examines Russian air, naval, and ground force capabilities.
 
This report from the Congressional Research Service discusses the role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in U.S. and Russian military strategy.

 
This CFR backgrounder provides an in-depth look at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its transformation in the wake of the Cold War.

 
This CFR backgrounder reviews the development of U.S. ballistic missile defense systems, assessing emerging threats from North Korea and Iran, as well as ongoing tensions with Russia.

More on this topic from CFR

 
  • Remarks Before the Russia 2+2 Meeting, August 2013 Speakers: John Kerry, Chuck Hagel, Distinguished Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Sergey V. Lavrov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, and Sergey Shoygu