Militiamen loyal to the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi sit on top of tanks in the southern city of Aden.(STR/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
While the al-Houthi movement struggles to manage multiple regional challenges to its north, its rise to power in Yemen is a setback for Saudi Arabia on its southern flank. After the fall of the Yemeni government, Riyadh will have to capitalize on the al-Houthis' need for political and financial support to re-establish its influence in the country. But because Iran is trying to fill that support gap, too, Yemen has become another battleground where the two sectarian rivals will struggle against one another.
Analysis
After being driven from the capital of Sanaa in September, Yemen's government is at war with itself. President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi issued a statement March 19 denouncing the airstrikes on his compound in the southern port city of Aden as an attempted military coup by forces loyal to his predecessor and one-time ally, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Earlier that day, soldiers and militiamen loyal to Hadi battled their way into Aden's airport and stormed a nearby military base, both of which were under the control of Gen. Abdel-Hafez al-Saqqaf, a Saleh loyalist. The infighting in Aden comes after Ansar Allah, the pro-Iranian Zaidi group led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, emerged as the single largest force in the country after taking over large swathes of territory in north and central Yemen. The al-Houthis represent a change in the balance of power in Yemen and even the Arabian Peninsula that has opened the door for Iran to become a major player in what was the exclusive domain of Saudi Arabia not too long ago.
The Rise of the al-Houthis
A number of factors facilitated the al-Houthis' power grab in Yemen. First, Saudi Arabia's attempts to manage the Yemeni government in the wake of Arab Spring protests did not go as planned. Saleh stepped down in favor of his one-time vice president, Hadi, but the move exacerbated intra-government fissures along tribal, ideological, political and military lines. By the time Hadi took over, Riyadh's method of playing the various Yemeni factions against each other had undermined the old system to the point where the al-Houthis could take advantage of and align enough tribes to push beyond its northern stronghold of Saada and make their way down into areas south of the capital. While Saudi Arabia has long meddled in Yemen and focused on combatting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Riyadh lost sight of developments in Yemen while focusing on other regional fights. Saudi Arabia has been trying to stem chaos in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, especially threats from transnational jihadist groups such as the Islamic State. It has also been occupied with supporting Bahrain's pro-Saudi Sunni monarchy as it faces a democratic uprising from its Shiite minority. It was not that Saudi Arabia was not paying attention to Yemen, but it was not expecting Iran to gain ground on its southern frontier via a movement that is not a traditional Shiite one and in fact is theologically closer to Sunni Islam. Also, Saudi Arabia did not do enough to prevent Saleh from returning to Sanaa, where he could plot against those he felt were responsible for his fall from power and execute his own return. His plotting weakened the Yemeni government and diminished its ability to combat the al-Houthi insurgency. Finally, it appears the al-Houthis have learned lessons from when theyclashed with Saudi border guards in 2009. Now the al-Houthis are taking caution to steer clear of any direct engagement with the Saudis along the border and have instead focused inward. They are consolidating the nascent power they have accumulated and are weakening groups that might resist them. The strategy appears to have worked. The Saudis have focused on the conflicts to their north and have not reacted aggressively to the power shift that has taken place in Yemen. Now it is too late to reverse course — at least in the short term. Riyadh lacks the military capabilities to directly intervene in the country and impose order like it did in Bahrain. Also, the different political factions they used to operate through by proxy do not have the same power they once did, making any efforts less effective. Even if it had the means to intervene, it is not entirely clear the Saudis would want to. The al-Houthis do not pose a major threat to Saudi Arabia; on the contrary, the rebels' control over north and central Yemen insulates Saudi Arabia from the chaos in other parts of the country and especially from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is a more immediate threat. The Saudis would rather have the al-Houthis on their southern border instead of a jihadist quasi-state that is hostile to them. While the Saudis would prefer not to have al-Houthi control of such a large piece of Yemen so close to their border, the situation seems to be the best outcome in a situation where all options are bad — as long as the al-Houthis do not start pushing northward.
Potential Border Incursions
Even if the al-Houthis decided to change course, Saudi Arabia would be able to defend itself. It already has a fence — though it is nothing more than a concrete-filled pipeline — with surveillance equipment in place along long stretches of the border. Nonetheless, Zaidi militiamen were able to penetrate the border in 2009, but they did not make it past the mountains. The Saudi military was able to contain them there and used airstrikes to eliminate them. The eastern part of the border in Hadramawt is open desert with little cover to conceal an incursion force. Surveillance aircraft can spot ground vehicles from long distances, and reaching a Saudi city or even a road would require traversing hundreds of miles of desert.
The west appears to be the only place where an incursion could have success because there are mountains, roads and people there. The area also happens to be adjacent to the al-Houthi stronghold of Saada. However, the Saudi military has enough capacity to deploy forces that outnumber al-Houthi fighters. Fighting could possibly last for a while, but in the end, the al-Houthis would not be able to withstand or break through the Saudis, who have artillery and air support.
Financial Aid Is Key
The biggest factor keeping the al-Houthis from antagonizing Saudi Arabia is their need for financial support. The country's poor financial and economic situation means the al-Houthis — or any other governing group for that matter — cannot maintain order in country without external assistance. Without long-term financial support, Yemen's water shortages could turn into a humanitarian crisis that draws in Saudi Arabia, creating the need for Sanaa and Riyadh to cooperate. The al-Houthis are aware of this, explaining why they have reached out to Riyadh to participate in indirect talks. While it would seem logical for the al-Houthis to seek more aid from Iran, they know that Tehran is not capable of matching Saudi aid, even if the West were to lift economic sanctions. Iran can provide military, intelligence, logistical, and political support, but it has little hard cash to offer. Besides, Iran is more than 1,950 kilometers (1,200 miles) from Yemen, while Saudi Arabia is just on its northern border. Saudi Arabia can also help the al-Houthis gain international recognition as the legitimate government of Yemen.
Implementing the Hezbollah Model
The al-Houthis find themselves in a situation fairly similar to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both groups are the biggest force in their respective countries, but they exist within political and demographic conditions that keep them from running their countries alone. Ansar Allah is trying to emulate Hezbollah in terms of getting other factions to work with it and form a government like the confessional democracy in Lebanon. Ansar Allah, however, is where Hezbollah was in the 1980s, and it will need time to translate its military prowess into political power. Also, the Saudis will try to prevent the group from going the route of Hezbollah. Unlike Lebanon, Yemen is not under Israeli occupation, and it does not have a neighbor like Syria that the Iranians can use as a conduit to nurture the al-Houthis.
Negotiating Yemen's Future With Iran
Saudi Arabia knows the threat is not pressing and has decided to abstain from any formal diplomatic talks with Yemen. Riyadh also knows Tehran wants to use the al-Houthis to gain a seat at the negotiating table and become a stakeholder in Yemen, so it is being cautious. Ultimately, serious geographic and political limitations prevent Tehran from undermining Riyadh in Yemen. Though the Saudis see the situation as ultimately favorable, they cannot become too comfortable and allow the al-Houthis to take hold in Sanaa. Riyadh must ensure that the opposition improves its position enough to sufficiently counter the al-Houthi movement. At the same time, Riyadh will need to engage Ansar Allah in talks at some point, especially while the opposition is weak from infighting — and jihadists reap benefits from the struggle. Many of Ansar Allah's opponents — including tribes, religious Sunni elements and members of the ousted government's security establishment — are open to cooperating with jihadist forces to fight the al-Houthis. The Salafists and jihadists are the most eager to engage in a sectarian battle because they see it as a way to enhance their position. Saudi Arabia cannot allow al Qaeda or the Islamic State to emerge as the most effective forces against Ansar Allah. In fact, the United States has already indicated that it will work with the al-Houthis to fight jihadists in Yemen, another sign of the shift in the United States' position in the Middle East. Washington sees Iran, Hezbollah and even the Syrian government — except for President Bashar al Assad — as partners in the fight against the Islamic State, a development Saudi Arabia feels threatened by. If the al-Houthis successfully consolidate their power in Yemen, the southern Saudi provinces of Jizan and Najran will become vulnerable to al-Houthi expansion in the long run because of the significant Shiite Ismaili populations that live there. Certainly the Iranians would welcome this outcome, influencing their support for the Zaidis.
The Saudis see the al-Houthis as a possible threat from Iran. How the Saudis engage with the group and try to put distance between them and Iran will be a key factor to watch. Nonetheless, Yemen's deteriorating security situation has created another Saudi-Iranian geopolitical struggle that will last for the foreseeable future.
Since Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the new Saudi king, domestic developments in Saudi Arabia have taken a rapid pace, as a result of which questions have arisen as to the foreign policy approach of the new Saudi monarch. King Salman is apparently attaching high importance to foreign policy of Saudi Arabia because the current versatility in the Middle East’s political sphere and the resultant security challenges have had no precedent since the end of the World War II. Under these conditions, even a small change in the policies of regional powers can have a profound effect on security and political trends in the region and may even lead to emergence and rise of new trends. As a result, following the ascension to the throne of King Salman and due to subsequent changes in the power structure of Saudi Arabia, active players in the Middle East as well as observers elsewhere expected changes in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and, at the same time, posed various questions in this regard.
Changes first started inside Saudi Arabia. Within a week after he came to power, King Salman issued 34 royal decrees. The extent of changes brought about by those decrees was unprecedented in contemporary history of Saudi Arabia in terms of speed and scope. Of course, it was habitual with Saudi kings to appoint those closest to them to key posts and power positions in a gradual manner. However, despite usual expectations, King Salman did not follow that gradual pattern. As a result of changes introduced by him, those close to Salman rapidly fortified their positions within the power structure of Saudi Arabia. These vast and speedy developments, gave rise to speculations about possible parallel changes in the country’s foreign policy. Assuming that the foreign policy is just an extension of domestic policies of a country, it would follow that expecting change in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy would be quite logical.
The most important change, whose signs have already appeared on the horizon, is an effort by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman to get his country rid of foreign policy approaches that had caused serious problems for Saudi Arabia during recent years. Those approaches had practically caused Saudi Arabia to lose needed dynamism in reacting to developments under versatile conditions that prevailed in the region. In other words, one of the priorities of King Salman’s foreign policy was to do away with self-imposed limitations in the area of foreign relations. As a result, changing the type of Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the regional affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood was put on the agenda. The conflict between the interests of Riyadh and the Muslim Brotherhood started right after the beginning of the Arab Spring and was mostly the result of Riyadh’s concern about increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood both within and in the surroundings of Saudi Arabia. Extended support lent by Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian army following the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Mohamed Morsi; intensification of differences between Riyadh and Ankara, Tunisia and the Palestinian resistance movement of Hamas; and near-complete severance of ties with al-Islah party in Yemen were major highlights of Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Muslim Brotherhood following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. On the whole, Riyadh was at odds with all organizational branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region and decided to support those regional regimes that opposed the Muslim Brotherhood. However, as compared to his predecessor, King Abdullah, Salman is more religious, more traditional and, on the whole, closer to the social realities of Saudi Arabia. In addition, it seems that previous rumors and speculations about his close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood have come true. The fact that he has let Tunisia’s Rashid al-Ghannushi to visit Saudi Arabia is a positive sign in this regard because the former Saudi king had twice rejected Ghannushi’s demand. Another signs was related to Saud al-Shuraim, one of the Imams of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, who had been banned from preaching because of his close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, under the new king, he was allowed to restart preaching. The third sign proving a détente between Riyadh and the Muslim Brotherhood was restoration of the passport of the Saudi cleric, Salman al-Ouda, who had been previously stripped of his passport. Above all, a recent visit to Saudi Arabia by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the type of welcome given to him and private talks with him as compared to his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was the most important sign of this change in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy orientation.
Simultaneity of Saudi visits by Erdogan and Sisi gave rise to some questions because given the fastidiousness of Riyadh in arranging such diplomatic exchanges, this development could not be taken as haphazard. In fact, by planning these simultaneous visits, Riyadh was sending out the message that it will no longer limit its diplomatic and security priorities to Egypt and will engage in serious interactions with Turkey as well. In other words, Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Turkey is changing, but this change does not necessarily mean that Riyadh is changing its approach to Egypt. Nonetheless, Saudi officials are well aware that such interactions with Turkey cannot be desirable to Cairo. Of course, this is not actually a source of concern for Saudi Arabia because they know that Cairo under the rule of Sisi needs Riyadh more than any time before. Saudi officials are well aware that Egypt has currently no choice, but to maintain special relations with Saudi Arabia and this situation will continue, at least, in medium term. Now, it is turn for Egypt to be bound by security and diplomatic priorities of Saudi Arabia. It is evident that Riyadh has changed its approach to Ankara. Saudis have apparently reached the conclusion that the optimal way for rivalry with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its influence in the Middle East is to get close to Erdogan’s Turkey. The positive attitude of King Salman toward the Muslim Brotherhood has been the key to restoration of relations between the two countries. Both countries have been losers of the Syrian war. In Iraq, they have been watching the rising power of the Islamic Republic and the war launched by the United States against the ISIS terrorist group. Moreover, when it comes to Hamas, Yemen and even Lebanon, they see themselves faced with the increasing power of Iran. In this way, short-term priorities of the two countries with regard to issues of the Middle East have made it easy to forecast a possible détente between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The only obstacle to such a détente was Riyadh’s animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been largely removed following the enthronement of King Salman. The warm welcome given to Erdogan and private talks between Salman and Erdogan as opposed to the unceremonious return of Sisi to Cairo were all telltale signs which proved that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are working toward convergence on certain regional issues. According to available information, the two countries have emphasized continuation of support for the Syrian opposition. On the other hand, a plan is already in gear to train the Syrian opposition in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It was due to these developments and positons that the Syrian opposition groups announced following the meeting between Erdogan and Salman that they have turned down a truce plan offered by the United Nations’ special envoy so Syria, Staffan de Mistura. In other words, the Syrian opposition has been inspired with new hope as it sees a new prospect for Syria’s developments in the light of the assistance that it is receiving from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Of course, Syria has been recently more of interest to Turkey than Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we should expect some sort of exchange of cooperation between the two countries in this regard. Yemen is the most important place where Turkey and Saudi Arabia can exchange reciprocal cooperation. Of course, no accurate reports have been published in this regard yet, but Saudi Arabia has been apparently resuming its support for al-Islah party. This development, considering Turkey’s special relations with this party, can form a connecting link to bolster cooperation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in various fields. On the whole, protecting Sisi’s Egypt is not on the top of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy priorities anymore. Getting closer to Turkey in a bid to deal with the new developments in Yemen as well as increasing support for the Syrian opposition are now the main components of new and emerging regional policy of Riyadh. The previous interaction between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Syria lacked a farsighted and strategic approach to regional developments as a result of which the ISIS was born, which is now posing a major threat to the entire Middle East region. The same story is being repeated in Yemen as Saudi Arabia is lending its support to certain currents in this country. It should be noted that the different and sometimes conflicting approaches taken by Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the past has so far wreaked havoc on both Syria and Iraq. We must wait and see what developments will take shape in the Middle East region as a result of the new round of the two countries’ cooperation on regional issues. A look to the past will tell us that one cannot expect establishment of more stability and security in the region. Sisi’s Egypt cannot join the new alliance formed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the near future, but certainly, it will not oppose that alliance either.
*Hassan Ahmadian PhD, Senior Researcher; IRI Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research (CSR)
Iran Review is a Tehran-based site that claims to be independent, non-governmental and non-partisan and representing scientific and professional approaches towards Iran’s political, economic, social, religious, and cultural affairs, its foreign policy, and regional and international issues within the framework of analysis and articles.
The latest news from Saudi Arabia is that 90-year-old King Abdullah is, in the words of the crown prince, “recovering from [his] illness.” That could be about right: The king went into a hospital in Riyadh on Dec. 31 and it takes about a week for antibiotics — the standard way to treat pneumonia, his declared ailment — to take effect.
But this is hardly a time to relax. The kingdom is a key member of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, whose fighters are testing its defenses, as a Jan. 5 attack along the Saudi-Iraqi border, which killed three Saudi border guards, showed. Also, Saudi Arabia should be a key player in the collapsing oil market, but is currently a powerless one, unable to stop the plunging price of oil but consoling itself that U.S. shale producers, as well as Russia and Iran, are probably finding the process even more painful.
Even if Abdullah suffers no health setbacks, the king is probably going to be out of the picture for a few weeks, dealing with the aftereffects of pneumonia. That is a big enough challenge. Until now he has been the top decision-maker, playing a personal role in sorting out the diplomatic squabble with neighboring Qatar, holding a summit with Jordan’s King Abdullah, and replacing six ministers in a cabinet reshuffle last month.
Will Abdullah allow Crown Prince Salman to take over that role in his absence? Probably not.
There are questions about whether Salman, despite his frenetic schedule of meetings and public events, is capable.
There are questions about whether Salman, despite his frenetic schedule of meetings and public events, is capable. As former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel wrote almost two years ago, the crown prince “has been reported to be increasingly ill … and often not up to the job.” A BBC analysis also noted unconfirmed reports that Salman “suffers health problems.”
A key question is the extent to which Abdullah will have a role in the palace politics over his successor, which are gathering pace. The prevailing view of commentators writing about the kingdom has been that, this time around, succession to the Saudi throne should be “smooth.” The caveats are about the future — concerns about the time after next that the desert kingdom has to choose a leader, rather than about how it will choose Abdullah’s successor.
It’s high time that conventional wisdom came under greater scrutiny. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s coming transition is unlikely to be smooth — although this is certainly the way the House of Saud will want it to appear.
The kingdom’s leadership is arguably actually at a crossroads, with two royal factions vying for preeminence. The outcome could produce a whole range of new faces in positions of power in Riyadh. This could emerge as a problem for Washington, as experienced hands could be replaced with merely ambitious ones. In these circumstances, King Abdullah’s likely legacy of a slightly cranky approach to progress — allowing for some marginalization of the more obscurantist clerics but always retaining a foot on the proverbial brake — could become a distant memory.
To understand why the coming succession battle will be so thorny, it’s important to understand the succession system that has operated in Saudi Arabia since its founding. All the main characters — King Abdullah himself, as well as Crown Prince Salman and Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin — are sons of the kingdom’s founder, King Abdulaziz, also known as Ibn Saud. When he died in 1953, Ibn Saud left a system in which the throne passed from son to younger son, rather than from father to son. All but a few of the original 35 sons of Ibn Saud who were still alive in 1953 have since died. Of those remaining — other than Abdullah himself, Salman, and Muqrin — all have been passed over for the throne. At 69 years old, Muqrin, the son of a Yemeni slave girl, is the youngest surviving son.
In essence, the struggle pits the Sudairis, the largest single group of full brothers among Ibn Saud’s sons, against the rest. Originally seven strong, the Sudairis all were born to the same mother, who came from the Sudairi tribe — hence their moniker, “the Sudairi Seven.” The group included some of Ibn Saudi’s most ambitious sons, and has dominated the House of Saud since the 1960s. King Fahd (died 2005), Crown Prince Sultan (died 2011), and Crown Prince Nayef (died 2012) were Sudairis, and older brothers of Crown Prince Salman. The remaining brothers are former Vice Minister of Defense Prince Abdulrahman, black sheep Prince Turki, and former Vice Minister of Interior Prince Ahmed.
The rise to prominence of King Abdullah — who was younger than Fahd, whom he succeeded, but older than Sultan — was achieved despite the best efforts of the Sudairis to thwart him. But since becoming king in 2005, Abdullah has had to accept three Sudairis as his crown prince: Sultan, then Nayef, and now Salman. With no full brothers of his own, he made alliances with other non-Sudairi princes to cement his authority. And crucially, he was also commander of the Saudi Arabia National Guard, the kingdom’s largest fighting force.
From a Western perspective, the way forward is for Abdullah to abdicate, Salman to be sidelined (there is a mechanism to declare the king or crown prince medically unfit), and for Muqrin to become king. From a Saudi point of view, however, this wouldn’t work.
Within the royal family, there is tremendous respect for ancestry, history, and the orderly transfer of power.
Within the royal family, there is tremendous respect for ancestry, history, and the orderly transfer of power. Even though Salman might not be up to the job, it’s politically very hard to for Saudi royals to push him aside: The princes hate any suggestion of dissension, which would then be visible to the wider world. The House of Saud was enormously embarrassed in the 1960s when Ibn Saud’s successor, King Saud, had to be pushed aside for demonstrable incompetence. Mere fecklessness is easier to paper over.
So, given Abdullah’s incapacity, Salman’s continuing ambition (or what instead may be his sons’ lust for power), and Muqrin’s apparent reluctance to raise his own profile to project leadership potential, it is easy to understand that many Saudis seem to think that the accession of Salman is inevitable. This logic would suggest that — again, not wanting to rock the boat too much — Salman would anoint Muqrin as his own crown prince.
But that’s not necessarily how Salman’s accession to the throne would play out. As king, he would be entitled to appoint his own crown prince. Yes, Abdullah created the job description of “deputy crown prince” and put Muqrin in the role — but that doesn’t guarantee Muqrin would be promoted.
Abdullah’s attempt to secure Muqrin an advance oath of allegiance from other senior princes was not unanimous. Salman could reverse Abdullah’s plans once he becomes king, perhaps appointing his previously passed-over full brother, Ahmed, as crown prince. However, that concentration of power may be more than the non-Sudairi princes would tolerate.
This still leaves open the question of where the throne goes after Muqrin: Once all of Ibn Saud’s sons are dead or incapacitated, which grandson of Ibn Saud will inherit the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? And given Saudi Arabia’s central role in the current challenges of the Middle East, is it enough that the succession be smooth — or should Washington and other Western capitals encourage the House of Saud to allow the prince with the greatest experience and leadership qualities to emerge on top?
There is at least one argument that should trump the institutional conservatism in the palaces of Riyadh: Given the regional threats in the Middle East, making a muddled decision on a leader now could threaten the future of the royal house itself.
Ian Bremmer<p> Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of the newly released Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World.< /p> | The Call |
Simon HendersonSimon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. | Argument |
Simon HendersonSimon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. | Argument
