The Singapore Mutiny of 1915 would have profound consequences for the future of Asia.
By
Joseph Hammond
for The Diplomat
Image Credit: REUTERS/Vivek Prakash
February 10, 2015
When Ismail Khan began shooting at a British Army lorry on a humid afternoon of February 15, 1915, few realized one of the most consequential events of World War I in Asia had just begun. This act signaled the start of a mutiny in which 850 soldiers of the 5th Light Infantry of the Indian Army rose up against their officers. Though the actual fighting was brief, the Singapore Mutiny was another nail in the coffin of the British Empire. The mutiny would also have important consequences for the nationalist history of India, the role of Japan in Southeast Asian politics, and Singapore’s security that resonate to this day. After seizing arms, groups of mutineers fanned out across the defenseless city. One group barged into the headquarters of the colorfully named Malay States Guides Mule Battery, a largely volunteer unit, and killed its officer. While some of the Malays were press-ganged into joining the mutineers others fled into the jungle. A British inquiry would later find this reaction “perhaps justifiable.” Another group of mutineers went to free a group of German POWs who were being held in the city. While a few of the Germans joined the mutiny, most – confused by the violence – balked. At the time Singapore was celebrating Chinese New Year, which meant that most of the city was caught off guard. For a moment the mutineers had control of Singapore within their grasp. Yet within two days the British had started to take back the city. This was in no small part thanks to important contributions from Britain’s wartime allies. Nearby French, Japanese and Russian warships responded to the crisis by steaming to Singapore and disembarking shore parties of armed sailors. To assist the British, Singapore’s Japanese Consul also raised 190 “special constables” who were promptly given British arms. A Japanese journalist writing a year later wondered if there was “significance to be attached to the fact that the flag of the Rising Sun was set up in the center of Singapore?” By coincidence, in 1942 Singapore would fall to Japanese forces on February 15, the 27th anniversary of the Singapore Mutiny. Some mutineers attempted to flee across to the Malay Peninsula. The Sultan of Jahore promptly dispatched his army to hunt them down. Others believed their best chance at escaping was to blend into Singapore’s multi-ethnic population. By May, all but a half a dozen mutineers had been accounted for. The mutiny had been suppressed at the cost of the lives of 47 British soldiers and civilians. The official enquiry held in the wake of the mutiny blamed a lack of discipline and poor leadership within the regiment as well as the agitation of the Ghadar Party. The Ghadar Party, founded by secular Indian nationalists in the United States and funded by Berlin, sought to achieve independence for India from British rule through rebellion. Ghadarists became part of a terrorist network that also included Irish Finnian agitators, and were linked to a number of terrorist attacks in British India as well as to the bombing of a munitions dump in the United States in 1916 that killed seven. Interestingly, the group’s activities are recognized today with holidays in several American cities. Nur Alam Shah, one of the leaders of the 1915 mutiny in Singapore, was exposed as a prominent Ghadarist during the subsequent trial of the mutineers. For some South Asian historians, the Singapore Mutiny is a sequel to the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny and an important milestone in the struggle for independence. The 5th Light infantry would be disbanded shortly after World War I after serving with the British Army in East Africa. Yet, Singapore would again be the site of another important rebellion involving colonial Indian troops. In 1942, the fall of Singapore, placed 40,000 Indian troops of whom nearly 30,000 would join the anti-British First Indian National Army (INA) under nationalist leader Mohan Singh. That army collapsed but, a second INA under Subas Chandra Bose joined Japanese forces during the Burmese campaign. During World War II, similar but smaller units of Indian soldiers were raised by both Germany and Italy from among Indian POWS. The Singapore Mutiny anticipated similar revolts involving colonial soldiers in Southeast Asia in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1920, a mutiny of several English and Irish soldiers in the Connaught Rangers in 1920 would also be linked to the influence of the Ghadar Party. In 1924, Philippine Scouts units staged a non-violent mutiny over their mistreatment by American colonial authorities. In 1930, the French crushed the Yên Bái mutiny, which like the Ghadarist-inspired Singapore Mutiny, involved both civilian rebels and colonial soldiers. The events of the Singapore Mutiny would have a lasting impact on Singapore itself. In August 1915 the British introduced a “Reserve Force and Civil Guard Ordinance” requiring compulsory military service for all Singaporean men between 15 and 55 years of age. The law was an early forerunner of independent Singapore’s own national service law, which was enacted in 1967. In an article marking the 20th anniversary of the mutiny, the Straits Times in 1935 described the mutineers as “merely dupes of conspirators elsewhere,” presumably a reference to the Ghadar Party. The fear that residents of Singapore could become “dupes of conspirators elsewhere” has been a perpetual fear within Singapore’s security establishment. During the Cold War, Singapore fostered a paranoid fear of communism that resulted in the imprisonment of agitator Chia Thye Poh the longest serving political prisoner of the 20th century. Today, Muslims and Hindus serving in Singapore’s military sometimes feel like they are viewed with suspicion. One young Singaporean, Moustafa (not his real name) spoke to The Diplomat in 2014. He complained that Muslims serving in the Singaporean military are routinely kept away from critical roles in air and naval units. “The Singaporean military continues to think of Muslims as a possible liability in a war with Malaysia or Indonesia. Yet we Muslims are proud Singaporeans.”
Still, in a dynamic society like Singapore there is always room for change. Sentosa Island, where Chia Thye Poh once served part of his long prison sentence in a one-room guard shack has been redeveloped into a resort and tourist attraction.
The thinking of its former prime minister has profoundly shaped Singapore’s foreign policy.
By
Ang Cheng Guan for The Diplomat
Image Credit: REUTERS/Tim Chong
March 04, 2015
The “Great Man Theory of History” most eloquently articulated by the Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle (1797-1881) is perhaps not very fashionable with historians today. It was Carlyle who penned the memorable quote – “the history of the world is but the biography of great men.” Carlyle might have exaggerated the role of great men and undervalued the social, economic and other forces that shaped his “heroes,” but I do not think we should completely disregard the importance and influence of certain individuals. Rather, a more nuanced approach is warranted. Indeed, as the American psychologist and philosopher William James argued in his October 1880 lecture to the Harvard Natural History Society, great men do have the capacity to influence and shape the thoughts of society. Thus, I believe it is not out of place to approach the study of Singapore’s foreign policy through the perspective of Lee Kuan Yew. According to S. Rajaratnam, the first and longest serving foreign minister of Singapore, Singapore’s foreign policy was shaped principally by him and Lee Kuan Yew, with contributions from Dr. Goh Keng Swee (the first defence and finance minister) when there were economic implications. Indeed, historians who have perused the archival documents, both in Singapore and abroad, would attest that it is impossible to re-construct the history of Singapore’s foreign policy without constant reference to Lee because he figures so prominently in most of the documents. Lee’s influence owed to both his strong character and longevity is without doubt. Rajaratnam died in 2006 at the age of 91 and Goh in 2010 at the age of 92. Both had been inactive politically for many years prior to their passing. Although he retired as prime minister in 1990, Lee assumed the position of senior minister and later minister mentor until 2011. Second-generation leaders like Goh Chok Tong (who became Singapore’s second prime minister) gained much from Lee’s “mentoring sessions” – usually over lunch. Goh recalled that the lunches were always “serious affairs,” where “we didn’t discuss light topics. It was always political… what was happening in the region and how (these events) would affect us.” In the words of another mentee, Lim Chee Onn (Minister and NTUC Secretary-General), Lee Kuan Yew “passed on a lot of his experience, his way of thinking, his way of analysis and of course, his own interpretations and assessments of situations. Not just the related facts, but also the way you look at things.” Indeed, Asad Latif in his 2009 book described Lee as still a guiding force in Singapore’s foreign policy. In explaining a state’s foreign policy, international relations scholars adopt what is described as “levels of analysis”: (a) the characteristics/mindset of the individual leaders (“agency”), (b) the state’s domestic political system (“structure”), (c) the external environment (“international context”), or some combination of the three. Here, I have chosen to focus on “agency,” in this case Lee Kuan Yew, and the intellectual assumptions underlying Singapore’s approach to world affairs under his leadership and guidance, rather than documenting the execution of foreign policy or diplomatic exchange – an explanation of the evolution of Singapore’s foreign policy rather than its application. Bearing in mind Raymond Aron’s dictum that strategic thought “draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment in history, from the problems which events pose,” Lee’s tenure as prime minister coincided with the period of the Cold War. His time as senior minister (a title that he assumed after stepping down as prime minister in November 1990) and minister mentor (August 2004-May 2011) fell rather neatly into the post-Cold War period. Anyone following Lee’s strategic thinking and its evolution from the 1950s, when he first embarked on a political career, to the present will discover that he had a very well developed sense of history and a dynamic grasp of geostrategic reality. As Alexander George noted, “… the way in which leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature of world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among states… The foreign policy of a nation addresses itself not to the external world, as is commonly stated, but rather to “the image of the external world” that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy.” As Lee is so influential in the making of Singapore’s foreign policy – indeed one cannot miss the echoes of Lee’s thinking in every single foreign policy speech and interview given by the second and third generation Singapore leadership – an understanding of his beliefs and premises is imperative for anyone interested in understanding and analyzing Singapore’s foreign policy, because they serve as “a prism” that shapes “his perceptions and diagnoses of international politics and also “provide norms, standards and guidelines” that influence Singapore’s choice of “strategy and tactics, structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action.” While much have been written about Lee and his leadership role in the development of Singapore, almost all have focused on his domestic policies and on issues of governance, with very little on his foreign policy thinking. This is somewhat surprising considering that Lee is generally acknowledged as Asia’s leading strategic thinker, one who does not flatter but “who is known, from time to time to, to speak bluntly,” and someone who helps “us find direction in a complicated world.” Former U.S. President Richard Nixon recalled Lee as one of the ablest leaders he had met, comparing him to Winston Churchill. The link between the two may appear on the surface tenuous. Yet in his political career, Lee would indeed become Churchillian in his own right, a “big man on a small stage,” a leader “who, in other times and places, might have attained the world stature of a Churchill, a Disraeli, or a Gladstone.” Even former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who did not share all of Lee’s views, particularly with regards to China, described him as “undoubtedly one of the twentieth century’s most accomplished practitioners of statecraft.” And former U.S. President Bill Clinton described Lee as “one of the wisest, most knowledgeable, most effective leader in any part of the world for the last 50 years.” Lee has been described as one “known for his outspoken views” and “one of Asia’s most candid commentators on regional and security issues.”In fact, Lee has indirectly given some advice on how to interpret his political speeches and related statements. In his speeches, talks and interviews, Lee said he needed to strike a balance between (a) “maintaining confidence and stability” with “the need to alert people” and (b) being polite and also truthful (“I have to be polite but also don’t want to be untruthful”). In an interview not long after the fall of Saigon, Lee said that any person in office in Southeast Asia, any minister, any person carrying responsibilities, had to weigh on the one hand, what he says for his internal and international audience so as not to shake confidence and, on the other hand, if he says that all was well when everything was not well, risk being discredited in a few weeks or months. Historians seeking to make use of Lee’s public statements to understand his thinking should bear this in mind. Pragmatist, Not Ideologue Lee had this uncanny ability to foresee the political trends that helped Singapore to be so nimble in the conduct of its foreign relations. On more than one occasion, Lee has said that he is not an ideologue but a pragmatist and that his thinking and worldview were not shaped by any particular theory but “the result of a gradual growing up from a child to adolescent to a young student to a mature adult.” In this sense, he is rather Lockean in affirming that knowledge comes from experience. In his conversation with Tom Plate, he said, “I am not great on philosophy and theories. I am interested in them, but my life is not guided by philosophy or theories, I get things done and leave others to extract the principles from my successful solutions. I do not work on a theory. Instead I ask: what will make this work?…So Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, I am not guided by them. I read them cursorily because I was not interested in philosophy as such. You may call me a ‘utilitarian’ or whatever. I am interested in what works.” In response to a question that his views were quite Darwinian, Lee’s reply was “it’s not quite Darwinian. It’s something that I’ve observed empirically. I didn’t start off with any theory. I didn’t start off with Edward Wilson. Wilson just gave me an intellectual basis and an example, but I’ve observed this.” Note that Lee did not deny that he held certain Darwinian views. It is worth noting the similarity of his March 24, 1965 speech and what he said in 2008-9 in reply to a question about the overarching framework which shapes his understanding of international relations: “It’s always been the same from time immemorial. A tribe wants more space, wants to take over the territory of other tribes, they fight and they expand. Even when it is part of them and they become a different unit, they still fight, for supremacy….” Bringing this to its logical conclusion, Lee predicts that by the 22nd century, China and the United States would either have to learn to co-exist or would destroy each other. Although Lee claims that he does not adhere to any theory or philosophy of foreign policy, and while he might not have started off with any theory in mind, his overall thinking does resemble that of a “soft realist.” Lee’s life-long preoccupation was the survival of Singapore. This was his perennial foreign policy challenge – How to “seize opportunities that come with changing circumstances or to get out of harm’s way.” In his view, to achieve this would require “a prime minister and a foreign minister who are able to discern future trends in the international political, security and economic environment and position ourselves (Singapore) bilaterally or multilaterally to grasp the opportunities ahead of others.” While foreign ministry officers or diplomats can give insightful recommendations, “it is ultimately the prime minister and other key ministers who decide on change in policies.” In his late 80s, Lee remained concerned “that a younger generation of Singaporeans no longer regarded his views with the same weight and relevance as older citizens who had rallied around him unwaveringly in the country’s tumultuous journey to nationhood.” He felt an urgent need to find a way to “engage” the younger generation. The result was a third book Hard Truths To Keep Singapore Going, culled from sixteen 16 lengthy interviews he gave between December 2008 and October 2009. The book adopted a question-and-answer format that presumably would appeal to younger readers. Two years later, in 2013 and in the 90th year of his life, Lee published One Man’s View of the World, his last book. Utilizing a hybrid of the narrative-interview approach, One Man’s View of the World brings his views on foreign affairs and global issues such as the international economy, energy and climate change up to-date. It is noteworthy that even before Singapore became independent, Lee Kuan Yew had formed a broad strategic outlook of international affairs, forged by his experience of the Japanese occupation during World War II, and his observation of the postwar developments and British response to the Cold War division of Europe and the formation of the U.S.-led military blocs to counter and contain the Soviet-led communist bloc. While Lee noted the positive impetus that the Soviet challenge to European imperialism gave to the decolonization of British and French colonies, particularly in South and Southeast Asia, he also saw how the nationalist struggle for independence in the colonies were driven by the competing appeals of communism and communalism. He was also keenly aware of how communal conflicts underpinned regional conflicts over disputed territory such as that of India-Pakistan. Psychological Dimension Lee was attuned to the psychological dimension of international events and big power politics, for example, the U.S. intervention in Indochina and the U.K. military withdrawal from east of Suez. He was prescient in projecting the shifting balance of power from a European-Western dominance of the period from the 1500s to the 1900s, to one in which China and India, and Asia in general, would become dominant once again in the 2lst century. By 1985, he already foresaw the rise of Asia in the 21st century, anticipated the inexorable rise of China, and to a lesser extent India, with the relative reduction of influence of the Western world. Lee was impressed by the realities of power behind the formalism in the United Nations and other international organizations and the importance of having the ability to enforce sanctions to uphold international law. He saw the need for small states to arrange relationships with bigger countries to ensure their independence and to exercise indirect influence. At the same time, he had a clear vision of the possibilities and limits of multilateral organizations such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization and Movement of Non-Aligned Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations. While acknowledging the need for Singapore to join these organizations to gain acceptance, Lee was realistic about their ability to protect and promote the interests of members against the efforts of the superpowers to divide and patronize them. He always stressed the need for Singapore to be nimble and alert to ensure that in any arrangement or shifts in the balance of power it had the preponderant force on its side. Lee was equally conscious of the important nexus between economics and politics. He addressed this issue as early as 1966 and did so again on various occasions throughout his political career. Many of his speeches and interviews particularly after the end of the Cold War were on the international political economy. He has also shown an interest in technological change and its implications for global politics. In the post-Cold war period, he has also addressed, albeit briefly, on non-traditional security issues such as climate change. Almost fifty years after his first speech (in March 1965) on the future of Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew has continued to espouse a clear vision of global trends and geostrategic developments in an ever-changing world. Starting from first principles, he saw the survival of small states like Singapore as being intertwined with the stability and well-being of their regional neighborhood and the dynamic balance and economic interaction of the global powers. Finally, Lee Kuan Yew has been very committed to the fundamentals of his philosophy of foreign policy. He has also been remarkably consistent in his views about the balance of power, the inter-relationship between economics and politics, and the role of the great powers in the international system. He certainly had the ability to sense change, for example, the need to cultivate the Americans when the British could no longer be counted on, or the rise of China. But for all the accolades that have been heaped on him, he professed that he did not know when he started his political life in the 1950s that he would be on the winning side of the Cold War and that Singapore would be what it is today – an implicit reminder of the role of contingency in the study of history, even though this essay has focused on the perception and role of one man. As Louis Halle said, “what the foreign policy of any nation addresses itself is the image of the external world in the minds of the people who determine the policy of that nation.” In the case of Singapore, it is surely the worldview of Lee Kuan Yew that has been most influential. Ang Cheng Guan is presently Head of Graduate Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is the author of numerous books, including Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought (London: Routledge, 2013). He is currently working on two book projects: Southeast Asia and the Cold War, 1945–1991: An International History and its sequel, Southeast Asia and the Post-Cold War: The First Thirty Years.
Lee Kuan Yew has died at the age of 91. Singapore's elder
statesman, he is widely viewed as the man who brought the city-state into the
modern era and turned it into a wealthy business hub. The BBC looks at how the
news of his death unfolded.
Lee Kuan Yew was admitted to hospital in early February with pneumonia and
was later placed on life support. In the early hours of Monday, a statement from
the prime minister's office confirmed his death.
The announcement was not unexpected. Mr Lee's condition had deteriorated in
recent days. People had begun leaving tributes and messages of support outside
the Singapore General Hospital, where he was being treated, and at a community
centre in his local constituency.
One of the first to offer his condolences was UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon. In a
statement, he described Mr Lee as a "legendary figure in Asia, widely
respected for his strong leadership and statesmanship".
Within hours, the Facebook
page of Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong - who is Lee Kuan Yew's
son - was flooded with messages of condolence. "Thank you Mr Lee Kuan Yew for
the Singapore we now have," wrote one man. "Don't worry. Singapore will continue
to do well, in the way you have worked hard all your life ensuring that," wrote
another. At the hospital, meanwhile, Lawrence Hee, 68, said: "I'm very sad. He
created Singapore."
Sayeed Hussain, 59, with his wife Sharmin, 44, son Sanerm, 13, and daughter
Samira, 16, came to the hospital as a family before the children went to school.
"He was a great leader and role model. He did a lot for us, helped to shape a
multi-racial and multi-cultural Singapore. We wanted to start our day with no
regrets so we came here to pay our respects," Mr Sayeed said.
In Washington, US President Barack Obama spoke of a "true giant of history
who will be remembered for generations to come as the father of modern Singapore
and as one the great strategists of Asian affairs". The two men met in
Washington DC in 2009. Other leaders, past and present, also paid tribute,
including former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.
As the sun rose, flags were lowered to half mast at government buildings,
including this one here at parliament. A state funeral is to be held on 29
March, the government said.
Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak - leader of the nation from which
Singapore was expelled 50 years ago - tweeted his condolences to Mr Lee's
son.
British Prime Minister David Cameron also released a statement, saying:
"[Former British PM] Lady [Margaret] Thatcher once said that there was no prime
minister she admired more than Mr Lee for 'the strength of his convictions, the
clarity of his views, the directness of his speech and his vision of the way
ahead'."
Phil Robertson of Human Rights Watch said Mr Lee's role in Singapore's
economic development was undeniable but came with a "significant cost to human
rights".
In
a statement on Facebook, the party Mr Lee founded - the People's Action
Party - praised his "incalculable contributions to Singapore". President Tony
Tan described
Mr Lee as "the architect of our modern republic". And in an emotional televised
address, Lee Hsien Loong - his son and the current prime minister - said: "We
won't see another man like him. To many Singaporeans, and indeed others too, Lee
Kuan Yew was Singapore."
Ong Choo Bee, 71, a clerk, visited a tribute area at Singapore General
Hospital. "I think we'll have to wait a few hundred years before Singapore can
have another leader like Lee Kuan Yew. But he's left a good legacy and a strong
government."
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was an ally of Lee Kuan Yew. "He
was not at all a charmer - he was not a flatterer. He had developed his point of
view. He would present it with great intelligence," he told the BBC.
Lee Kuan Yew forged strong ties with China, including a friendship with
leader Deng Xiaoping, and met successive presidents including Hu Jintao (below).
A Chinese
foreign ministry spokesman called him "a uniquely influential statesman in
Asia and a strategist boasting oriental values and international vision".
At the Istana, the prime minister's office, a steady stream of people arrived
bringing bouquets and condolence cards, reported the BBC's Tessa Wong. A tented
area has been set up for people to write messages and post them on boards. Some
of the well-wishers were in tears, others wore grim expressions.
"Dearest Mr Lee, you are our Superman. Superman never dies. Forever in your
debt," read one message. Another simply says: "Thank you for your contributions
to Singapore."
After midday, a hearse carrying Mr Lee's body arrived at the Istana. A period
of national mourning has been declared from 23-29 March and for several of those
days Mr Lee's body will lie in state at parliament house so the public can pay
their respects.
Singapore's main opposition Workers' Party turned its Facebook cover page black.
It was founded by JB Jeyaretnam, the city-state's first opposition MP who ended
up financially ruined because of court cases brought by the PAP. Its leader, Low
Thia Khiang, said
in a condolence letter that Mr Lee's death marked the end of an era in
Singapore's history.
Papers and broadcast media were dominated by his death. The Straits Times,
Singapore's leading daily, called Lee Kuan Yew the "man most instrumental in
shaping Singapore".
23 March 2015Last updated at 08:26
Singapore mourns founding father Lee Kuan Yew
Flowers, messages and other tributes are piling up
outside the hospital where Lee Kuan Yew died
Singapore has begun seven days of
national mourning following the death of its founding father, Lee Kuan Yew.
Mr Lee, who was 91, led Singapore's transformation from a small port city to
one of the wealthiest nations in the world. World leaders have paid tribute to Mr Lee, who served as the city-state's
prime minister for 31 years. US President Barack Obama described him as a "giant of history" whose advice
had been sought by other world leaders. The Chinese foreign ministry called him "a uniquely influential statesman in
Asia" and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said he was "deeply saddened" by Mr
Lee's death. The period of national mourning will culminate in a state funeral next Sunday
and Mr Lee's body is to lie in state at parliament from Wednesday to
Saturday. A private family wake is taking place on Monday and Tuesday. News of Mr Lee's death came in a government statement that said he had
"passed away peacefully" in the early hours of Monday at Singapore General
Hospital. Mr Lee had been in hospital for several weeks with pneumonia and was
on life support. State television broke away from its normal schedules and broadcast rolling
tributes.
Thousands are also expected to pay their respects at
the Istana, the prime minister's official home
A steady stream of Singaporeans, many openly grieving, arrived at the
hospital where an area has been set aside for flowers and other tributes. "I'm so sad. He is my idol. He's been so good to me, my family and everyone,"
said resident Lua Su Yean, 64. "His biggest achievement is that from zero he's built up today's
Singapore." A hearse carrying Mr Lee's body later arrived at the Istana, the prime
minister's official residence, where a book of condolence has been set up. In an emotional
televised address, Mr Lee's son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, paid
tribute to him. "He fought for our independence, built a nation where there was none, and
made us proud to be Singaporeans. We won't see another man like him." Lee Kuan Yew - widely known LKY - oversaw Singapore's independence from
Britain and separation from Malaysia and co-founded the People's Action Party
(PAP), which has governed Singapore since 1959.
Lee Kuan Yew on the role of the state
I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yes,
if I did not, had I not done that, we wouldn't be here today (National Day Rally
in 1986) In quotes: Lee Kuan
Yew
Mr Lee set about creating a highly educated work force fluent in English, and
reached out to foreign investors to turn Singapore into a manufacturing hub. He embarked on a programme of slum clearance, industrialisation and tackling
corruption. He was a fierce advocate of a multi-racial Singapore. However, Mr Lee also introduced tight controls, and one of his legacies was a
clampdown on the press - tight restrictions that remain in place today. Dissent - and political opponents - were ruthlessly quashed. Today, PAP
remains firmly in control. There are currently six opposition lawmakers in
parliament. Other measures, such as corporal punishment, a ban on chewing gum and the
government's foray into matchmaking for Singapore's brightest - to create
smarter babies - led to perceptions of excessive state interference. Mr Lee criticised what he saw as the overly liberal approach of the US and
the West, saying it had "come at the expense of orderly society".
My first collision with the peculiar majesty of Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore came in 1986 when, as a junior cog at Time magazine, I edited a story on his government’s alleged harassment of its minuscule opposition party.
Big mistake.
Lee’s press chief sent in a lengthy refutation. I trimmed it to fit on the letters-to-the-editor page, and sent the changes back for Lee’s approval. The prime minister, I was told, wanted the letter published in full. I dithered. Weeks passed. One day the government cut Time’s circulation in the island-state by 90% as punishment for having “engaged in the domestic politics of Singapore.” Soon I found myself at the Istana government center inquiring sheepishly about mending relations.
Lee would not see me. Nine months and much lost circulation and advertising revenue later, the circulation ban was quietly lifted.
Over many years and visits, I watched with admiration and anxiety as Lee built Singapore into the most prosperous, efficient, and quirkily repressive regime in Asia. “Disneyland with the death penalty,” as cyberpunk writer William Gibson labeled it. The press was muscled into docility, political opponents were sued into bankruptcy, human-rights activists were hustled into jail. Drug dealers were hanged, rowdy schoolboys flogged. But the corruption rampant elsewhere in Asia was virtually unknown in Singapore. People were afraid to talk about anything controversial, but the economy boomed and personal income hit US levels. Singapore became the country western journalists loved to hate and hated to leave.
Perhaps Singapore’s greatest attraction for us was Lee himself. Ethnic Chinese but English-speaking (he learned Mandarin Chinese only in his 30s), Cambridge-trained and street-educated, he worked for Singapore’s Japanese occupiers and dabbled in the black market during World War II. He consorted with underground communists during the Malay peninsula’s move toward independence from Britain, and, after Singapore separated from neighboring Malaysia in 1965, built the resource-poor island into a regional power through sheer force of will.
He was a thoughtful interview subject, particularly incisive on the need for a strong US presence in Asia. Also pleasant company, though loathe to suffer fools like me. When, at some function two decades ago, I proffered a compliment that he seemed to be unusually fit “for a man your age.” He scowled, turned on his heel and walked away.
Though mocked for his authoritarian streak, Lee was at heart a progressive social engineer. He believed in the perfectibility of mankind, and his Singapore was a bubbling laboratory of schemes both sound and silly. He banned jukeboxes, chewing gum and Playboy (his successors added tobacco advertising and e-cigarettes to the list). He raised civil service salaries to private-sector levels to attract top talent and discourage payoffs: cabinet ministers today make nearly $1 million a year, five times as much as their U.S. counterparts.
Worried about overpopulation in Singapore’s early days, Lee launched the “Stop at Two” campaign that included subsidies for vasectomies. When the program succeeded a bit too wildly, it was replaced by the “Three or More” campaign, with subsidies for having vasectomies reversed. To improve the local gene pool, the “Graduate Mothers Scheme” offered special incentives to would-be moms with college degrees (most of them ethnic Chinese, whose fertility rates lagged those of the other major ethnic group, Malays). When the government concluded that young people were not marrying in sufficient numbers, it introduced the “Romancing Singapore” campaign, which sponsored river cruises and other match-making events for singles.
Romance and Singapore are words not often heard together in that famously nonsense-free zone, but Lee was clearly a man of passion—for his country and especially his vision of it. So convinced was he of his rightness that opposition was deemed not just unpatriotic but, worse, stupid. Lee’s results speak for themselves, but he rarely missed an opportunity to do it for them. In frequent articles and books, he expounded on matters great and small—like the proper room temperature for sleeping (66 degrees Fahrenheit).
When, in 1998, he finished the first volume of his memoirs, The Singapore Story, I timidly inquired on Time’s behalf about serial rights. They were secured without fuss, and Lee even volunteered to sit for a chat in a hotel room near my Hong Kong office.
He was, as ever, worried about America’s commitment to Asia. He was also having trouble getting comfortable in his chair. An aide brought more cushions. “My rear end hurts,” he said. “Getting old isn’t fun.” I trimmed the 700-page book down to a 7,500-word excerpt, which depicted the early years of an impatient young man who knew what he wanted, and sent it off for his comment. This time, he found nothing to complain about.
The forthright and farsighted Cambridge-trained lawyer who transformed Singapore from a colonial entrepot in Southeast Asia to one of the world’s most important financial centers has died.
Lee Kuan Yew, the city-state’s founding prime minister and one of Asia’s most prominent statesmen, had been in the hospital on life support for several weeks, suffering from severe pneumonia. He was 91.
“The Prime Minister is deeply grieved to announce the passing of Mr Lee Kuan Yew, the founding Prime Minister of Singapore,” says a statement on the prime minister’s official website. “Mr Lee passed away peacefully at the Singapore General Hospital today at 3:18am.”
For much of his adult life, Lee dominated the politics of this small island nation, assembling the People’s Action Party (PAP) in 1951 and ensuring its control over Singapore for half-a-century and counting.
While Lee’s undeniable talents that propelled Singapore’s meteoric rise will define his legacy, the man sometimes described as Asia’s Henry Kissinger also leaves behind a country at the crossroads.
“We are at an inflection point,” his son and incumbent prime minister Lee Hsien Loong said in a 2013 speech, “Our society is more diverse, our economy is more mature, our political landscape is more contested.”
The Singapore that his father inherited and helped build when he was prime minister between 1959 and 1990 is now an entirely different country. And Lee’s passing could potentially trigger a shift in Singapore’s political and economic landscape.
Kampongs to casinos
Singapore was barely a shadow of the economic powerhouse that it is today when it was expelled from Malaysia and became an independent nation in 1965. After hundreds of years of colonial rule as part of “British Malaysia,” the island had been invaded by Japan in WWII and left in a shambles. Its population was a mix of traders, former indentured servants, escaped convicts and businessmen, who frequently clashed along economic and racial lines.
“…Singapore was doomed to live on the wits of its people,” The Economist (pdf) wrote of the separation, “They were not a promising mix.”
Instead of falling apart, though, Singapore thrived. Ramshackle single-storied houses in rural kampongs—Malay for villages—have now given way to an iconic glass and steel skyline complete with some of the world’s most profitable casinos where Asia’s second largest concentration of millionaires (after Qatar) can burn some cash.
This city-state of a little more than 715 square kilometers is now one of the richest countries on the planet, in terms of per capita GDP, with an economy entirely incommensurate for its tiny size.
And this ambitious growth trajectory was engineered under Lee’s close supervision. Bereft of any natural resources, a young prime minister pushed the island to develop key infrastructure, including a world-class port and an airport.
Alongside these projects, Lee focused on housing and jobs—Singapore’s preceding British overlords had other concerns—and established the foundations for the Housing Development Board (HDB) and the Economic Development Board (EDB).
The HDB transformed this swampy island into a first-rate, first-world metropolis, and helped pull Singaporeans—of Chinese, Malays and Indian descent—out of their ethnic enclaves and into carefully planned mixed townships. The EDB, meanwhile, slowly built up Singapore’s mix of industries and businesses, dodging recessions and crises to assemble an economy that could support a population swiftly moving out of poverty.
From a per capita GDP of about $500 in 1965, Lee’s administration raised it a staggering 2800% to $14,500 by 1991.
It came with a price, however: Little room for dissent, debate or a free press.
Yet, in under three decades, the little “red dot”—as a sneering Indonesian president once described Singapore—had become an unlikely Asian success story, with diplomatic clout that belied its size.
And Lee, the son of a Shell Oil storekeeper, established himself as a statesman of reckoning, having steered Singapore through the treacherous geopolitics of the East and the West.
“When Lee Kuan Yew speaks,” the introduction to a 2013 book on Lee observed, “presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and CEOs listen.”
Whither Singapore?
By the time Lee stepped down as prime minister in 1990—remaining “senior minister” till 2004, and “minister mentor” till 2011—Singapore’s remarkable turnaround under his leadership was indisputable. Instead, the question was whether it was sustainable.
And few understood that better than Lee himself. “Singapore cannot take its relevance for granted,” he said in a 2009 speech. “Singapore has to continually reconstruct itself and keep its relevance to the world and to create political and economic space. This is the economic imperative for Singapore.”
But Lee’s son, the current prime minister, has inherited an entirely different Singapore than what his father had to reinvent 50 years ago.
The once unshakeable political domination of the PAP is fraying. The general elections in 2011 was the worst ever for Lee’s party since independence in 1965, although the PAP remained in control of 81 out of 87 seats in parliament. Then, in 2013, the opposition wrested control of another seat in a by-election, with the widest margin in decades.
And the next general elections in 2017 will be a “a deadly serious fight,” the prime minister said last year, a far cry from the years between 1968 and 1981 when the PAP won every seat in every election.
The political downfall has been so extraordinary for a party once so completely in control that, after the 2013 by-election debacle, Singapore’s widely-respected former foreign minister, George Yeo, publicly wondered on Facebook: “Whither Singapore?”
Tightrope
Much of this electoral disgruntlement has to do with the widening income gap in Singapore, which is also the world’s most expensive city to live in. Despite the wave of prosperity that has washed over this city-state in recent decades, it has one of the highest Gini Coefficient—a measure for wealth inequality—in the developed world. Low income families in the country are struggling to make ends meet, even as the government is pouring more money into subsidies.
As ordinary Singaporeans falter, the success of better skilled immigrants—and their growing numbers—has increasingly caused friction, forcing the government to cut back on foreign workers.
Non-resident population growth (pdf), as a result, dropped to 2.9% in 2014, compared to 4% in 2013. Foreign employment growth also fell to 3% in 2014, from 5.9% in 2013.
That is unlikely to help an economy built on overseas talent, instead risking slowing it down precisely when the government could do with more money to share.
Still, resentment against immigration runs so deep in certain sections that Singaporeans staged a mass rally—a very rare event in a tightly-ruled country—in 2013 against a government paper that forecast rising numbers of foreign residents.
And that’s the tightrope that prime minister Lee—or whoever replaces him in 2017—must negotiate, seeking to balance sustained economic growth with the rising aspirations of this developed Asian country.
In his time, of course, Lee Kuan Yew made it all look rather easy.