Tuesday, August 16, 2016

Russian Build-Up In and Around Ukraine

SOURCE
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-build-and-around-ukraine-august-12-2016

Russian Build-Up In and Around Ukraine: Kathleen Weinberger

August 12, 2016

CLICK & OPEN THE 'PDF' FILE

An ongoing Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders may indicate preparations for conventional military conflict. It certainly marks a dramatic escalation of tensions that will have significant repercussions in Ukraine. Russia has deployed additional military forces and systems to Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern borders. Russian military activity around Ukraine has increased since May 2016 when Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the creation of three new divisions in the Western and Southern Military Districts. The current crisis escalated following August 8th when Russia accused Ukrainian special-forces of attempting to infiltrate Crimea on August 7th. Russia has used the allegation to engage in a rapid military buildup on the peninsula and in the separatist regions of Donbas. In a five-day period August 7-12th, Russia has deployed additional naval and air units, ground forces and military hardware, as well as the S-400 air defense system on August 12th. Russia also conducted provocative exercises in Transnistria on Ukraine’s western border. These new deployments constitute a significant expansion of Russia’s force projection capabilities and may signal preparations for a large-scale military conflict. Russia’s current force posture allows it to threaten or conduct military operations into Ukraine from multiple directions, increasing Ukraine’s vulnerability to Russian or Russia-backed separatist forces. It thereby compels the Ukrainian military to divide its own forces to address multiple threats. It has also predictably triggered Ukrainian military alerts and mobilizations, which will tax Ukraine’s finances and military capabilities and may also further weaken Ukraine’s fragile political situation.

Related posts:

July 19, 2016: “Moldova Warning: The Next Target for Russian Destabilization”

August 10, 2016: “Russia Posturing to Escalate Militarily in Ukraine Following Alleged Attack on Crimea”

August 11, 2016: “Military Escalation by Russia in Crimea Against Ukraine”

Why India Fails at Olympics?

SOURCE:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/other-sports/why-india-fails-at-olympics-chinese-media-thinks-it-knows-the-answer/story-8mGSL9gaQ1AMlYTNAUt1ZM.html?utm_source=LI&utm_medium=also-read

               Why India Fails at Olympics?

                           FIRST & ONLY PRINCIPLE

Winning Medals at Olympics is directly related to the NATIONAL INDEX of corruption. MEDAL TALLY AT OLYMPICS is inversely proportional to the index of corruption.Higher the index lower the tally of medals

INDIANS AS A NATION ARE PROFESSIONALLY DISHONEST in governance & MEDAL TALLY AT OLYMPICS IS A  DIRECT INDICATOR OF THE SAME

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                -VASUNDHRA

          [ https://youtu.be/guq717f0aXQ ]

Why India Fails at Olympics?
Chinese Media Thinks it has the Answer

Shooter Gagan Narang competes in the Men's 10m Air Rifle qualifying round at Rio Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. (PTI)

Why does India, which houses a sixth of the world’s population, inevitably figure at the end of the medal tally at the Olympics?
The Chinese state media has listed out the reasons it believes are behind the poor show. These are: lack of infrastructure, poor health, poverty, girls not being allowed to participate in sports, boys being coaxed into becoming doctors and engineers, the popularity of cricket over other sports, India’s fading hockey glory and lack of information about the Olympics in rural

In a spate of commentaries over the past week, the state-run media has explained to readers the reasons for India’s repeated failures at the world’s greatest sports event – there was no mockery or chest-thumping, just plain reasoning.

Full coverage: Rio Olympics

“India has 1,200,000,000 people, and is the second populous country following China. But India’s getting scarce medals in the Olympic Games. Why? Counting by population, India ranks the last in Olympic medal number, India got only six medals in the 2012 Olympics, while none were gold,” said an article on the website Toutiao.com.

“Counting the recent three (2004 Athens, 2008 Beijing, 2012 London) Olympics, if the medals were given equally to the whole population, India ranks last.”

It added: “Large gap between rich and poor has made it hard for the poor people even to make a living, let along saving the energy for sports practice. Adding that the government has only little investment on the sports infrastructure, the mass sports and competitive sports are both lagging behind in India.”

The lack of a sports culture in India has contributed to the lack of Olympic success, according to a piece on the website Chinanews.com.

“The Indian culture has hindered local sports development. Most families want their children to become doctors or accountants. Sports talents would be persuaded by family and even neighbours, stopping them from taking part in high-level competitions,” the article said.

“Besides, a large portion of the population is from lower castes and such people hardly get chance for education and suffer from lack of sufficient nutrition.”

Information about the Olympics in rural areas of India is key to success at the event, wrote the official website ChinaPolitics.org.

“Researchers have investigated in rural areas in Karnataka and Rajasthan. They asked villagers about the best job they ever heard of in the past decade. In Rajasthan, the answer of more than 300 villagers showed software engineer, architecture engineer, doctor, lawyer and in some villages teachers or soldiers. There was not much difference in Karnataka, which had a better economy,” the website said.

There was no mention of sports, forget Olympics.
And, then cricket.
“Cricket is the national sport of India. Indians love it so much that it has been religion-like. In India, those who don’t like cricket could be regarded as pagan. Because of this, many young people don’t have the courage to receive other sports training. Indians love cricket and are proficient at it, but sadly, cricket is not among the Olympic events, Indians can’t win a gold medal with it,” was Toutiao.com’s succinct explanation.

The reasons behind China’s success at the Olympics: The commentaries did not specify but possibly the reasons are the exact opposite of why India fails.

Tags

Olympics

Chinese state media

India's lack of success at Olympics

India at Olympics

Sino-India ties

Monday, August 15, 2016

PIRACY : BEFORE THE SOMALI THREAT: PIRACY IN THE ANCIENT INDIAN OCEAN

SOURCE:
The Journal Hakluyt Society
ociety

14

BEFORE THE SOMALI THREAT:                                       PIRACY
   IN THE ANCIENT INDIAN OCEAN
            Pierre Schneider
GOOGLE/CLICK TO READ THE 'PDF' FILE http://www.hakluyt.com/PDF/Schneider_piracy.pdf

ISLAM : CALIPH - Caliph خَليفة

SOURCE:

http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2016/the-caliph-islamic-history/

Caliph خَليفة‎

(n) Arabic word for successor or deputy.

For almost 13 centuries, from the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 to the overthrow of the last Ottoman caliph in 1924, the Islamic world was ruled by a caliph.

Translated from the Arabic ‘Khalifa’, the word ‘caliph’ means successor or deputy.
The caliph was considered the successor to the Prophet Muhammad.

It is a term that has, at times, been abused.

In June 2014, an armed group calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (known as ISIL or ISIS) declared the establishment of a caliphate and proclaimed its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a caliph. This proclamation was rejected by the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims.

ISIL had attempted to appropriate a title imbued with religious and political significance – and in doing so had cast a dark shadow over a rich history.

This is the story of the caliph, a title that originated 1,400 years ago and that spanned one of the greatest empires the world has ever known.

Watch part one of the three-part documentary series

WATCH PART TWO

WATCH PART THREE

FURTHER PRODUCTION HAS BEEN STOPPED BY ALJAZEERA FOR THE REASONS BEST KNOWN TO THEM

Saturday, August 13, 2016

OROP : FIRST ANNIVERSARY TURNING POINT

SOURCE :
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2015/08/orop-arrival-of-jesus-christ-truth-at.html

                                                   VETERAN'S DAY

                                                   TURNING POINT

FIRST ANNIVERSARY

14 AUGUST 2016

JANTAR MANTAR 2015

Colonel Pushpendra Singh and
Hawaldar Major Singh

IN MEMORY OF मेरे मेरे बिछड़े हुए दिन

7 CPC : BHAINSE KE AAGE 'BEEN BAJANA'

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/unhappy-with-7th-pay-panel-armed-forces-write-to-modi/280005.html

BHAINSE KE AAGE 'BEEN BAJANA'

BHAINSE KE AAGE 'BEEN BAJANA'

Published on Aug 7, 2016

On We The People, we look at the 7th Pay Commission recommendations which puts police and forest service at par with IAS, leaving military out in the cold. How seriously should government pay attention to the disquiet within the military over pay disparities? Can it damage and rupture the larger military-civilian relationship? We also speak to chairman of the commission Justice AK Mathur.

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S4vNgSFzDkc]

UNHAPPY WITH 7TH PAY PANEL, ARMED FORCES WRITE TO MODI

Ajay Banerjee

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, August 12

A letter from the services to Modi and Parrikar seeking better wages is not unprecedented. PTI file photo

Ajay Banerjee

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, August 12

Seeking a quick redress against shortcomings of the 7th Central Pay Commission (CPC), the three armed services — The Army, IAF and the Navy — have collectively written to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has not issued the notification in regard to enhanced pay like other Central Government employees, who will get higher wages from September 1. The notification has been held up as issues raised by the three services are being considered.

The three forces have recently sent a collective letter through the office of the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) – the CoSC being the senior most among the Chiefs of the three services. Air Chief Marshall Arup Raha, the IAF Chief, is the present CoSC.

A letter from the services to Modi and Parrikar seeking better wages is not unprecedented. After the Sixth Pay Commission, the services had faced a similar “lowering of status”. The then CoSC, Admiral Sureesh Mehta (now retired) had shot off a letter to the UPA-I regime. A high-powered committee was set up in 2008 under Pranab Mukerjee (then a minister in Manmohan Singh’s Cabinet) to study the matter.

The services, in their letter, have pointed out four key issues that need to be addressed and lift the morale of the forces.

The first is how the salaries of the service officers have been “artificially suppressed”. The formula applied for basic pay fixation is different than the one applied to other Central Government employees. As a result, in each rank the service officers have ended up being lower in pay scales.

In the government, facilities like car, housing, or sanctions for air travel depend upon the basic pay.

The second is the non-acceptance of the demand for non-functional upgrade (NFU). After the last pay commission (the sixth), the government allowed “non-functional scale upgradation” and allowed Group-A officers to get the same scale as a Joint Secretary, but after 24 years of service.

Strangely, the armed forces are neither classified as group “A” services nor are they termed as “Central services” like the IAS or the IPS and did not get NFU. Now, with others getting NFU the gap gets widened.
The third issue is higher military service pay (MSP) for junior commissioned officers (JCOs). They rise from the lower ranks (jawans). The 7th CPC has clubbed the MSP of JCOs and jawans at Rs 5,200. The demand is to have it at Rs 10,000 for the JCOs. The MSP for officers between Lieutenant-rank and Brigadier-rank is common at Rs 15,500.

The fourth main issue is lowering of disability pension. As per the new formula, okayed by the 7th CPC, soldiers/officers with 100 per cent disability will see their pensions reduced from the current levels. However, in case of the disabled of other services their perks will rise.

In March this year, the MoD had conveyed to an empowered committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary that the status, pay and allowances of the armed forces be kept above all other “fighting” arms of the government. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had also taken up the case that issues of status, pay and allowances for the forces have to be paramount.

RELATED VIDEOS

[https://youtu.be/z2uFqCY2pBc]

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZiU2fgFiRBQ ]

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2uFqCY2pBc]

Friday, August 12, 2016

NUKES :THE NUCLEAR MISSION MUST STAY MANNED

SOURCE
http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-mission-must-stay-manned9768

                                                                  20YY
                       PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE                         ROBOTIC AGE

GOOGLE/CLICK THE URL TO OPEN pdf FILE

PREPARING FOR ROBOTIC WAR

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_20YY_WorkBrimley.pdf

PART-1

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_RoboticsOnTheBattlefield_Scharre.pdf

PART-2

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf

                      NUKES :THE NUCLEAR MISSION                     MUST STAY MANNED

Opinion

9 August 2016

The nuclear mission must stay manned

Alexander Velez-Green

Alexander Velez-Green is a research assistant with the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program and 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at the Center...

A lot of things can and should be automated

—but nuclear bombers are not one of them.

Unfortunately, it’s not clear that Moscow agrees. Reports surfaced in July that Russia has begun development of a hypersonic nuclear bomber that can deliver nuclear strikes from outer space. Unnamed officials quoted in the semi-official Russian news organ Pravda say that the bomber will have an unmanned variant. Their statement has not been confirmed, but the idea that Russia would pursue an unmanned nuclear bomber is not new. The commander of Russia’s long-range aviation fleet, Lt. Gen. Anatoly Zhikharev, stated in 2012 that Russia was considering developing a “pilotless” sixth-generation nuclear bomber.

While it’s too soon to know for sure whether or not the new Russian bomber will be unmanned, it’s apparent that Russian military officials have been considering that option for some time. And Russian policymakers have made no public promises that the nuclear mission would only be carried out by a manned version of the bomber.

This development is deeply concerning. Deploying a highly autonomous unmanned nuclear bomber would significantly raise the risk of inadvertent or uncontrolled nuclear war. As the world prepares for war in the robotic age, the United States must take steps to ensure that the nuclear mission remains manned.

An unmanned nuclear bomber?

The announcement from July of this year leaves much room for skepticism. One thing that should not be taken lightly, however, is the possibility that future Russian nuclear bombers may come with unmanned variants. The recent statement that Russia’s latest bomber will be capable of being unmanned has not been confirmed, but it would align strongly with influential Russian military strategists’ emphasis in recent years on the need for the Russian military to embrace unmanned and autonomous military systems in order to win future wars.

There are plenty of reasons why Russian military thinkers might consider de-manning their nuclear bomber. Most boil down to one thing: Russian policymakers think that having an unmanned nuclear bomber might one day be useful, if not necessary, to protect their country. Looking at the future air and space operating environments, they foresee the possibility that rapidly-improving enemy air and space defenses will make it impossible for manned aircraft—or small numbers of unmanned aircraft, for that matter—to get in range of their targets. To launch nuclear strikes from air or space, then, they might need to use large swarms of robotic systems capable of autonomously navigating to the target; evading or defeating any US and NATO countermeasures they encounter on the way; and releasing their nuclear payloads against previously designated targets. Given Moscow’s history of automating nuclear strike platforms, this calculus has clear precedent.

The problem with autonomy.

Assigning the nuclear mission to highly autonomous, unmanned bombers would create an unprecedented risk of inadvertent or uncontrolled nuclear war between the United States and Russia. No matter their sophistication, autonomous systems can behave unexpectedly for a wide variety of reasons, including system malfunction; unanticipated interaction with the air, space, or cyber environments; or hacking by the enemy.

This creates two types of vulnerabilities when it comes to a nuclear bomber. The first is located early in the kill chain—the series of steps taken to find and ultimately destroy the enemy—at the point where the unmanned system is ordered to begin a nuclear strike mission. Due to any of these unexpected inputs, the unmanned bomber could initiate a nuclear strike mission completely against the will of its earthbound operators.

The second vulnerability is located near the end of the kill chain, where the bomber would launch its ordnance at pre designated targets. A frightening number of unforeseen inputs could cause the unmanned system’s original target coordinates to be scrambled or replaced. This could lead it to launch nuclear weapons at targets that were previously off-limits, like major cities.

Having a pilot onboard would create a “human circuit breaker” that could intercede to manually halt operations if something went awry, such as if orders were received to launch a nuclear strike during peacetime, or to hit civilian centers early on in a limited nuclear war. Soviet colonel Stanislav Petrov played this role in 1983 when the sun’s reflection off of the tops of clouds caused an automated early warning system to falsely report that the United States had launched a nuclear attack on Russia. Without a pilot, the bomber would be quite vulnerable to such manipulation.

It may be possible to design automated fail-safes for these systems. But automated fail-safes would be vulnerable to the same types of failures due to technical malfunction, environmental triggers, or hacking. And, depending on when and how the aircraft’s fail-safe engaged—for instance, if it kicked in after the bomber had already begun its final approach on to a target—it may be too late to prevent the defender from initiating its own retaliation sequence.

The potential ramifications of such unexpected behavior would be quite severe indeed. An unauthorized nuclear first-strike by an unmanned bomber would almost certainly trigger retaliation, rapidly forcing the United States and Russia down a path towards nuclear war. A similar effect would occur if a limited nuclear war were ongoing and an unmanned system struck a site beyond the designated set of targets, leading to unintentional escalation. And the potential for a third party to hijack an unmanned bomber in order to trigger nuclear war between the United States and Russia is increasingly real, particularly as advanced cyber capabilities become available to a greater number of state and non-state actors.

Keep the nuclear mission manned.

Russian readers might receive this criticism with indignation and point out that the United States hasn’t firmly rejected the possibility of de-manning the nuclear mission either—and they’d be right. Indeed, the US Air Force has offered only ambiguous language on this point, suggesting that it is keeping its options open to de-man nuclear strike assets in the future. This is particularly concerning, given reports that the US Air Force is considering designing an unmanned variant of its own nuclear bomber—the Long-Range Strike Bomber—in the coming years.

But the United States is not immune to the same vulnerabilities that would imperil a Russian unmanned nuclear bomber. For example, it remains unknown why the US RQ-170 stealth drone went down in Iran in 2011. But there have been claims that it was brought down by enemy hacking —something that could not have happened with a pilot onboard. What if the RQ-170 had been a US unmanned nuclear bomber on patrol?

The truth is that no state is immune to the vulnerabilities inherent to autonomous systems—vulnerabilities that would dramatically undermine the reliability of the bomber leg of the nuclear triad. Now is the time to avoid needless catastrophe and set the precedent that the nuclear mission must remain manned during the robotic age.

The United States should clearly and unequivocally reject the possibility of using unmanned nuclear strike assets. It should state forcefully that no potential operational benefits afforded by an unmanned nuclear bomber could outweigh the potential costs of a nuclear conflict driven by the unexpected behavior of a highly autonomous unmanned system. The Defense Department should focus instead on developing ways to penetrate enemy air defenses using manned nuclear bombers, perhaps escorted by highly autonomous, unmanned wingmen.

Washington should then engage Moscow directly on these points. Its objective should be to secure Russia’s entry into an international agreement banning the automation of nuclear strike assets. The agreement should be premised on a mutual understanding of the risks of automating the nuclear mission and confidence-building measures assuring each state of the other’s continued adherence to the agreement.

And the United States should not stop there. With Russia and other partners’ support, the United States should lead arms control negotiations with China, India, Pakistan, and other nuclear-armed states to craft an international agreement prohibiting the de-manning of the nuclear mission. These talks will undoubtedly face significant hurdles, not the least when it comes to defining “autonomy.” But with the automation of nuclear strike assets just over the technical horizon, these discussions must begin now. If the world’s nuclear-armed states wait for real-world events to demonstrate the folly of integrating greater autonomy into their nuclear strike assets, it may be too late.